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Precis
Sir Garfield Barwick and the Commonwealth 
Constitution were closely associated for some forty 
years. This thesis examines Barwick's contribution, 
as counsel and as Chief Justice of the High Court, 
to the exegesis of the Constitution.
The thesis commences by outlining the doctrinal 
basis for the High Court 's position as interpreter 
of the Commonwealth Constitution and for its place 
in the distribution of governmental power. Then 
Barwick's involvement in the major constitutional 
issues of Federal Parliament, Commonwealth 
legislative power, Commonwealth spending power, 
intergovernmental immunity, section 90's denial of 
power to the States to levy excise duties and s92's 
declaration of freedom for inter-State trade is 
examined in depth.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth Constitution was enacted as section 9 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, an Act of the Imperial 
Parliament. The problems of the Commonwealth Constitution are 
therefore, problems of statutory interpretation and application. The 
Constitution is of course an unusual statute. It is expressed in 
general and imprecise language, it is difficult to amend and it has as 
its subject matter, the division of governmental power within 
Australia.
The Constitution's generality and imprecision allow, even demand 
that judicial choice be made in selecting from a range of possible 
constructions and/or implications. The difficulty of amending the 
Constitution means that the main source of change in constitutional 
law is change in the Judiciary’s interpretation and application of the 
Constitution. The governmental subject matter of the Constitution 
means that beneath the constructional issues are powerful 
undercurrents. Principles and perceptions of national union and need, 
State autonomy, Parliamentary sovereignty, responsible government, 
democracy, separation of powers, constitutionality, stare decisis and 
individual liberty tug in their various directions.^- The 
undercurrents inherent in the fact that the document deals with 
government become a positive turmoil when one adds to them the 
undercurrents inherent in the analytical frameworks, philosophies, 
values and idiosyncracies of the human beings, the judges, who decide 
what the Constitution means for the purposes of settling a dispute 
between specific parties about specific government action.
The Constitution of the Commonwealth came into operation in 1901. 
Garfield Edward John Barwick was born in 1903. Unlike the 
Commonwealth, however, Barwick did not spring fully armed and of full 
stature from the brain of his begetters. There were about forty 
years of precedents in the reports before Barwick was of sufficient
1 One of the most lucid discussions of the nature of the problem of 
interpreting the Constitution is provided by LJM Cooray in the 
first 16 pages of his book, Convention, The Australian 
Constitution and the Future.
2 Apologies to Sir Owen Dixon. See p. 191.
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stature as a barrister to be involved in constitutional litigation.
The first reported case I can discover involving Barwick in a 
constitutional case in the High Court is the 1938 case of R v Federal 
Court of Bankruptcy; Ex p Lowenstein.  ^He does not seem to have had 
another such appearance until the later years of the second world 
war. When he took silk in 1941 at the age of 38 his involvement in 
constitutional law was only just beginning. From the middle of the 
1940's, however, until the end of the 1950's when he entered Federal 
Parliament as a Liberal member of the coalition government, Barwick 
was involved as counsel in almost every High Court and Privy Council 
case raising a significant constitutional issue. Barwick was 
Commonwealth Attorney-General from 1961 until his appointment to 
succeed Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice of the High Court in 1964.
Barwick was Chief Justice from 1964 to 1981, a record period for Chief
Justice of the High Court. In those different capacities then,
Barwick was closely associated with the issues of constitutional
interpretation and application, from the end of World War II to the 
start of the 1980's, a period of almost forty years covering half the 
life of the federation.
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine Sir Garfield Barwick's 
approach to significant constitutional issues. I examine Barwick's 
approach both as counsel and judge but acknowledge immediately that 
the submissions of counsel unlike the judgments of a judge, are not 
necessarily expressions of the opinion of their formulator. (For 
reasons of time and space I do not examine Barwick's years as 
Attorney-General).
1 (1938) 59 CLR 556. Discussed below pp.30ff.
2 Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504.
3 If one pages through the Commonwealth Law Reports of the 
1950's, one will see that Barwick was engaged in many other 
important cases as well.
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At one l e v e l  t h e  t h e s i s  w i l l  d e s c r i b e  B a r w i c k ’s s o l u t i o n s  f o r  
s p e c i f i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s  and w i l l  r e l a t e  t h o s e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  
a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s .  At a n o t h e r  l e v e l  I  w i l l  s e e k  t o  i d e n t i f y  
dom in an t  them es  i n  B a r w i c k ' s  a p p r o a c h .  The t a s k  of  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  
them es  of  any j u d g e ’s a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
e n o u g h .  The t a s k  of i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  e s s e n c e  of  t h e  a p p r o a c h  of  S i r  
G a r f i e l d  Barwick  i s  made more d i f f i c u l t  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he r e g u l a r l y  
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  a l l  he  e v e r  t o o k  i n t o  a c c o u n t  a s  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  when 
d e c i d i n g  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c a s e  was t h e  t e x t  of t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . ^
S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  f rom t h e  C o u r t ,  Ba rw ick  CJ pu t  h i s
p o s i t i o n  u n c o m p r o m is in g l y  when he w r o t e  a r e v i e w  of  LR Z in e s  ' ,  The
High Cour t  and t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  of  New Sou th  Wales 
2
Law J o u r n a l .  B a rw ick  CJ t o o k  i s s u e  w i t h  Z i n e s '  f a i r l y  m ild
p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  High C our t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  a f f e c t e d  by
unacknowledged  v a l u e s  o f  High C our t  J u s t i c e s .  Barwick  CJ w r o t e  "T h is
a s s e r t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  go u n c h a l l e n g e d .  I  do no t  t h i n k  t h a t  members of
t h e  Cour t  would a c c e p t  t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s e d  r e a s o n s  f o r  judgment  were
n o t  t h e  r e a s o n s  a c t u a l l y  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  r e s u l t  o r  t h a t  any c a s e  was
d e c i d e d  on any  u n d i s c l o s e d  g r o u n d ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  on any u n d i s c l o s e d
3
s o c i a l - e c o n o m i c  g round  of  t h e  k i n d  a d u m b ra te d  by t h e  P r o f e s s o r . "  
D e v e l o p in g  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  f u r t h e r  Ba rw ick  CJ s o u g h t  t o  deny  t h a t  t h e r e  
was any r o l e  f o r  j u d i c i a l  c h o i c e .  "Thus ,  i t  i s  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
i t s e l f  which  h a s  d e c i d e d  t h e  e x t e n t  and c o n t e n t  of  S t a t e  power .  That  
i s  n o t  a q u e s t i o n  l e f t  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  of  t h e  C o u r t ,  t h o u g h  of 
n e c e s s i t y  t h e  C our t  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  e x t e n t  of  a Commonwealth power may 
r e s u l t  i n  t h e  S t a t e s  h a v i n g  more o r  l e s s  power t h a n  had  t h e r e t o f o r e  
been  t h o u g h t . "  ( B a rw ic k  CJ made no a t t e m p t  t o  r e c o n c i l e  t h i s
1 C o n t r a s t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  o p e n n e s s ,  a s  J u s t i c e s  of  t h e  High C o u r t ,  of
HV E v a t t  (LR Z i n e s ,  "Mr J u s t i c e  E v a t t  and t h e  C o n t i t u t i o n "  (1969)
3 FL Rev 153) and of  LK Murphy (P B i c k o v s k i i ,  "No D e l i b e r a t e  
I n n o v a t o r s :  Mr J u s t i c e  Murphy and t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n "
(1977)  8 FL Rev 460.
2 (1981 )  4 UNSWLJ 131.
3 I d . 133. S p e a k in g  on t h e  o c c a s i o n  of  h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  11 F e b r u a r y
1981 Barwick  r e p e a t e d  t h e s e  v iew s  commenting i n t e r  a l i a : "There
i s  no room f o r  t h e  Cour t  t o  change  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n "  and " t h e  
t r u t h  i s  [ t h e  j u d g e  d e c i d i n g  t h e  e x t e n t  of  Commonwealth power]  
h a s  no c h o i c e . "
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notion of the Constitution as having a fixed objective meaning with 
the fact upon which he also commented that there was a "comparative 
rarity of a decision of the Court either grounded on a course of 
reasoning unanimously expressed or on a course of reasoning common to 
a majority of participating Justices, but individually 
expressed").^
Statements to the effect that the Constitution has a fixed 
objective meaning were made by Sir Garfield with such frequency and 
earnestness that one can almost accept that, for him, the Constitution 
was, despite its generality and its government subject matter, on the 
same level as a Dog Act. At other times Barwick CJ seemed to 
acknowledge that High Court judges are not just passive conduits . On 
6 April 1979 I attended a luncheon addressed by Barwick CJ. On 
that occasion Barwick CJ asserted that when reaching its decisions the 
High Court was sensitive to their social implications. His Honour 
then made reference to the current truck drivers’ blockade of major 
highways in protest against road taxes. According to Barwick CJ, no 
court sensitive to the social implications of inserting the tax as a 
cost into "the base of the structure" would have upheld the validity 
of the tax. In a more mystical mood, Barwick is reported to have 
commented in 1959 when Commonwealth Attorney-General that even though 
there was no crude political content to important legal decisions, 
such decisions were affected by the juristic climate which was itself 
affected by the political climate.^ In 1979 Barwick CJ spoke of the 
"advantage in the constitutional work of the Court of political
1 (1981) 4 UNSWLJ 131, 134.
2 Id. 133. Consistently with this view that the law has a fixed 
objective content, Barwick CJ argued for appointments to judicial 
office to be brought under the influence if not control, of 
lawyers and others "better" able to assess suitability for 
judicial office than a Minister of State. "The State of the 
Australian Judicature" (1977) 51 ALJ 480, 494.
3 The luncheon organized by the Australian National University 
(Student) Law Society and held at University House Canberra was 
attended by a large number of people.
4 The Times "People to watch" 9 November 1959.
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experience"'*' and suggested that 3arton J had been a great judge 
because of his recognition of the value of inter-State free trade and 
because of his ability to express that recognition in a forceful and 
logical judgment." In 1980 Barwick CJ argued that part of the 
genuis of the common law approach to the interpretation of statutes 
(including apparently, written Constitutions) was that the judiciary 
could "make law" by interpreting legislative language on the 
assumption that the legislature would only intend to make rules 
acceptable to the community's sense of fairness and justice.
I will try to refrain from judging as good or bad according to my 
prejudices Barwick's responses to specific issues and (in so far as 
they can be identified) Barwick's dominant themes. I will, however, 
evaluate Barwick's reasoning and doctrine against criteria of 
coherency and consistency.
The materials upon which I concentrate are the reported judgments 
and the reports of argument in the High Court and Privy Council in 
constitutional cases. Again for reasons of time and space I do not 
pursue material such as extra-curial addresses, Hansard reports and 
Ministerial statements.
I organize the thesis around constitutional issues with the result 
that the three levels of my examination of Barwick - analysing 
responses to specific issues, identifying themes and evaluating - are 
run together.
I start with the constitutional relationship of the Courts to 
Parliament and the Executive. In Chapter I under the topic of 
"Constitutionality" I discuss the decision in the Communist Party
1 His Honour went on ”... when over laid on high professional 
knowledge and experience." Foreword in republication of J 
Reynolds, Edmund Barton v, ix.
2 Id. viii-ix.
3 "Judiciary Law: Some observations thereon" (1980) 33 Current
Legal Problems 239.
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Case^ a loss for Barwick as counsel, and a vigorous reaffirmation of 
the High Court’s position as guardian of the Constitution. The 
doctrine of Separation of Powers is outlined in Chapter II for another 
aspect of the constitutional relationship of the Courts to Parliament 
and the Executive.
Chapter III turns to the constitutional law about the Federal 
Parliament itself. The cases dealing with that topic continue to have 
the principle of constitutionality to the fore. Arguments drawn from 
the concept of federalism however, become more important. The 
"federalism" arguments here are concerned with the position of the 
States' house, the Senate, within the Commonwealth Parliament.
Federalism, in the sense of the distribution of governmental power 
between the Commonwealth and the States, is the link to Chapter IVs 
group of topics where I consider the pre-Engineers’ Case doctrines of 
reserved powers and intergovernmental immunities, the Engineers' Case 
explosion of these doctrines and the post-Engineers' Case development 
of law and principle about the extent of Commonwealth legislative 
power and about intergovernmental immunities.
In the final two substantive Chapters, I examine in detail two 
sections, section 90 and section 92, which prohibit government action. 
These two sections were considered by the founders to be essential to 
the establishment and survival of the federated nation. These 
sections have raised some of the most difficult and complex issues of 
constitutional law.
Important topics which I am not able to include within the 
prescribed word length are federal jurisdiction under Chapter III of 
the Constitution and the guarantee of just terms in section 51 (xxxi) 
and the frequently litigated provision, s51(xxxv). I also make no 
attempt to discuss Barwick's position on broader "constitutional" 
issues such as stare decisis and the role of the Privy Council in the 
Australian judicial hierarchy.
1 (1951) 83 CLR 1.
Chapter I
CONSTITUTIONALITY
7.
Chapter I ; Constitutionality
It is an axiom of the Australian system of government that the 
Commonwealth Constitution binds the Commonwealth and State governments 
and defines and limits their respective spheres of authority.
The statute which is the Constitution is an extension of, and 
intended to operate in, a context of British principles of government.
The Constitution is also , however, intended to adopt some features 
and principles of the American Federal Constitution.^- The British 
principle of sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament provides the 
ultimate or at least the original rationale for the authority of the 
Constitution. The British background also delivers the axiom that it 
is for the Courts to interpret and declare the meaning of statutes and 
the Commonwealth Constitution, enacted by the Imperial Parliament as 
s9 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, is a 
statutory provision. The American federal tradition also allocates 
the function of interpreting the Constitution to the Judiciary and 
according to Galligan it was that background of American experience 
which was the main reason, historically, for the Australian High Court 
acquiring its anologous role.^ Because of the principle of 
constitutionality, the principle that government action in Australia 
is subject to the Constitution, governments are in an important sense, 
subject to the Courts especially the High Court and, formerly, the 
Privy Council.
1 RCL Moffat "Philosophical Foundations of the Australian 
Constitutional Tradition” (1965) 5 SLR 59.
2 GJ Lindell explores the question whether the High Court has a duty 
as well as a right to enforce the Constitution in "Duty to 
Exercise Judicial Review" at pp.150 ff in Zines (ed), Commentaries 
on the Constitution.
3 63 &64 Victoria cl2.
4 B Galligan, "Judicial Review in the Australian Federal System:
Its Origin and Function" (1979) 10 FL Rev 367.
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Another important principle with both British and American 
experiences to provide potential models for the Commonwealth 
Constitution is the principle of the separation of the powers of the 
legislature, executive and judiciary. At one level, that principle 
has carried through to provide constitutional limitations on 
government action. At that level the doctrine reinforces the 
independent status of the Courts and reemphasises the subjection of 
legislatures and executives to the Courts. (That level of the 
doctrine is outlined in Chapter II). At another level, however, 
British assumptions attributing certain functions to one branch of 
government rather than another, limit the reviewing role of the 
Courts. First, because it is axiomatic that the Courts are confined 
to reviewing the validity of government action and not the merits of 
government action which are for the legislature and the executive, 
and, thus basally, for the people to whom the legislature and the 
executive are answerable. Secondly, because when the Courts are 
interpreting and declaring the meaning of the Constitution that 
process may be affected by the notion that some inquiries and 
decisions are inappropriate for Courts and/or are only appropriate for 
legislatures and executives.
The interaction and conflict between the principle of 
constitutionality and the looser notions of the "appropriate” 
relationship of the Courts to Parliament and the Executive can be seen 
in the Communist Party Case which involved Barwick as counsel.
The Communist Party Case
In this case'*' Barwick KC had one of his few briefs as a defender 
of government action. The Commonwealth Act in issue, the Communist 
Party Dissolution Act 1950 had been enacted by the recently installed 
conservative coalition. The Act commenced with a long series of 
recitals.
1 Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1950) 83 CLR 1.
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The first group of recitals noted the existence of three sources 
of Commonwealth power expressly granted by the Constitution;
(i) the power in s 51(vi) to make laws with respect to the 
defence of the Commonwealth;
(ii) the executive power of the Commonwealth declared by s 61 to 
be vested in the Queen and exercisable by the Governor- 
General and further declared by s 61 to extend to the 
execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws 
of the Commonwealth;
(iii) the power in s 51(xxxix) to make laws with respect to matters 
incidental to the execution of any legislative or executive 
power of the Commonwealth.
The rest of the recitals declared the existence of certain facts. 
It was declared inter alia that the Australian Communist Party, was 
involved in espionage, sabotage, treason and subversion and in 
activities designed to lead to revolution against the established 
system of government in Australia and against the established systems 
of government in other countries. The recitals further declared that 
there were some industries vital to the security and defence of 
Australia. Six industries were identified as being examples of vital 
industries. The Australian Communist Party its officers and members 
were declared to be engaged in activities designed to cause disruption 
of work in vital industries. The recitals concluded by declaring that 
it was necessary for the security and defence of Australia and for the 
execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of the 
Commonwealth, that action be taken along the lines of that set out in 
the operative provisions of the legislation.
The legislation in its main operative provisions;
10.
( a )  d e c l a r e d  u n l a w f u l  and d i s s o l v e d  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Communist P a r t y  
( s 4 ) ;
(b )  made l i a b l e  t o  b e i n g  d e c l a r e d  by t h e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  t o  be 
u n l a w f u l  and t o  b e i n g  d i s s o l v e d  a f t e r  such  d e c l a r a t i o n ,  b o d i e s  of  
p e r s o n s  h a v i n g  a c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Communist P a r t y ,  
communism or  com munis t s  ( s s  5 & 6 ) ;
( c )  made any p e r s o n ,  who was e i t h e r  a member of  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  
Communist P a r t y  or  was a c o m m u n i s t , l i a b l e  t o  b e i n g  d e c l a r e d  t o  be 
a p e r s o n  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Act (s  9) w i t h  
c o n s e q u e n t i a l  e x c l u s i o n  of  t h a t  p e r s o n  f rom  h a v i n g  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  
r e w a rd  w i t h  t h e  Commonwealth o r  i t s  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s  and f rom  
h o l d i n g  o f f i c e  w i t h  t h e  Commonwealth o r  i t s  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s  o r  
w i t h  any i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  c o n s i d e r e d  by t h e  G o v e r n o r -  
G e n e r a l  t o  have  a s u b s t a n t i a l  number  of  i t s  members engaged  e i t h e r  
i n  one of  t h e  s i x  i n d u s t r i e s  d e s i g n a t e d  by t h e  Act a s  b e i n g  v i t a l  
o r  i n  any o t h e r  i n d u s t r y  which  t h e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  
be v i t a l  t o  t h e  s e c u r i t y  and d e f e n c e  of  A u s t r a l i a .  ( s s  10 & 14) .
The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  c o u ld  o n l y  make a s5  d e c l a r a t i o n  a b o u t  a body 
of  p e r s o n s  o r  a s 9  d e c l a r a t i o n  a b o u t  an i n d i v i d u a l  i f  he h e l d  t h e  
o p i n i o n  -  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a body of  p e r s o n s  -  t h a t  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  
a s s o c i a t i o n  of  t h e  body o f  p e r s o n s  would  be p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  t h e  
s e c u r i t y  and d e f e n c e  of  t h e  Commonwealth o r  t o  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  or  
m a i n t e n a n c e  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  o f  t h e  laws of  t h e  Commonwealth 
( s 5 ( 2 ) )  - o r ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  an i n d i v i d u a l  -  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  was 
engaged  i n  or  was l i k e l y  t o  engage  i n  a c t i v i t i e s  p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  t h e  
s e c u r i t y  and d e f e n c e  of  t h e  Commonwealth,  o r  t o  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  and 
m a i n t e n a n c e  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  of  t h e  laws of  t h e  Commonwealth 
( s 9 ( 2 ) ) .  The E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l  c o u ld  o n l y  a d v i s e  t h e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  
t o  make a s5  o r  a s 9  d e c l a r a t i o n  i f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  upon which  t h e  a d v i c e  
was founded  had f i r s t  been  c o n s i d e r e d  by a com m it t ee  " c o n s i s t i n g  of  
t h e  S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  Depa r tm en t  of  D e f e n c e ,  t h e
11.
Director-General of Security, and two other persons appointed by the 
Governor-General" (ss5(3) and 9(3)).
This outline of the legislation demonstrates, albeit in tortured 
and ungainly language, how the recitals of power, the recitals of 
facts and the subject matters for the Governor-General’s satisfaction 
were all drafted to create a correlation in the language describing 
the Commonwealth powers and the language associated with the operative 
provisions.
The main basis for challenge to the legislation appears in this 
passage from the report of the submissions of HV Evatt KC, 
representing unions in the case.
The solution of the case depends upon an undeviating application 
of some of the fundamental principles of Federalism in Australia, 
as authoritatively laid down by the courts. The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth is empowered to make laws only with respect to 
specified subject matters, and it is therefore constitutionally 
impossible either for Parliament itself or for the executive 
Government to enlarge in any respect whatever, and whether 
directly or indirectly, the scope or ambit of Commonwealth
legislative authority.
This was an assertion of the principle of constitutionality. Its 
application led Evatt KC to these submissions about the specific 
provisions of the legislation.
First, the operation of the direct legislative outlawing and 
dissolution of the Australian Communist Party (s4) was not dependent 
on the existence of any fact or matter which provided a connection of 
the legislation with any Commonwealth head of power. The recitals 
attributing certain behaviour to the Australian Communist Party 
"irrespective of the true facts" could not provide the connection with
1 Id. 45.
2 Id. 49.
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heads of power.^ The Parliament had no authority to create
"constitutional power which would not otherwise exist". The
Parliament could not "trespass beyond the area of its specified
„ 2subject matters....
As for the provisions which were dependent on the Governor-General 
forming opinions about subject matters relevant to Commonwealth heads 
of power and making declarations about individuals and bodies of 
persons (ss5, 6, 9 and 10), the offence here, in the submission of 
Evatt KC, was that
... all questions of fact and/or law as to which the Governor- 
General becomes ’satisfied' are remitted for the final decision to 
the Governor-General himself. ... It is evident that this 
’satisfaction’ of the Governor-General is not examinable by any 
court for the purpose of determining whether in fact and/or law 
the body or the person has been concerned in any activities, 
whether they are related to defence or the maintenance of the 
Constitution or whether they are injurious to the defence of the 
country or the maintenance of the Constitution or of the laws of 
the Commonwealth.^
Despite the references in the operative sections to matters relevant 
to Commonwealth heads of power, the sections were not laws with 
respect to these matters, they were rather laws with respect to 
Executive opinion on those matters.^
These arguments were drawn directly from the principle of 
constitutionality. Parallel submissions were also derived from the 
doctrine of separation of powers.^ Sections 5 and 9, it was 
submitted, amounted to attempts by the Parliament to "vest the 
Governor-General with the power of determining matters arising under
1 Id. 50.
2 Id. 50.
3 Id. 55.
4 Id. 57.
5 Id. 35-36 per FW Paterson. Also id. 84 per M Ashkanasy KC and 87 
per Webb KC.
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the constitution and involving its interpretation".  ^ The doctrine 
of separation of powers receives some discussion in a separate section 
below and will not be pursued here. Nor will other subsidiary- 
arguments. The discussion will concentrate on the principle of 
constitutionality which turned out to be determinative of the case.
Barwick KC attempted to meet the arguments drawn from the 
principle of constitutionality by building on the frequent statements 
in the cases emphasising the wide discretion which must be left to the 
Parliament and Executive in defence matters. Barwick KC argued that 
the subject matter of "defence" involved a notion that certain issues 
were matters only for Parliament and the Executive to the exclusion of 
the Judiciary. Included within that group of issues, Barwick KC 
submitted, was the issue of whether or not the continued existence of 
a body of persons or the behaviour of an individual, was in fact 
prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth.^ The exclusion of 
the Judiciary followed from the fact that a decision would be affected 
by matters "peculiarly within the knowledge of the Executive".^ If 
it was within Parliament's power to delegate to the Executive such a 
decision (as it had done with ss 5 and 9), then it must be within 
Parliament's power to make such decisions itself (as it had done with 
s4).^ Barwick's final proposition - that Parliament must itself be 
able to do what it can authorise the Executive to do - did not sit
1
2
3
4
5
6
Id. 57 per HV Evatt KC. Also id, 84 per Ashkanasy KC and 89 per 
Webb KC. —
Id. 23-24.
Id. 23. 
Id. 24.
Id. 97.
Id. 98.
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particularly well with his point that the Executive had special 
knowledge. The Executive is, of course, drawn from and answerable to 
the Parliament but it is not clear that it would be any easier to 
inform Parliament than it would be to inform the High Court, of the 
Executive’s special knowledge.
Berwick KC was able to cite the cases of Lloyd v Wallach  ^ and
Exp Walsh^ where the High Court allowed orders for detention for the
duration of the war to be made against individuals where the sole
connection with the defence of the Commonwealth seemed to be the
formation of an unreviewable administrative opinion about the
individual's loyalty or about the threat the individual presented to
the defence of the Commonwealth. Neither of these cases was
particularly satisfactory. The judgments in Lloyd v Wallach did not
discuss the constitutional issues and the party who might have raised
those issues did not participate in argument in the High Court. In
Exp Walsh, an attempt to have an order for detention reviewed before
the High Court failed at the point of making an application for
special leave. The application was rejected on the basis that Lloyd v
Wallach constituted a binding precedent. Again the latent
constitutional issues seem to have gone by default. Despite these
aspects, the decisions were consistent with Barwick KC's submission
about the content of the defence power. (Barwick also argued that
there was an analogous arm of the legislative power associated with
the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of
the Commonwealth and that, therefore, the existence of a threat to the
execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of the
3Commonwealth were matters for the Executive and the Parliament.)
1 (1915) 20 CLR 299.
2 [1942] ALR 359.
3 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 26, 105.
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Barwick KC presented this line of argument as being a matter of 
the inherent content of the subject matters of power, that is, as 
being a matter of determining the constitutional limits on 
Commonwealth action rather than as being a repudiation of, or 
exception to, the principle of constitutionality. The distinction 
seemed to be little more than semantic when it became:
A law, the criterion for which is a matter for defence, made by 
Parliament is a defence law. If Parliament makes the opinion of 
the Governor-General as to a matter of defence the criterion of 
its operation then that equally is a law with respect to defence, 
as Parliament has full power over the subject matter. The nature 
of the provision as to the subject matter which Parliament makes 
is for Parliament and not for the Court.'*'
The central provisions of the legislation were held to be invalid 
by Dixon, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. Only 
Latham CJ was in favour of upholding the main provisions of the 
legislation.
As reported, Barwick KC did not present his case particularly 
vigorously. It was left to the dissenting judge, Latham CJ to expand 
points which Barwick KC' s submissions seemed merely to suggest.
Latham CJ acknowledged the general principle "that the opinion of a 
Government or a Minister or a Parliament -on either fact of law - 
cannot provide any link between a law and a subject of legislative 
power but considered there was an exception founded in the 
necessity of allowing the Government a wide discretion to act without 
"a cloud of legal doubt" to meet threats to the Commonwealth.^
Latham CJ considered that the determination of who or what constituted 
a threat (to be met with action under s51(vi)) was a matter for the 
Executive, which was answerable to the Parliament and thus to the
1 Id. 24.
2 Id. 162.
3 Id. 164.
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people, to the exclusion of the Courts. This exclusion of the 
Courts arose, according to Latham CJ, from the nature of the material 
to be used to make such a determination itself. Barwick KC had 
referred in his submission to matters "peculiarly within the knowledge 
of the Executive . Latham CJ, a former Commonwealth Attorney-
”5General, Minister for External Affairs and envoy to Japan, 
commented that special knowledge available to the Executive could very 
often not be produced in a court to determine an issue such as whether 
or not another country constituted a threat to the Commonwealth.
The responsible authorities, in making up their minds upon these 
matters, will act upon diplomatic reports, intelligence reports 
from many countries, security reports, rumour, suspicion - upon 
such information which is necessarily secret - and upon other 
material which is highly relevant but which could not possibly be 
proved or used in any way in accordance with legal rules of 
evidence. No Government could produce such material in a court. 
Much of it would be derived from friendly foreign chancelleries 
and would necessarily be highly confidential. Reports from its 
own representatives and officers would, in the interest, of public 
safety, also necessarily be confidential, and the identity of the 
security officers who made the reports could not be disclosed. 
Publication of such reports might well bring about a situation of 
aggravated danger which they were designed to prevent or 
forestall
It followed as a matter of necessity, according to Latham CJ, that the 
decision of who or what constituted a threat to the Commonwealth, had 
to be left to the Executive which had access to the relevant 
information. There could, otherwise, be no effective defence.^
1 Id. 143.
2 Id. 97.
3 Latham CJ's full title in the Japan posting was "Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for the Commonwealth of 
Australia in Japan". (1940) 14 ALJ 205.
4 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 144-145.
5 Id. 145.
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Furthermore the very nature of the decision of who or what 
constituted a threat was, according to Latham CJ, a matter of policy 
not a matter of fact. Policy decisions were for the Executive, 
Parliament and the people, not the courts.'''
2Latham CJ agreed with the submission of Barwick KC that the 
power derived from s51(vi) for the Executive and Parliament to 
identify the sources of external threat to the Commonwealth, had its 
analogy in a similar power in the Executive and Parliament to identify 
the internal enemy. Latham CJ considered that the defence power in 
s51(vi) included the power to identify, and defend against, internal 
as well as external enemies. Latham CJ also considered that the power 
to identify and deal with internal enemies might equally be drawn from
"the power to make laws to protect the existence of constitutional 
„ 3government .
The key to the matter was, for Latham CJ, that the powers involved 
were "essentially different" from other Commonwealth powers.
These powers are perhaps the most important powers entrusted to 
the Parliament of the Commonwealth. The continued existence of 
the community under the Constitution is a condition of the 
exercise of all other powers contained in the Constitution, 
whether executive, legislative or judicial. The preservation of 
the existence of the Commonwealth takes precedence over all other 
matters with which the Commonwealth is concerned.^
The majority judges all considered that neither the opinion of 
Parliament nor the opinion of the Executive about defence 
considerations or about considerations relevant to any other head of 
power put forward, could suffice to provide constitutional
1 Id. 142-143
2 Id. 105.
3 Id. 141-143
4 Id. 141.
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justification for the Communist Party Dissolution Act's action against 
associations and individuals. Fullagar J stated the essence of the 
matter thus:
The validity of a law or of an administrative act done under a law 
can not be made to depend on the opinion of the law-maker, or the 
person who is to do the act, that the law or the consequence of 
the act is within the constitutional power upon which the law in 
question itself depends for its validity. A power to make laws 
with respect to lighthouses does not authorize the making of a law 
with respect to anything which is, in the opinion of the lawmaker, 
a lighthouse. A power to make a proclamation carrying legal 
consequences with respect to a lighthouse is one thing: a power
to make a similar proclamation with respect to anything which in 
the opinion of the Governor-General is a lighthouse is another 
thing.^
The same principle was recognized in the other majority judgments and
ofounded the conclusion of invalidity.
The strongest aspect of Barwick KC's case had been the support he 
drew from Lloyd v Wallach and Exp Walsh. No member of the Court 
questioned the authority of those decisions. All members of the 
majority considered, however, that those decisions did not apply in 
the current international situation and would only apply in time of
4war or grave emergency.
Dixon J recognized that the possibility in time of war or grave 
emergency, of action based upon opinion about individuals or bodies,
1 Id. 258.
2 The principle permeates the discussion of Dixon J from id. 183-205 
but see especially at 186 and 200. Also 207, 211 per McTiernan J; 
222, 231-232 per Williams J 236, 247-248 per Webb J 271-272 per 
Kitto J.
3 Id. 247.
4 IcL 195-202 per Dixon J; 206-207 per McTiernan J (without 
expressly referring to those cases); 227, 229 per Williams J; 
244-245 per Webb J; 258-259 per Fullagar J and 282 per Kitto J.
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represented an exception to the principle of constitutionality. This
exception had to be admitted as a matter of necessity.^- Dixon J
quoted with approval this passage from the judgment of Williams J
in the case of Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v The 
3Commonwealth.
The paramount consideration is that the Commonwealth is undergoing 
the dangers of a world war, and that when a nation is in peril, 
applying the maxim salus populi suprema lex, the courts may 
concede to the Parliament and to the Executive which it controls a 
wide latitude to determine what legislation is required to protect 
the safety of the realm.
(It should be noted that even when the circumstances were such that 
Lloyd v Wallach would apply, the Court would not allow Government 
action against individuals to be completely immune from Court review 
for sufficiency of connection with power. Thus although in wartime 
the formation of an unreviewable opinion might be sufficient link with 
defence to support preventive detention, the formation of such an 
opinion might not justify other action against individuals or 
associations.
The majority judges (one of whom, Dixon J, had also had experience 
of diplomatic affairs as Minister to the United States during World 
War 11)^ did not see that the necessities of defence led to Latham 
CJ's conclusion of the exclusion of the judiciary for all time. The 
wartime exclusion of the judiciary which Lloyd v Wallach involved, was
1 Id. 202.
2 Ibid.
3 (1943) 67 CLR 347, 400.
4 Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v The Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116. Compare the submissions of Barwick KC (1951)
83 CLR 1, 103; "... the Act is within the defence power ...
because on the narrowest view of such cases as Lloyd v Wallach and 
Exp Walsh .... it makes provisions not inappropriate to such an 
emergency conditioned upon the opinion of the Executive". Also
id. 227, 229 per Williams J; 282 per Kitto J.
5 (1942) 16 ALJ 34.
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based on necessity and could only operate when there was in fact a 
necessity. For all of the majority judges the extent of the current 
threat to the Commonwealth was a matter of fact to be determined by 
the Court.^
2The majority judges either expressly rejected the proposition 
that the power in s51(vi) went beyond defence against external enemies 
to defence against internal enemies, or impliedly rejected the 
proposition by discussing s51(vi) solely in terms of external threat. 
Some of the majority judges were also at variance with Latham CJ and 
Barwick KC when they took the view that the Commonwealth power to 
protect constitutional government from internal subversion was, unlike 
s51(vi), an incidental power and not likely to justify extreme 
measures such as Lloyd v Wallach allowed under s51(vi).
In a submission in the alternative Barwick KC had conceded that 
the opinion of Parliament and the Executive might not suffice to link 
the legislation with the subject matter of power and that the 
legislation could be subjected to an objective test.1 234^ Barwick KC 
pointed out, however, that all that the cases required was that the 
legislation could possibly aid defence and need not be shown to be in 
fact aiding defence.^ That objective test could readily be 
satisfied, in Barwick KC's submission, if the Court would take 
judicial notice of various general facts about the uneasy state of
1 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 195 per Dixon J; 207-208 per McTiernan J; 222- 
225, 230 per Williams J; 244 per Webb J; 255 per Fullagar; and 
276 per Kitto J.
2 Id_. 194 per Dixon J; 259 per Fullagar J.
3 Ici. 192-194 per Dixon J; 261 per Fullagar J; 274-275 per Kitto
J.
4 Especially id. 99.
5 Id. 24-25, 96.
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international relations between Australia's allies and communist 
powers and of various specific facts about the likelihood of 
communists within Australia sympathizing with the aims and ambitions 
of communist powers and of the potential for espionage and industrial 
disruption to interfere with success in warfare.^ Barwick KC 
submitted that once the Court had taken judicial notice of these 
matters then the provisions of the legislation operating by reference 
to people being communists could be supported as being, laws with 
respect to the defence of the Commonwealth and/or (analogously) as 
being laws relevant to maintaining the Constitution and the laws of 
the Commonwealth, in the sense that the legislative measures taken 
could rationally be thought to be relevant to these concerns.
Barwick KC further indicated that the Commonwealth would not be 
offering specific evidence to support its legislation.
As for the issue of the extent of the current external threat - 
the majority judges considered that the international circumstances, 
albeit disturbed, were in fact closer to peace than were the 
circumstances associated with the decision in Lloyd v Wallach.^
It was implicit in the majority's answers to the questions around 
which the case was argued, that even if the Commonwealth had been 
ready to offer specific evidence, specific evidence could not have 
assisted in determining the external threat. Only Fullagar J offer id 
an explanation of why it should be that specific evidence would not be 
relevant to that inquiry and he seemed to base that exclusion of 
evidence on the very points of admissibility and confidentiality^ to 
which Latham CJ had referred to indicate how unrealistic it was to 
think that the Court was in a position to assess the external threat.
1 Id. 21-22.
2 Id. 22-23, 102-104.
3 Id. 25, 103.
4 Id_. 196 per Dixon J; 208-209 per McTiernan J; 223, 227 per
Williams J (implicitly); 244-245 per Webb J; 267-268 per
Fullagar J; 282 per Kitto J.
5 Id. 256.
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McTiernan J gave some recognition to the special position of the 
Executive in such matters when he commented that he would have given 
great weight to "a formal statement made by the Executive Government 
of its appreciation of the international situation".''' Latham CJ had 
pointed out the difficulties for the Executive of carrying out the 
defence of the Commonwealth if it was required to put before the Court 
sensitive material about other nations. McTiernan J pointed out that 
the Executive could also be compromised by a High Court decision which 
implied that, for the purposes of constitutional action, a nation, 
against which no declaration of war had been made by the Executive, 
was an enemy.^
All members of the majority were agreed that judicial notice about 
communism and communists did not reveal any basis to justify the
-5legislation. Webb J considered that it was open to the 
Commonwealth to attempt to establish the constitutionality of its 
legislation dealing with communists by adducing evidence to prove the 
truth of the allegations which the recitals made about communists. It 
was the absence of any attempt by the Commonwealth to adduce such 
evidence which was, for Webb J the final determinant of 
invalidity
Dixon, McTiernan, Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ considered that 
even if the Commonwealth had been willing to offer evidence, about 
communists and communism, it could not have established the validity 
of the legislation. These judges considered that legislation 
operating on people because of their beliefs rather than their actions 
would be beyond any Commonwealth power in peacetime.^ This 
conclusion that evidence about communists would be immaterial was
1 Id. 208.
2 Id. 209.
3 Id_. 196-197 per Dixon J; 210 per McTiernan J; 226 per Williams 
J; 262 per Fullagar J; 277-278 per Kitto J.
4 Id. 242-248.
5 Ld. 201 per Dixon J; 206 per McTiernan; 225 per Williams J; 266 
per Fullagar J; 278 per Kitto J.
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derived primarily from the notion that the legislation took measures 
which were "extreme", in the sense that the legislation affronted the 
underlying assumption of the rule of law by proscribing individuals 
instead of prescribing rules of action,^- in the sense that it 
intruded into the State domain by dealing with associations and their 
property^ and in the sense that it interfered with civil
Oliberties. (Not all considerations were given the same emphasis by 
each of these majority judges). (Fullagar J also added that the 
recitals only made assertions of a general character not susceptible 
of proof by specific evidence.)^ Kitto J attempted to explain the 
exclusion of evidence by drawing a distinction between "the legal 
operation of the law" and "the practical results likely to follow in 
the train of its operation".'* (Apparently evidence showing that 
taking action against communists would curtail activities threatening 
constitutional government would be merely demonstrating the practical 
result not the legal operation.)**
When Barwick KC had put his submissions in reply he had modified 
and, to an extent, merged his lines of argument, in so far as they 
related to ss 5 and 9. Sections 5 and 9 were preconditioned on the 
formation of Executive opinion. Barwick KC submitted that the 
Executive "satisfaction" involved was subject to administrative law 
remedies. Barwick KC argued that the administrative law remedies
1 _Id_. 193, 198, 201 per Dixon J; 206 per McTiernan J; 220, 226 per 
Williams J; 261, 266 per Fullagar J.
2 Id. 202-203 per Dixon J; 207, 209 per McTiernan J; 226 per
Williams J.
3 _Id_. 195, 198per Dixon J; 206-207 per McTiernan J; 227, 229 per
Williams J.
4 Id. 267.
5 Id. 228.
6 I would have thought that whenever the criterion of power was the 
relevance of a law to achieving an effect that the likely 
practical effect of the law would have to be relevant. Compare 
the discussion of the Commonwealth controls of intra-State air 
navigation safety in Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New 
South Wales [No2] ( 1965) 113 CLR 54, discussed below pp!39ff.
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would allow a review of any particular decision to see whether the 
facts were such that the decision could be seen to be irrational or 
based on a misunderstanding of law. As Barwick KC pointed out, the 
Court had never required that legislation under the defence power be 
shown to be in fact aiding the defence of the Commonwealth. It was 
enough if there were reasonable grounds for the view that the 
legislation might aid the defence of the Commonwealth.-^ There was a 
correspondence in the administrative law and the constitutional law 
tests of validity. The availability of administrative law remedies to 
test exercises of the delegated authority therefore sufficiently plinked to the head of power the legislation making the delegation.
This late attempt by Barwick KC to save sections 5 and 9 by 
connecting administrative law remedies with constitutional law 
requirements, was defeated by the decision of Dixon, McTiernan, 
Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ that the formation by the Governor- 
General of an opinion (about the tendency of some association or 
individual to prejudice the defence of the Commonwealth or the 
execution and maintenance of the Constitution and laws made 
thereunder) was unexaminable. Only Webb J considered that "the 
satisfaction of the Governor-General under ss5(2) and 9(2) would be 
examinable to see whether in the particular case there is a real 
connection with the power"/
In a sense the fundamental point of the Communist Party Case - 
that the Constitution as interpreted by the High Court, is binding law 
- went by default. The argument of Barwick KC was that the special
1 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 96.
2 Id. 100-102. Compare Reid v Sinderberry (1944) 68 CLR 504, 512 
Latham CJ and McTiernan J. LR Zines "Executive Discretion and the 
Adequacy of Judicial Remedies to uphold the Constitution" (1971) 4 
F L Rev 236.
3 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 178-180; 211; 221; 257-258; 279-280
respectively. Latham CJ considered that the Governor-General’s 
satisfaction was unexaminable but that the delegation of authority 
was, for the reasons discussed above, valid nevertheless. Id. 
161-162.
4 Id. 243. (Emphasis added)
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problem of national security in its very nature and a fortiori in the 
current circumstances, justified on exception to the general 
principle. The fact that Barwick KC tried to set up an exception to 
the general principle and made no attempt to challenge the general 
principle itself, and the fact that, even in the face of widespread 
anti-communist feeling amongst the community, the Court by a majority 
of six to one refused to allow the exception, demonstrate just how 
entrenched is the general principle. No member of the Court in the 
Communist Party Case felt obliged to explore at any length the 
question of exactly why it is that the Constitution is binding law.-*- 
Fullagar J had most to say and this is what he said.
Such a law as the Communist Party Dissolution Act could clearly be 
passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any of the 
Australian States. It is only because the legislative power of 
the Commonwealth Parliament is limited by an instrument emanating 
from a superior authority that it arises in the case of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. If the great case of Marbury v 
Madison^ had pronounced a different view, it might perhaps not 
arise even in the case of the Commonwealth Parliament; and there 
are those even to-day, who disapprove of the doctrine of Marbury v 
Madison, and who do not see why the courts, rather than the 
legislature itself, should have the function of finally deciding 
whether an Act of a legislature in a Federal system is or is not 
within power. But in our system the principle of Marbury v 
Madison is accepted as axiomatic, modified in varying degree in 
various cases (but never excluded) by the respect which the 
judicial organ must accord to opinions of the legislative and 
executive organs."^
The reference to "a superior authority" is presumably a reference to 
the Imperial Parliament. Notwithstanding the fact that the
1 PE Lane "Judicial Review or Government by the High Court" (1966) 5 
SLR 203 argues that nothing in the express wording of the 
Constitution establishes the High Court’s role as the 
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. GJ Lindell "Duty 
to Exercise Judicial Review" in LR Zines(ed), Commentaries on the 
Australian Constitution 150, 183-184 responds that express wording 
is not necessary in a system where it is the function of Courts
to interpret laws and where a law, the Constitution, defines and 
limits government power.
2 (1803) 1 Cr 137; 2 Law Ed 118.
3 (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262-263.
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Commonwealth Parliament is exercising power derived at least 
originally from the will of the Imperial Parliament it might have been 
possible to construe Commonwealth authority in the light of the 
British background of unlimited Parliamentary sovereignty. (Indeed in 
the application to the Privy Council for leave to appeal to the Privy 
Council''- from the High Court decision in Baxter v The Commissioners 
of Taxation the transcript of proceedings reports the Earl of 
Halsbury as saying that he did not understand the suggestion that an 
Act of Parliament could be invalid because unconstitutional.) As 
Fullagar J pointed out, the fact that the United States Supreme Court 
had, in Marbury v Madison established the binding force of the United 
States Constitution was undoubtedly a significant factor in the 
establishment of the same proposition in the Australian federation.
The proposition of constitutionality is the foundation of the High 
Court’s position of power and importance in Australian Government.
This proposition underlies all the case law discussed in the remainder 
of this thesis.
The next topic - The Doctrine of Separation Powers - and the next 
one after that - Federal Parliament - fill out the main aspects of 
constitutional law which contribute to the determination of the 
relationship of the High Court to Parliament and the executive.
1 (1907) 5 CLR 398.
2 (1907) 4 CLR 1087.
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Chapter II: Separation of Powers
Early in the life of the Constitution, the proposition was 
established that the doctrine of separation of powers - the notion 
that the legislative, executive and judicial arms of government should 
be kept separate from one another - provided a constitutional 
limitation to Commonwealth action. The doctrine reinforced decisions
1 oof the High Court and the Privy Council which invalidated 
attempts to vest judicial power in bodies which were not judicial 
bodies within the meaning of Chapter III of the Constitution.
In Dignan's case decided in 1931, Dixon J brought together the 
arguments for incorporating the doctrine into Australian 
constitutional law. Dixon J first asserted that the Constitution of 
the United States of America was meant to embody the doctrine of 
separation of powers as expounded by Montesquieu in his writings on 
the merits of the British system of government.^ Dixon J quoted^ 
this passage from the American Madison to indicate the importance of 
the principle. "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic 
value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of 
liberty ... The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and 
whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be
1 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v JW Alexander Ltd 
(1918) 25 CLR 434.
2 Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Comissioner of Taxation (1930) 
44 CLR 530.
3 Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan 
(1931) 46 CLR 737. As counsel Dixon had also formulated such 
arguments in the case of Roche v Kronheimer (1921) 29 CLR 329, 
331-332.
4 (1931) 46 CLR 73, 89.
5 Id. 90.
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pronounced the very definition of tyranny". Dixon J pointed out that 
the doctrine was recognized by the United States Supreme Court very 
early in the history of that Federation.^
The fact that the Commonwealth Constitution followed the same 
structure as the American Constitution with Chapter I relating to the 
legislature, Chapter II to the executive and Chapter III to the
judiciary, could itself have indicated an intention to draw on the
2American experience. Dixon J considered that even in the absence 
of any knowledge of the American background, the doctrine of
separation of powers would be discovered in the Commonwealth 
Constitution on an independent consideration of the arrangement of the 
Constitution, the emphatic wording of ss 1, 61 and 71 and the detailed
provisions constituting and/or defining the respective repositories of 
3power.
Dixon J believed that these considerations justified judicial 
recognition of the proposition that "The Parliament is restrained both 
from reposing any power essentially judicial in any other organ or 
body, and from reposing any other than judicial power in such 
tribunals. The same or analogous considerations apply to the
1 Id_. 90. See also Latham CJ addressing the First Conference of
Australian Legal Studies on the Topic "Duties and Opportunities of 
the Legal Profession in Australia" (1933) 7 ALJ 15, 18. "The 
independence of the profession and the independence of the Bench 
are the safeguards on which the independence and liberty of the 
community depend".
2 Id. 95.
3 Id_. 96. Section 1 which is the first section of Chapter I, "The 
Parliament", commences -"The legislative power of the Commonwealth 
shall be vested in a Federal Parliament ...". Section 61 which is 
the first section of Chapter II, "The Executive Government", 
commences - "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in 
the Queen ...". Section 71 which is the first section of Chapter 
III, "The Judicature", commences - "The judicial power of the 
Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be 
called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal 
courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it 
invests with federal jurisdiction ...".
2 9 .
provisions which vest the legislative power of the Commonwealth in the 
Parliament, describe the constitution of the legislature and define 
the legislative power
Dixon J went on, however, to conclude (as did other members of the 
Court) that the doctrine of separation of powers did not generally
preclude the delegation of legislative power to the executive so long
2as there was not a complete abdication of legislative function. In 
the passage set out in the preceding paragraph, Dixon J had 
acknowledged that in so far as the doctrine of separation of powers 
depended on the terms and structure of the Constitution itself, those 
considerations applied equally to the confining of legislative 
functions to the legislature as they did to the confining of judicial 
functions to the judiciary. "It may be acknowledged that the manner 
in which the Constitution accomplished the separation of powers does 
logically or theoretically make the Parliament the exclusive 
repository of the legislative power of the Commonwealth . How then 
was the tolerance of the vesting of legislative function in the 
executive to be explained? "The existence in Parliament of power to 
authorize subordinate legislation may be ascribed to a conception of 
that legislative power which depends less upon juristic analysis and 
perhaps more upon the history and usages of British legislation and 
the theories of English law"
Dixon J’s comments in Dignan's case about the vesting of non­
judicial power in judicial bodies were dicta. The issue of vesting 
non-judicial functions in judicial bodies arose in 1938 in the case
1 Id. 97.
2 Id. 101-102.
3 Id_. 101. Compare JM Finnis, "Separation of Powers in the 
Australian Constitution" (1967-1970) 3 Adelaide Law Review 159, 
159.
4 (1931) 46 CLR 73, 101-102.
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of The King v The Federal Court of Bankruptcy; Exp Lowenstein, the 
first case reported in the Commonwealth Law Reports of Barwick 
appearing in the High Court as counsel in a case with a constitutional 
issue. ^ Section 209 of the Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act made it an 
offence for any person being a bankrupt to omit to keep books of 
account detailing his business and financial transactions for the five 
years immediately preceding his bankruptcy. Section 217 provided that 
if during an application for discharge from bankruptcy the court had 
reason to believe that the bankrupt had committed a breach of s209 
then the court could charge the bankrupt, set down a time for hearing 
the charge and then hear the charge at the appointed time.
Barwick submitted that the Constitution required that judicial and 
non-judicial functions not be vested in the same body, that the 
decision to prosecute was a function of the executive, both in its 
very nature and because the express terms of s61 entrusted to the 
executive the function of maintaining the laws of the Commonwealth, 
and that the notion of judicial power necessarily precluded any 
possibility of a judge being at the one time a party to proceedings 
and the judge presiding therein.
1 (1938) 59 CLR 556. At the Australian National University Law
Society luncheon to which reference has already been made (above 
p.4) Barwick CJ told those pr .ent that after Lowenstein had been 
sentenced to gaol by a judge in bankruptcy, a solicitor sought 
Barwick's advice on possible ways for overturning the sentence or 
at least delaying its commencement. Barwick's first response was 
to say that there was no viable ground for attacking the sentence. 
On being pressed by the solicitor whose client was particularly 
keen to avoid spending winter in gaol, Barwick suggested that it 
might be possible to raise a question of separation of powers for 
High Court consideration. That argument would, in Barwick's 
opinion, be unlikely to succeed but it should at least delay the 
commencement of the serving of the sentence until winter was over. 
In the event the bankruptcy judge declined to state questions for 
the High Court and by the time an order had been obtained to have 
them stated and the questions had been considered by the High 
Court and the sentence upheld, the seasons had come around to 
winter again.
2 Id. 559.
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Barwick also submitted that the offence provision was itself
insufficiently connected with s51(xiv) as the section had the effect
of punishing deeds committed before the individual had become
bankrupt.^ The Court did not require counsel defending the
2legislation to address on the s51(xiv) argument.
Four members of the Court, Latham CJ, Rich (concurring with Latham
CJ), Starke and McTiernan JJ held that even though the Constitution
3did require some separation of judicial and non-judicial functions, 
the Constitution did not require a complete separation of such 
functions.^ The function vested in the Bankruptcy Court by by s217 
was according to these judges, compatible with the judicial function 
of that body.^ (Starke J commented that the separation required was
L’not as rigorous as that required in America.)0
Dixon J and Evatt J gave a joint dissenting judgment. Absent from 
this joint dissenting judgment was the grandiloquence and sweeping 
endorsement of generalities which had characterised Dixon J's 
discussion of separation of powers in Dignan' s case. Their Honours 
considered that s51(xxxix) in its application to matters incidental to 
the execution of judicial power was the only possible source of power 
to support s217. Zines° comments that "Having regard to the fact 
that Evatt J was one of the authors of the judgment [the
1 Id. 560.
2 Id. 563.
3 Id_. 567 per Latham CJ; 577 per Starke J, and 591 per McTiernan
J.
4 Ld. 565-566 per Latham CJ; 576-577 per Starke J.
5 Id_. 567-569 per Latham CJ; 577 per Starke J; 590-591 per 
McTiernan J.
6 Id. 576-577.
7 Id. 585-587.
8 The High Court and the Constitution 141.
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interpretation of the judgment of Dixon and Evatt JJ which I have set 
out] is an unlikely intepretation". Zines probably had in mind the 
comments of Evatt J in Dignan1 23s case. There Evatt J said
"But it does not follow from these decisions^ that the only 
function which may lawfully be assigned by the Comonwealth 
Parliament to the three kinds of tribunals mentioned in s71 is the 
exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. For instance 
there is a Federal Court created by the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act. Such Court has for some years performed 
functions which are not the exercise of judicial power at all. So 
much was decided by this Court in Alexander’s Case.^  The 
exercise of 'arbitral' functions in relation to industrial 
disputes is lawful because the Commonwealth Parliament has made a 
valid law in the exercise of its power under s51(xxxv) of the 
Constitution. This also shows that it is not possible to infer 
from the fact that an organ for the exercise of one of the three 
Commonwealth powers is lawfully acting, that it must be exercising 
the power associated with it as an organ in ssl, 61 & 71 of the 
Constitution.
It is indeed difficult to reconcile those words from Evatt J in 
Dignan's case with the interpretation which I place on the joint 
judgment of Dixon and Evatt JJ in Lowenstein. That interpretation 
does seem to me, however, to be compelled by the language used in that 
Lowenstein dissent.
In Lowenstein Dixon and Evatt JJ concentrated on the word 
"incidental". Section 51(xxxix), they considered, would not support 
provisions "at variance" with judicial power, and, in so far as it was 
used to vest functions in the judicature, would only support laws 
dealing "with something arising in the course of exercising judicial 
power, something attendant upon or incidental to the fulfilment of
1 New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, Alexander's
Case (1918) 25 CLR 434, In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 
29 CLR 257.
2 (1918) 25 CLR 434.
3 (1931) 46 CLR 73, 116-117.
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powers truly belonging to the judicature".^ Then Dixon and Evatt 
JJ took up an argument of Barwick. For these judges the maxim nemo 
potest esse simul actor et judex "epitomizes part of the English 
notion of the judicial function. A long course of development produced 
a conception of judicial process which placed the court in the 
position of a detached tribunal entertaining and determining civil and 
criminal pleas brought before it". Section 217 was not incidental 
to judicial power because it was at variance with judicial power.
In Lowenstein's case the majority judges reinforced their 
conclusion that the particular mix of judicial and non-judicial 
functions involved was compatible with the constitutional requirement 
of separation of powers, by referring to the mixing of arbitral and 
judicial functions in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration.^ That issue of the validity of the mixing of functions 
in the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and the more general 
issues raised by the submissions of Barwick in Lowenstein's case came 
up for consideration in the Boilermakers' Case where challenge was 
made to the vesting in the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of 
both arbitral and judicial functions.^ (The judicial function had 
been exercised to impose a fine for breach of an industrial award made 
in exercise of the arbitral function).
1 Id. 587.
2 Id. 588.
3 Id. 589.
4 Id. 565-566 per Latham CJ, 576-577per Starke J.
5 Attorney General (Commonwealth) v The Queen; Exp The Boilermakers'
Society of Australia. (1956) 94 CLR 254 (High Court) (1957) 95 
CLR 529 (Privy Council). The propriety of that particular mixing 
of non-judicial and judicial functions had been challenged in the 
Australian Law Journal back in 1930, before even Lowenstein had 
been decided. "The New Despotism in Relation to the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth" (1930) 3 ALJ 357, 358.
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The majority view in the High Court, upheld on appeal to the Privy 
Council, was that the doctrine of separation of powers precluded 
the mixing of judicial and arbitral function in the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court. The Privy Council’s explanation of the doctrine 
was similar in its essential points to the discussion of Dixon J in
2Dignan* s case, which was expressly endorsed in some of its aspects.
The Commonwealth Constitution was to be interpreted in the light of 
the drafters' knowledge of the political systems of the United States 
of America and the United Kingdom. The principle had force as 
constitutional law in the United States. The British background and 
practice meant that the doctrine would not, however, be as strict in 
the Australian Constitution as it was in the United States.^ Apart 
from the historical background to the Australian Constitution, the 
structure and terms of the document itself indicated the embodiment of 
the principle of separation of powers.^
Their Lordships followed the model of the dissenting judgment of 
Dixon and Evatt JJ in Lowenstein1 234567s case and stated that the only
sources of power for vesting functions in Courts were in Chapter III
£and s51(xxxix) and that therefore only judicial functions and 
functions forming incidents in the exercise of strictly judicial 
functions could be vested in Courts.^ Their Lordships sought to 
support the proposition that non-judicial functions (other than those 
merely incidental to judicial powers) could not be vested in Courts 
with the non sequitur that because Chapter III (with s51(xxxix)) was 
an exhaustive statement of the kinds of judicial power which could be 
vested in Courts it was also an exhaustive statement of the kinds of
1 WA Wynes "The Decision in the Boilermakers’ Case" (1957) 30 ALJ 
614.
2 (1957) 95 CLR 529, 540, 546.
3 Id. 536-537.
4 Id. 536-537.
5 Id. 537-538.
6 Id. 543.
7 Id. 544.
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non-judicial function which could be vested in Courts. Their 
Lordships also offered other reasons not involving any non sequitur 
which at once supported the separation of non-judicial from judicial 
functions and which explained why that separation was stricter than 
was the separation of legislative from executive functions. First, the 
elaborateness of the provisions in Chapter III dealing with the 
vesting of functions in Courts itself indicated that these provisions 
were meant to be an exhaustive statement of the vesting of functions 
in Courts.''" Secondly, the background of "the history and usages of
British legislation and the theories of English law" showed the
• • ? special nature of judicial power.
.. . the executive body is at all times subject to the control of 
the legislature. On the other hand in a federal system the 
absolute independence of the Judiciary is the bulwark of the 
Constitution against encroachment whether by the legislature or by 
the executive. To vest in the same body executive and judicial 
power is to remove a vital Constitutional safeguard."^
This then was the judicial justification for incorporating the 
doctrine of separation of powers and for incorporating the 
doctrine in this particular form. The constructional arguments based 
on the express terms of the Constitution were, apart from the point of 
the extent of detail in Chapter III, as strong (or weak) for 
separating legislative and executive function from one another as they 
were for separating judicial from legislative and executive functions. 
The difference in the application of the doctrine and perhaps even the 
fact that the doctrine was incorporated at all seem to be traceable 
to the background of political theory and to the "special nature" of
1 Id. 546.
2 Id_. 546 quoting from Dixon J in Dignan's case. 
Id. 540-541.3
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judicial power rather than to any compulsion in the text of the 
Constitution.
The societal value of the doctrine of separation of powers has 
been said in these cases to be
the protection of the liberty of the individual
the protection of the federal Constitution.
The latter effect of the doctrine is at first sight coextensive with 
the effect of the principle of contitutionality and might be said, 
therefore, to be subsumed by and superfluous to, that principle. The 
point of the doctrine of separation of powers goes further here, 
however, in that the doctrine requires not only that decisions of the 
constitutionality of government action be left to the Courts, but also 
that the Courts not be involved in activities which may prejudice 
their independent status and reputation when making such decisions.
Any law depends very much for its binding force on its acceptance by 
the community as law and the independent reputation of the law 
interpreters conduces to community acceptance of their authoritative 
interpretations.
The significance of the doctrine to the liberty of the individual 
is a large topic which it is not possible to explore in this paper.
It is possible, however, to identify two main ways in which the 
doctrine may tend to protect the liberty of the individual. There is 
first the simple fact that it divides power, as does federalism 
itself, and thus reduces the potential for action by any one branch
1 R Anderson," Exclusiveness of the Judicial Power of the 
Commonwealth" (1956-1959) 3 UQLJ 71, 72 saw the decision in the 
Boilermakers Case as being based "on an a priori conception of the 
nature of the judicial power and its segregation in Chapter III of 
the Constitution".
2 In an interview with The Times on 9 November 1959, Barwick, then 
Attorney-General, commented that he considered the federal system 
to be "one guarantor of individual.freedom".
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of government and introduces the potential for any one branch of 
government to restrain and interfere with action by any other branch 
of government. (The ''benefit” here for individual liberty depends on 
the making of an assumption that government action will seldom itself 
be a protector of individual liberty). The other main level at which 
the doctrine tends to protect individual liberty, comes in its 
operation to prevent individual liberty or property being interfered 
with other than as a consequence of breach of clear prospectively 
prescribed rules of conduct, with the fact of breach being a matter 
for determination by a judiciary, independent of law maker and law 
enforcer. In this "rule of law" aspect, the doctrine again has some 
overlap with the principle of contitutionality.
The direct effect of the Boilermakers1 2 Case was to compel the 
separation of the body making industrial awards from the body 
enforcing industrial awards. The decision thus excluded from the 
process of enforcement, the arbitrators' special industry knowledge 
and familiarity with the problem of maintaining industrial peace. The 
learned editors of the Australian Law Journal'*' commented:
"An efficient and powerful arbitration system of Commonwealth 
operation is one of the basic requirements of a progressive and 
developing economy and the deficiencies in the Commonwealth's 
powers under s51(xxxv) are only too well known. It is a matter of 
regret that the probable consequence of the decision will be that 
the Arbitration Court as a judicial tribunal has now been 
emasculated.
Five years after the division of the arbitral and judicial functions 
one respected practitioner in the area, CI Menhennitt QC found strong
1 NH Bowen QC and R Else-Mitchell QC assisted by RW Fox (as they 
then all were before their judicial appointments).
2 "Judicial power of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court" (1956) 29 
ALJ 623. See also R Anderson, "Exclusiveness of the Judicial 
power of the Commonwealth" (1956-1959) 3 UQLJ 71, 73.
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advantages in that division. He thought it particularly valuable for 
preventing confusion in the minds of parties between arbitral and 
judicial function.'''
As Chief Justice, neither Barwick nor any of his Courts showed any
enthusiasm for applying the doctrine of separation of powers so as to
ohold invalid particular mixes of functions. In the case of Giris
'iPty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation challenge was made to 
the vesting in the Commissioner of Taxation of a power to determine, 
according to his opinion of what was reasonable, that one rate of tax 
rather than another should apply to particular taxpayers. It was 
argued that this legislation amounted to an abdication of legislative 
function and thus offended the principle of separation of powers.^ 
Barwick CJ accepted that "... whilst Parliament may delegate 
legislative power it may not abdicate it."^ Neither Barwick CJ, 
however, nor any other member of the Court considered that the 
legislation went too far. In the case of R v Quinn; Exp Consolidated 
Foods Corporation^ Barwick CJ joined in a unanimous decision 
upholding the vesting in a non-judicial body of a function which might 
more typically have been vested in a judicial body. In Taiga Ltd v 
MBC International Ltd,^  R v Joske; Exp Australian Building 
Construction Employees and Builders* Labourers Federation^ and R v
1 Commentary on G Sawer's paper "The Separation of Powers in 
Australian Federalism" presented to the twelth Legal Convention of 
the Law Council of Australia (1961) 35 ALJ 177 at 188-189.
2 PH Lane, "The Decline of the Boilermakers Separation of Powers 
Doctrine" (1981) 55 ALJ 6. This article, inter alia, contrasts 
the fate of mixtures of functions in Barwick CJ’s court with the 
fate of similar mixtures in earlier courts.
3 (1969) 119 CLR 365.
4 Id. 367.
5 Id. 373.
6 (1977) 138 CLR 1.
7 (1976) 133 CLR 622.
8 (1974) 130 CLR 87.
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Joske; Exp Shop Distributive and Allied Employees* Association  ^
Barwick CJ joined in unanimous decisions upholding the vesting in 
judicial bodies of powers which might more typically have been vested 
in administrative bodies.
There was, during Barwick's Chief Justiceship, no direct challenge 
to the proposition that the doctrine of separation of powers has the 
force of constitutional law. Given the imprecise nature of the 
doctrine it was susceptible to being redirected and it was at the 
point of working out the operation of the doctrine that Barwick CJ and 
his Courts drew back from the possible line which might have been 
developed from the mystical sweep of the language in the Boilermakers 
Case. On the question of the particular application of the doctrine in 
the Boilermakers Case itself Barwick CJ even went so far as to 
indicate in dicta that while it might be '’proper" to continue to 
follow the decision in the Boilermakers Case, it might well be that 
the decision should be rejected.
"The principal conclusion of the Boilermakers’ Case was 
unnecessary, in my opinion, for the effective working of the 
Australian Constitution or for the maintenance of the separation 
of the judicial power of the Commonwealth or for the protection of 
the independence of courts exercising that power. The decision 
leads to excessive subtlety and technicality in the operation of 
the Constitution without, in my opinion, any compensating 
benefit.
Barwick CJ did not deny that the doctrine of separation of powers is 
part of Commonwealth constitutional law. Nor did His Honour deny that 
the doctrine has value. The fact that His Honour indicated sympathy 
for the proposition that arbitral and judicial function could be mixed 
might lead one to infer that Barwick CJ was more interested in the
1 (1976) 135 CLR 194.
2 G Sawer, "The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth "(1948) 1 Annual 
Law Review 29, 29 "... the delimitation of the frontiers of the 
judicial power ... is never likely to be reduced to a deductive 
system of propositions."
3 R v Joske; Exp Australian Building Construction Employees (1974) 
130 CLR 87, 90. Also id. 102 per Mason J.
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strength of the judiciary than in the independence of the judiciary. 
Barwick CJ also held the view however, that arbitration under 
s51(xxxv) must, by definition, be independent.  ^ A mixing of 
arbitral and judicial function should not therefore identify the 
judiciary with legislative or executive interests.
In the passage set out Barwick CJ makes no reference to the value 
which some see in the doctrine of separation of powers, of protecting 
the liberty of the individual. Barwick CJ did, in Giris, couple his 
acceptance of the vesting in an administrative officer of what was "in 
truth a function of the legislature, rarely delegated to an
t oofficial with a conclusion that the administrative officer would
obe subject to fairly rigorous judicial control. The decline in 
judicial enthusiasm for the separation of powers does not necessarily 
mean a plunge into tyranny. There has been a contemporaneous and 
arguably offsetting widening of the scope of judicial review of 
government action. That widening of the scope of judicial review has 
come about both from developments of judge made law and from statutory 
introduction of new administrative law.^
1 (1969) 119 CLR 365, 372.
2 Total Wage Case (Exp AEU) (1967) 118 CLR 219, 242.
3 Id. 374.
4 GDS Taylor "The New Administrative Law" (1977) 51 ALJ 804.
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Chapter III: Federal Parliament
In the middle of the 1970’s the High Court considered a series of 
constitutional cases relating to the Commonwealth Parliament itself. 
Also on the public record are Barwick CJ's November 1975 advice to the 
Governor-General relating to the 1975 conflict between the House of 
Representatives and the Senate over supply and Barwick CJ's statements 
about the advice at a National Press Club Luncheon in 1976. The 
principles interacting through this section are - the principle of 
constitutionality, the principle of the non-involvement of the 
Judiciary in political issues, the principle of democracy and the 
principle of federalism.
The Assertion of High Court control over the Parliament based on the 
principle of constitutionality.
In some of the Parliamentary cases Barwick CJ emphasised the right 
and duty of the High Court to enforce constitutional provisions, even 
those relating to the Parliament itself. The cases in which this 
emphasis was made related to s57 of the Constitution, the provision 
relating to disagreement between the Houses.
In the first of these cases, Cormack v Cope the Court considered, 
inter alia, an application for an interlocutory injunction to stop 
proposed laws being dealt with by a joint sitting of the Houses of 
Parliament purporting to act under s57. 'The basis for the application 
was an alleged absence of preconditions for action under s57. The 
case was argued and the judgments delivered within a space of four 
days. All members of the Court agreed that the interlocutory 
injunction should be refused. The routes to this conclusion varied.
At one extreme McTiernan J took the view that it was not within 
the judicial power of the Commonwealth to inquire into the existence 
of the preconditions for action under s57, which related to
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political matters, events in Parliament.^  Menzies J and Stephen J 
considered that the proceedings in Parliament could be inquired into 
and a failure to comply with s57 would result in any purported law
9being invalid but that the Court had no jurisdiction to interfere
*3in the Parliamentary proceedings.
None of these three judges made plain in their own judgments and 
nor is it made plain in the cases cited by Menzies J and Stephen J 
what the precise reason for this absence of jurisdiction was, but 
British notions of the dignity and privilege of Parliament can be 
discerned.^ Attorney-General Murphy had submitted, inter alia, that 
the immunity of Parliamentary proceedings from Court intervention was 
a matter of privilege in the British House of Commons and as such was 
attracted to the Australian Parliament by the terms of s49 of the 
Constitution.^
Both Barwick CJ and Gibbs J, without there being any necessity to 
do so for the purposes of their decisions, asserted that the Court did 
have jurisdiction to intervene in s57 proceedings.^  Both rested 
that jurisdiction on the fact that s57 "constitutionally required"
1 (1974) 131 CLR 432. Id. 461 Expanded in the PMA Case (Victoria v 
The Commonwealth) (1976) 134 CLR 81, 135.
2 Ld. 464, 472 respectively.
3 (1974) 131 CLR 432, 464-465, 472 respectively.
4 Ici. 465 per Menzies J. Also Clayton v Heffron (1960) 105 CLR 214 
(especially 234-235 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Taylor and Windeyer 
JJ) cited by Menzies J and Stephen J at (1974) 131 CLR 432, 465, 
472 respectively.
5 Section 49 "The powers, privileges, and immunities of the Senate 
and of the House of Representatives, and of the members and the 
committees of each House, shall be such as are declared by the 
Parliament, and until declared shall be those of the Commons House 
of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and 
committees, at the establishment of the Commonwealth".
6 Id. 453-454, 466 respectively.
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a specified process of law-making.^  Neither judge gave an 
unambiguous answer to Murphy's submission that s49 was also part of 
the Constitution and required that the Commonwealth Parliament have, 
inter alia, the privileges of the British House of Commons. Neither 
would say flatly that the British House of Commons had had no relevant 
privilege in 1901.
Barwick CJ did say in response to the s49 submission: "We are not 
here dealing with a Parliament whose laws and activities have the 
paramountcy of the Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom'. In 
the context of determining the operation of s49, this was, with 
respect, a very strange thing to say. Section 49 said directly that 
the activities within the Houses of the Australian Parliament were to 
have the same paramountcy which activities within the House of Commons 
had had in 1901.
The essence of the attitude of Barwick CJ and Gibbs J seemed to be 
that whatever privilege might be attracted by s49, the text of s49 
would have to give way to their assertion of the High Court's right to 
ensure compliance with the text of s57. It is to be noted that 
Barwick CJ in expressing his conclusion that the Court did have 
jurisdiction said not that there was no privilege but instead that 
"there is no parliamentary privilege which can stand in the way of 
this Court's right and duty to ensure that the constitutionally 
provided methods of law-making are observed".
1 Id_. 453 per Barwick CJ, Similarly 466 per Gibbs J.
2 Id. 452.
3 Id. 454, similarly 466 per Gibbs J.
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The weakness in the logic supporting Barwick CJ and Gibbs J's 
assertion of jurisdiction to intervene in s57 proceedings was that it 
failed to acknowledge that the assertion of the High Court's right to 
enforce compliance with the law-making steps prescribed by s57 did not 
lead inexorably to a conclusion of jurisdiction to intervene in 
Parliamentary proceedings. The terms of s57 could be vindicated by 
declaring invalid, laws the enactment of which did not comply with 
those prescribed steps. The availability of that reconciliation of 
the principles of immunity for Parliamentary proceedings and 
constitutionality was, of course, made abundantly clear by the 
judgments of Menzies J and Stephen J, already discussed, and Mason J. 
Mason J reserved the issue of jurisdiction and decided that it was not 
an appropriate case to exercise any jurisdiction that the Court might 
have as there would be opportunity to challenge any laws relying on 
s57 procedures after their purported enactment.^ That 
reconciliation was also, paradoxically, recognized by Barwick CJ and 
Gibbs J themselves in a different form. Having asserted jurisdiction 
(and, in Barwick CJ's case, a duty) to intervene to ensure 
observance with s57's process, Barwick CJ and Gibbs J then exercised
-3their discretion not to grant an interlocutory injunction noting as 
they did so that laws could be challenged after their enactment.^
1 Id. 473-474.
2 Id. 452-454.
3 Id. 460, 466-468 respectively.
4 Id_. 460, 466 respectively. This "reconciliation" is only
completely acceptable if one assumes that persons with standing to 
seek orders to prevent double sittings taking place other than in 
compliance with s57 would also be amongst those with standing to 
challenge laws enacted in purported reliance on s57.
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The S t r u c t u r e  of  P a r l i a m e n t  -  F e d e r a l i s m  and Democracy
( i ) S e c t i o n  57 -  Deadlock, b e tw e en  t h e  Houses c o n s t i t u t e d  by t h e  
S e n a t e ’s f a i l u r e  t o  p a s s  a l aw p r o p o s e d  by House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  ^
O
In  Cormack v Cope i t s e l f  and i n  t h e  PMAjCase^ and t h e  F i r s t  
T e r r i t o r i e s  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  Case ( W e s te rn  A u s t r a l i a  v The 
Commonwealth) p e r c e p t i o n s  of  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  S e n a t e  
and House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  one a n o t h e r  were t a k e n  i n t o  
a c c o u n t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  m eaning  of  c e r t a i n  p a r t s  o f  s 5 7 .
S e c t i o n  57 of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  
d e a d l o c k s  b e tw e en  t h e  Houses by d o u b l e  d i s s o l u t i o n  and j o i n t  s i t t i n g ,  
i n c l u d e s  among i t s  c o n d i t i o n s  a c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  S e n a te  " r e j e c t s  o r  
f a i l s  t o  p a s s "  a law p r o p o s e d  by t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and 
a n o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  " a f t e r  an  i n t e r v a l  of  t h r e e  m o n th s ” and a n o t h e r  
p a s s i n g  of  t h e  p r o p o s e d  law by t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t h e  S e n a t e  
a g a i n  " r e j e c t s  o r  f a i l s  t o  p a s s "  t h e  p r o p o s e d  l a w .
McTie rnan  J  and J a c o b s  J  a p p r o a c h e d  t h e  p r o b le m  of  s 5 7 ' s  m ean ing  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of  h a v i n g  c e r t a i n  and unambiguous  
e v e n t s  f rom  which  t o  m easu re  t h e  i n t e r v a l  o f  t h r e e  m o n th s .  M cTie rnan
1 D i s c u s s e d  by JE R i c h a r d s o n ,  " F e d e r a l  D e a d lo c k s  : O r i g i n  and 
O p e r a t i o n  o f  S e c t i o n  57 (1960 )  1 Tas Uni LR 706 e s p e c i a l l y  a t  71 3 -  
715 and  LR Z i n e s , "The Double D i s s o l u t i o n s  and t h e  J o i n t  S i t t i n g s "  
e s p e c i a l l y  "The PMA Case and t h e  Q u e s t i o n  of  Time" i n  G Evans 
( e d ) ,  Labor  and t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 5 , 217 ,  224 -2 2 7 .
2 V i c t o r i a  v The Commonwealth (1975)  134 CLR 81 .
3 (1975)  134 CLR 201.
46.
J concluded that whatever "fails to pass" meant, when the section said 
"after an interval of three months", it meant "after an interval of 
three months after the passing of the proposed law by the House of 
Representatives".^
Jacobs J considered that the interval of three months ran from the 
time of failure to pass. His Honour construed fails to pass to 
mean "does not pass the proposed law when it [The Senate] might have 
passed it . For Jacobs J it was obvious that the Senate could not 
pass the proposed law until the law had been passed by the House of 
Representatives and sent to the Senate.^ Sawer finds this 
interpretation unacceptable because no provision in the Constitution 
expressly speaks of or regulates the transmission of Bills from the 
Lower to the Upper House.^ Admittedly Jacobs J's judgment is weak 
in that it simply assumes that the Senate would not be able to pass a 
Bill until the Bill had been sent to the Senate by the House of 
Representatives. (Sawer’s comment seems to imply that the only 
possible relevant source of control on the transmission of Bills would 
be the express terms of the Constitution. Section 50 of the 
Constitution enables the House of Parliament to make procedural rules 
and orders and it may be that Jacobs J had in mind such a source of 
constraint on the Senate’s power to pass B i l l s . F o r  me, Jacobs
1 The PMA Case (1975) 134 CLR 81, 133. It seems that McTiernan J 
was inclined to construe "fails to pass" in the same way that the 
majority judges did but treated the decision of whether or not 
there had been a failure to pass as a non-justiciable issue.
2 Id. 192-193.
3 Id. 194.
4 Id. 194, 199.
5 Federation Under Strain 49.
6 House of Representatives Standing Order, SO 243 "After a passed
bill has been certified by the Clerk, it shall be sent to the 
Senate with a message desiring the concurrence of that House."
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J's essential point - that the word "fails" can mean "omits to do 
something that could have been done" - is not destroyed by His 
Honour’s failure to explain why the application of that definition to 
s57 would mean that the Senate could not be said to have failed to 
pass a Bill until it had received the Bill.
The real difficulty with Jacobs J ’s definition of "fails" is that 
it would mean that after the second passing of the Bill by House of 
Representative, the instant that the Senate received the Bill it would 
be liable to a s57 dissolution. Jacobs J sought to deprive that point 
of its force with three mitigating circumstances. First, that the 
Senate’s "failing to pass" would cease to exist to provide a condition 
precedent for a s57 dissolution if the Senate passed the Bill.
Secondly that the Governor-General might exercise a discretion to 
delay a double dissolution if the government did not allow the Senate 
any time to consider the Bill. Thirdly, that when construing the 
Constitution, it was permissible to assume that Ministers of the Crown 
would only give advice compatible with the spirit of the 
Constitution.^
The majority judges Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ found 
that there had not been the lapse of time required by s57. This 
conclusion turned on their decision (a) that the phrase "after an 
interval of three months" meant "after an interval of three months 
after the Senate fails to pass (or rejects or passes with amendments 
unacceptable to the House of Representatives)" and (b) that the 
expression "fails to pass" be construed so as to give the Senate an 
opportunity to consider the proposed law before the three months began 
to run.
1 (1975) 134 CLR 81, 197.
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Although the reasoning of all the majority judges was similar, the 
judgment of Barwick CJ was particularly vigorous. The points he made 
were these.
The Senate was intended by the Constitution to be co-equal with 
the House of Representatives except in the ways specified in s53 
relating to money Bills.^ It is apparent on the face of the 
Constitution that the Senate was intended to represent the States and 
might therefore be considering a law "from a standpoint different from 
that which the House of Representatives may have taken. Taking 
account of the status and role of the Senate "the Constitution can not 
be read as if laws ought to be passed by the Senate without debate, or 
as if the House of Representatives may in any respect command the 
Senate in relation to a Bill." (No one in fact suggested any 
construction of s57 which would have required the Senate either to 
pass a law "without debate" or to become subject to the possibility of 
being sent to the electors. On any of the suggested constructions, 
section 57 guarantees the Senate at least three months for debate 
and/or deliberation.) This course of reasoning led Barwick CJ (and 
the other majority judges) to adopt a very vague concept of "fails to 
pass". For Barwick CJ "The word ’fails' in s57 involves the notion 
that a time has arrived when, even allowing for the deliberative 
processes of the Senate, the Senate ought to answer whether or not it 
will pass the Bill or make amencments to it for the consideration of 
the House: That the time has arrived for the Senate to take a stand
with respect to the Bill."^
1 Id_. 121 per Barwick CJ. Similarly at 143 per Gibbs J, 168 
per Stephen J and 185 per Mason J.
2 IH. 122. The Senate in fact reviews legislation by reference to 
considerations other than parochial State interest. The Senate's 
function as a general House of Review is not recognized on the 
face of the Constitution and was not referred to to support the 
majority construction.
3 Id. 122.
4 Id_. 122. Similarly (though not to exactly the same effect) 148 
per Gibbs J, 171 per Stephen J and 186 per Mason J.
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Barwick CJ's proposition (upon which he built his interpretation 
of the word "fails") that the Constitution intended the Houses of 
Parliament, apart from the s53 provisions, to be co-equal requires 
examination. First the fact that s53 creates that difference in 
relation to money bills is a clear indicator that the House of 
Representatives is the House of Government. Consistent with that 
indicator is the fact that members of the House of Representatives are 
elected on a more democratic basis than are Senators. Section 57 
itself indicates that the will of the "House of the Commonwealth" is 
more important than the will of the "States’ House".^ It is only 
when there is a deadlock over laws originating in the House of 
Representatives that s57 can operate. If s57 does operate and there 
is a joint sitting to resolve a conflict between the Houses, then the 
will of the electorate of the more numerous House, the House of 
Representatives, is likely to prevail. These factors indicate that the 
Constitution intended the House of Representative to be more important 
than, rather than co-equal with, the Senate.
One must next query whether the majority interpretation of the 
word "fails" would allow the House of Representatives even "co-equal" 
let alone superior or dominant status in the Parliament. The majority 
interpretation puts the Senate in a very strong position to frustrate 
the will of the House of Representatives.
According to the majority interpretation the Senate could delay 
the taking of any legislative action, delay incurring the risk of 
being required to answer to its electorates and delay a joint sitting
1 Section 24 requires the members of the House of Representatives to 
be chosen directly by the people of the Commonwealth. Section 7 
requires the Senators for each State to be chosen by the people of 
the State. These sections are discussed below.
2 Compare Stephen J at 170.
50.
of both Houses first by holding the proposed law for the "reasonable" 
period of Senate deliberation before the three months even began and 
then by holding the proposed law for the same period after a second 
passing by the House of Representatives. The blocking period could be 
extended by the Senate by waiting each time until near the end of the 
period of deliberation and then passing the law with amendments. 
According to Barwick CJ the interval of three months would not 
commence after the first passing with amendments by the Senate, and 
the option of double dissolution would not be available after the 
second passing with amendments by the Senate, until the House of 
Representatives had not only expressed its attitude to the amendments 
on each occasion, but had also explored the usual parliamentary 
procedures of negotiation with the Senate about amendments.^
On the majority approach, and in particular on Barwick CJ's 
approach, it is not inconceivable that the House of Representatives 
would have to wait for over a year before it obtained a resolution of 
a deadlock. It is no doubt still open to argue that when assessing 
the reasonableness of the time taken by the Senate for deliberation, 
the High Court should take into account the urgency attached to the 
matter by the House of Representatives. That possible argument is 
not barred by the majority judgments in the PMA Case. It was, 
however, plain that the status of the House of Representatives as the 
democratically elected House of government, was given little weight in 
the majority’s approach to s57.
The majority interpretation involved a large extension of the 
declaration in Cormack v Cope of the High Court's willingness to 
inquire into Parliamentary proceedings. Now Barwick CJ and the other 
majority judges declared their readiness to inquire into the substance
1 Id. 125.
2 Barwick CJ noted that the House of Representatives had not sent 
any message to the Senate attaching urgency to the bill in issue. 
Id. 114, 149.
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of proceedings in the Senate and to judge whether the Senate had 
finished its deliberative processes and "ought" to take a stand. On 
the facts the majority concluded that the Senate could not be said to 
have failed to pass the proposed law at the relevant time. If there 
ever were a borderline case the High Court could find it an extremely 
uncomfortable and politically controversial matter to examine the 
proceedings of the Senate with a view to declaring those proceedings 
either bona fide deliberation or insincere obstruction. Such possible 
problems, implicit in the majority approach, indicate just how great 
was the assertion of High Court control over the Parliament itself.
(ii) Parliamentary Representation for the Territories
In the First Territories Representation Case (Western Australia v 
The Commonwealth)^  the issue was the sufficiency of sl22 to support 
legislation providing for full voting representation in the Senate for 
the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. Section 
122 was held to be sufficient to support such legislation by 
McTiernan, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ with Barwick CJ, Gibbs and 
Stephen JJ dissenting. McTiernan J retired from the Court shortly 
afterwards and was replaced by Aickin J.
In the case of Attorney-General of New South Wales (ex rel. 
McKellar) v Commonwealth, Barwick CJ stated that he considered it 
unfortunate that although two States had during argument questioned 
the correctness of the decision in the First Territories 
Representation Case, neither State had proffered any argument to
osupport that questioning.
1 (1975) 134 CLR 201.
2 (1977) 139 CLR 527, 532.
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... if the decision is to be reconsidered, that reconsideration 
should take place before what, with due respect to the opinion of 
others, appears to me to be a serious departure from the federal 
nature of the Constitution, becomes entrenched in constitutional 
practice by the mere passage of time.
It was not surprising that shortly afterwards Queensland asked the 
High Court to reconsider the question of representation for 
Territories in the Senate, and Western Australia asked for a 
consideration of the validity of the legislation giving the Northern 
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory representation in the 
House of Representatives. In the outcome in this Second Territories 
Representation Case, (Queensland v The Commonwealth) the new judge, 
Aickin J held sl22 to be insufficient to support full voting 
representation in either House. This did not, however, result in a 
majority for invalidity. Two of the judges who had been in dissent in 
the First Territories Representation Case, Gibbs and Stephen JJ now 
upheld the legislation . Their Honours had not changed their view of 
the merits of the case. They could see, however, no sufficient reason 
for reviewing the decision made in the First Territories 
Representation Case such a short time before and could, furthermore, 
see no relevant distinction between the issue of Senate representation 
decided in the First Territories Representation Case and the issue of 
representation in the House of Representatives raised for the first 
time in the Second Terrritories Representation Case.^
1 Ibid. Sir Arnold Bennett QC of the Queensland Bar placed the 
First Territories Representation Case at the head of his list of 
"wrong turnings" which if not reversed would lead, in his opinion 
to the destruction of the States. "The High Court of Australia- 
Wrong Turnings" (1977) 51 ALJ 5, especially at 14.
2 (1977) 139 CLR 585.
3 Id. 619.
4 Id_. 601, 605 respectively. Editorial comment in the Australian 
Law Journal suggests that this decision may have been affected 
by the fact that the people of the Commonwealth had, in a 
referendum of 21 May 1977, indirectly indicated their approval of 
the First Territories Representation Case by giving the support 
required by sl28 to a proposal to amend sl28 itself to allow 
Territory electors to vote in referendums. "Current Topics - The 
Territories Representation Case" (1978) 52 ALJ 57.
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The constructional issue involved the conflict between the 
unreserved generality of the Parliament's power in sl22 to make laws, 
inter alia, allowing "the representation of such territory in either 
House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms which it [the 
Parliament] thinks fit" and the specific provisions providing for the 
composition of the Senate (s7) and of the House of Representatives 
(s24). Section 7 commences with the declaration that
The Senate shall be composed of senators for each State, directly 
chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament 
otherwise provides as one electorate .. .
Other clauses in s7 itself and other sections in the 
Constitution^- seem to assume that the Senate shall be composed only 
of State representatives. The conflict with sl22 is not so marked in 
the case of s24 which starts with the declaration:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly 
chosen by the people of the Commonwealth ...
Section 24 goes on, however, to create a nexus between the number of 
representatives and the number of senators ("the number of such 
members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the 
senators") and to make specific provision for the fixing of the number 
of members to be chosen from each State.
For McTiernan, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ the word 
"representation" usually included, and was used elsewhere in the 
Constitution to include, full membership and there was no reason to 
restrict the meaning of the term where it appeared in sl22.^ Any 
conflict between the wide power to provide for Territories' 
representation in sl22 and the specific provision for the composition 
of the Houses in ss7 and 24 was to be reconciled by regarding ss7 and 
24 as provision for the original composition of the Parliament with
1 Sections 15, 21.
2 First Territories Representation Case (1975) 134 CLR 201, 267-272
per Mason J (with McTiernan J concurring 234); 272-275 per Jacobs
J; 280-287 per Murphy J. Second Territories Representation Case 
(1977) 139 CLR 585, 606-607 per Mason J; 608-609 per Jacobs J; 
611-612 per Murphy J.
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the possibility of a later need for the Territories to be represented
being provided for by sl22. At Federation the existing condition of
Australian Territories was not likely to call for immediate
representation but there was no reason to think that the possibility
of later development in the Territories should go unprovided for.-'-
There was also a very real possibility at the time of Federation of
other British colonies in the Pacific region becoming Territories of
the Commonwealth. Of these Fiji already had a form of representative
government and it was by no means unthinkable that acquisition of such
a Territory would be accompanied by full representation in the 
oParliament. Murphy J reinforced his conclusion by reference to the 
principle of democratic government which was part of the historical 
background, both British and American, for the framers of the 
Constitution. Disenfranchisement of Territories would be contrary to 
the democratic theme of the Constitution.
Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Stephen JJ in the First Territories 
Representation Case and then Barwick CJ and Aickin J in the Second 
Territories Representation Case considered that the word 
"representation" in sl22 should be given a restricted meaning not 
extending to full voting membership.^
All these minority judges pursued the same general line of 
argument.-* Barwick CJ developed the argument this way. The 
Constitution was federal not only in the way it distributed
1 First Territories Representation Case (1975) 134 CLR 201, 270 per 
Mason J.
2 Id_. 273-274 per Jacobs J.
3 Id. 283-286.
4 First Territories Representation Case (1975) 134 CLR 201,
226-232 per Barwick CJ, 243-250 per Gibbs J, 255-264 per Stephen 
J. Second Territories Representation Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 
591-592 per Barwick CJ, 616-620 per Aickin J.
5 First Territories Representation Case 134 CLR 201, 243-250 
per Gibbs J; 255-263 per Stephen J. Second Territories 
Representation Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 616-620 per Aickin J.
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governmental powers but also in the way it structured Parliament as a 
bi-cameral system with a States' House.^ The federal principle 
permeated the whole Constitution and was particularly evident in the 
amendment section, sl28, both in its general requirement of a majority 
of voters in a majority of States (as well as an overall majority of 
voters) and also in its specific provision giving the voters of any 
one State the power to veto by their majority vote any amendment
diminishing their State's proportionate representation in either
2House.
Territories were merely peripheral dependencies attached to but
3not part of the federation. It was unthinkable that the balance of 
power within the Parliament should be subject to disruption by the 
intrusion of Territorial members. The power in sl22 should be read 
down so as only to extend to non-voting membership in either House of 
the Parliament.^ Barwick CJ pointed out that if no such limitation 
were put on sl22 then Parliament might give representation to small 
Territories. ^
Again Barwick CJ's approach is that the Court should construe the 
Constitution on the assumption that Parliament is to be closely 
controlled by the Constitution where the status of the States is in 
issue. Barwick CJ's position seems to ignore that the Founders had 
provided for the protection of State interests by giving the States' 
House "co-equal" status in the legislature.
1 First Territories Representation Case (1975) 134 CLR 201, 226-227, 
233.
2 Id. 227-228.
3 Id. 229. Second Territories Representation Case (1977) 139 
CLR 585, 592.
4 First Territories Representation Case (1975) 134 CLR 201, 232 per 
Barwick CJ.
5 Id_. 230. Also in argument at 214 "If this Act is good, then an 
Act which appoints six senators for each Territory would be 
good" .
56.
As majority judges pointed out, "swamping" the Parliament would 
require the cooperation of the Houses of Parliament themselves to 
enact the legislation.''’
(iii) Adult Voting
Early in the 1970's the Court had, in the case of King v Jones
considered whether the word "adult” appearing as one of the
qualifications in s41's guarantee of voting rights in Federal
2elections, extended to eighteen year olds. It was argued by 
Senator Murphy, shadow Attorney-General at the time, that "adult" 
meant "a mature person and that In fact persons of eighteen years 
of age and upwards are mature persons.^ Murphy pointed out that 
society regarded eighteen year olds as mature persons for many 
purposes.
... persons above the age of eighteen can marry, are fully 
responsible under the criminal law, they are liable to be 
sentenced to death under Commonwealth law and they are liable for 
service in the armed forces.
Murphy was prepared to bring expert sociological evidence to establish 
that "persons of eighteen years of age and upwards in Australia are 
mature persons’ .^
1 First Territories Representation Case (1975) 134 CLR 201, 271 per 
Mason J; 275 per Jacobs J.
2 (1972) 131 CLR 221. Noted by PH Lane at (1972) 46 ALJ 590.
3 (1972) 131 CLR 221, 222.
4 Id. 224.
5 Id. 223.
6 Id. 224. RR Millhouse offered an alternative avenue to bring 
eighteen year olds within s41. He submitted that being or not 
being an "adult" was a matter of status in law. Id. 224. In 1901 
the common law (and in some cases and for some purposes, statute 
law) fixed adulthood at twenty-one years of age. Icl. 225. In the 
State, South Australia, in which Millhouse's client resided, 
statute law had changed the age of adulthood to eighteen years of 
age. Ibid.
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Murphy's case had a certain emotional appeal. It seemed to many 
young people to be not only unfair but also undemocratic to subject 
young people to politically controversial liability for military 
conscription with a possibility of service in politically 
controversial actions like Vietnam while denying to young people the 
vote which might influence the outcome of political decisions.
Despite that emotional appeal, Murphy's case had the significant 
weakness that it offered a vague definition - "mature person" - for 
the word "adult". The logical result of accepting Murphy's proposed 
definition would have been a person by person assessment of 
maturity.^
Barwick CJ and all his brethren, McTiernan, Menzies, Walsh, Gibbs 
and Stephen JJ, concluded that the word "adult" where appearing in s41 
meant "of or above the age of twenty-one"That conclusion was 
affected inter alia by the assumption that the framers would have 
intended to create a voting qualification which would be precise in 
its application.
This conclusion was neither unexpected (there were other good 
arguments to support this construction unanimously endorsed) nor 
particularly oppressive. Section 41 was only a minimum guarantee. It 
did not prevent Parliament legislating to extend voting rights to 
(non-adult) eighteen year olds and in time voting rights were so 
extended.
1 Cf. Ellicott, Solicitor General for the Commmonwealth; id.
226.
2 Id_. 239 per Barwick CJ. Similarly 249 per Menzies J; 254 per 
Walsh J; 265 per Gibbs J; 272 per Stephen J.
3 IcL 237 per Barwick CJ; 244 per McTiernan J; 240-249 per Menzies
J; 254-255 per Walsh J; 262 per Gibbs J; 271 per Stephen J.
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(iv) One vote, one value
A more debatable issue than that of the preceding topic was that 
dealt with in Attorney-General (Commonwealth) (Ex rel McKinlay) v 
Commonwealth^" relating to the words of s24 of the Constitution which 
provide
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly
chosen by the people of the Commonwealth . ..
It was argued that the phrase "directly chosen by the people" imported 
a democratic principle of equality, that each "choice" should "carry 
the same weight" and should (as nearly as possible) be made either by 
or on behalf of the same number of electors or, in the alternative, 
people, and that therefore electoral subdivisions should have similar 
numbers of electors or people in them. (The development of a 
similar principle in the United States was referred to to support this 
argument.) The Commonwealth Electoral Act tolerated divergences in 
numbers of one-tenth either side of the quota figure when Distribution 
Commissioners were proposing electoral divisions and wider divergences 
in fact existed.^
1 (1975) 135 CLR 1. Noted by "LH" at (1976) 50 ALJ 185. The issues 
in the case had been canvassed by PA Paterson, "Federal 
Electorates and Proportionate Distribution" (1968) 42 ALJ 127 and 
PH Lane in a Comment at (1968) 42 ALJ 139. See also M Sexton,
"The Role of Judicial Review in Federal Electoral Law" (1978) 52 
ALJ 28.
2 (1975) 135 CLR 1, 6-7 per Cox Solicitor-General for South 
Australia and 4-5 per KM Marks QC.
3 Id. 5-6.
4 A tolerance of 1/10 either side should mean that the division with 
the least number of people has never less than 9/11 the number of 
people of the division with the greatest number of- people. 
According to figures quoted by Murphy J (id. 63-64) much wider 
divergences had come to exist with the ratio of the number of 
people in the division with least number of people relative to the 
number of people in the division with the greatest number of 
people falling towards 1/2 in Victoria and below 1/2 in 
Queensland. See the slightly different proportions referred to by 
McTiernan and Jacobs JJ at 39.
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Four members of the Court, McTiernan, Stephen, Jacobs and Murphy 
JJ accepted the basic argument of those challenging the electoral 
divisions that the phrase "directly chosen by the people" did 
incorporate a democratic principle of popular government as a legal 
requirement.^
McTiernan, Jacobs and Murphy JJ (with Stephen J not commenting) 
also considered that what would be required to comply with the 
principle would vary and had varied since Federation according to "the 
common understanding of the time" of what constituted choice by the 
people (per McTiernan and Jacobs JJ jointly) or 'Because of the 
silent operation of constitutional principles (per Murphy J).
Murphy J went on to conclude that the Constitution did require 
equality and that what it required was equality in the number of 
electors (rather than people) in each electorate.^ On the other 
hand McTiernan, Stephen and Jacobs JJ considered that an election 
could answer the description of choice by the people even if the 
choice were made on the basis of unequal electoral distributions. The 
degree of divergence from equality was only one factor to be taken 
into account in the overall question of degree - did the method of 
election answer (as a matter of degree) the description "choice by the 
people".^
1 Id_. 36 per McTiernan and Jacobs JJ; 56 per Stephen J; 71 
per Murphy J.
2 Id. 36.
3 Id. 69.
4 Id. 75.
5 _Id. 36-37 per McTiernan and Jacobs JJ jointly. Similarly 57 per
Stephen J.
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The authorisation of an Electoral Act's margin of one-tenth departure 
from the quota was not, in the circumstances, incompatible with s24 of 
the Constitution and some divergence might even be necessary to avoid 
gerrymanders.^ (Pending a redistribution) an election based on the 
current electoral divisions albeit with the current high level of 
divergence in some instances, could not be said in all the 
circumstances to be other than a choice by the people as required by 
s24.1 2 3456
Mason J simply concluded that an election based on electorates 
with some variation even with a marked variation in size still 
answered the description of a choice by the people. By reserving 
the question of variations leading to gross disproportions between the 
electorates,^ Mason J may be taken to have reserved the question of 
the political content of the formula.
It had been submitted that the function of the word '’directly" was 
to preclude "indirect" election by, for example, an electoral college 
system. Only Barwick CJ and Gibbs J were willing to commit themselves 
to the proposition that the formula "directly chosen by the people of 
the Commonwealth" did not import any other principle. Central to the 
supporting reasoning offered by Barwick CJ and Gibbs J was the 
distinction between the history of the American colonies and 
Australian colonies and in particular the different experiences in 
relation to the British principle of sovereignty of Parliament.^
1 Id. 37 per McTiernan and Jacobs JJ jointly.
2 Id. 40-41 per McTiernan and Jacobs JJ; 57 per Stephen J.
3 Id. 61.
4 Ibid.
5 Id. 9 per TEF Hughes QC.
6 Id. 22-24 per Barwick CJ, 46-47 per Gibbs J.
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There was, in Australia, not the same antagonism to Parliamentary 
power as there was in America, and it was, therefore, for these 
judges, quite appropriate to conclude that Parliament had been 
entrusted with a wide discretion relating to electoral boundaries.
Barwick CJ put it thus
The contrast in constitutional approach is that, in the case of 
the American Constitution, restriction on legislative power is 
sought and readily implied whereas, where confidence with 
parliament prevails, express words are regarded as necessary to 
warrant a limitation of otherwise plenary powers. Thus, 
discretions in parliament are more readily accepted in the 
construction of the Australian Constitution.
The point hardly needs to be stated. Barwick CJ trusted Parliament 
with democracy but not with federalism.
The Disqualification of members of Parliament on account of pecuniary 
interest
In 1975 the question arose of whether a member of the coalition 
opposition, one Senator Webster was disqualified from sitting in 
Parliament by s44(v) of the Constitution which provides
Any person who -
(v) Has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any 
agreement with the Public Service of the Commonwealth otherwise 
then as a member and in common with the other members of an 
incorporated company consisting of more than twenty-five persons: 
shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a 
member of the House of Representatives.
1 _Id. 24 per Barwick CJ, similarly 46 per Gibbs J.
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The facts which brought Senator Webster's position into doubt were 
that he was managing director, secretary, manager and one of only nine 
shareholders in a timber merchant company which had an arrangement 
with the Commonwealth Department of Housing and Construction whereby 
it (the company) agreed to supply timber, sometimes with the prices 
specified in advance and sometimes not, to the Department according to 
its orders from time to time. During the relevant period orders were 
made by the Department and filled by the company.
Barwick CJ, saying that the case did not involve any 
"constitutional matters of great moment" declined the application of 
TEF Hughes QC appearing for the Commonwealth Attorney-General to refer
the matter to the Full Court and sat alone to deal with the case as a
2Court of Disputed Returns. Given the political sensitivity of the 
issue, one would have expected the Chief Justice of Australia to avoid 
the possibility of having his actions construed or represented as an 
abuse of his position as Chief Justice for partisan or personal 
purposes. The case was far from routine and it was most unusual 
for the Chief Justice to roster himself to deal with single Justice 
matters. To say that the case did not involve any "constitutional 
matters of great moment" could only mean either that Barwick CJ had 
prejudged the constitutional question, not previously considered by 
the High Court, of the meaning of s44(v) or that he did not think the 
constitutional requirements of proper conduct for Parliamentarians 
were very important.^
1 Re Webster (1975) 132 CLR 270, 271-272.
2 D Marr op cit 280.
3 Cf_ D Marr op cit 280-281.
4 It was not exactly clear what the effect of a disqualification of 
Senator Webster would have been for the composition of the Senate 
and Barwick CJ did not intend to hear argument on that matter 
until he had considered whether s44(v) applied. (1975) 132 CLR 
270, 272. On that issue see G Evans, "Pecuniary Interests of 
Members of Parliament Under the Australian Constitution" (1975) 49 
ALJ 464.
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It was almost inevitable that the sweeping terms of s44(v) would
be read down.^ The question was - what limitations should be read
into the provision. Marr reports that Barwick as counsel in the early
1950's had prepared an opinion on the meaning of s44 which considered
that the section should be read as intended to meet the mischief - at
which its seventeenth and eighteenth century legislative predecessors
had been aimed - of securing the independence of Parliamentarians from
oinfluence by the Executive. Now as Chief Justice Barwick adopted
2that approach as the basis for construing s44(v) and rejected a 
more "modern" approach discernible, in inter alia, the Convention 
Debates which would treat s44(v) as a provision for preventing members 
of Parliament from abusing their position or from being open to 
suspicion of abusing their position.^ Barwick CJ further indicated 
his attitude for approaching the section when he remarked^ that in 
1869 Montague Smith J had said
"I can not help thinking that it would be very desirable that this 
Act^ should be revised, because it certainly appears to me to be 
totally inapplicable to the present state of commerce, and that it 
really provides a pit-fall into which men who wish to walk 
uprightly and according to the law may unwittingly tumble."^
1 Cf_ G Evans, op cit 464-465, 476.
2 Op cit 281.
3 (1975) 132 CLR 270, 277-278.
4 ld_. 278-279. Barwick CJ acknowledged that there were indications 
of concern with that "mischief" in the National Australasian 
Convention Debates, (Adelaide) 1897, 736-738 and Australasian 
Federal Convention Debate (Sydney) 1897, 1022-1028 but made no 
comment on the relevance of that material. Cf G Evans, "Pecuniary 
Interests of Members of Parliament Under the Australian 
Constitution (1975) 49 ALJ 464, 467.
5 (1975) 132 CLR 270, 278.
6 22 Geo III C45.
7 Royse v Birley (1869) LR 4 CP 296, 319.
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Barwick CJ commented, "However, the provision is part of the 
Constitution and, however vestigial, must be enforced".  ^ Construing 
s44(v) in the light of what he considered to be its purpose and in the 
light of established constructions of similar legislation in England, 
Barwick CJ considered that for any agreement to come within s44(v) it
"must have a currency for a substantial period of time, and must 
be one under which the Crown could conceivably influence the 
contractor in relation to parliamentary affairs by the very 
existence of the agreement, or by something done or refrained 
from being done in relation to the contract or its subject matter, 
whether or not that act or omission is within the terms of the 
contract ... Further, it seems to me that the interest in the 
agreement of the person said to be disqualified must be pecuniary 
in the sense that through the possibility of financial gain by the 
existence or the performance of the agreement, that person could 
conceivably be influenced by the Crown in relation to 
Parliamentary affairs".^
That construction went beyond simply construing the provision in the 
light of the mischief at which Barwick CJ thought it was aimed. It 
effectively elevated the original mischief aimed at by such 
disqualification provisions to a condition for the operation of 
s44(v). The limitations which Barwick CJ implied into the general 
words of s44(v) left that provision with a very narrow range of 
operation. The limitations were such also that their application 
could lead the judiciary into political controversy and examination of 
internal Parliamentary proceedings.
1 (1975) 132 CLR 270, 278.
2 Id. 280.
3 There was support for Barwick CJ's approach in nineteenth century 
English cases he cited. Contrast however, the attitude of the 
Tasmanian Law Officers who gave a wide Construction to similar 
provisions in the Tasmanian constitutional provisions in 18 Vic 
17, sl9 and 34 Vic 42, s6. AN Lewis, "The Tasmanian Members' 
Case. Contracts Between Members of Parliament and Government 
Trading Departments" (1935) 6 ALJ 322, 365 especially at 367-368.
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Applying his construction to the facts, Barwick CJ came to these
conclusions. Even where the arrangement between the company and the
Department of Housing and Construction should be analysed as
constituting a standing offer from the company to supply specified
timber at specified prices^ a separate contract would come into
existence each time the Department made an order (accepted that
offer.) There was therefore no single continuing agreement. There
2was only a casual and transient arrangement.
The conclusion that the arrangement was casual and transient was 
reinforced by Barwick CJ’s belief that it was inconceivable that "in 
these days, the Crown could exert influence in Parliamentary affairs
by anything it could do, properly or improperly, in relation to such 
„ 3an agreement .
Barwick CJ commented that he regreted that the application of 
s44(v) should depend on "technical concepts of the law of 
contracts".^ Also "The distinction is a nice one, and as I have 
said, it is more than unfortunate that the answer to the Senate's 
questions could turn upon it."^ At one level there is inconsistency 
between Barwick CJ's approach to the construction of s44(v) which 
emphasises the spirit and purpose of the provision rather than its 
literal terms and his approach to the application of s44(v) which 
allows the technical analysis rather than the substance of a 
transaction to be the determining consideration. The common factor at 
both levels was Barwick CJ's clear belief that s44(v) is anachronistic 
and unnecessary.
1 In the cases where no price was quoted there was not even an offer 
and the transactions were even further removed from s44(v). Id. 
284.
2 Id. 283-286.
3 Id 286.
4 Id. 277.
5 Id. 283.
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The Advice to the Governor-General - Federalism and Constitutionality 
working together to bring down Governments.
In an interview with The Times in his first months as Attorney- 
General in 1959, Barwick explained for the British reader the 
importance of the law in Australian politics.^ Governments in 
Australia are, as Attorney-General Barwick explained, subject to the 
Constitution. A-G Barwick introduced the further proposition that it 
had been the decisions of the High Court and Privy Council, holding 
unconstitutional attempts by the Chifley Labour Government to exercise 
more power than the Commonwealth had, which had caused that Government 
to lose office. A-G Barwick considered federalism to be a very 
important check to government power and a "guarantor" of individual 
liberty.
There were parallels in Barwick CJ's advice of 10 November 1975 to 
the Governor-General. (I reproduce the full text of the letter in an 
appendix). Barwick CJ gave the advice without consulting or even 
informing the other members of the High Court. The day after that 
advice was given, Governor-General Kerr dismissed the Whitlam Labor 
government. The Governor-General also commissioned the Fraser-led 
Opposition as a "caretaker" government and dissolved both Houses of 
Parliament. At the ensuing general election the caretaker government 
won by a landslide.
In Barwick CJ’s advice to the Governor-General there was the 
assertion of the principle of constitutionality, the subordination of 
the government to the supreme law, the Constitution. Again also there 
was the assertion of the importance of federalism. Now, however, the
1 9 November 1959 under the ambiguous heading "People to Watch".
2 Most of the documents relating to the dissolution are collected 
under the heading "Current Topics - The Fourth Double Dissolution, 
11th November 1975" (1975) 49 ALJ 645.
67.
federal feature that was emphasised was not the distribution and 
limitation of governmental powers, but was instead the bicameral 
structure of Parliament with a State's House.
The essential elements of Barwick CJ's advice were these.
1. He could give the advice because the situation was unlikely
to come before the Court.
2. The constitution of Australia is a federal constitution 
which embodies the principle of ministerial responsibility.
The parliament consists of two Houses, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, each popularly elected, and 
each with the same legislative power, with the one exception 
that the Senate may not originate or amend money bills.
3. The Senate has constitutional power to refuse supply 
to the government of the day.
4. A Prime Minister who does not have the confidence
of both Houses of the Australian Parliament is in a position 
analgous to that of a Prime Minister who does not have the 
confidence of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. The 
analogy [or part of the analogy - the advice is ambiguous] is 
that a Prime Minister who cannot ensure supply to the Crown 
owes a duty to the Crown either to resign or to advise a 
general election.
5. If a Prime Minister who is unable to secure supply,
refuses to take either step then the Governor-General has the 
constitutional authority and, duty to dismiss that Prime 
Minister and invite the leader of the Opposition, if he can 
undertake to secure supply, to form a caretaker government 
pending a general election, "whether of the house of 
representatives, or of both houses of Parliament, as that 
government may advise".
On 10 June 1976 a few months after he had given his advice to the 
Governor-General, Chief Justice Barwick was the guest speaker at a 
National Press Club luncheon. His address did not relate to the 
events of November 1975 but most of the questions he received 
afterwards did.
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Various conspiracy theories were abroad after the dismissal of the 
Government. At the Press Club Luncheon'*' Barwick CJ attempted to 
allay the suspicions aroused by the fact that his advice bore a close 
resemblance to the opinions published on 16 October 1975 by his 
relative RJ Ellicott QC, at the time a shadow Minister.^ Barwick CJ 
made these points. First he had no close relationship of friendship 
with Ellicott. Secondly, Barwick CJ had no contact with Ellicott. 
Thirdly, although Barwick CJ was in the habit of reading the questions 
on notice in Hansard, he was not aware until a "long time after" that 
Ellicott had made a speech in Parliament relating to the matter. A 
point which Barwick CJ did not address was whether or not he was aware 
of the press reports of the opinion which Ellicott had released to the 
press on 16 October. The similarity between Ellicott's opinion and 
Barwick CJ's advice about the Governor-General's proposed course of 
action could of course be explained by the fact that Governor-General 
Kerr had taken the Ellicott opinion into account when forming his own
'iopinion upon which he sought comment from Barwick CJ.
Many Australians saw and continue to see the fact that Barwick 
gave the advice he did as being an improper use of his status as Chief 
Justice to assist the Opposition parties to force the Labor Government 
from office. At the luncheon Barwick CJ was asked^
"Now with hindsight do you have any regrets about your letter of 
November 10th....?"
Barwick CJ replied
"... I have none whatever. And for my part I am quite content to 
abide by history when it is written by informed people who have no 
bias party political wise at all and that won't be perhaps for
1 When answering a question from Allen Lloyd.
2 Kerr 0£ cit 270-271.
3 Kerr Op cit 270-271.
4 By Allen Lloyd.
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twenty or thirty years. And when somebody writes about this I am 
quite confident myself as to what the answer will be, but I am 
not in the least bit regretful about anything I did."^
Unfortunately this thesis cannot wait twenty or thirty years and I 
must attempt an appraisal now. In this section of the thesis, I 
depart from one of the general constraints I set for myself of 
avoiding judging Barwick CJ’s resposes to specific issues as being 
good or bad. I will in this section comment on the propriety of 
Barwick CJ giving the advice he gave to the Governor-General. If I 
did not discuss the propriety of the giving of that advice, then the 
picture of Barwick CJ’s perception of the relationship of the 
judiciary to the government, would be incomplete.
Professor Geoffrey Sawer, seems to me to have demonstrated 
clearly, how Barwick CJ's decision to advise the Governor-General 
endangered the independent status of the Court and also seems to me 
to have demonstrated what ambiguities, logical flaws, and
2inconsistencies there were in the content of Barwick CJ’s advice.
I respectfully adopt the points made by Professor Sawer. I now 
summarise those points adding as I do so, supplementary comments of my 
own and reference to Barwick CJ’s answers at the National Press Club 
Luncheon of 10 June 1976, to questions about the advice.
Professor Sawer in his first point took issue with Barwick CJ’s 
proposition that he was free to give advice without compromising 
himself or the Court, because it, the advice, related to an "existing 
situation which, of its nature, was unlikely to come before the 
court." (This seems impliedly to acknowledge that advising on 
matters which could come before the Court would have compromised
1 Also later when answering George Negus "And as I told the 
questioner here, even at this point of time I am quite content to 
be judged by what I did because I think it was right"
2 Federation Under Strain 158-160.
3 Op cit 158.
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Barwick CJ and the Court). ^ This statement is subject to challenge 
at two levels - whether or not the statement in fact related only to 
matters unlikely to come before the Court - whether, even, if it did 
only relate to matters unlikely to come before the Court, Barwick CJ's 
behaviour compromised his own and the Court's position. At the Press 
Club luncheon Barwick CJ was questioned on this and related points.
His main line of defence was to assert that his advice only related to 
the authority of the Governor-General to withdraw the commission of a 
Prime Minister and that that question could never come before the 
Court.2
No matter how one reads Barwick CJ’s advice, however, it is 
impossible to conclude that it only related to the power of the 
Governor-General to withdraw a Prime Minister's commission. First, it 
contained assertions about the duty of a Prime Minister unable to 
obtain supply either to resign or to advise a general election. One 
can probably extend to this point Barwick CJ's statement that the 
"situation ... was unlikely to come before the Court" but still 
question the propriety of such advice being given. (The discussion 
will return to this aspect of the advice.) Secondly, it contained 
assertions about the constitutional authority and duty of the 
Governor-General, after dismissing a Prime Minister unable to obtain 
supply, to invite the leader of the Opposition if he could obtain 
supply to form a caretaker government pending a general election for 
either the House of Representatives or for both Houses of Parliament 
as that Government may advise. If the advice is to be construed as
1 Sir Garfield Barwick, "A Judge's Role in Public Life" Sunday 
Australian 10 October 1971. "Yet the judge who ventures to take 
place in the community in relation to its social affairs, must be 
astute not to act or to speak on or in relation to any matter 
which may generate litigation which may came before him in his 
judicial capacity."
2 Answers to questions from Mungo MacCallum, Richard Ackland, George 
Negus, John Lombard.
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endorsing a doable dissolution,^ then it was touching on a situation 
which could have come before the Court.
At the Press Club luncheon when a questioner drew attention to 
the aspect of Gibbs J's judgment in the Petroleum and Minerals 
Authority Case^ which indicated that the Court might be able to 
intervene to prevent an illegal dissolution of the Senate (the 
inference being that the deposed government might have instituted such 
action), Barwick CJ replied "if there is a difference between Mr
Justice Gibbs and the rest well that will have to work itself
„ 4 out .
This was an extraordinarily inadequate answer.^  In the s57 
cases Barwick CJ himself had asserted that the Court had jurisdiction 
to ensure compliance with s57's prescribed method of law-making even 
to the point of taking preventative action to restrain a joint sitting
1 Although it might be argued that Barwick CJ's advice did not 
express a concluded opinion on whether or not a double dissolution 
could properly be effected, it is open to the construction that it 
did authorise a double dissolution. The advice concluded with the 
declaration that the "course upon which Your Excellency has 
determined" was consistent with his Constitutional duty. Governor- 
General Kerr's record of his conversations with Barwick CJ is 
similarly ambiguous and open to the construction that the "course" 
which the Governor-General explained to Barwick CJ included a s57 
double dissolution. Sir John Kerr Matters for Judgment - An 
Autobiography 337, 342.
2 Mungo MacCallum.
3 (1975) 134 CLR 81, 157.
4 Cf_ Sawer op cit 158.
5 The question itself was less than satisfactory. The questioner 
(Mungo MacCallum) suggested that Gibbs J had expressed a concluded 
view on the power of the Court to intervene to prevent a 
dissolution not complying with s57. In fact Gibbs J, although 
indicating some support for the existence of such a power, 
carefully reserved the question. (1975) 134 CLR 81, 157. The 
question was also misleading in that it attributed to Gibbs J an 
opinion about the Court's power to prevent improper dissolution of 
both Houses of Parliament. In fact Gibbs J expressed the opinion 
that the power derived from ss5 and 28 to dissolve the House of 
Representatives was probably unrestricted Id. 155-156. Gibbs J's 
concentration was on the power in s57 to dissolve the Senate.
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from legislating if s57’s preconditions had not been satisfied. A 
questioner at the luncheon^- reminded Barwick CJ that in the First 
Territories Representation Case, he (Barwick CJ) had also expressed 
the opinion that deadlocked bills could become stale by the lapse of 
time so as no longer to be available for s57 action.
In relation to this specific point about stockpiled bills becoming 
stale, Barwick CJ replied that he was in the minority in expressing 
that opinion so he must have been wrong. This answer was received 
with hilarity by the audience and it cannot be seen as anything other 
than a joke. It in no way constituted a satisfactory answer. It is 
not inconceivable that Barwick CJ might have deferred to the opinion 
of his brother Judges who had expressed their opinion that deadlocked 
bills could not become stale through lapse of time. (Having in 
Cormack v Cope expressed the view that a reference in the Governor- 
General’s proclamation convening a joint sitting to a bill which was 
not in fact eligible for enactment by a joint sitting, would vitiate 
any action taken at the joint sitting,^ Barwick CJ then in the First 
Territories Representation Case itself^ deferred to the contrary 
opinion expressed by three of his brethren in Cormack v Cope)
Still if Barwick CJ were to have deferred readily on the fundamental 
point of stockpiling, going to the power to dissolve the Senate, it 
would have contrasted strongly with his refusal in the Second 
Territories Representation Case^ to accept what he perceived to be
1 Richard Ackland.
2 (1975) 134 CLR 201, 220-222 accepting the submission (id. 211-212) 
of Western Australia’s Solicitor General, Wilson later Wilson J of 
the High Court.
3 (1975) 134 CLR 201, 236-237 per Gibbs J; 251-253 per Stephen J; 
265-266 per Mason J. 277-278 per Jacobs J; 289 per Murphy J.
4 (1974) 131 CLR 432, 459-460.
5 (1975) 134 CLR 201, 225.
6 (1974) 131 CLR 432, 462-463 per Menzies J, 468 per Gibbs J 471
per Stephen J.
7 (1977) 139 CLR 585. Above pp.51ff.
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the fundamental inroad upon the Senate's position in the Federation 
created by the decision in the First Territories Representation 
Case. ^
In any case the point was not whether, if any action were brought, 
either to restrain the Governor-General from dissolving the Houses of 
Parliament or to challenge the validity or efficacy of that action 
afterwards, it would succeed. The question was whether if any such 
action were brought it would be entitled to be argued and not 
dismissed as vexatious. If any such action had been brought it is 
difficult to see that it would not have been entitled at least to be 
argued. Barwick CJ's own published judgments had clearly 
identified possible grounds for challenging s57 action and it was 
always possible that other grounds could be identified.^
Barwick CJ's advice said, of course, not that it was impossible 
that the situation could come before the Court but that it was
1 (1975) 134 CLR 201. Above pp.52ff.
2 G Sawer Op cit 158-159.
3 In the First Territories Representation Case Stephen J expressed 
the opinion that the Governor-General’s powers in s57 were limited 
by purpose. (1975) 134 CLR 201, 260-262. Leslie Katz developed 
the argument that the Governor-General’s power (under s57) to 
dissolve the Houses of Parliament can only be used for the purpose 
of resolving deadlocks of bills which have satisfied the 
preconditions for s57 action and cannot be used for other 
purposes. On that approach the Governor-General's action was 
ultra vires as it was taken for the purpose of resolving the 
conflict over the supply bills which were not deadlocked under 
s57. "The Simultaneous Dissolution of Both Houses of the 
Australian Federal Parliament 1975” (1976) 54 Canadian Bar Review 
392. The Governor-General's statement explaining the basis for 
his action is set out in Sawer op cit 207-210 and in "Current 
Topics -The Fourth Double Dissolution, 11th November 1975” (1975) 
49 ALJ 645. Richard Ackland at the Press Club luncheon attributed 
such a view to Barwick CJ in the First Territories Representation 
Case. The argument was a logical extension of Barwick CJ's 
proposition that we should bear in mind "the function of s57 in 
providing the possibility of the electorate expressing its opinion 
or the matters in difference between the Houses of Parliament ..." 
(1975) 134 CLR 201, 222) but Barwick CJ's judgment did not 
directly endorse the proposition.
(The judgments of Mason J (icU 265-266) and Jacobs J (ici. 277) 
were inconsistent with the notion that the Governor-General's 
actions under s57 might be reviewed for relevance of purpose.)
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unlikely to do so. In a sense it was true to say that the situation 
was "unlikely" to come before the Court. It was "unlikely" that an 
action would be brought to restrain the Governor-General from 
dissolving the Houses of Parliament as the Governor-General did not 
intend to keep the Prime Minister informed of his intended actions.^ 
There is no evidence, however, that Barwick CJ knew of this secrecy. 
If Barwick CJ had been party to the secrecy, then he would have been 
involved in bringing the Court into highly controversial political 
action. (On the one previous known occasion of a Governor-General 
seeking advice from the Chief Justice, the Governor-General first 
obtained the consent of the Prime Minister to such an approach being 
made. It is not clear whether Barwick CJ knew or even questioned 
whether such consent had been given on this occasion.)
Even though Barwick CJ himself had stated in the PMA Case that 
failure to comply with s57's conditions would not vitiate any actual 
dissolution or consequent election in purported reliance on s57, the 
point could hardly be said to be conclusively settled^ and there was 
a real possibility of an application by the dismissed Prime Minister 
for a declaration that the purported double dissolution was a 
nullity.
And what of the deadlocked bills on which the double dissolution 
was based? According to the opinion polls, the Labor government had 
been out of favour with the electorate for some months and was not 
"likely" therefore to be returned so as to have the opportunity to
1 Sir John Kerr Op cit 334 "... Mr Whitlam, by his publicly 
announced and privately stated attitudes, had left me under no 
obligation to tell him how my thinking was developing."
2 G Sawer Op cit 157.
3 (1976) 134 CLR 81, 120.
4 Jacobs J thought it possible that a failure to satisfy s57’s 
preconditions could result in a purported dissolution being void. 
Id. 196. Gibbs J and Stephen J were of the same opinion as 
Barwick CJ, id. 157, 178. Mason J expressed no concluded opinion 
id. 183-184. The minority opinion of McTiernan J that the 
satisfaction of s57's preconditions was not justiciable would 
prevent challenge to the validity of a double dissolution.
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submit the deadlocked bills to a joint sitting. It would seem, 
however, improper for the Chief Justice to risk compromising his 
position on the basis of the expectation of the success of one 
political s rouP rather than another in a general election.^ 
Furthermore, whatever the colour of the government elected after the 
double dissolution, this newly elected government could have adopted 
some of the deadlocked bills and might have submitted them to a joint 
sitting. There were twenty-one deadlocked bills. If any one of them 
had been passed by a joint sitting following the double dissolution 
the Court could well have been asked to decide on the validity of the 
resulting law.
I now leave for the moment the question of the propriety of
Barwick CJ giving the advice and turn to the contents of the advice.
Barwick CJ's proposition that the Senate has constitutional power to
orefuse supply has been exhaustively discussed by others. The 
general opinion is that Barwick CJ was correct to conclude that the 
final words of s53 - "Except as provided in this section, the Senate 
shall have equal power with the House of Representatives in respect of 
all purpose of laws" - mean what they say and there is no basis for 
limiting them by implication to exclude the power to reject supply. I 
have nothing to add to that topic.
1 Compare the Bank Nationalisation Case (1949) 79 CLR 497 where the 
Privy Council felt "free" to give its advisory opinion of how it 
would have decided the case if it could have. It is obvious that 
the Privy Council could not have felt "free" to publish its views 
if those views had been supportive of the substance of the 
appellant's case.
2 Op cit 158-159. "Current topics - standing by the Constitution" 
(1975) 49 ALJ 553; JE Richardson "The Legislative Power of the 
Senate in respect of Money Bills" (1976) 50 ALJ 273; C Howard and 
C Saunders, "The Blocking of the Budget and Dismissal of the 
Government" in G Evans (ed), Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975 
251 ff; G Sawer Op cit 107ff.
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Barwick CJ's assertions about the duties of a government unable to 
obtain supply and about the responsibility of a government to the 
Houses of Parliament have not received similar general acceptance. As 
Sawer points out, Barwick CJ offered no authority for his assertion 
that a Prime Minister unable to obtain supply must either resign or 
advise a general election. Sawer could find no unequivocal precedent 
for the proposition and points out the inappropriateness of such a 
rigid rule in a complex political situation.^
Barwick CJ’s advice is not free from ambiguity. It can be 
construed as offering a justification for the assertion about the duty 
of a government unable to obtain supply, in these terms:- In the 
British unitary system, a government having the confidence of the 
House of Commons can continue in office and obtain supply without the 
support of the House of Lords. (Implicitly, a government not having 
the confidence of the House of Commons will not obtain supply.) The 
Australian Parliament is structured around principles of ministerial 
responsibility and federalism. For federal reasons supply can not be 
obtained without the support of the House of the States as well as the 
House of Representatives. Therefore, inability to obtain supply 
indicates an absence of Parliamentary confidence in the government 
which, according to principles of ministerial responsibility, is 
obliged to resign or advise an election.
Such a line of reasoning by equating ability to obtain supply with 
the confidence required by the doctrine of responsible government, 
introduces the proposition that Commonwealth governments must have
1 Op cit 158. BL Lovell in a letter to the Editor of the
Australian Law Journal, (1976) 50 ALJ 256, supports Barwick CJ’s 
opinion and its basis in analogy with the United Kingdom 
Parliament. JG Starke rejects out of hand the suggestion that 
refusal of an upper house to grant supply is a basis for forced 
dismissal of a Prime Minister (reviewing Kerr, Matters for 
Judgment) (1979) 53 ALJ 105, 106.
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the confidence of both Houses. As Sawer comments it would simply be 
absurd to say that Australian governments must have the confidence of 
both Houses.^  If that proposition were correct then it would make a 
nonsense of Australian parliamentary tradition and it would result in 
a state of anarchy whenever the House of Representatives and the 
Senate were under the control of different political forces as no 
government would have the confidence of both Houses. A questioner^ 
at the Press Club luncheon pointed out to Barwick CJ that after the 
Governor-General had dismissed Prime Minister Whitlam, and 
commissioned Fraser as Prime Minister, the House of Representatives 
had reaffirmed that Whitlam and not Fraser had its confidence. The 
questioner asked, should not Fraser have resigned his commission, 
because, according to Barwick CJ's theory of responsible government, 
governments must have the confidence of both Houses. Barwick CJ might 
have answered that according to his theory a Prime Minister lacking 
the confidence of both Houses must either resign or advise a general 
election and Fraser had done the latter. Instead Barwick CJ asserted 
that all that really mattered was ability to get supply and Fraser got 
supply. If this was all that Barwick CJ's written advice to the 
Governor-General had been intended to convey, then the references 
therein to ministerial responsibility in a federal bi-cameral 
structure and to the confidence of both Houses, were of marginal 
relevance and served only to confuse. The advice, however, seemed to 
treat these notions as pivotal.
Even if we accepted Barwick CJ's statement at the Press Club as 
confining the "duty to resign or advise election" to situations of 
inability to obtain supply, it still means that the advice carries 
consequences which it is difficult to believe the Founders could have 
intended. Even with such a limitation the advice would still give the 
States’ House, the Senate, the power (through the coercion of threat 
to deny supply), to dictate to the House of the nation, the House of
1 Op cit 159.
2 Bill D'arcy.
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Representatives, that it must either accept a ministry of the Senate’s 
choosing or keep on being dissolved and having general elections until 
people willing to do the Senate’s bidding gained a majority in the 
House of Representatives. This consequence would follow because 
although the power of the Governor-General to send the House of 
Representatives to a general election is not subject to any express 
limitations, the Senators are guaranteed a fixed term unless 
there happen to be deadlocked bills making s57 available. Some might 
think it fortuitous and beneficial that the Senate have the power to 
force the House of Representatives to go to its electorate for re­
endorsement. The nation may, otherwise, have to suffer a bad 
government for three years. Barwick CJ did not introduce any such 
notion to his advice and there is nothing to suggest that the Founders 
intended the House of Representatives to have to carry on its business 
under constant threat of election called, effectively, by the States' 
House.
In the context of determining the meaning of s57's phrase "fails 
to pass", Barwick CJ had eschewed any construction which would give 
the House of Representatives any power to compel the Senate even to 
enter upon deliberation of a bill. It was for him unthinkable and 
inappropriate to the Senate’s status that the House of Representatives 
should have anything like a power to direct the Senate to consider a 
bill. Barwick CJ’s advice implicitly recognized a much more
1 Constitution ss28 and 32.
2 Constitution s7. PH Lane raised the question of whether the 
Governor-General has any prerogative power (apart from s57) to 
dissolve Parliament. "Double Dissolution of Federal Parliament" 
(1973) 47 ALJ 290. Barwick CJ emphasised in Cormack v Cape (1974) 
131 CLR 432,449-450 that s57 provides the only power to dissolve 
the Senate. (No reference was made by Barwick CJ to the arguments 
proposed by Lane for the existence of a separate prerogative 
right.) J Goldring discusses the issue in "The Royal Prerogative 
and Dissolution of the Commonwealth Parliament" (1975) 49 ALJ 521 
and agrees with Barwick CJ’s conclusion. So too do the editorial 
commentators of the Australian Law Journal in Current Topics - 
"The Precise Ground for the Double Dissolution of 11th April,
1974" (1974) 48 ALJ 161.
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fundamental and "unthinkable power" for the Senate to coerce the House 
of Representatives in any and every aspect of government.^
Sawer's other line of criticism of Barwick CJ’s assertions about 
Prime Minister’s duties was that the assertions seemed to elevate
oconventional standards to rules of law. This criticism was also 
central to Sawer's fourth point dealing with the references in Barwick 
CJ's advice to the constitutional duties of the Governor-General.^
Kerr reports that he only asked Barwick CJ in what circumstances he 
(Kerr) could take certain actions. "I did not, of course, ask the 
Chief Justice whether existing circumstances would warrant my doing 
this"
Barwick CJ said at the Press Club "... he never asked me to advise 
him as to whether he should or he should not. He merely asked me 
whether if he took that course it was within his authority, 
constitutional authority, and that is quite a different thing".^
There is indeed a very large difference between power and duty. Yet 
despite all his protestations at the Press Club that his advice 
related solely to the power of the Governor-General to withdraw a 
Prime Minister's commission, Barwick CJ's advice clearly went 
beyond that topic. As noted above the advice contained the clear 
assertion that the Governor-General had a duty to invite the 
leader of the Opposition, if he could obtain supply, to form a 
caretaker government pending a general election for the House of
1 Compare Press Club luncheon. Question Tony Hawker "Do you think 
the events of November the eleventh have now confirmed or now 
indicated that ... the Senate has primacy over the House of 
Representatives, the People's House?
Barwick CJ - that is not for me to discuss. That is a political 
question."
2 Op cit 158-159.
3 Id. 159-160.
4 Kerr Op cit 342.
5 Answering Tony Hawker.
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Representatives or for both Houses of that Parliament. The advice 
also contained ambiguous declarations that "the course upon which Your 
Excellency has determined is consistent with your constitutional 
duty."
Sawer asks, were the Prime Minister's and Governor-General's 
duties to which Barwick CJ referred in his advice, legal or non-legal 
(conventional, moral) duties?^- Sawer asks further, if, as seems 
likely, Barwick CJ was talking about non-legal matters then what 
business was it of his to enter political debate about what Prime
oMinisters and Governors-General should do. The fact that Barwick 
CJ's advice seemed to go beyond matters of law into matters of 
convention and politics, reinforces the point already made - the 
giving of such advice endangered the independent status of the High 
Court. (One might add, if Barwick CJ wanted to enter the political 
arena, why did he not discuss whether the Governor-General should urge 
the Senate to comply with what many people considered to be a 
convention that Senates should not refuse supply?)
During one phase of questioning at the Press Club Barwick CJ's 
answers might be construed as elevating the duties referred to in his 
advice to duties in law. That viewpoint and Barwick CJ's 
understanding of the source of these legal duties emerge from these 
extracts.
Barwick CJ ... It is not reserve power at all. Its a simple
case, simple case that of a Minister who cannot provide the 
Crown with money for the ordinary services of government, 
cannot remain the Crown's Minister. Now the fact is that.
1 Op cit 158-160.
2 Op cit 160.
3 The suggested convention is discussed in "Current Topics - 
Standing by the Constitution" (1975) 49 ALJ 553, 554; JE 
Richardson, "The Legislative Power of the Senate in Respect of 
Money Bills" (1976) 50 ALJ 273 especially pp.280-290; G Sawer Op 
cit 121-129.
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[Unidentified questioner] Sir Garfield could I clarify an
answer that you gave to an earlier question.^ If I just
repeat the question. What section of the Constitution
specifies that the Prime Minister unable to obtain supply,
should either advise an election or resign, what section of
the Constitution lays down that the Governor-General's duty
would in these circumstances be to commission the opposition
as a Caretaker Government. Now my understanding of it was
2that you replied to that, those questioners no.
Barwick CJ No, no - no sections about it - no.
[ ? ] Well was not the advice that you gave to the Governor-General
then Sir, purely political?
Barwick CJ No, no, no. It was, it was founded on the legal 
traditions of a responsible government.
[ ? ] But Sir you referred in that, to the question there, to
constitutional authority, which ...
Barwick CJ Yes that is right, well that is right, a_
responsible Government constitutional authority is built into 
our whole system."
Through this exchange there is of course the slide from questions 
about duty to answers about authority. The point to note is that 
Barwick CJ's answers can be construed as asserting that the assumption 
of responsible government underlying the Constitution creates by 
implication the legal duties described by the unidentified questioner.
1 Then the questioner was Geoff Simpson.
2 Barwick CJ had simply replied when asked before "None. But you 
could not carry on a Government otherwise”.
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This is, to say the least, a highly debatable proposition, indeed a 
radical proposition.^
Some of the criticism which I have set out here of the content of 
Barwick CJ's advice and the fact that he gave such advice, can be 
undercut by pointing out that it turns on attributing the worst 
possible construction to Barwick CJ’s words. This defence itself 
emphasises the ambiguity of Barwick CJ’s language and thus reinforces 
the essential point that the decision to give such advice took the 
Chief Justiceship of the High Court of Australia into the political 
arena. Lawyers reading Barwick CJ’s advice with their background 
knowledge of constitutional tradition might well be able to discern 
the narrower and more acceptable constructions and limitations in the 
scope of the advice. The advice was, of course, prepared for the 
Governor-General - who happened to be a distinguished lawyer. Both 
Governor-General and Chief Justice well perceived, however, the 
possibility of widespread publication of the advice. Given its 
ambiguity, the publication of the advice in the political context of 
the time, left it open to being construed as an approval of the 
legality and propriety of all the Governor-General's actions.
Federal Parliament - Themes and Patterns in Barwick's behaviour
The issues dealt with in this Chapter surrounded sections of the 
Constitution which had not been explored by the High Court before 
Barwick's Chief Justiceship. The opportunity was thus presented for 
the members of the Court to state what they believed to be the best 
constructions of the sections without having to compromise their
1 "Current Topics - Standing by the Constitution" (1975) 49 ALJ 553, 
554. "Likewise, it cannot be postulated that there is any legal 
duty in the Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General that the 
House of Representatives should be dissolved in the event of a 
refusal of supply. The best that can be said is that there is 
something approaching a parliamentary usage that such dissolution 
should be advised, in view of the difficulty of carrying on 
government without the parliamentary control of moneys."
2 Kerr op cit 342.
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beliefs on account of precedent. (The activity of the 1970's quickly 
generated its own precedent, with, of course, dramatic effect on the 
outcome in the Second Territories Representation Case).
The following hypotheses are some of those which might be set up 
to explain the pattern of Barwick CJ's behaviour discussed in this 
Chapter.
HI: Barwick CJ was compelled to his conclusions by the
unambiguous language of the constitution.
The discussion through the Chapter has demonstrated that seldom was 
the text of the Constitution unambiguous or inexorably compelling. 
Options were available. Indeed, where the language seemed to be at 
its most powerful - in s44(v) - Barwick CJ read it down.
H2: Barwick CJ’s judicial choice was affected by his belief that
the Senate should be strong so that it can perform its 
essential federal role of protecting State interests.
Barwick CJ expressly relied on the role which he considered that the 
Constitution intended for the Senate. Barwick CJ's zeal in defending 
(and some would say, elevating) the status of the Senate by reasoning 
emphasising its position as the States House might have surprised some 
of those who had followed the trend of his decisions relating to the 
scope of Commonwealth legislative power in the first decade of his 
Chief Justiceship. In that period and on that issue (which is 
examined in the following Chapter), Barwick CJ had generally not been 
one to tolerate let alone rely on, States rights arguments.
H3: Barwick CJ's judicial choice was affected by a belief that
the Upper House (regardless of the electorates it 
theoretically represents) should be strong so that it can 
review and delay or block hastily conceived or ill conceived 
action of the House of Government.
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(The evidence which might support this hypothesis is subsumed by the 
discussion relating to the next hypothesis).
H4: Barwick CJ's judicial choice was affected by a lack of
respect for the democratic principle that the people manifest 
their political will through their elected government.
Barwick CJ clearly indicated his willingness to assert the power of 
the High Court over elected government even if that led the High Court 
into political controversy. He gave no recognition, to notions of 
democracy as a source for constitutional law relating to election of 
Parliamentary representatives.
On almost every issue through these cases on Federal Parliament 
and in his advice to the Governor-General, Barwick CJ chose a position 
which made it harder for the Labor Government to enact laws and to 
retain office than did other positions available. On the other hand 
the giving of the advice to the Governor-General, which contributed to 
the dismissal of the Labor Government might be seen as indicating 
faith in the electoral process which came into operation on that 
dismissal).
There may be some degree of accuracy to all of these hypotheses.
No single one of them is unshakeably convincing nor is any one of them 
sufficient to explain all of Barwick CJ’s positions discussed in this 
Chapter. (None of the hypotheses set out above, for example, explains 
Barwick CJ’s position in Re Webster. Perhaps the key to that decision 
lies in Barwick CJ’s attitude to freedom of trade.)''' The evidence 
does not suggest to me any other sustainable hypotheses. One broader 
point does emerge - as with his position on the doctrine of separation 
of powers, Barwick CJ set a higher value on the strength of the 
judiciary than he did on its reputation for independence and 
neutrality.
1 Section 92 chapter.
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Chapter IV: The Federal Balance - The Distribution of
Governmental Power Between the Commonwealth and the States
This Chapter follows Barwick's path through the issues of law and 
principle relating to the distribution of governmental power between 
the Commonwealth and the States. The States have general power to 
make laws for their respective geographical territories. The 
Commonwealth is given express power with respect to specific subject 
matters. Those express specific grants have been supplemented by 
implication. Some of the Commonwealth’s powers are made exclusive to 
the Commonwealth by the Constitution. Most Commonwealth powers are 
concurrent so that the mere existence of Commonwealth power does not 
exclude the States. Section 109 provides that if there is 
inconsistency of a Commonwealth and a State law, the Commonwealth law 
shall prevail.
A - Federal Assumptions of the First Judges of the High Court
The first judges of the High Court, Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O'Connor JJ, determined constitutional issues by express reference to 
their understanding of the kind of federal balance the Constitution 
was intended to create.^- Their Honours’ perception of the intended 
balance was not stated with any great precision. Fundamental to their 
federation was the the proposition
"In considering the respective powers of the Commonwealth and of 
the States it is essential to bear in mind that each is, within 
the ambit of its authority, a sovereign State, subject only to the 
restrictions imposed by the imperial connection and to the 
provisions of the Constitution, either express or necessarily 
implied" .
1 Given their central involvement in the drafting of the 
Constitution their Honours were, of course, in a rather special 
position to comment on the federal balance intended by the 
Constitution. See also Clark J in Pedder v D ’Emden (1903) 2 TasLR 
146.
2 D 'Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 109 per Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O ’Connor JJ (emphasis added).
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This perception of federalism provided the basis for two main 
doctrines, the doctrine of reserved powers, and the doctrine of 
intergovernmental immunities.
(i) The doctrine of reserved powers - federalism as a basis for 
construing grants of Commonwealth power
This doctrine went to the general problem of ascertaining the 
reach of Commonwealth powers in s51. This doctrine held that the 
Constitution had reserved to the States by ssl06x and 107^ powers 
omitted from the express list of Commonwealth powers in s51 (and, in 
particular, had reserved to the States the subject matter of intra­
state trade, which was omitted from s51(i)'s grant to the Commonwealth 
of power with respect to inter-State and overseas trade). The 
reservation of certain powers to the States was just as much a part of 
the Constitution as the grant to the Commonwealth of a list of express 
powers. If the Commonwealth's express powers were to encroach on the 
States reserved powers, then the Constitution would involve an 
internal contradiction which could not have been intended. The 
Constitution should therefore be construed so as to avoid such a 
contradiction. From this reasoning there emerged two separate 
branches, both directed to protecting the area of powers and, in 
particular, the power with respect to intra-State trade, reserved to 
the States.
1 "The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject 
to this Constitution continue as at the establishment of the 
Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the 
State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance with the 
Constitution of the State."
2 "Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or 
becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution 
exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or 
withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the 
establishment of the Commonwealth or as at the admission or 
establishment of the State as the case may be".
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One branch went to the definition of subject matters of power in 
s51. When a subject matter of power was capable of receiving more 
than one meaning, then it should be given the meaning which would 
encroach the least on the powers (or at least, on power over intra­
state trade) reserved to the States. Thus, the phrase "trade marks" 
in placitum (xviii), rather than having the meaning "any mark used in 
connection with trade" (which would have encroached on the reservation 
to the States of power with respect to intra-State trade and which 
would have included the "Union Made" labels in issue,^ meant instead 
a "kind of incorporeal or industrial property consisting in the right 
of a person engaged in trade to distinguish by a special mark goods in
which he deals, or with which he has dealt, from the goods of other
2persons. Since a trade union could not be said to be engaged in
. . 3trade, Union Made labels could not be trademarks.
The second branch went to the characterisation of a law as being 
with respect to a subject matter of power.^ When a Commonwealth law 
touched on a subject matter of Commonwealth power, and a subject 
matter not of Commonwealth power that is, a subject matter reserved to 
the States, then the High Court had to decide whether the law was in 
substance with respect to the Commonwealth head of power (and 
therefore valid) or, in substance, with respect to the non- 
Commonwealth subject matter (and therefore invalid.) The indicator of 
a law’s substance or true character was its purpose apparent on its 
face. Thus in Barger's Case a law imposing tax liabilities on 
products manufactured in accordance with prescribed employment
1 The Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 461, 503 per Griffith CJ.
2 Id. 512-513.
3 Id. 516-518.
4 Although some writers would use the word "characterisation" to 
cover both the definition of subject matter and the "with respect 
to" issue, it seems to me more appropriate to reserve the word 
"characterisation" solely for the "with respect to" issue and that 
will be the way in which I use the word.
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standards was held to be not in substance a law with respect to 
taxation (so as to come within s51(ii)) but rather a law with respect 
to employment conditions, a subject matter reserved to the States.''"
The notion of substance involved here was necessarily vague,
impressionistic and unpredictable in its application. By way of
contrast with the result in Barger, in Osborne v Commonwealth a tax on
large land-holdings was held to be in substance a law with respect to
taxation and valid rather than a law with respect to breaking up large
2land-holdings and invalid.
(ii) The doctrine of intergovernmental immunities - federalism 
as a basis for implying law into the Constitution
This doctrine was directed to the specific problem of the power of
the Commonwealth to burden or hamper the States and the power of the
States to burden or hamper the Commonwealth. The doctrine held that
neither could bind the other. Each was sovereign and could not
therefore be subject to the other. This mutual immunity was seen to
3be necessarily implied in the Constitution. As a result of this 
doctrine States could not tax the remuneration received by a federal 
officer^ and the relations between State railways and their 
employees were held to be beyond the Commonwealth power in 
s 51(xxxv).^
1 (1908) 6 CLR 41 per Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ; Isaacs 
and Higgins JJ dissenting.
2 (1911) 12 CLR 321 per Griffith CJ, Barton, O'Connor, Isaacs and 
Higgins JJ unanimously.
3 The Railway Servants Case (1906) 4 CLR 488, 538.
4 D 'Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91. Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585; 
Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (1907) 4 CLR 1087.
5 The Railway Servants Case (1906) 4 CLR 488.
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The doctrine was qualified by the proposition that the implication 
of State immunity from Commonwealth legislation (based as it was on 
the necessity for the continued sovereign existence of the States) 
could be offset if it was necessary for the effective exercise of any 
of the express Commonwealth powers (which defined Commonwealth 
sovereignty) that the States be bound. Thus, when it was considered 
necessary for the effectuation of the Commonwealth’s power to impose 
customs duties (whether derived from the express power in s51(i) or 
the express power in s51 (ii)) that the States be bound like other 
importers, the implication of State immunity from Commonwealth action 
was pro tanto rebutted.^
B - The Engineers Case - the rejection of federalism as a basis 
for constitutional interpretation
The specific issue in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v The 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd was whether the Commonwealth could, in 
giving effect to the settlement of an industrial dispute otherwise 
within its power in s51 (xxxv), bind a State government in its 
industrial relations with its employees. It was held that the 
Commonwealth could so bind a State. In the course of explaining 
its decision the Court repudiated the reasoning and propositions on 
which both the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities and the 
doctrine of reserved powers had been based.
Four members of the majority in this 1920 Court, Knox CJ,Isaacs, 
Rich and Starke JJ gave a joint judgment. Central to their framework 
was the proposition that there is one indivisible Crown.^ There 
was, therefore, no justification for any reasoning, doctrine or
1 The Steel Rails Case (1908) 5 CLR 818.
2 (1920) 28 CLR 129.
3 Per Knox CJ, Isaacs, Higgins, Rich and Starke JJ, Gavan Duffy J 
dissenting.
4 Id. 146-147.
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implication based on a perceived necessity to protect the independent 
sovereignty of the States from the Commonwealth (or vice versa). The 
one sovereign, the Imperial Crown had assented to be bound by laws 
made under the Commonwealth Constitution which had been established by 
the Imperial Parliament to fulfil the agreement of the people of the 
colonies to join in a Commonwealth.^  Therefore the extent to which 
the Crown in right of a State was bound by Commonwealth laws depended 
solely on construing the Commonwealth Constitution to see what 
authority it gave to bind the Crown. Since the Commonwealth 
Constitution dealt expressly with sovereign legislative, executive and 
judicial functions of the Crown, it would not have been difficult to 
conclude that it was intended that the Crown be bound by the
Constitution and by laws made under its authority. That conclusion
2 Swas put beyond doubt by the presence of covering clause V.
Without adverting to the possibility of a distinction being found in
the absence from State Constitutions of any provision like the
Commonwealth coveting clause V, their Honours also concluded that the
Commonwealth could be bound by State laws. Any conflict of laws was
to be resolved by recourse to sl09.^
The extent of particular Commonwealth heads of power (and, 
therefore, the extent of Commonwealth power to bind the States) was to 
be ascertained by construing the heads of power according to ordinary 
principles of construction.^ It was not a proper function for a 
Court to take to itself the power to veto government action by 
reference to vague political theories and the erection of arbitrary
1 Id. 152.
2 Id. 152-153.
3 "This Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
under the Constitution shall be binding on the courts, judges, and 
people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth, 
notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State; ..."
4 Id. 155.
5 Id. 148, 154.
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unpredictable implications. The possibility of abuse of power was a
matter between government and the electors.^ If the text were
explicit the Court could not add to it or subtract from it by making 
9implications.
There was, as a matter of construction, no contradiction involved 
in s51 intruding into areas of State power continued by sl07. There 
was no logical imperative that Commonwealth and State power be 
mutually exclusive. State powers were general and were therefore 
concurrent with most of the Commonwealth’s express powers. Conflict 
through action in overlapping areas of competence was to be resolved 
by recourse to sl09.
Thus, after the Engineers Case it appeared that the High Court had 
abandoned the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities and had 
abandoned so much of the reserved powers doctrine as went to subject 
matter definition. In relation to the branch of the reserved powers 
doctrine going to characterisation of a law as being with respect to a 
(defined) Commonwealth subject matter, the Engineers Case was, 
however, inconclusive.
I turn now to outline the experience after the Engineers Case, and 
Barwick's part in the exploration of the principles relating to the 
three issues - definition of subject matters of Commonwealth power, 
characterisation of laws as being with respect to (defined) subject 
matters and intergovernmental conflict.
1 Id. 145, 150-152.
2 Id. 149-150.
3 Id. 153-155 Cf the judgment of Dodds CJ in D 'Emden v Pedder 
(1903) 2 Tas LR 146, 168ff.
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C - Definition of Subject Matters of Commonwealth Power after 
the Engineers Case
(i) Definition of Subject Matters - General Principles
It was established early in the High Court’s life that when 
defining terms used in the Constitution, it is the meaning of the 
terms as at the date of enactment, 1900, which must be ascertained.'*'
It was also early established that although the 1900 meaning remained 
fixed, new developments not existing and perhaps unforeseen in 1900
Omight be encompassed by a 1900 definition. These propositions were 
unaffected by the Engineers Case and are now entrenched. It is now 
customary to talk of the fixed meaning as the connotation in 
distinction from the denotation which means the things from time to 
time falling within the connotation. Barwick CJ accepted these 
propositions
In its nature, the problem of definition cannot be reduced to 
predictable mechanical rules. There has been no return to the pre- 
Engineers reserved powers doctrine of construing s51 powers to as to 
avoid "contradiction” with sl07. Members of the High Court have 
simply set about finding the "natural meaning" of the words used.
Thus, for example, when asked to construe "like services" in placitum 
(v) "Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services" the 
members of the High Court gave the phrase what they perceived to be 
its natural meaning without feeling any compulsion to choose a
1 Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 469, 501 per Griffith CJ.
2 Ibid.
3 Professional Engineers Case (1959) 107 CLR 208, 267 per Windeyer
J.
4 Eg. King v Jones (1972) 128 CLR 221, 229. R v Federal Court of 
Australia; exp Western Australian National Football League (1979) 
143 CLR 190, 208.
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reasonable but narrower meaning which would have encroached less on 
intra-State trade.^ When considering a problem of subject matter 
definition in the St George County Council Case, Barwick CJ 
commented:
"The reserved powers doctrine of the past has been fully exploded;
but care needs to be taken that it does not still in some form or 
another infiltrate one’s reasoning when construing Commonwealth 
powers or Acts of the Parliament."^
The reserved powers doctrine drew significance from what had been 
omitted from grants of power to the Commonwealth and, thus, reserved 
to the States. Another argument which would limit the content of one 
power by reference to the presence of others, draws significance from 
what has been included in the other powers. The argument is that the 
presence of specific powers should prevent a generally expressed power 
being given a broad meaning (albeit a meaning otherwise available) if 
to do so would render the specific powers superfluous.
3This argument was put in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case 
in an attempt to limit the content of s51(xxix) "External affairs", by 
taking account of the presence of the specific provisions, s51(x) 
"Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits" and 
s51(xxx) "The relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the 
Pacific". No member of the Court accepted the argument. Only three 
members of the court, Barwick CJ, Mason and Jacobs JJ commented on 
this argument. All three were of the opinion there was no need to 
adopt a narrow definition of "external affairs" so as to avoid overlap
1 R v Brislan; ex p Williams (1935) 54 CLR 262. The majority 
thought "like services" covered any system of distant 
communication and therefore included broadcasting. Dixon J in 
dissent thought the natural meaning of "like services" involved 
only two-way communications systems.
2 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; exp St George County Council (1974) 
130 CLR 533, 540-541.
3 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 47 per KA 
Aickin QC later Aickin J of the High Court.
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with s51(x) and s51(xxx). Only Mason J went so far as to say that the
presence of s51(x) and s51(xxx) had no_ effect on sSICxxix).1
Barwick CJ and Jacobs J seemed to leave open the possibility that the
wide definitions of external affairs that they were willing to adopt
could be subject to implied limitation(s) to take account of other 
9specific powers.
Parallel arguments have been put to try to limit the otherwise 
broad meaning of s51(xxi) "Marriage" by reference to the presence of 
the specific s51(xxii) "Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in 
relation thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of 
infants". When taking the form of an argument that "Marriage" be 
limited to the entry into of the marital relationship, the argument 
was rejected by Taylor J and Menzies J in the Marriage Act Case and 
implicitly rejected by the conclusions about the content of the 
"Marriage" power expressed by other members of the Court.
In Russell v Russell the argument took two forms: first, that the
specific reference in s51(xxii) to "parental rights, and the custody 
and guardianship of infants" in relation to divorce or a matrimonial 
cause precluded parental rights, custody and guardianship being
1 Id. 471.
2 Id. 360, 497 respectively. Their Honours’ reservation may have 
been affected by the discussion of s51(x) in the earlier case of 
Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177. There Barwick CJ at 190 
(although foreshadowing at 189 the proposition which he and the 
majority adopted in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case (1975) 
135 CLR 337, that the States geographical territories end at low- 
water mark) and Menzies J at (1969) 122 CLR 177, 209-210 concluded 
that s51(x) gave the Commonwealth no power with respect to 
fisheries in waters within three nautical miles of the coast.
Kitto J expressed sympathy for that view (at 202), Windeyer J 
rejected it (226-227), and McTiernan J and Owen J did not express 
opinions.
Attorney-General (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529,
560, 572 re ec vely.
3
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reached by s51(xxi) "marriage”;^  secondly, that the specific 
reference to enforcement of marital rights in s51(xxii)’s "matrimonial
causes" impliedly took out of s51(xxi) enforcement of the rights
2created under s51(xxi).
The majority in Russell, Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ rejected 
both these variations of the argument and held that despite the 
presence of s51(xxii), s51(xxi) extended to the institution of 
marriage both in terms of the creation of rights and obligations of 
parties to marriage relating to maintenance, custody and property, and 
in terms of the enforcement/creation of jurisdiction to deal with such
■3rights and obligations. For these judges it was, in the context of 
determining a constitutional power, a rather dubious exercise to try 
to imply limitations for one power from the presence of another.^
Gibbs J (in dissent) was of the opinion that s51(xxi) if read 
alone, would enable "the Parliament to legislate for the enforcement 
of the rights which one party had against the other and which arose 
from the marriage relationship, including rights to maintenance and 
custody".^ The presence, however, of the specific reference in 
s51(xxii) to "parental rights, custody and guardianship of infants" in 
relation to "Divorce and matrimonial causes" prevented "parental 
rights, custody and guardianship of infants" being reached under 
s5i^xxi) unless associated with a divorce or matrimonial cause.^
1 (1976) 134 CLR 495, 500.
2 Id. 498.
3 Id_. 538-539 per Mason J with the concurrence of Stephen J on this 
point id. 529; also 547-550 per Jacobs J.
4 Id. 539 per Mason J (Stephen J concurring 529), 550 per Jacobs J.
5 Id. 525.
6 Id. 525-527.
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The other dissentient, Barwick CJ, seemed to allow that s51(xxi)
extended to the creation of rights relating to the consequences of the
celebration of a marriage both for the parties and for the children of
the marriage.^ (So much was, of course, assumed by the Marriage Act
21961 which Barwick had sponsored as Attorney-General and which had 
been upheld in the Marriage Act Case.) That is, his Honour did not 
seem to think that the entire topic of parental rights, custody and 
guardianship of infants was taken out of s51(xxi) because of the 
specific treatment of part of that topic in s51(xxii).
Barwick CJ gave full force to the second argument for limiting 
s51(xxi) by reference to the presence of s51(xxii). His Honour was of 
the opinion that although some overlapping of subject matters of power 
is possible it was not permissible to construe s51(xxi) in a way 
which would render otiose s51(xxii), a power on a cognate topic.^
The subject matter in s51(xxi) could not, therefore, be construed so 
as to reach to the creation of jurisdiction to deal with rights that 
might be created under s51(xxi). (Barwick CJ offered as an 
alternative ground for decision, and in this he went further than 
Gibbs J, that even in the absence of s51(xxii) he would have held 
s51(xxi) did not reach to enforcement of rights created 
t h e r e u n d e r ) I n  the result, according to Barwick CJ the 
Commonwealth's only power to create jurisdiction to enforce rights 
created by s51(xxi), was the power in s51(xxii) which limited the 
Commonwealth to creating jurisdiction to deal with divorce and nullity 
proceedings and matters ancillary thereto.^ (Similarly, in the 
Australian Assistance Plan Case Barwick CJ reinforced his conclusion
1 Id. 509.
2 Sir Garfield Barwick AG, "The Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961" 
(1962) 3 MULR 277.
3 (1976) 134 CLR 495, 508.
4 Id. 508.
5 Id. 510, 512.
6 Id. 512.
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that the words "for the purposes of the Commonwealth" in s81 import a 
limitation on Commonwealth Parliament’s power to appropriate funds, by 
referring to the presence of the specific power in s96 to make grants 
to the States.)'*'
Barwick CJ made no attempt to explain the difference between his 
attitude to s51(xxi) - construing it so as to prevent it rendering 
s51(xxii) otiose - and his attitude to s51(xxix) - construing it 
regardless of rendering s51(xxx) otiose. It might be suggested that 
legislative history provides a distinction between s51(xxi) and 
s51(xxii) on the one hand and s51(xxix) and s51(xxx) on the other.^ 
Barwick CJ offered no such reconciliation. Perhaps the strong views on 
s51(xxi) and s51(xxii) which Barwick expressed as Chief Justice can be 
traced to the views he had formed as Attorney-General. Then Barwick 
had expressed his belief, apparently based on a perusal of the 
Convention Debates "that the founding fathers proposed the cession to 
the Federal Parliament of the power to make laws with respect to 
marriage and with respect to divorce and matrimonial causes though 
deliberately confining power with respect to any further matters of 
matrimonial and family concern to such as were ancillary to divorce 
and matrimonial causes.
1 (1975) 134 CLR 338, 355.
2 The Federal Council of Australasia Act (Imp) (1885) 48 & 49 Viet C 
60, sl5 gave the Federal Council of Australasia legislative 
authority in respect to inter alia "(a) The relations of 
Australasia with the islands of the Pacific". That legislative 
background could explain why the Founders would incorporate into 
the Constitution a power - s51(xxx) - in similar terms to sl5(a) 
of the Federal Council of Australasia Act - even though the final 
draft of the Constitution had acquired a new power - s51(xxix) 
which subsumed s51(xxx). There was in the Federal Council of 
Australasia Act (sl5(i)) a reference to legislative power in 
respect to "recognition in other colonies of marriage or divorce 
duly soleminized or decreed in any colony". That reference 
provided no justification in legislative history for an overlap of 
s51(xxi) and s51(xxii).
3 "Some Aspects of the New Matrimonial Causes Act" (1961) 3 SLR 409, 
409-410. R Sackville and C Howard, "The Constitutional Power of 
the Commonwealth to regulate Family Relationships" (1970) 4 FL Rev 
30, 33-34 agree with Attorney-General Barwick’s construction of 
the Debates.
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(ii) Definition of Subject Matters - Specific Powers
Barwick CJ’s position on some other issues of subject matter 
definition should be noted at this stage.
(a) Section 51(i)
Barwick CJ gave a relatively wide definition to the subject matter 
of inter-State trade which is the subject matter of Commonwealth power 
in s51(i). That wide definition, however, was set out by Barwick CJ 
not in the context of s51(i) but instead in the context of s92 which 
declares that inter-State trade shall be absolutely free. The 
significant points of Barwick CJ's definition are set out in the s92 
Chapter.
(b) Section 51(xx)
Section 51(xx) gives the Commonwealth power to make laws with 
respect to, inter alia, "trading corporations". In the St George 
County Council Case a Court of only five divided three to two with 
Barwick CJ and Stephen J in dissent.^" McTiernan, Menzies and Gibbs 
JJ held that the St George County Council, a corporation established 
under the New South Wales Local Government Act, was not subject to the 
Commonwealth Restrictive Trade Practices Act which applied to "trading 
corporations".
No member of the Court suggested that the Council had any inherent 
intergovernmental immunity. For McTiernan J it was simply a matter of 
construction of the Commonwealth Act involved which, in McTiernan J’s 
opinion, was only intended to apply to private enterprise 
corporations. The other members of the Court, could not discern 
any such limitation in the meaning of the Act and treated the meaning 
of the phrase "trading corporation" in the Act as being tied to the 
same phrase in s51(xx).
1 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; exp. St George County Council 
(1974) 130 CLR 533.
2 Id. 546-547.
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Menzies and Gibbs JJ followed the approach of Isaacs J who had in 
1908 in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead  ^expressed his 
opinion that corporations fell into mutually exclusive categories. 
Isaacs J offered a number of examples of categories. The decision of 
the true character of a corporation, the decision of which category a 
corporation belonged, was to be determined, according to all the 
corporation’s circumstances such as the purpose and manner of its 
formation and its internal structure as well as its activity.^
There was a case for this "one true character" approach in nineteenth 
century company law. Isaacs J had set up this approach in 1908 to 
meet the argument that if the law in issue dealing with trade 
practices of trading corporations were held to be within s51(xx) there 
would be a radical Commonwealth encroachment on State areas. Isaacs 
J ’s point was that an application of his test would only bring a 
narrow range of corporations within the reach of s51(xx).^ His 
brethren Griffith CJ, Barton, O'Connor and Higgins JJ nevertheless 
held the law invalid. Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Pty Ltd^ had 
overruled Huddart Parker just three years before St George.
The dissentients in St George, Barwick CJ and Stephen J considered
that the character of a corporation as a "trading corporation" could
be derived solely from the corporation’s activity - whether intended
or current activity was the discrimen did not matter (though Barwick
£CJ expressed a preference for the latter)0 - and whether or not the 
test was exclusive or predominant activity was the discrimen did not 
matter either (though again Barwick CJ expressed a preference for the
1 (1908) 9 CLR 330, 393.
2 (1974) 130 CLR 533, 552-554 per Menzies J; 561-564 especially 564 
per Gibbs J.
3 LR Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 70.
4 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 393.
5 (1971) 124 CLR 468, below p.l22ff.
6 (1974) 130 CLR 533, 539, 542-543.
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latter)'*" - because the sole intended and sole current activity of 
the corporation was to trade.
When a Court of seven considered the definition of "trading 
corporation" again in R v Federal Court of Australia; Exp WA National 
Football League Inc Barwick CJ found that he was one of four judges 
(the others were Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ) holding that 
incorporated football organizations were trading corporations because 
of their current trading activities. (Included among the three 
dissentients was Stephen J who agreed that the activity of the 
corporation was the determining consideration but who concluded, on 
applying that test to the facts, that the football organizations were 
not trading corporations. Barwick CJ's requirement in St George that 
trading be the predominant activity softened in the Football League 
Case to a requirement that trading be a substantial and not merely 
peripheral activity. This tended to widen the power - a 
corporation can have many substantial activities. It can, however, 
only have one predominant activity. (Barwick CJ did not acknowledge 
that this amounted to a shift.) Mason J (with Jacobs J ’s concurrence) 
was close to Barwick CJ’s new approach adopting a test of whether 
trading represented a significant proportion of the corporation’s 
activities.^ Murphy J took the most generous approach. He 
indicated that he would be satisfied if the trading was an important 
current activity of the corporation either in relative or in absolute 
terms^ and that he would be satisfied either by the current activity 
of the corporation or by the purpose for which the corporation was 
established
1
2
3
4
5
Id. 543.
(1979) 143 CLR 190. 
Id. 208.
Id. 233.
Id. 239.
6 Ibid.
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I do not wish to argue the relative merits of the arguments for 
and against accepting that the character of trading corporation can be 
derived solely from the corporation's activity. Nor do I wish to 
discuss the problems of applying a test which requires comparisons to 
be made of the relative significance of different activities carried 
on by one corporation. Such a test is inherently subjective and 
impressionistic and may in time lead back to the examination of the 
same kinds of balancing of factors which the true character test 
involved. The true character test is, of course, no more certain in 
its application. The significant point for current purposes is that 
acceptance of the activity test means that more corporations are 
likely to be within the reach of s51(xx) than would have been the case 
if the true character test had been the sole test. As the fact of 
Stephen J's dissent in the Football League case demonstrates however, 
the potential of the activity test can be curtailed, given its 
vagueness, at the point of application.
(c) Section 51(xxix)
The final specific point of subject matter definition to be 
mentioned relates to the subject matter of s51(xxix), "external 
affairs". It is generally agreed that the subject matter includes 
matters affecting Australia's relations with other countries. In the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Case  ^ Barwick CJ, Mason J and Jacobs J 
also regarded things geographically external to the continent of 
Australia as being a branch of the subject matter. Gibbs CJ (with the 
concurrence of Aickin and Wilson JJ) has since indicated his 
reluctance to accept the existence of that second branch to the 
subject matter. The issue takes on special importance when it is 
connected with the question of the geographical limits of the States 
which constitute the Commonwealth. The assumption of most legal 
experts was once that the league seas off the coasts of the States
1 New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 360, 471, 
197 respectively.
2 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 417, 430-432.
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were part of the Territories of the States.^ In 1958 Professor 
O ’Connell published an article arguing the view that the States' 
territories end at the low water mark. The 1969 case of Bonser v 
La Macchia concerned the sufficiency of s51(x) to support a 
Commonwealth law applying to a fishing activity six miles off the New 
South Wales coast. Both the Commonwealth and New South Wales 
requested the Court to refrain from considering the issue of the 
territorial limits of the States on the basis that that issue was not 
essential to the decision of the case.^ Despite that request, and 
even though there had been no argument on the point Barwick CJ 
delivered elaborate dicta arguing the view that the States' 
territories do end at low water mark.^ Windeyer J also favoured 
that view. Of the other members of the Court, only Kitto J made 
any comment and he indicated a tendency to recognize State territories 
as extending to a three mile limit.^
The issue was brought directly to a head by the Seas and Submerged
QLands Case when the Commonwealth statutorily asserted certain 
sovereign rights over the league seas and their subsoil and over the
1 E Campbell, "Regulation of Australian Coastal Fisheries" (1960) 1 
Tas Uni L Rev 405. See also the material collected in the 
dissents of Gibbs and Stephens JJ in the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Case (1975) 135 CLR 337.
2 DP O'Connell, "Some Problems of Australian Coastal Jurisdiction" 
(1958) 34 BYIL 199, 209.
3 (1969) 122 CLR 177.
4 Id. 180.
5 Id_. 184-189. In a note on the case in (1970) 3 Adelaide L Rev 
500, 504 Professor O'Connell states that after the conclusion of 
argument in the case Barwick CJ had presided at a symposium where 
Sir Percy Spender argued the view that the States’ territories end 
at the lowwater mark. Sir Percy Spender and Barwick had been on 
the same floor in Chambers when Barwick was at the bar. Marr, 
Barwick 27.
6 IcU 218-224. Also after his Honour's retirement from the High 
Court his address "The Seabed in Law" (1974) 6 FL Rev 1.
7 (1969) 122 CLR 177, 201-202.
8 New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337.
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continental shelf beyond. There was not really any issue about the 
Commonwealth assertion beyond the league seas. The Court was divided, 
however, about the league seas. The majority judges, Barwick CJ, 
McTiernan, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ, held that the States' 
territories ended, generally, at low water mark. The dissents of 
Gibbs and Stephen JJ brought together a very strong case to support 
the proposition that the documents establishing the States and 
defining their territories placed the league seas under the 
sovereignty of the States. Barwick CJ left it to Mason and Jacobs JJ, 
to deal with the construction of the States' constituting instruments. 
Barwick CJ gave most of his attention to stating and supporting his 
view that it was "the intendment of the Constitution" that the 
Commonwealth should become an internationally recognized independent 
nation state and that any Imperial rights, sovereign or proprietary, 
in offshore waters subsoil and air space, which existed at federation 
were derived from international law and should pass to the Crown in 
right of the Commonwealth on acquisition of international status.
That "intendment" was indicated by the grant to the Commonwealth of 
power with respect to "defence" and "external affairs". The 
Commonwealth had in time acquired that independent status "aided in 
that behalf by the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster 
and its adoption".^
Barwick CJ indicated that his cone isions (both as to territorial 
limits and as to the passing of Imperial rights to the Crown in right 
of the Commonwealth) were affected by his belief in the desirability 
of these conclusions when he commented:
"This result conforms, in my opinion, to an essential feature of a 
federation, namely, that it is the nation and not the integers of 
the federation which must have the power to protect and control as 
a national function the area of the marginal seas, the seabed and 
airspace and the continental shelf and incline. This has been 
decided by the Supreme Courts of the United States^ and of
1 Iji* 373. Similarly id_ 382 per McTiernan J; 469-470 per Mason J, 
497-498 per Jacobs J.
2 United States v California (1947) 332 US 19; 91 Law Ed 1889; 
United States v Texas (1950) 339 US 707; 94 Law Ed 1221; United 
States v Louisiana (1950) 339 US 699; 94 Law Ed 1216; United 
States v Maine (1975) 420 US 515; 43 Law Ed 2d 363.
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Canada^- ... I am satisfied with the reasons given by those 
Courts for their conclusions.^
The decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case obviously 
represented a significant victory for the Commonwealth and provided 
the potential for the Commonwealth to have control, similar to that of 
a government in a unitary state, over offshore activities and 
resources. The Commonwealth victory was traceable to judicial 
encouragement voluntarily offered by Barwick CJ and Windeyer J in 
Bonser v La Macchia. Their Honours may well have been surprised when 
their conclusions drawn from their perceptions of the needs of 
national government were rejected by the national government. After 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Case the Commonwealth government used 
s51(xxxviii) to extend federalism to offshore regulation by enacting 
a complex "offshore settlement" giving the States a role in the 
control of significant offshore regulation.
D - Characterisation ("with respect to") after the Engineers Case
The issues of definition of Commonwealth subject matters of power 
are one of the determinants of the federal balance - the line between 
Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth. The discussion now turns to 
another major determinant of that balance - the characterisation of a 
law as being "with respect to" a defined subject matter of 
Commonwealth power.
(i) Characterisation - General Principles for the Central Areas of 
Powers
1 Reference re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights [1967] SCR 792; 
(1967) 65 DLR (2d) 353.
2 (1975) 135 CLR 337, 374.
3 "Current topic - Distribution of offshore constitutional 
responsibilities between the Commonwealth and States" (1979) 53 
ALJ 605; RD Lumb, "Section51, pl.(xxxviii) of the Constitution" 
(1981) 55 ALJ 328.
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No High Court judge has ever sought to make the subjective motives 
of the legislators a criterion of validity. When the pre-Engineers 
Court spoke of the relevance to validity of the purpose of a law, the 
reference was to the purpose apparent on the face of the law.-1 2345-
The pre-Engineers approach to characterisation had been affected
by Canadian doctrines. In the Canadian context, with subject matters
allocated to mutually exclusive lists, when a law touches on subject
matters from the different lists, a decision must be made to allocate
the law to one list or the other. The very structure of the Canadian
Constitution requires Courts to decide the substance, in the sense of
the one predominant character, of a law. After the Engineers Case,
the reasoning which had sought to find for Australia a similar
necessity in sl07 was debunked. In Engineers it was pointed out that
State power and Commonwealth power under s51 are concurrent not
2mutually exclusive.
The issue which remained after Engineers was, even if a Barger 
type inquiry into the purpose and substance of Commonwealth laws 
was not dictated by the structure of the Constitution, was such an 
inquiry nevertheless appropriate - and, if such an inquiry was not 
appropriate, what were the principles for characterisation of 
Commonwealth laws.
For three decades after Engineers, references to the substance of 
a law as the determinant of a law’s validity were standard. Barger's 
Case was cited with approval.“^ In Moran’s Case^ the Privy Council 
referred to that aspect of Barger with approval.
1 Barger's Case (1908) 6 CLR 41, 75 per Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O'Connor JJ.
2 (1920) 28 CLR 129, 153-155 per Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke 
JJ.
3 Above pp.87ff.
4 Eg First Uniform Tax Case (1942) 65 CLR 373, 442 per Starke J.
5 (1940) 63 CLR 338, 341.
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As counsel in the State Banking Case (1947)^ and the Bank 
Nationalisation Case (1948)“ Barwick KC submitted that a law 
prohibiting banking was not a law with respect to banking so as to be 
supported by s51(xiii) unless the prohibition was conditioned on some 
fact relevant to banking regulation. In the State Banking Case the 
prohibition was on the provision of banking services to State 
governments and was held invalid by a majority, (Latham CJ, Rich, 
Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ with McTiernan dissenting). Some of the 
majority judges^ used language compatible with the approach to 
characterisation involved in Barwick's submission but the issue of 
intergovernmental interference was very significant for the outcome 
and the case is dealt with further below under the heading 
"Intergovernmental immunities after the Engineers Case".'*
In the Bank Nationalisation Case^ the prohibition of banking was 
a prohibition of all private banking. Four members of the Court, 
Latham CJ, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ^ with Rich and Williams JJ
Qdissenting on this point, held that it was within power under 
s51(xiii) to prohibit banking absolutely but there was no common 
approach to characterisation.
1 (1945) 71 CLR 29, 33-34.
2 (1948) 76 CLR 1; HCT (High Court Transcript) 9/2/48, 11-12;
11/2/48, 131-141, 151-153; 12/2/48, 155-185. Especially at
11/2/48, 152 "The test is pith and substance".
3 (1945) 74 CLR 31.
4 Id. 61-62 per Latham CJ; 67 per Rich J (reference to "pith and
substance"); 98, 100 per Williams J.
5 Below pp.l71ff.
6 (1948) 76 CLR I.
7 Id. 197-198, 301, 331-333, 392-393 respectively.
8 Id. 258.
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Latham CJ was amongst those who could find no clearer test than
the "substance” of a law. His approach clearly differed from the
reserved powers approach in that, although he required Commonwealth
laws not only to operate on a Commonwealth subject matter but also to
be substantially with respect to that Commonwealth subject matter, he
did not require that the laws be predominantly concerned with the
Commonwealth subject matters.^- That is, his Honour allowed that a
law validly with respect to Commonwealth subject matter could also be
with respect to non-Commonwealth subject matter. Nevertheless, this
approach, like the Barger approach seemed to treat characterisation as
an impressionistic matter of degree, a matter of sufficiency of
connection with (defined) Commonwealth subject matters. PH Lane has
exposed the lack of principle, the lack of guidance that is provided
2by terms such as "substance" and "predominant character".
Dixon J introduced an alternative. Dixon J was opposed to any
resort to imprecise tests of "substance". These, for him, led the
Court too quickly into hazy inquiries into purpose and this led the
law into uncertainty. Dixon J asserted that for most of the
paragraphs of s51, operation on the Commonwealth subject matter was
per se enough to bring a law within power. The existence of a non-
Commonwealth purpose on the face of the law would not deprive the lawqof its relevant Commonwealth character.
Dixon J considered that his approach should be applied to those 
paragraphs of s51 where the subject of power could be described 
either:
1 Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 185-187.
2 "Judicial Review or Government by the High Court" (1966) 5 SLR 
203, 212-220.
3 Stenhouse v Coleman (1945) 69 CLR 457, 471; State Banking Case 
(1947) 74 CLR 31, 80.
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1 by reference to a class of legal, commercial, economic or 
social transaction or activity such as trade and commerce, 
banking or marriage;
2 by specifying some class of public service (such as postal 
installations or light-houses) or undertaking (such as 
railway construction with the consent of a State), or
3 by naming a recognized category of legislation (such as 
taxation or bankruptcy).^
The quest by Dixon J for certain and predictable tests of 
characterisation was consistent with the tone of the main judgment in 
the Engineers Case which had criticised the doctrine of implied
intergovernmental immunity because inter alia, it introduced a vague
2and unpredictable test of validity.
This flurry of activity in the 1940's had gone some way to 
identify the main alternative approaches to characterisation - vague 
and impressionistic true character/substance/degree/purpose tests on 
one hand versus the legalistic mechanical predictable test of Dixon J 
on the other.
A major development came with the case of Herald and Weekly Times
3Limited v The Commonwealth involving s51(v), the power with respect 
to "Postal, telgraphic, telephonic, and other like services". The 
case was argued and decided after Barwick had joined the Court but he 
did not participate. One of the Commonwealth laws in issue prohibited 
television broadcasting without a Commonwealth licence. (It was 
already established that the subject matter included television
1 Stenhouse v Coleman (1945) 69 CLR 457, 471.
2 (1920) 28 CLR 1, 145, 150-152 per Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke 
JJ.
3 (1966) 115 CLR 418.
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broadcasting).''- The holding of the licence was subject, inter alia,
to a condition requiring the independence of the licence-holder from
2other licence holders. It was argued that the validity of the 
prohibition depended on the relevance of the conditions to the subject 
matter. In answer to this, there was a strong argument that the 
conditions were relevant to the subject matter of the power anyway. 
Indeed McTiernan J, a member of the High Court since 1930, simply 
dismissed the attack on the legislation with the statement that the 
legislation was in substance within s51(v). The other members of 
the Court, all appointed since 1950 and all members of the Court 
during Dixon's Chief Justiceship preferred to decide according to the 
same general principles which Dixon J had developed.
Kitto J, with Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ concurring,^ reasoned 
thus - television broadcasting was within the subject matter in s51(v) 
- the prohibition of television broadcasting was therefore a law with 
respect to a television service - a law relaxing the prohibition on 
conditions was therefore also a law with respect to a television 
service^ and then, the central point:
"A law which qualifies an existing statutory power to relax a 
prohibition is necessarily a law with respect to the subject of 
the prohibition. Even if the qualification gives it the 
additional character of a law upon some other topic - even, 
indeed, if that other topic be not a subject of federal 
legislative power - it is still a law with respect to the subject 
of the prohibition, and is valid if that subject be within federal 
power: cf Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.^
1 Jones v The Commonwealth [No 2] (1965) 112 CLR 206.
2 (1966) 115 CLR 418, 433 according to Kitto J. No such submission 
appears clearly in the report of the argument (id_. 428-430) of KA 
Aickin QC (later Aickin J of the High Court).
3 Id. 432.
4 Ld^ . 438, 442, 442 respectively.
5 Id. 433.
6 Id. 434.
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(Menzies J gave a similar separate judgment).'*'
The case which Kit to J cited, Fairfax v Commonwealth Commissioner 
of Taxation,^ had been decided early in Barwick’s Chief Justiceship. 
The Commonwealth law in issue in Fairfax was an amendment to a tax 
assessment Act provision which gave an exemption to the investment 
income of superannuation funds. The amendment sought to deny the 
exemption unless a prescribed percentage of a fund’s investments was 
in Commonwealth securities. Thus, this case, like Barger, involved 
s51(ii).
It was first argued that the Court should take notice of the 
notorious fact that the Commonwealth had been having difficulty in
*3filling its loans. This argument which went to the motives of the 
legislature received scant attention from the Court.^
The submissions of Commonwealth Solicitor-General AF Mason QC,
(who was to be part of a later Barwick Court which developed the 
general principles further), echoed the dissents of Isaacs J and 
Higgins J in Barger’s Case.^  Mason submitted that the validity of 
the law could only be determined by examination of its legal 
operation. The only legal liabilities defined by the legislation were 
tax liabilities. There was no positive command to invest in a certain 
way or any prohibition on investing in a certain way.^
1 Id^ . 439 ff, especially 439-440.
2 (1965) 114 CLR 1.
3 Id. 2 NH Bowen QC.
4 Compare Ld. 10-11 per Kitto J.
5 (1908) 6 CLR 41, 99, 119 respectively.
6 (1965) 114 CLR 1, 3.
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The Court of Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Menzies and Windeyer JJ 
unanimously upheld the legislation despite the purpose, apparent on 
its face, of affecting the investment policies of superannuation 
funds. There was, however, no united Court position on the issue of 
whether or not the purpose of a tax law could be relevant to its 
validity.
Kitto and Taylor JJ took the Dixon approach to characterisation. 
The validity of a law depended on the duties, obligations and 
liabilities it created. That was the only relevant "substance". ^
The purpose, apparent on the face of this tax law, of inducing 
trustees of superannuation funds to invest in a certain way, did not 
change the character of the law. No legal obligation was placed on the
otrustees to make such investments. Kitto and Taylor JJ referred 
directly to Barger’s Case and pointed out that that decision was a 
manifestation of the reserved powers doctrine which had since been 
exploded. Neither could see that the reasoning in Barger's Case had 
any continuing validity but neither unequivocally declared the 
decision overruled.
Menzies J's judgment was ambiguous in its attitude to the Barger 
approach to characterisation. Those who would read Menzies J's 
judgment as supporting Dixon J's approach can point to the passage.
"Whether or not a law is one with respect to taxation can not be 
determined by looking at its economic consequences, however 
apparent they must have been at the time of its enactment; nor is 
an enquiry into the motives of the legislature permissible."^
1 Id_. 13 per Kitto J, 16 per Taylor J.
2 Li. 13 per Kitto J, 16 per Taylor J.
3 Id. 11-12 per Kitto J, 14-16 per Taylor J.
4 Id. 17.
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That statement was, however, quite compatible with the Barger approach 
which claimed to ascertain the purpose (but not the motive) and thus 
the true character of a provision solely from its terms. What 
followed immediately was consistent with a Barger framework but 
inconsistent with Dixon J's approach.
"There may be laws ostensibly imposing tax which, nevertheless, 
are not laws with respect to taxation. For example, a special 
prohibitive tax upon income derived from the sale of heroin or 
from the growing or treatment of poppies for the production of 
heroin may not be a law with respect to taxation but rather a law 
made for the suppression of the trade in that drug by imposing 
penalties described as taxes for participation in it. The reason 
for denying to such a law the character of a law with respect to 
taxation would not be either its economic consequences or the 
motive behind its enactment. It would simply be that its true 
character is not a law with respect to taxation. The problem in 
every case is, therefore, to ascertain from the terms of the law 
impugned its true nature and character.^
This passage is inconsistent with Dixon J's approach to
characterisation but is consistent with Barger' s (and Latham CJ's)
characterisation approaches. It is to be noted that although Menzies
J's heroin example referred to a prohibitive tax, towards the end of
the quoted passage his Honour said that the "true character" test was
to be applied in every case. That is, it seems that his Honour was
not setting up his test as a mere proviso for extreme cases. Menzies J
went on to find the impugned legislation valid but that decision seems
to have been affected by his Honour's opinion that this was a typical
kind of tax law. "The giving of taxation advantages to induce
investment in Commonwealth securities has long been a feature of the
•• 2taxation laws of the Commonwealth.
There was thus a division with Kitto and Taylor JJ declaring for 
the Dixon J approach to characterisation and Menzies J supporting some 
(not necessarily Barger) true character/ substance/purpose approach.
1 Id. 17-18.
2 Id. 17.
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Windeyer J expressed "substantial agreement”  ^with all the 
judgments delivered in the case (including, presumably, the one yet to 
be discussed, that of Barwick CJ). His Honour made no direct 
reference to the apparent differences in approach of Kitto and Taylor 
JJ on one hand, and Menzies J on the other. Windeyer J seemed to come 
close to the position of Menzies J when he accepted that a condition 
might show that a law in the guise of a tax, was not a tax in its true
character. The condition in issue, seeking to replenish the Treasury
2did not, however, deprive the tax of such character.
Chief Justice Barwick gave a short non-committal judgment. He 
stated that he had read the judgment of Menzies J and agreed with that 
judge that there was no basis for declaring the legislation 
invalid. On the point of difference between Kitto and Taylor JJ 
and Menzies and Windeyer JJ, Barwick CJ would say only;
"It is possible that a law increasing or decreasing the extent of 
an existing exemption from liability to pay a tax validly imposed 
may in some circumstances for my part not readily envisaged - be 
held not to be a law with respect to taxation."1 234*
If Barwick CJ thought that this possibility was remote and 
unlikely why was it that he chose to express agreement with the 
judgment of Menzies J rather than that of Kitto J or Taylor J? It may 
simply be that Menzies J had circulated a draft and received Barwick 
CJ's concurrence before any other judge had circulated and that 
Barwick CJ having once given his "support" to Menzies J, although 
perhaps later moved to qualify his support after reading other drafts, 
had no desire to re-direct his support to another judge.
1 Id. 18.
2 Id. 19.
3 Id. 4.
4 Id. 5. Emphasis added.
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Whatever the explanation, the result was that Barwick CJ clearly 
conveyed the impression that he would not have much sympathy for 
attempts to attack tax laws because of their purpose. Barwick CJ did 
not, however, give an unequivocal statement rejecting purpose 
inquiries. This fact left the judgment somewhat vulnerable.
A case of great significance for general principles of 
characterisation was the case of Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v The 
Commonwealth.^ This case involved legislation which prohibited the 
export of minerals without the consent of a Minister. The Minister 
withheld his consent to the export of minerals mined from Fraser 
Island in Queensland, pending the outcome of an inquiry into the 
environmental effect of the mining. The Minister proposed, when 
deciding whether or not to allow export, to take account of the 
inquiry's report on the environmental effect of the mining.
Former Commonwealth Attorney-General TEF Hughes QC challenging the
validity of the Commonwealth action, argued that the export
prohibition enabled the Commonwealth Minister to control a matter not
within Commonwealth power, environmental considerations. In this
operation Hughes submitted, the prohibition on export ceased to be a
2law with respect to overseas trade. This argument was similar to 
those that Barwick KC had put to the High Court thirty odd years 
before. Now Barwick CJ interjected from the bench "That is R v Barger 
in its worst form.
When Hughes pressed on, calling in aid defence power cases which 
required a relevance of criteria for government action to the purpose 
of the power,^ Barwick CJ again interjected to point out that the 
defence power is a purpose power and then stated that
1 (1976) 136 CLR 1.
2 Id. 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. 3.
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"Other powers such as trade and commerce power can be used to
attain an object not within the scope of the power.
Later Barwick CJ also commented that the fact that the prohibition on 
export derived from a provision in the Customs Act, a taxing Act, was 
a further reason for "saying there is no limit to the objects that may 
be attained by the use of the power. It was perhaps a little 
careless of Barwick CJ to suggest that the inclusion of a non-tax 
provision in a tax Act would make it subject to tax power (s51(ii)) 
principles of characterisation. Each operative provision of any Act 
should be tested against the principles of Characterisation for the 
power supporting the particular provision in issue rather than against 
the principles of characterisation for the power supporting other 
provisions in the Act. The significance of Barwick CJ’s comment for 
present purposes is in its assumption that the tax power can be used 
to pursue non-Commonwealth purposes.
The legislation was upheld unanimously by the Court of seven. All 
members of the Court (except Murphy J who gave no reasons for his 
decision other than to say that the Minister could take account of 
national policies when deciding whether to grant or withhold his 
consent to export) endorsed the approach to characterisation set 
out by Kitto J in Herald and The Weekly Times to the effect that where 
an activity is within the centre of the subject matter of power, the 
Commonwealth can prohibit it absolutely or allow it conditionally 
without having to show that its prohibition has been imposed or 
relaxed by reference to conditions relevant to that or any other 
Commonwealth subject matter.^
1 Id. 4.
2 Ibid.
3 Id. 26-27.
4 Id_. 8 per McTiernan J; 11-12 per Stephen J, 22-23 per Mason J 
with Barwick CJ, endorsing the judgment of Stephen J (id. 5), and 
Gibbs (id_. 9) and Jacobs JJ (id. 26) endorsing the judgments of 
both Stephen J and Mason J.
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This declaration of principle was very important. (It was, of 
course, a victory for Dixon J and Kit to J. Barwick CJ was neither 
author nor sponsor. His only involvement as counsel had been to 
oppose its adoption. And, as the discussion of Barwick CJ’s judgment 
in the Payroll Tax Case will show Barwick CJ left some doubt about his 
acceptance of the principle. •*■) It is important to note »however, the 
limitations of the decision. The decision was directly concerned with 
the characterisation of laws imposing, and laws relaxing, prohibitions 
on activities within the central area of a subject matter or power;
The decision had nothing to say directly to the characterisation 
of laws authorising activities within the central area of a subject 
matter of power, that is, to the characterisation of laws going beyond 
mere relaxation of a Commonwealth prohibition to the vesting of a 
positive right, overriding any State prohibition, to engage in an 
activity. The thrust of the discussion in the case would probably, 
however, carry over to deal with vesting rights (overriding State 
prohibitions) to engage in activities within the central area of a 
subject matter of power.
The second main limitation is that the decision had nothing to say 
directly to the characterisation of laws when the subject matter of 
power is not an activity. The principle to be derived from the Herald 
a .id The Weekly Times and Murphy or es decisions - that when the 
Commonwealth has power with respect to an activity it can prohibit it 
absolutely or allow it conditionally - probably governs not only the
1 Below ppl85ff.
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broadcasting power (s51(v))^ and the trade and commerce power 
(s51(i)) but also other powers with activities as subject matters - 
banking (s51(xiii)) and insurance (s51(xiv)) and arguably even reaches 
Astronomical and meteorological observations, (s51(viii)) immigration 
(s51(xxvii)) and the influx of criminals (s51(xxviii)). But what 
about other subject matters?
The Herald and The Weekly Times and Murphyores decisions can 
probably be taken to have settled for all kinds of Commonwealth 
subject matters: first that a Commonwealth law can have more than one
character so long as in at least one of its characters it is with 
respect to a Commonwealth head of power. Secondly that the mere fact 
that a Commonwealth law reveals on its face a purpose of achieving an 
effect not referable to a Commonwealth head of power will not take the 
law beyond Commonwealth power. But what about other problems of 
characterisation?
(ii) Characterisation - Specific powers 
(a) Section 51(ii)
Dixon J had set up as his third general group of powers to which 
his mechanical, legalistic approach to characterisation would apply, 
those powers which defined their subject matter by naming a recognized
1 Section 51(v) refers to "services” rather than activities but has 
been held to include broadcasting activities. R v Brislan exp 
Williams (1935) 54 CLR 262 (Dixon J dissenting). Dixon J had, in 
his Stenhouse v Coleman classification, (1945) 69 CLR 457, 471 
(Above p.108) originally placed the subject matter of s51(v) in 
his second category of powers where the power is described by 
specifying some class of public service. Dixon J would in any 
case have applied to that second category the same principles of 
characterisation as he applied to his first category of powers - 
legal, commercial, economic or social transactions or activities.
2 The body of precedent relating to this power is consistent with 
the Herald and The Weekly Times / Murphyores principle.
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category of legislation such as taxation or bankruptcy.^ The 
Murphyores decision could not even be said to have settled 
conclusively the principles of characterisation appropriate to 
s51(ii). Mason J (whose reasons for decision were adopted by Gibbs J 
and Jacobs J) did say that the decision in Fairfax had "swept away the 
last vestigial remnants of Barger's Case." The other judges, 
however, did not mention Bargers Case. The endorsement by McTiernan J 
and Stephen J of the discussion by Kitto J in Herald and Weekly Times, 
which drew support from Fairfax, doubtlessly left Barger in tatters. 
Given, however, the "true character" approach of Menzies J and 
Windeyer J in Fairfax, and given the silence in Murphyores of 
McTiernan J, and Stephen J (with whom Barwick CJ agreed) and Murphy J 
on the status of Barger, it was not perhaps completely accurate to say 
that the "last vestigial remnants of Bargers Case" had been swept 
away.
Barwick CJ could have tilted the balance by indicating agreement 
with the judgment of Mason J rather than, or as well as, that of 
Stephen J. (It is unlikely that Stephen J had circulated his draft 
judgment and received Barwick CJ's concurrence thereto before Barwick 
CJ had seen Mason J's draft as Stephen J referred to Mason J's
"3description of the form and history of the action. Indeed 
Professor Zines informs me that the first copy of Barwick CJ's 
judgment which he saw expressed agreement with both Stephen J and 
Mason J.^) Given the contempt which Barwick
1 Stenhouse v Coleman (1945) 69 CLR 457, 471 Above p.108.
2 (1975) 136 CLR 1, 23.
3 Id. 10.
4 The report of Barwick CJ's judgment in both (1976) 9 ALR 199, 200 
and (1976) 50 ALJ 570, 571 is the same as in the "official" CLR.
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CJ e x p r e s s e d  f o r  B a r g e r  d u r i n g  a r g u m e n t ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  he was 
s e e k i n g  t o  keep  i t s  p r i n c i p l e s  a l i v e .  His  Honour may of  c o u r s e ,  have 
t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d  what  Mason J  was s a y i n g  d i r e c t l y  -  t h a t  t h e  c a s e  had 
no t  a s h r e d  o f  a u t h o r i t y  l e f t .  Barwick  C J ' s  w i t h d r a w a l  of  h i s  
o r i g i n a l  a g re e m e n t  w i t h  Mason J ' s  judgm en t  was p r o b a b l y  c o m p l e t e l y  
u n c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  t h e  j u d g m e n ts  of  S t e p h e n  J  and 
Mason J  on t h e  p o i n t  of  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of  B a r g e r ’s C a s e . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
by f a i l i n g  t o  e n d o r s e  Mason J ’s s t a t e m e n t  a b o u t  B a rg e r  , Barwick  CJ 
a g a i n  m is s e d  an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  add h i s  v o t e  t o  an u n e q u i v o c a l  
r e j e c t i o n  o f  B a r g e r  ' s  a p p r o a c h  t o  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  and t h u s  l e f t  
B a r g e r  ' s  shadow o v e r  p ro b le m s  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  f o r  s 5 1 ( i i ) .
( b )  S e c t i o n  51 (x x )
There  i s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  power ,  s 5 1 ( x x ) ,  where no c l e a r  a p p r o a c h
t o  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  h a s  e m e rg e d .  S e c t i o n  51 (xx)  g i v e s  t h e
Commonwealth power w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  " F o r e i g n  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and t r a d i n g
o r  f i n a n c i a l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  fo rm ed  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t s  of  t h e
Commonwealth" . The d e c i s i o n  i n  1908 i n  Huddar t  P a r k e r  & Co P ty  Ltd v
Moorehead  ^ seemed t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  a v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
2
pow er .  There  i t  was h e l d  by a m a j o r i t y ,  G r i f f i t h  CJ ,  B a r t o n ,
O'Connor  and H i g g i n s  J J ,  o v e r  t h e  d i s s e n t  of  I s a a c s  J ,  t h a t  t h e  power 
d i d  no t  e x t e n d  t o  c o n t r o l  of  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s  of  s 5 1 ( x x )
1 (1908)  8 CLR 330.
2 In  a rgum en t  i n  t h e  Bank N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  Case t h i s  exc hange  t o o k  
p l a c e :  Latham CJ " P l a c i t u m  (xx )  h a s  been  l e f t  by t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  
M o o re h e a d ' s  Case i n  a nimbus of  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  has  i t  n o t ? "  Dr 
E v a t t  "Not o n l y  a n im b u s ,  bu t  a c i r r u s " .  Latham CJ "A c u m u lu s " .  
T r a n s c r i p t  o f  a rgum en t  8 / 3 / 4 8 ,  1132.
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corporations. The judgments of Griffith CJ, Barton and O ’Connor JJ 
were based on the reserved powers proposition that the control of 
intra-State trade had been reserved to the States.'*’
These three "reserved powers" judges and Higgins J offered some 
thoughts on what kinds of laws would be within the reach of s51(xx). 
The concentration was on the corporate aspect of the subject matter. 
Griffith CJ^ (Barton Jnot dissenting from the reasons of Griffith 
CJ) considered that the power extended to defining the capacity of 
foreign, trading and financial corporations (rather than the legality 
of their activities). O'Connor and Higgins considered that 
the power extended to recognition (throughout Australia) of corporate 
status obtained under foreign law or the law of one State.
In the Bank Nationalisation Case the power was put forward by 
Commonwealth Attorney-General Evatt to support a law prohibiting 
banking.^ Evatt adopted the approach foreshadowed in the dissent of 
Isaacs J in the Huddart Parker decision. According to this approach, 
s51(xx) should be approached on the basis that its purpose was to 
enable Parliament to control the external activities of three kinds of 
corporations with a great potential to affect society.^ Barwick KC 
also sought to derive an approach to characterisation for s51(xx) from 
the nature of the subject matter involved. He reasoned that the 
characteristics common to each of the three kinds of corporations 
mentioned in s51(xx) were - (a) the derivation of corporate status by 
the law of one jurisdiction; and (b) the likelihood of operation in
1 (1908) 8 CLR 330, 352, 354 per Griffith CJ, 363 per Barton J and 
370 per O'Connor J.
2 Id. 353-354.
3 Id. 366.
4 Id. 372-374.
5 Id. 413-414.
6 High Court Transcript (HCT) 2/3/48, 890-914, 3/3/48, 944.
7 Ibid. For Isaacs J ’s dissent (1908) 8 CLR 330, 395-398.
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Australia outside the jurisdiction of incorporation. It was therefore 
to be inferred that s51(xx) was intended to support laws providing for 
the recognition throughout Australia of corporate status originally 
based on foreign law or the law of one State as the case may be.'*’
The content which Barwick KC found in the power corresponded to
that suggested by O'Connor and Higgins JJ in Huddart Parker. O'Connor
J had based his proposition on the reserved powers doctrine. Barwick
KC acknowledged that his view of the content of the power coincided
with that of O'Connor J and submitted that O'Connor J's conclusion was
the correct one even if its reserved powers reasoning was 
ounacceptable.
Barwick KC developed his perception of s51(xx), and developed it 
fairly convincingly, by reference to the nature of the subject matter 
involved. Barwick KC disavowed reliance on the (discredited) reserved 
powers doctrine; He did, however, reinforce his submission that 
s51(xx) only had a relatively narrow scope by asserting
"... after all, the dominant idea of the Constitution is federal 
... So often we fall into what I submit is the error of thinking 
about this national Parliament of today that there was a desire to 
give it unlimited power. This Constitution originates essentially 
as a federal document and federal by deliberate choice, whether 
the framers had before them the Canadian and American examples, 
and they chose to give, and in a somewhat niggardly spirit, power 
to the Federal Parliament and to give it by limitation as to the
subject matters in these paragraphs..... when the reserved powers
doctrine was exploded it did not mean that you ... forget that it 
is a Federal Constitution ...[that] the States have the residue 
... that these are only specific powers yielded up and you must 
find out what each means in relation to the other.
This aspect of Barwick's argument represented a fairly clear attempt 
to limit the potential of s51(xx) by reference to assumptions about 
the intended federal balance.
1 BNC HCT 31/3/48, 2030-2051.
2 BNC HCT 1/4/48, 2039.
3 BNC HCT 1/4/48, 2036, 2050.
4 BNC HCT 1/4/48, 2050.
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In the outcome Latham CJ,^ Rich and Williams JJ^ agreed with
Barwick that s51(xx) did not support the law in issue. Dixon J and
McTiernan J did not comment on the reach of s51(xx). Starke J did not
express a concluded opinion but inclined to the view that s51(xx) did
3give a power to regulate the activities of the named corporations.
On his retirement from the High Court in 1952^ and again in 
1958,^ Sir John Latham suggested that s51(xx) might be very 
important if it were explored. Sir John went so far as to say that 
the Huddart Parker decision was no authority and was of no use.^
As Attorney-General, Barwick sought to secure the enactment of 
trade practices legislation based, inter alia, on s51(xx),^ but it 
was only after his appointment to the High Court that any significant 
trade practices legislation was enacted. In 1971 in Strickland v 
Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd® a High Court including Barwick CJ grasped 
an opportunity to reconsider the Huddart Parker decision. In issue 
was Commonwealth trade practices legislation requiring the 
registration of restrictive trade practices. On its face, the 
requirement applied generally to all persons in business without
1 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 184.
2 Id. 255-256 jointly.
3 Id. 304.
4 (1952) 85 CLR vii, ix-x.
5 Reviewing G Sawer, Cases on the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia (1958) 1 MULR 266, 268.
6 Ibid.
7 Sir Garfield Barwick QC, "Some Aspects of Australian Proposals for 
Legislation for the Control of Restrictive Trade Practices and 
Monopolies" (1963) 36 ALJ 363. The reliance on s51(xx) is 
indicated at 373. See also JE Richardson, "Legal Aspects of the 
Control of Monopolies, Mergers and Restrictive Trade Practices in 
Australia" (1962) 35 ALJ 423, 431-432. JE Richardson and DJ Rose, 
"Trade Practices Act 1965” 1966 AULSA Conference paper especially 
at 39.
8 (1971) 124 CLR 468.
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reference to s51(xx) and, it was conceded, exceeded Commonwealth
power.^ It was held by a majority, Barwick CJ, Menzies, Windeyer,
? 3Owen and Walsh JJ with McTiernan and Gibbs JJ dissenting that
the legislation could not be read down so as only to apply to
agreements involving s51(xx) corporations.
Despite the decision that the legislation before them was 
inseverable most of the members of the Court stated their opinion that 
Huddart Parker was wrongly decided and should be overruled. All 
members of the Rocla court agreed that the taint of the reserved 
powers doctrine prevented the decision in Huddart Parker from 
constituting binding authority.^ It was one thing to conclude that 
the supporting reasoning for the decision was unacceptable. The able 
submissions of Barwick KC had demonstrated in the Bank Nationalisation 
Case, however, that it was quite another to conclude that the decision 
was wrong. The members of the Rocla Court made the leap to that 
second conclusion with remarkable ease and a conspicious lack of 
reasoning.^
Barwick CJ (McTiernan and Walsh JJ concurring) referred to and 
reserved the question of whether every law addressed specifically to 
s51(xx) corporations would be held to be a law with respect to s51(xx) 
corporations.^ (Such an approach would, of course, have provided a
1 Id. 472.
2 Id_. 498, 499, 505, 513, 521 respectively.
3 Id. 499, 527-528 respectively.
4 Id. 485-488 per Barwick CJ (with the concurrence of McTiernan CJ
id. 499); 507-511 per Menzies J; 512-513 per Windeyer J; 513 per
Owen J; 522-525 per Gibbs J.
5 Preceding note references. It is arguable that Windeyer J (at 
512-513) was only committing himself to the opinion that Huddart 
Parker no longer constituted binding authority and was not 
expressing any opinion on whether the decision was nevertheless 
correct.
6 Id. 489-490. Similarly id. 507-508 per Menzies J.
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certain and predictable test of characterisation). Why then should 
the laws considered in Huddart Parker have been held valid? Barwick 
CJ declined to offer any clear framework for testing laws for 
connection with s51(xx). Barwick CJ delivered himself of this theory 
(or non-theory) of characterisation.^-
We were also invited in the argument of these appeals to express 
some criteria by which a law may be held to be a law with respect 
to the topic of s51(xx). But such a submission in my opinion both 
misconceives our function and fails to realize that the 
constitutional formula is sufficient in itself. Efforts I know 
have been made to offer synonyms and explanations of that formula 
but, with great respect to those who have made the endeavour, the 
result cannot be definitive. An assumption of the Constitution in 
providing this Court as the arbiter of constitutional validity was 
that the Court would be able on being presented with a law made by 
the Parliament to answer the direct question whether properly 
construed and understood it was law with respect to one or more of 
the granted heads of power. The Constitution itself provides the 
criterion of validity: the law must be with respect to a topic of
granted power. For my part the formula requires no explanation: 
in any case, it is the text and no commentary upon it however 
helpful may displace it. The constitutional formula requires a 
substantial connexion between the topic and the law. What will 
suffice in any particular instance to require an affirmative 
answer to the question whether it is a law with respect to the 
subject matter necessarily involves a matter of degree co-related 
to the nature of the power and to the provisions of the Act as 
they would operate in the area in which it is held they were 
intended to operate. As I have indicated, I have myself no 
difficulty whatever in saying that ss5(l) and 8(1) were laws with 
respect to, amongst other things, trading corporations formed 
within the limits of the Commonwealth.
There are two main points in this passage which require comment. 
First there is the notion that characterisation is a question of 
degree depending on all the circumstances of the case. That may well 
be the case with the periphery of Commonwealth power. The decisions 
in Herald & Weekly Times, Fairfax and Murphyores (the last two
1 Id. 490-491.
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involving Barwick CJ) reveal that there are some problems of 
characterisation which do not involve questions of degree and which do 
not depend on any "circumstances" other than the terms of the 
legislation. Secondly, it is, with respect, a duty of the High Court 
not only to decide but also to explain its decisions. Unless 
explanation is given for decisions there is no certainty or 
predictability in the law and the legitimacy of the High Court’s 
position as authoritative interpreter of the Constitution is undercut. 
It was, with respect, remarkably unhelpful and uninformative for 
Barwick CJ simply to say that it was clear to him what the 
constitutional formula "with respect to" meant.
Barwick CJ did at least indicate that his conclusion that the laws 
in Huddart Parker were valid, depended on the fact that those laws 
were controlling the trading activities of s51(xx) corporations.^
But why was that relevant? There is some suggestion of a possible 
theoretical basis for the conclusion in this passage:
"In my opinion such laws were laws with respect to such 
corporations. They dealt with the very heart of the purpose for 
which the corporation was formed, for whether a trading or 
financial corporation, by assumption, its purpose is to trade, 
trade for constitutional purposes not being limited to dealings in 
goods".
In Huddart Parker Isaacs and Higgins JJ had sought to derive 
theories of characterisation from the notion that to be valid under 
s51(xx) a law must deal with an identifying feature of the persons 
which are the subject of power. Higgins J proposed that to be valid a 
law must deal with the corporate aspect of the identity, in
1 Id. 489-491
2 Id. 489.
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particular, with the recognition of corporate status^- (and not with
the trading aspect of the identity). Isaacs J proposed that to be
valid a law must deal with the trading or financial (not the
corporate) aspect of the identity.^ The weakness in Isaacs J ’s
judgment was that it was in favour of holding valid a law which
applied not only to trading and financial corporations engaged in
restrictive trade practices but also to foreign corporations engaged
in such activities. There is no correlation between the "foreign"
aspect of a foreign corporation’s identity and restrictive trade
practices. Appearing as an alternative and wider theory in Isaacs J ’s
judgment was the proposition that s51(xx) is concerned with "the
regulation of the conduct of the corporations in their transactions
-awith or as affecting the public". This wider proposition (which 
easily subsumed the restrictive trade practices of foreign 
corporations) was based inter alia on the fragile argument that the 
control of external aspects of s51(xx) corporations was within 
Commonwealth power because the internal aspects of s51(xx) 
corporations were not.^ Majority judgments in Huddart Parker 
demonstrated that it was possible to give a content to the power that 
reached neither the external nor the internal aspects that Isaacs J 
placed as opposites.
If Barwick CJ’s judgment in Rocla were to be attributed to an 
identity theory approach to characterisation under s51(xx) then, like 
the dissent of Isaacs J in Huddart Parker, it had the weakness that it 
did not explain why that theory should bring the restrictive trade 
practices of foreign corporations within power. Barwick CJ was quite 
emphatic that the trading activities of foreign corporations were 
within the reach of s51(xx) and commented that the range of activities 
within the reach of s51(xx) might be wider for foreign corporations 
than it would be for the other corporations.^
1 (1908) 8 CLR 330, 409-414.
2 _Id. 393-398 especially 397-398.
3 Id. 395. Emphasis added.
4 Id. 393-396.
5 Id. 490.
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The judgment of Barwick CJ (which received the concurrence of 
McTiernan and Walsh JJ) is undoubtedly open to the criticism that it 
asserted that laws controlling the trade of foreign corporations and 
the trade of locally formed trading and financial corporations would 
be within power without explaining the reasons for those assertions. 
Other judgments in Rocla made the same assertions with even less
attempt at explanation.^ The issue is, of course, a difficult
2one.
It is plain that the exploration of the corporations power has
only just begun. It is plain also that the decision in Rocla that the
power extends (at least) to regulation of the trade of trading 
corporations made this power one of the most important in the 
Commonwealth’s list of powers and severely reduced the significance of 
s51(i)'s withholding from the Commonwealth of power over intra-State 
trade. The decision in Rocla probably represents Barwick’s most 
significant and lasting mark on the federal balance. Barwick CJ’s was
the leading judgment and the members of the Court were united in their
attitude to the issue of trade regulation under s51(xx). The 
decision to test the corporation's power as a basis for trade control 
was made during Barwick’s Attorney-Generalship (albeit after Sir John 
Latham's suggestion).^ The fact that the Court in Rocla found it 
appropriate to comment on the scope of s51(xx) despite the majority 
opinion that the legislation was inseverably invalid, might itself be 
construed as a victory for Barwick CJ's enthusiasm for the matter.
1 Id_. 507-508, 511 per Menzies J, 513 per Owen J, 525 per Gibbs J.
2 Generally, G Evans, "The Constitutional Validity and Scope of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974" (1975) 49 ALJ 654, 660-662; J O ’Donovan, 
"Can the Contract of Employment be Regulated Through the 
Corporations Power?" (1977) 51 ALJ 234, 239-246. Actors and 
Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd 
(1982) 40 ALR 609.
3 Below pp.l36ff.
4 Above p.122.
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The early proponent of s51(xx) as a basis for trade controls,
Isaacs J, had offset his attitude on that issue with a narrow
definition of trading corporation.* As discussed previously Barwick
CJ rejected that "compensating" narrow definition and favoured a more
2wide-reaching definition. The combined result was to push out 
Commonwealth power under s51(xx) both on issues of definition and 
characterisation. Barwick CJ joined the unanimous decision in 
R v Australian Industrial Court; exp CLM Holdings Pty Ltd  ^which 
added to the efficacy of the power by holding that the power (whether
1 Above pp.99.
2 Above pp.99ff.
3 LR Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 70-71 argues that 
the narrow approach of Menzies and Gibbs JJ in the St George 
County Council Case to the definition of trading corporations 
might have led to a wider range of laws being characterised as 
being "with respect to" such corporations than was associated with 
Barwick CJ’s relatively wider approach to the definition of 
trading corporations. In conversations on the point Zines has 
explained to me that his essential point was that if an "overall 
characterisation approach" and, in particular, an approach of 
characterising corporations according to nineteenth century 
company law had prevailed then the word "trading" might have been 
given a larger content than that derived from the meaning of the 
word "trade" in s51(i). (If that was the point then, with 
respect, Zines confused the issue in his book by stating (twice) 
that "all the corporate activities" might have been brought within 
Commonwealth power if an "overall characterisation approach" had 
been adopted.) I take Zines' point that nineteenth century 
company law may have given the word "trading" appearing as part of 
a term of art - "trading corporation" - a content different from 
that obtainable by reference to the word "trade" in s51(i). As 
for the specific example given by Zines, however - that 
manufacture might be within the "trading" activities of a trading 
corporation on Menzies J’s "overall characterisation" approach to 
definition but not on Barwick CJ's "current activity" approach - 
there is room for comment. It is clear enough that manufacture is 
not inter-State trade for the purposes of s51(i) and s92. It is 
not clear, however, whether that is because manufacture is not 
"trade" or whether it is because manufacture is not "inter-State" 
or whether it is because it lacks either character. (Discussed 
below pp454ff.) That is, "manufacture" may well be "trade" even 
if within the meaning of that term where appearing in s51(i).
4 (1977) 136 CLR 235.
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centrally or incidentally was not decided) supported a law making it 
an offence for a natural person (a company officer) to be involved in 
the commission of an offence by a trading corporation.
The final point to be made about Barwick C J ' s role in making 
s51(xx) an important source of Commonwealth power is that Barwick CJ 
proceeded almost entirely by assertion and offered very little in the 
way of a theoretical framework. It is quite remarkable that the 
essential proposition of Rocla could have been established without any 
positive supporting reasoning apart from a few cryptic comments.
(iii) Characterisation - tests of purpose, degree and substance for 
some powers
The discussion now turns to the problems of characterisation 
associated with powers where the validity of the law will turn on the 
purpose of the law or on the law being incidental to or calculated to 
affect some subject matter. The issues here are such that they could 
eventually swamp the fine issues of subject matter definition and 
central area characterisation and could become the main determinants 
of the federal balance.
To say that any thing may possibly be relevant to, or have and 
effect on, any other thing is to state a universal truth. That is the 
truth around which the issues of this sections revolve. What will 
constitute a sufficient connection between a law’s operation on a 
subject-matter not within power, and the effect of the law on the 
purpose within the subject matter of power to justify the conclusion 
that the law is within power? Will certain kinds of effects be 
ignored? Will any effects of the law which do not provide a relevance 
to the Commonwealth subject matter be weighed against the effects 
which do have a relevance? If so, will the harshness of the law in 
its operation be weighed against its relevant effect - will the degree 
of its intrusion into areas of State power be taken into account?
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(a) Section 51(xxi)
Dixon J had classified s51(xxi) "Marriage” as being subject to his 
legalistic approach to characterisation. Dixon J had put marriage 
along with trade and commerce and banking in his first category of 
powers - powers where the subject matter of power was described by 
reference to a transaction or activity.^- If that categorisation were 
appropriate then the Herald and Weekly Times and Murphyores judgments 
would lead to the conclusion that the Commonwealth could, under 
s51(xxi), prohibit marriage absolutely or allow it by reference to any 
kind of condition such as, for example, environmental considerations. 
Perhaps that is correct in so far as the activity of entering a 
marital relationship goes. The discussion in the Marriage Act Case^ 
demonstrated, however, that the subject matter "Marriage" in s51(xxi) 
includes more than just the entering into of the marital 
relationship.
The Marriage Act Case involved a consideration of various 
provisions from the Commonwealth’s Marriage Act of 1961, an Act owing 
its existence to the work of Attorney-General 3arwick. For the 
purposes of present discussion attention need only be given to the 
Court's response to the attack on s89 providing that children born out 
of wedlock should be regarded as legitimate for all purposes should 
their parents later marry. Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ with
1 Stenhouse v Coleman (1945) 69 CLR 457, 471.
2 Attorney-General (Victoria) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529.
3 D Marr, Barwick 142-143. Sir Garfield Barwick AG, "The 
Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961" (1962) 3 MULR 277.
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Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Windeyer JJ dissenting held s89 valid.^
At one extreme Kitto J can be read as suggesting that a law 
attaching a consequence (legitimacy) to the taking of a step 
(marriage) should be held to be a law with respect to the step as well 
as a law with respect to the consequence, simply because the 
consequence is enacted by reference to the taking of the step.
Such a mechanical approach would provide a predictable but 
extraordinarily wide test of characterisation. At the other extreme, 
echoing a Barger type approach, McTiernan J set out as a generally 
applicable test for characterisation the object to which a law is 
primarily directed. McTiernan J's test of "object" is vague. His 
reference to the primary direction of a law assumes that a law can 
have only one character.
More important than these extreme positions for later developments 
was the notion common to some majority and minority judges, including
1 Some of the disagreement between the majority and the minority can 
be attributed to their different perceptions of the (purported) 
effect of s89. Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ clearly appproached 
the question on the basis that s89 merely vested the status of 
legitimacy. There would be consequential effects for State 
legislation or private instruments which operated by reference to 
the presence or absence of the status of legitimacy. Nothiiin 
s89 would, however, prevent State legislation or private 
instruments from adopting a different criterion which would 
differentiate between people born in wedlock and people born 
outside of wedlock regardless of legitimate status. (1962) 107 CLR 
529, 553, 564, 574-575 respectively. Dixon CJ considered that 
State legislation attempting to differentiate between people born 
in wedlock and people born outside of wedlock whose parents 
subsequently married, would be inconsistent with s89. Id. 547.
See also id_. 586-587, 597 per Windeyer J. The case is fully 
discussed in R Sackville and C Howard, "The Constitutional Power 
of the Commonwealth to Regulate Family Relationships" (1970) 4 FL 
Rev 30, 40-53.
2 (1962) 107 CLR 529, 554.
3 Id. 549.
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McTiernan J and Kitto J^, that the subject matter of power in 
s51(xxi) "Marriage" includes the "institution" rather than just the 
activity - that is, that the subject matter includes the definition by 
law of marriage and extends to attaching by law of consequences to the 
state of being married. Once the subject matter is defined in that 
way then it becomes impossible to maintain the distinction between the 
definition of this subject matter (as including a certain kind of law) 
and the characterisation of a law as being with respect to this 
subject matter. The characterisation issue merges into the 
(unpredictable, impressionistic) issue of definition.
Against that background, some decided that a law providing for
legitimacy per subsequens matrimonium was a law dealing with defining
the institution of marriage, some that it was not. Neither group's
conclusion could be said to be more valid, more consistent with
general principle than the others, any more than the majority
conclusion on the issue of subject matter definition in R v Brislan 
3exp Williams could be said to have been dictated by inexorable 
predictable principle. As Sackville and Howard point out, however, to 
the extent that the minority judges reasoned from a presumption that 
private rights were not intended to be within Commonwealth power, 
their approach was inconsistent with the Engineers Case.^
1 Id_. 549 per McTiernan J; 554-555 per Kitto J; 560-561, 570-571 
per Taylor J; 572, 574 per Menzies J; 576, 580, 589 per Windeyer 
J; 602 per Owen J.
2 It might therefore, be more appropriate to place s51(xxi) under 
Dixon J's third heading of powers, where the subject of power is 
described by naming a recognized category of legislation). 
Stenhouse v Coleman (1945) 69 CLR 457, 471. Above pl08. PH Lane, 
"Federal Family Law Powers" (1978) 52 ALJ 121 discusses the nature 
of the problem of s51(xxi).
3 (1935) 54 CLR 262. Above p92.
4 Op cit 52-53.
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When the question of the principles of characterisation to be 
applied to s51(xxi) arose during Barwick's Chief Justiceship all 
members of the Court adopted vague tests of characterisation. Barwick 
CJ and some other members of the Court supported the erection of tests 
which were not only vague tests but were also tests of degree. In R v 
Lambert; Exp Plummer Barwick CJ agreed'*' with these statements by 
Gibbs J
’The question whether a law is one with respect to marriage is one 
of degree. The answer to it depends on the closeness of the 
connection between the law and the marriage relationship.
Sometimes - as in the present case - it is helpful to consider 
what sort of rights and duties flow from the relationship of 
marriage in the ordinary understanding of reasonable men."^
(Wilson J (with Aickin J's concurrence) adopted a similar test 
requiring that there be "a close relationship between the law and the 
marriage relationship . ..").^ Gibbs J (with Barwick CJ’s 
concurrence) went on to apply that vague test of degree to a 
Commonwealth provision authorising the making of orders relating to 
the custody of the child of a marriage, which would prevail over any 
State law placing the child under the guardianship, care or control of 
State Minister, officer or authorized authority. Gibbs J concluded 
that the connection between the provision and marriage was so slight 
that it could not "properly be said to be, in reality and substance, a 
law with respect to marriage, at least in so far as its operation is 
relevant to the present case"."’ (Wilson J with Aickin J concurring 
came to a similar conclusion.)^
1 (1980) 32 ALR 505, 507.
2 Id. 512-513.
3 Id. 526.
4 Id. 537.
5 IcU The case involved an attempt by the husband of a marriage to 
obtain a custody order which would override a State order which 
had placed the child of the marriage under the care of a State 
officer after the child had been assaulted by a man living with 
the wife after the separation of the husband and the wife.
6 Id. 540.
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The decision by Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Aickin and Wilson JJ, to 
introduce a test of degree, was not an inexorable extension of the 
proposition established by the Marriage Act Case that the power under 
s51(xxi) is a power with respect to marriage as an institution. The 
judgment of the dissentient, Stephen J (with Mason J concurring)'*’, 
demonstrated that the notion of marriage as an institution can be 
applied without adopting a test of degree. Stephen J, decided that the 
topic "Marriage” included as part of the centre of its subject matter 
the vesting in a party to a marriage of custody rights over a child of 
the marriage. Stephen J explained that by custody he meant the 
"making and carrying out of decisions relating to the upbringing of 
infant children" subject to general laws relating to topics such as 
criminal law, health controls and the like. If a child’s movements 
were confined by a law operating on the child because the child had an 
infectious disease or because the child had committed a criminal 
offence that would not affect the continuation of any custodial rights 
in relation to the child - it would merely affect the range of options 
available in exercise of those rights.^ The topic of marriage does 
not include power with respect to, for example, general criminal law 
and there would be, therefore, no inconsistency between a Commonwealth 
law vesting custody rights and a State law sending a child to a
1 Mason J adopted Stephen J ’s discussion and conclusion. Id. 521. 
Murphy J who referred to federal law cutting"across State child 
welfare laws" may have seen a wider content for the power. Id. 
525.
2 Id. 515-517. Also Dowal v Murray (1979) 22 ALR 577, 583-584.
3 (1980) 32 ALR 505, 515.
4 Id_. 515-516. Compare persons who are sui juris. They remain sui 
juris even though the law may prohibit them from doing certain 
things. Custody is in a sense, the vesting of legal capacity to 
act (within the law) on behalf of a person who lacks capacity 
because of infancy.
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reformatory for a breach of criminal law.^ The State law in issue 
dealt, however, with the matter of custody itself and there was valid 
Commonwealth law which was intended to prevail and did therefore 
prevail.
At first sight there might seem to be little difference between 
the majority approach in R v Lambert requiring that laws under 
s51(xxi) have a close connection with the marriage relationship and 
the minority approach treating the subject matter "Marriage” as 
indicating a category of laws. Both are impressionistic and 
unpredictable. The majority approach brings to the forefront, 
however, a test of degree. Under the branch of the reserved powers 
doctrine dealing with characterisation a test of degree was 
dictated by the assumptions made about the appropriate position of the 
States in the federation. The test of degree enunciated by Gibbs J 
and adopted by Barwick CJ, Aickin and Wilson JJ, as governing 
characterisation for the central area of s51(xxi), was perhaps 
introduced because of the difficulty found in defining precisely the 
subject matter "marriage". Once degree became the criterion then it 
was only a short step to the introduction, as a consideration to be 
balanced against aspects of the law relevant to establishing its 
connection with Commonwealth power, of the aspects of the law 
intruding into non-Commonwealth (State) concerns. Gibbs J left little 
doubt in his discussion that the effect of a law on State concerns 
would be taken into account under his degree test. Immediately after 
setting out his degree test, Gibbs J (with Barwick CJ's concurrence) 
commented "if a law is, in truth, a law with respect to marriage, it 
is not necessarily invalid because it affects the exercise of the 
powers of an authority of a State . To say that a law so affecting 
an authority of a State is not necessarily invalid seems to imply that
1 Id. 516.
2 Above pp.87-88.
3 Id. 513. Emphasis added.
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it probably would be invalid. It would have been more consistent with 
the Engineers Case to say that the fact that a Commonwealth law may 
affect a State authority is prima facie irrelevant to the question of 
the validity of the Commonwealth law.
After Barwick CJ’s retirement from the Court, the threat to 
introduce State interests as factors going to characterisation for 
s51(xxi)’s central area seemed to be borne out by the decision in 
Gazzo v Controller of Stamps (Victoria) exp Attorney-Genferal 
(Victoria).^ In that case Gibbs CJ, Stephen and Aickin JJ held that 
neither s51(xxi) nor s51(xxii) nor s51(xxxix) interacting with the 
judicial power were sufficient to support a Commonwealth law 
immunising from State stamp duty payable on instruments of transfer of 
land, an instrument transferring the matrimonial home from the husband 
of a marriage to the wife of the marriage on trust for herself and the 
children of the marriage. The instrument had been executed by the 
husband pursuant to a Court order on dissolution of the marriage. 
Consistently with the Engineers Case explosion of the reserved powers 
doctrine Gibbs CJ did say "that the effect of the law is to invade 
State power ... would not of course be relevant if the law were 
clearly within the substantive power expressly granted'. Earlier 
in his judgment, however, and while holding the central area of 
s51(xxi) to be insufficient Gibbs CJ had said
"... the connection is only a remote one, since the object of 
the section is to destroy a liability that would otherwise be 
owed by a person (albeit a married person) to a State, under 
a law which does not take as the criterion of liability 
anything related to the marriage ..."^
(b) Incidental Powers and Economic effects
The Constitution contains an express incidental power in 
s51(xxxix) in these terms
1 (1981) 38 ALR 25.
2 Id. 34.
3 Id. 30. Emphasis added.
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"51. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have 
power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to:-
(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by 
this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or 
in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal 
Judicature, or in any department or office of the Commonwealth".
It is established doctrine that as well as this express power, each 
specific grant of legislative power impliedly carries with it such 
power to deal with other matters as is necessary to make the central 
grant of power effective.
The High Court has distinguished these two incidental powers by 
saying that the express incidental power goes to matters incidental to 
particular exercises of powers while the implied power goes to matters 
incidental to the subject matter of particular powers.^ These 
incidental powers provide a potential for the expansion of 
Commonwealth power. That potential has been kept in check by High 
Court doctrines about the incidental power and by High Court 
application of the incidental power.
Sir Owen Dixon developed a doctrine which held that Commonwealth 
law dealing with intra-State trade could not be held to be reasonably 
incidental to the subject matter of s51(i), by virtue of the economic 
effect of the intra-State trade on inter-State trade.^ Dixon J/CJ 
reasoned that as the Constitution had deliberately drawn a distinction 
between inter-and intra-State trade that distinction had to be 
maintained and could not to be blurred by economic effects.
Soon after his appointment as Chief Justice Barwick and his Court 
unanimously held in Airlines Case [No 2] that an economic effect - 
the influence of engagement in intra-State aircarriage on the 
profitability of an air carrier's overall operations, including inter­
state carriage - did not justify the grant by the Commonwealth of a
1 Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481, 497 per Knox CJ, Rich and 
Dixon JJ. GA Rumble "Section 51(xxxix) of the Constitution and 
the Federal Distribution of Power" (1982) 13 FL Rev 7.
2 R v Burgess; Exp. Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 671-672; Wragg v New 
South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 353, 385-386.
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right to a carrier to engage in intra-State trade.'*' A decade later, 
in the Port Hedlands Case Berwick CJ,, Gibbs and Stephen JJ again held 
such economic effect to be insufficient to justify the grant of such a
9right. This time the other members of the Court (and there were 
only two others sitting) did not support this approach. Mason J
•5reserved the question and Murphy J expressly rejected the majority 
approach
Dixon's rationale for his doctrine was cryptic. It seemed to 
involve either
(a) a proposition that economic effects could not be taken into 
account under s51(i) because that placitum deliberately 
divides economic affairs into Commonwealth and non- 
Commonwealth spheres;
(b) a proposition that mere economic effects are too intangible 
to justify something so significant as a Commonwealth 
intrusion into intra-State trade which is intended by the 
Constitution to be within State control; or
(c) both (a) and (b).
Barwick CJ did not add anything to Dixon's cryptic case. He simply 
quoted it with approval.-*
1 Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No2] (1965) 
113 CLR 54, 378-79 per Barwick CJ (quoting Dixon CJ directly); 
106-107 per McTiernan J speaking atavistically of "the residuary 
powers of a State"; 115 per Kitto J; 128 per Taylor J; 143 
Windeyer J; 167 per Owen J.
2 Attorney-General (Western Australia) ex rel Ansett Transport 
Industries Pty Ltd v Australian National Airlines Commission 
(1976) 138 CLR 492, 499, 502-503, 508-511 respectively.
3 Id. 521.
4 Id. 529-531.
5 Airlines Case [No 2] (1965) 113 CLR 54, 78-79 Kitto J developed a. 
justification for the doctrine around assumption (b). Id. 113- 
115.
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As for proposition (a) - which seems to treat the exclusion of 
economic effects as being a consequence logically derived from the 
nature of the subject matter - an application of the incidental power, 
by definition, always extends Commonwealth power beyond specific 
subject matters expressly allocated to the Commonwealth. That 
involves no contradiction of the Constitution's distinction between 
Commonwealth (inter-State trade) and non-Commonwealth (intra-State 
trade). The central area of the power remains the same whatever 
matters come within the incidental area. Dixon J/CJ did not say that 
intra-State trade could never be reached by the incidental area of 
s51(i) and Barwick CJ and some other judges who endorsed the Dixon 
doctrine accepted in the Airlines Case [No 2] that the potential 
physical effect of intra-State air navigation on inter-State and 
overseas air navigation justified the establishment of safety 
standards for intra-State air navigation.^- It was, apparently, only 
economic effects that were to be ignored.
There is, admittedly, a certain symmetry of language in saying 
that economic effects are irrelevant to the incidental area of the 
"economic affairs" power. There is, however, no intrinsic logic to 
this proposition. The subject matter in s51(i) is inter-State and 
overseas trade. In the Bank Nationalisation Case the Privy Council
oendorsed a discussion by Dixon J of the concept of trade which 
included a suggestion that even non-commercial movement is trade.
1 (1965) 113 CLR 54, 91-93 per Barwick CJ; 115-116 per Kitto J;
142 per Menzies J; 151 per Windeyer J; 166-167 per Owen J.
Taylor J dissenting accepted that the Commonwealth could under 
s51(i) impose safety standards on intra-State air navigation but 
held that the particular regulations in issue were not confined to 
safety considerations. Id. 130-132. McTiernan J did not express 
an opinion on the sufficiency of s51(i).
2 (1949) 79 CLR 497, 632-633.
3 (1949) 76 CLR 1, 381-383.
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(Barwick displayed no enthusiasm for that suggestion.)^- If part of 
the central area of s51(i) is inter-State movement, then the 
Constitution is drawing a distinction between inter- and intra-State 
movement. This distinction has just as much "logical" entitlement to 
be maintained as any other distinction made by s51(i) and should, 
therefore, result in the effects of intra-State movement on inter­
state movement being excluded from the incidental area of s51(i).
Such reasoning should have led the Court to conclude in Airlines 
Case [No 2] that the potential physical effect of intra-State trade on 
inter-State trade did not justify the establishment of safety 
standards for intra-State air navigation. The absurdity of such a 
conclusion highlights the unacceptability of trying to justify the 
exclusion of economic effects from the incidental area as being 
logically dictated by the subject matter of the central area of the 
power.
Proposition (b) has two aspects. First, there is its appraisal of
the "weight" of economic effects. The basic criterion of the
incidental power is the relevance of a law to a subject matter or
exercise, of power. One must ask, as Murphy J did in the Port Hedlands 
oCase, what could be more relevant to a commerce power than 
commercial considerations? The notion that economic effects are too 
intangible to be taken into account in a legal issue of cause and 
effect, prevailed for sometime in the law of tort. Shortly before the 
judgments were delivered in the Port Hedland Case a High Court 
composed of Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ handed down 
judgment in the torts case of Caltex Oil Australia Pty Ltd v The
1 See the s92 discussion.
2 (1976) 138 CLR 492, 530-531.
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Dredge "Willemstad”.''' Their Honours allowed that economic effects 
could sometimes be taken into account to show a causal link between 
action and injury in tort, and thus acknowledged that there is nothing 
in the nature of a test of sufficiency of connection between cause and 
effect which logically requires that economic effects always be 
ignored.^
The other half of assumption (b) which asserts that the denial to 
the Commonwealth of power with respect to intra-State trade is a 
fundamental assumption of the Constitution, comes perilously close to 
reviving the reserved powers doctrine. In Airlines Case [No 2] 
itself Barwick CJ criticised submissions which looked to the interests 
and purposes of the States, as involving a resurrection of the 
"exploded view of the so-called reserved powers of the States . ..".^ 
Barwick CJ declared his support for the principle of the Engineers 
Case:
"... the nature and extent of State power or of the interests or 
purposes it may legitimately seek to advance or to protect by its 
laws do not qualify in any respect the nature or extent of 
Commonwealth power.
On the contrary, the extent of that power is to be found by 
construing the language in which power has been granted to the 
Commonwealth by the Constitution without attempting to restrain 
that construction because of the effect it would have upon State 
power.
Barwick CJ did not acknowledge that by endorsing Dixon's exclusion of 
economic effects, he was restraining Commonwealth power "because of 
the effect it would have upon State power" and was thus in conflict 
with, or at least, significantly qualifying the principle of the 
Engineers Case which he had supported so forcefully. In the Port
1 (1976) 136 CLR 529.
2 Id. 555, 574, 592, 597, 606 respectively.
3 Port Hedlands Case (1976) 138 CLR 492, 530-531.
4 (1965) 113 CLR 54, 79.
5 Id. 79. Emphasis Added.
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Hedland Case Murphy J commented, "The maintenance of the supposed 
division and the further insistence ... that even the use of the 
incidental power in s51(xxxix) can not obliterate the division, keeps 
the pre-Engineers ghosts walking".
Admittedly the reserved powers doctrine shackled Commonwealth 
power much more significantly - the old doctrine went both to 
definition of subject matter and to characterisation within the 
central area. The Dixon doctrine goes only to the question of the 
incidental area and, as formulated by Dixon, only goes to the 
incidental area of s51(i). Both doctrines, however, involve the idea 
that the Constitution should be read so as to preserve State areas of 
power from Commonwealth encroachment. Barwick CJ did not reconcile 
his acceptance of the Engineers Case with his attitude to economic 
effects in the incidental area of s51(i).
Barwick CJ not only supported the exclusion of economic effects 
from consideration under s51(i)’s incidental area, he also was of the 
view that economic effects should be excluded from consideration when 
assessing whether sl22 supported the operation of law outside 
Commonwealth Territory. The direct issue in the Port Hedland Case was 
the sufficiency of sl22 to support Commonwealth legislation 
authorising a Commonwealth Commission, The Australian National 
Airlines Commission, to engage in intra-State air carriage which 
rendered the Commission's State/Territory air carriage more 
profitable. The facts involved a proposal to establish a route
between A and B in Western Australia and between B in Western
2Australia and C in the Northern Territory. ANA wished to carry
between A and B not only passengers going on to or comming from C,
1 (1976) 138 CLR 492, 530.
2 (1976) 138 CLR 492.
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but also passengers with no Territory leg to their journey. The 
service which ANA was providing for State/Territory travellers would 
be more financially viable if the Airline could carry intra-State 
travellers on the intra-State leg.
Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ held that sl22 did support the intra- 
State trading activities.^- Stephen and Murphy JJ each made the 
point that given the width of the terms of grant of the Territories 
power it was difficult to see that incidental power would add anything 
to it.^
Murphy J simply held without discussion that the activity was 
supportable as being part of the provision of services to the 
Territory. Mason J, who treated the source of power as being the 
incidental aspect of sl22, made it plain that when, as was the case 
with the incidental powers, the test of law is to ask "what is 
necessary or reasonably necessary" to the end within power (providing 
a service to the Territory) then attention must be paid to "all those 
factors which must be accounted for or satisfied so as to achieve the 
end in view."^ It was obvious to Mason J that maintaining a 
commercial air service to a Territory would be affected by economic 
considerations
Stephen J, who supported (or, at least, accepted as being 
authoritatively established) the exclusion of economic effects from 
the incidental area of s51(i), would not make a parallel exclusion of * 
economic effects from sl22. His Honour's comment that "the power 
conferred by s!22 is not, I think, to be limited by reference to an
1 Id_. 515, 523-524, 531 respectively.
2 Id_. 514-515, 531 respectively.
3 Id. 531.
4 Id. 523.
5 Id. 523-524.
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implication drawn from the terms of s51(i) or s92",''_ reveals just
how close to the reserved powers doctrine was the doctrine excluding
economic effects from s51(i)’s incidental area. Stephen J thought the
profitability of a government created corporation's activity of
providing transport to a Territory was quite relevant to the
ogovernment of the Territory.
The dissentients, Barwick CJ and Gibbs J both accepted^ that 
earlier decisions had established that sl22 could support the 
operation of laws outside Commonwealth Territories^ and did support 
the empowering of a corporation to provide transport services to 
Commonwealth Territories.“* Both judges, however, considered that 
the economics of providing such service could not justify empowering 
intra-State trading activities. Both considered that the arguments 
for excluding economic effects from the incidental area of s51(i) also 
applied to prevent economic effects justifying a sl22 intrusion into 
intra-State trade. Such arguments of course involve certain 
assumptions about the appropriate position of the States in the 
federation. By thus extending his application of "federal balance" 
arguments, Barwick CJ was widening the conflict with his endorsement 
of the general thrust of the Engineers Case. On the other hand 
Barwick CJ's position in relation to sl22 in the Port Hedland Case was 
quite consistent with Barwick CJ's perception of the place of the 
Territories in Federal Par.' lament. ^
1 Id. 514.
2 Id. 514-515.
3 Id_. 500, 503-504 respectively.
4 Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132.
5 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71
CLR 29.
6 (1976) 138 CLR 492, 501, 504-505 respectively.
7 Above Chapter III.
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There was another aspect to Barwick CJ’s reasoning about sl22 in 
the Port Hedland Case which throws up a point for comparison with 
Barwick CJ’s approach to other sections. There was a suggestion in 
Barwick CJ’s judgment here of an idea that he had proposed at the 
beginning of his career as a constitutional law advocate and which he 
was again to reintroduce at the end of his judicial career. It was 
the idea that government and commerce are mutually exclusive spheres. 
The idea is suggested in the Port Hedland Case by statements from 
Barwick CJ like this one.
”The efficiency, competitiveness and profitability of the business 
of the Commission can not be in themselves objects of legislative 
power to make laws for the Territory. In other words the 
economics of the business of the Commission do not, in my opinion, 
form part of the subject matter os sl22 - the peace, order and 
good government of the Territory - nor are they incidentally part 
of that subject matter. "■*■
The idea that government and commerce are mutually exclusive spheres 
was expressed more clearly by Barwick, as counsel and judge, in other 
contexts and is discussed fully in the Chapter on s92.
(c) Treaty implementation under s51(xxix)
It is generally agreed amongst High Court judges that the words 
"external affairs", describing the subject matter of power in 
s51(xxix) mean "Australia’s relations with other countries". At its 
core that subject matter encompasses activities carried on by 
Australia’s international representative, the Commonwealth Executive.
It is not inconceivable that a law might be passed directly 
regulating the Commonwealth Executive in activities such as the 
negotiation and entering into, of international treaties. The cases,
1 (1978) 128 CLR 492, 501.
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however, have not concerned laws which regulate Australia’s relations 
with other countries, or the Commonwealth Executive in the carrying on 
of such relations, but have concerned instead, laws which regulate 
activities of actors other than international personalities. The 
justification offered for such laws is that in regulating such 
activities the laws are affecting Australia’s relations with other 
countries.
There is a matter of terminology here worthy of mention. It would 
seem to me that a law, for example, prohibiting activities within 
Australia of exciting disaffection against foreign governments^- 
would be within the external affairs power not because the exciting of 
disaffection against foreign governments is an "external affair", is 
part of "Australia’s relations with other countries", but rather 
because the regulation of that activity may be relevant to Australia's 
external affairs, that is, to Australia’s relations with other 
countries. There are nevertheless statements in the cases to the 
effect that a subject matter (such as racial discrimination) can be
oregulated because it is an external affair'. That might of course 
be a simple shorthand way of expressing the steps which I have just 
set out in full. It might be, on the other hand, that such usage 
represents an implicit qualification of, or addition to, the generally 
agreed definition of the subject matter.
This issue is not just a semantic quibble. The issue of the 
characterisation of law as being within s51(xxix) may well be affected 
by the initial decision of whether or not the law is regulating an 
activity within the centre of the power. A decision that the activity 
is not within the centre of the power and that the law is to be 
supported, if at all, by recourse to the incidental power, leaves more
1 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121.
2 Eg Koowarta v Bjelke Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 417, 485 per 
Brennan J.
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scope for federal balance of power arguments to be raised. The latent 
issue of the line between the central area and the incidental area of 
s51(xxix) probably contributes to the conflict which has existed in 
the High Court since the Court first considered what would 
sufficiently connect the subject matter of a law with Australia's 
relations with other countries to justify the conclusion that the law 
was "with respect" to external affairs.
Most of the cases depending on the scope of s51(xxix) have 
involved legislation purporting to implement international treaties.
It is generally accepted that Australia is represented in 
international affairs by the Commonwealth Executive and that external 
prerogatives including the right to enter treaties are now vested in 
the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The dominating issue much 
discussed but still unresolved, is - when Australia is party to an 
international treaty what effect if any will that fact have on 
bringing the subject matter of the treaty within the reach of 
s51(xxix). Three main alternative views have been taken of the effect 
on commonwealth legislative power under s51(xxix) of the Commonwealth 
Executive having entered into a treaty; first, there is the wide view 
that any subject matter will be brought within the reach of s51(xxix) 
by the entering into of a treaty on that subject matter; secondly, 
there is the narrow view that the entering into of a treaty can never 
bring any subject matter within the reach of s51(xxix); thirdly, 
there is the compromise view that there are some subject matters which 
can, and some which can not be brought within the reach of s51(xxix) 
by the entering into of a treaty on the subject matter.
Alternative and not incompatible lines of reasoning have been 
offered to explain why it should be that the entering into of a treaty 
will or may bring its subject matter within the reach of s51(xxix):-
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First, the subject matter of a treaty is, by definition, a subject 
matter for which the treaty creates international obligations and 
rights and international obligations and rights are central to 
Australia’s relations with other countries:
Secondly, failure to fulfil a treaty will tend to affect 
Australia's international relations by inviting international 
reaction to that failure;
Thirdly, failure to fulfil a treaty will deprive Australia's 
international representatives of credibility when carrying on 
future international negotiations;
Fourthly, subject matters of international concern are likely to 
affect Australia's international relations and the fact that 
international representatives have entered a treaty relating to a 
subject matter evidences the existence of international concern 
about that subject matter.
These points are all directed to establishing that implementing a 
treaty will affect Australia’s relations with other countries. All of 
these points lose their force if the treaty is merely a sham contrived 
by the Commonwealth Executive as a device to generate legislative 
power. There would be no international consequences flowing from non- 
compliance with a treaty about which there is no international 
concern. It has been acknowledged by some judges, that a treaty can 
only convert a subject matter into an external affair if the treaty is 
bona fide.
The judges who say that the entering into of a treaty can never 
bring a subject matter within the reach of s51(xxix)(and pro tanto the 
judges who say that only some and not all subject matters can be 
brought within s51(xxix)) do not argue in terms of denying that treaty 
implementation may tend to affect Australia's international relations.
The narrow view judges instead argue that the tendency of treaty 
implementation to affect Australia's international relations cannot be 
accepted as a sufficient connection with power and that position when 
justified is justified, solely in terms of protecting the legislative 
domain of the States.
/
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The issue of the significance of the existence of a treaty was
explored both before and during Barwick’s Chief Justiceship. In 1936
in R v Burgess; Exp Henryk the issue received full discussion.
Only two judges, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, expressed a concluded opinion
2and they adopted the wide view. Latham CJ seemed to favour the
o  /wide view, Starke J seemed to favour the compromise. Dixon J 
would say only that the wide view seemed "extreme" but even on the 
narrowest view, the treaty in issue could be implemented because it
related to matters which were clearly "international affairs".^ (Sir
£Robert Garran published a commentary on the case and there were 
others who discussed the problem of treaty implementation.)^
In 1965 in Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales 
[No2]^  the issue was raised again but most members of the Court 
found no need to comment on it. Menzies J said in language consistent 
with the narrow view that "Under the Constitution, s51(xxix) ’External 
Affairs’, the Commonwealth has power to make laws to carry out its 
international obligations under a convention with other nations
Qconcerning external affairs."1 234567 89 Without explaining the basis for his
1 (1936) 55 CLR 608.
2 Id. 681 jointly.
3 Id. 640-641.
4 Id. 658.
5 Id. 669-670.
6 (1936) 10 ALJ 297.
7 JG Starke, "The Privy Council and the Competence of Federal 
Legislatures to Legislate Pursuant to International Obligations" 
(1937) 11 ALJ 45, 87; G Sawer, "Execution of Treaties by 
Legislation in the Commonwealth of Australia" (1955) 2 UQLJ 297.
8 (1965) 113 CLR 54.
9 Id. 136. Emphasis added.
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position, Barwick CJ said ”... I would wish to be understood as 
indicating that in my opinion, as at present advised, the mere fact 
that the Commonwealth has subscribed to some international document 
does not necessarily attract any power to the Comonwealth 
Parliament."^ This may have been just a particularly verbose way of 
reserving the issue. The passage might also be read, however, as 
indicating that Barwick CJ was tentatively endorsing the compromise 
position that some but not all subject matters can be brought within 
the range of s51(xxix) by the entering into of a treaty .
Consistently with that interpretation his Honour went on to say
"What treaties, conventions, or other international documents can 
attract the power given by s51(xxix) can best be worked out as 
occasion arises."^
If there were to be a division of subject matters into two 
categories such that entering a treaty about a subject from one 
category would "bring into existence an external affair" while 
entering a treaty about a subject from the other category would not, 
what would differentiate the categories? In Exp Henry Starke J seemed 
to indicate that the distinction was in the inherent nature of the 
subject matter. Starke J spoke approvingly of an American approach 
which would only allow implementation where the subject matter is "of 
sufficient international significance to make it a legitimate subject 
for international co-operation and agreement. J Starke J 
acknowledged that this did not provide a very clear test.
In Airlines [No2] in concluding that the Chicago Convention did 
bring into existence an external affair Barwick CJ said:
1 (1965) 113 CLR 54, 85.
2 Ibid.
3 (1936) 55 CLR 608, 658 quoting from Willoughby, The 
Constitutional Law of the United States 2nd ed (1929).
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"suffice it now to say that in my opinion the Chicago Convention, 
having regard to its subject matter, the manner of its formation, 
the extent of international participation in it and the nature of 
the obligations it imposes upon the parties to it unquestionably 
is, or at any rate brings into existence, an external affair of 
Australia.
In thus enumerating matters which in this case point to the 
Convention being or creating an external affair of Australia, I 
would not wish to be thought to say that all these features must 
in every case be present if a treaty or a convention is to attract 
the external affairs power . .."^
It might be that Barwick CJ was inclining to Starke J's approach and 
concentrating on the inherent international significance of the 
subject matter. Barwick CJ's enumeration, however, goes beyond the 
character of the "subject matter" of the treaty and includes "the 
manner of its formation". The passage might be construed (and seems 
to have been so construed by Brennan J in Koowarta v Bjelke- 
Petersen,) as indicating that Barwick CJ was concerned only with 
the bona fides of the treaty. Such a construction would place Barwick 
CJ in the category of judges who consider that the entering into of a 
bona fide treaty will convert any subject matter into an external 
affair.
In the end, all that one can say is that Barwick CJ’s position was 
ambiguous. If he was to be taken as supporting the compromise position 
- that there are some subject matters which can and some subject 
matters which cannot become external affairs - then he was supporting 
an approach which is such that it could be applied to any one treaty 
with the decision for or against there being Commonwealth power to 
implement, varying according to the centralist or States rights 
preferences of the individual judge.
There were other issues under s51(xxix) where Barwick CJ took 
clear positions all tending to be relatively favourable to 
Commonwealth power. Some have already been discussed.
1 (1965) 113 CLR 54, 85.
2 (1982) 39 ALR 417, 488.
3 Above pp.lOlff.
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It is accepted that if the existence of a treaty brings the 
subject matter of the treaty within the reach of s51(xxix) then there 
must be a correlation between the "general requirement " of the 
treaty-*- and the legislation depending on the treaty. In Airlines 
[No2] the Court was asked to hold that provisions requiring licences 
for air navigation inside Australia were supported by s51(xxix) 
implementing the Chicago Convention. The only relevant current 
obligation on Australia under the Convention was "to collaborate [with 
other contracting States] in securing the highest practicable degree 
of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization 
in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in 
all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air
1 R v Burgess Exp Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 688 per Evatt and
McTiernan JJ. After Barwick CJ retired from the Court Gibbs CJ 
(with Aickin and Wilson JJ concurring) took the view that a treaty 
can only be implemented if its subject matter is inherently 
relevant to Australia’s relations with other countries. Koowarta 
v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 39 ALR 417, 440 per Gibbs CJ. Stephen J 
can be construed as agreeing with this approach (id_. 453) - but as 
then taking a more generous approach than did Gibbs CJ, Aickin and 
Wilson JJ to what connection with Australia's international 
relations will suffice to bring a subject matter within the reach 
of s51(xxix). The difficulty with this narrow view of the effect 
of the existence of a treaty is that it seems to deny that the 
existence of an international treaty has any relevance. If the 
subject matter of a treaty is inherently relevant to Australia’s 
external affairs then there is no justification for requii_ng that 
legislation dealing with that subject matter correspond to the 
terms of the (irrelevant) treaty. The discussion of Gibbs CJ 
seems to proceed on the basis that there are only two 
possibilities - either that the entering of a treaty will bring 
any subject matter within power or that it will not bring any 
subject matter within power. This ignores the compromise 
suggested by Starke J in Exp Henry. When G Sawer published his 
article "Execution of Treaties by Legislation in the Commonwealth 
of Australia" in (1956) 2 University of Queensland Law Journal at 
p.297 HT Gibbs was a member of the Editorial Board. In that 
article Sawer explained (id. 299), inter alia, the Starke J 
compromise view which would allow some but not all subject matters 
to be brought within reach of s51(xxix).
2 (1965) 113 CLR 54.
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navigation." Three judges, Kitto Taylor and Windeyer JJ, held that 
s51(xxix) would not support the licensing legislation because the 
provisions were not closely enough related to carrying out the
obligation under the Convention. Taylor J and Windeyer J were
concerned, inter alia, about the width of the criteria for refusing a
licence.^ Kitto J took the point that the only current obligation
was to collaborate.
Barwick CJ, a former Minister for External Affairs, considered 
that the Convention was not to be read narrowly. Barwick CJ looked 
to the spirit not the strict letter of the convention to discern in it 
an obligation to secure uniformity.^ If one goes back to the basic 
definition of "external affairs" then Barwick CJ's approach is 
persuasive, for compliance with the spirit of international 
obligations is likely to be more important to Australia’s 
international relations than is compliance with the letter of 
international obligations.
In the alternative, Barwick CJ relied on the aspect of the 
Convention which required compliance with any specific international 
standards established from time to time. There were none presently 
established but Barwick CJ considered that the licensing system could 
be accepted as being a framework by which any future standard could be 
introduced. Such an approach of allowing action to be taken to 
anticipate possible future obligations was quite generous to the 
Commonwealth.
1 Id_. 130-131, 154-155 respectively.
2 Id. 117.
3 (1965) 113 CLR 1, 87.
4 (1965) 113 CLR 1, 86.
5 Id. 91.
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Another point at which Barwick CJ favoured the Commonwealth, was 
on the question of implementation of rights obtained under 
international treaty. Barwick CJ commented in Airlines [No2] that any 
Commonwealth power to implement treaties should apply as much to the 
securing of benefits as to the fulfilment of obligations.-^ In the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Case Barwick CJ gave as an alternative ground 
for his decision upholding the Commonwealth legislation asserting 
certain rights over offshore seas and submerged lands, that the 
legislation was taking the benefit of rights recognized by 
international convention. Neither Barwick CJ, nor any of the other 
judges who have indicated a willingness to allow the Commonwealth to 
legislate to take advantage of internationally recognized rights, have 
related their viewpoint to the arguments which relate treaty 
implementation to Australia's relations with other countries. Indeed 
any attempt to carry over the arguments in favour of allowing 
implementation of treaty obligations soon reveals how much weaker is 
the case for allowing implementation of a treaty right. Australia's 
international relations are much less likely to be agitated by the 
failure of Australia to exercise its rights than they are by the 
failure of Australia to fulfil its obligations. Barwick CJ stated in 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Case that it was because international 
sovereignty over offshore areas was conceded "internationally to the 
nation state and depends on international mutuality" that the 
legislative acceptance and assertion of that sovereignty were "pre-
1 14. 86. This view had been supported in Exp Henry by Latham CJ 
(1936) 55 CLR 608,644. Evatt and McTiernan JJ seemed to treat 
international rights as being subject to the same analysis as 
international obligations. (Id. 687.)
2 (1975) 135 CLR 337, 364.
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eminently external affairs."^ That approach does very much beg the 
question of the division of sovereignty in municipal law. All 
internationally recognized rights depend ex hypothesi on international 
recognition. The fact that there is international recognition for 
Australia’s sovereign right to control jay-walking does not imply that 
the Commonwealth has legislative power over jay-walking.
(d) Implied'National'Powers
In an article I published in (1981) 7 Adelaide Law Review, 348,
"The Commonwealth/State Co-operative Basis for the Australian Wheat
Board and the National Companies and Securities Commission: Some
Constitutional Issues", I traced the development of the proposition
that the Commonwealth has powers, legislative and executive, which are
not expressed in the Constitution but are implied into the
Constitution on account of, and as being incidental to, the
2Commonwealth’s status as the national government.
-5In the Australian Assistance Plan Case^ Barwick CJ was amongst 
those to discuss implied national power. The broadest view of the 
power was that of Jacobs J who proposed that the need for coordinated 
national action to deal with national problems itself generated 
national power and supported the Commonwealth activities (which were 
under challenge in the case,)^ of formulating and co-ordinating 
social welfare activities. No other member of the Court accepted
1 Id. 364.
2 Op cit 370-374.
3 (1975) 134 CLR 338.
4 Id. 412-413.
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"national need" as being a source of power. Barwick CJ, Gibbs and 
Mason JJ while acknowledging the existence of the implied national 
power, each emphasised that its content would be limited.^ Barwick 
CJ put it thus:
"However desirable the exercise by the Commonwealth of power in
affairs truly national in nature, the federal distribution of
power for which the Constitution provides must be maintained."^
Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Mason JJ each decided that implied national 
power was insufficient to support the activities under challenge.
Of course, any implication of national power necessarily alters 
the "federal distribution of power "because it increases Commonwealth 
power. Barwick CJ acknowledged that there is some implied national 
power. His Honour gave scientific research as an example of an 
activity within implied national power. Why should it be that the 
implication of Commonwealth power to engage in scientific research can 
be allowed to disturb the federal distribution of (express) powers 
while the implication of Commonwealth power to engage in welfare 
coordination can not? Perhaps the distinction is that activities of 
scientific research are not nearly so openly political as are social 
welfare decisions. As I commented in my article, the thrust of the 
Commonwealth's activities under the Australian Assistance Plan "was to 
shift the balance of power in a very significant manner. The Plan 
involved the Commonwealth directly in'making basic social value 
judgments. The State governments, Parliaments and bureaucracies were 
by-passed". ^
1 Id. 362, 364 per Barwick CJ; 328 per Gibbs J; 398 per Mason J.
2 Id. 364.
3 Id. 362.
4 Op cit 373.
157.
E - Financial Power
This topic provides a bridge between general issues of 
Commonwealth power and specific problems of intergovernmental 
conflict. The power of money is obvious. The discussion has already 
addressed one constitutional aspect of financial power - the 
Commonwealth power to tax, the power to impose financial burdens on 
activities. The discussion now turns to the Commonwealth's power to 
spend.
(i) Section 94
Section 90 of the Constitution prohibits States from exercising 
powers which had, before federation, been a major basis for colonial 
revenue raising. The federal purpose of that section is discussed 
below.^  Section 88 required the Commonwealth to impose uniform 
duties of customs within two years of the establishment of the 
Commonwealth. Section 94 reflects the Founders' expectation that the 
Commonwealth would not require all the revenue which it collected.
The section declares that ’After five years from the imposition of 
uniform duties of Customs, the Parliament may provide, on such basis 
as it deems fair, for the monthly payment to the several States of all 
surplus revenue of the Commonwealth”. In 1908 in New South Wales v 
The Commonwealth, the High Court upheld Commonwealth legislation which 
prevented there being any surplus available for distribution under 
s94. All members of the Court, even the authors of the reserved 
powers doctrine and the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities, 
Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ were agreed that an appropriation 
which merely set funds aside against the possibility of future 
expenditure was sufficient to prevent those funds being surplus
1 Pp203f f.
2 (1908) 7 CLR 179.
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under s94. Apart from that simple device for avoiding any "surplus" 
from coming into existence the pattern of Commonwealth government 
spending has so changed since federation and the practice of 
government operating in deficit has become so widely accepted, that 
s94 is not likely to have any function to perform in the foreseeable 
future.
(ii) Section 96
Contrary to the expectations of the Founders, s96 and not s94, has 
turned out to be the section around which Commonwealth/State financial 
arrangements have been organized. In 1942 in the First Uniform Tax 
Case^ the High Court considered the validity of a Commonwealth 
scheme of legislation which had the practical effect of excluding the 
States from the field of income taxation and of leaving that field 
entirely to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth set its income tax 
rates at such a level as to leave no scope for the exaction of State 
taxes. To make up for this exclusion of States from income taxation 
the Commonwealth proposed to provide funds to the States through s96. 
Each State’s s96 grants were, however, conditioned on the Treasurer of 
the Commonwealth being satisfied that the State did not tax incomes. 
The essential points of the scheme were upheld with Latham CJ, Rich, 
McTiernan and Williams JJ (Starke J dissenting) upholding, the 
attaching to s96 grants of conditions aimed at forcing the States to 
refrain from exercising their taxing powers.
There was some possibility that the decision could be confined to 
circumstances of defence emergency and the High Court was asked in
O1956 in the Second Uniform Tax Case to reconsider its decision.
This time Sir Garfield Barwick QC was involved.
1 South Australia v The Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373.
2 (1956) 99 CLR 575.
159.
He was part of the contingent representing Victoria and its Attorney- 
General. Barwick made submissions based on propositions about the 
federal nature of the Constitution and on doctrines of 
intergovernmental immunitites and those submissions are considered 
below. His only reported arguments based on s96 itself were these: 
first that s96 is only intended to support ad hoc grants to meet 
emergencies or other transient problems and can not, therefore support 
a system of standing grants available regardless of need,^ secondly, 
that it was incompatible with the purpose of the section for the 
Commonwealth to create the need to be met by a grant, by conditions 
attached to the grant.
Dixon CJ expressed agreement with Barwick's perception of the 
purpose of s96^ but neither he nor any other member of the Court 
felt able to translate that purpose into any acceptable constitutional 
limitation on s96. The First Uniform Tax Case was unanimously 
affirmed in its essential points. The interference with State 
governmental function was to be reconciled with federal doctrines 
against intergovernmental interference (which had come to the fore in 
the years between the First and Second Uniform Tax Cases) by pointing 
to the fact that no Commonwealth law attempted to regulate State 
behaviour. The Commonwealth merely offered an economic inducement, 
albeit an irresistible one, for the States to act in a certain 
way. ^
1 Pp185-186.
2 Id. 585.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. 603-604, 606-609.
5 Id. 609-610 per Dixon CJ. G Sawer, "The Second Uniform Tax Case" 
TT957) 31 ALJ 247.
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As Chief Justice in the Australian Assistance Plan Case, Barwick 
described the operation of s96 in these terms:
"Section 96 ... has enabled the Commonwealth to intrude in point 
of policy and perhaps of administration into areas outside 
Commonwealth legislative competence."
Echoing the First Uniform Tax Case’s reconciliation of this use of s96 
with the federal principle of the Constitution, Barwick CJ also 
commented
"But a grant under s96 with its attached conditions cannot be 
forced upon a State: the State must accept it with its
conditions. Thus, although in point of economic fact, a State on 
occasions may have little option, these intrusions by the 
Commonwealth into areas of State power which action under s96 
enables, wear consensual aspect."^
In the DOGS Case Barwick CJ and all other members of the Court 
reaffirmed the validity of the attachment to s96 grants of detailed 
conditions which reduced the States to mere conduits. In an extra­
judicial statement in 1968 Barwick CJ referred to the system of tied 
s96 grants as being one of the three most important stabilising 
features of the Constitution.^ Contrary to his submissions in the 
First Uniform Tax Case, and in an apparent reference to s90, Barwick 
CJ suggested that the achievement by the Commonwealth through the 
Uniform Tax Cases of control over the main governmental revenue 
sources, might be "regarded as a reversion to the original 
compact".^ The surprising suggestion that the purpose of s90 was to
1 (1975) 134 CLR 338, 357.
2 Ibid.
3 Attorney-General for Victoria and Black v The Commonwealth (1981)
33 ALR 321, 330-331 per Barwick CJ; 335-336 per Gibbs J (Aickin J
concurring); 351-352 per Stephen J; 357-358 per Mason J; 358 
per Murphy J; 389-392 per Wilson J.
4 Opening Address at the Eleventh Annual Conference of the Royal 
Institute of Public Administration (1968) 28 PA 1, 2.
5 Op cit 3.
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give the Commonwealth exclusive control over customs and excise 
because they were the main sources of government revenue is discussed 
below.
(iii) Sections 81 and 83 - The Commonwealth Parliament 's Power 
to Appropriate Funds
Section 81 of the Constitution provides that
"All revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive 
Government of the Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated Revenue 
fund, to be appropriated for the purposes of the Commonwealth in 
the manner and subject to the charges and liabilities imposed by 
this Constitution."
Section 83 prescribes that appropriation be "by law".
In the article I published in the Adelaide Law Review, I 
discuss, inter alia, the judicial attitudes to the question whether 
the words "for the purposes of the Commonwealth" impose any and if so 
what restraint in law on Parliament's power to appropriate funds.
That question had been considered in 1945 in the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits CaseJ and arose again during Barwick's Chief Justiceship in 
1975 in the Australian Assistance Plan Case.^
As with construing and applying constitutional sections relating 
to the structure and procedures of Parliament, Barwick CJ found no 
difficulty in holding that the compliance of an Appropriation Act with
1 Pp214ff.
2 "The Commonwealth/State Co-operative Basis for the Australian 
Wheat Board and the National Companies and Securities Commission: 
Some Constitutional Issues" (1981) 7 Adelaide LR 348, 355-364.
3 (1945) 71 CLR 237.
4 (1975) 134 CLR 338.
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the limitation, "for the purposes of the Commonwealth", was a 
justiciable issue.^ In the Australian Assistance Plan Case only 
Gibbs J clearly supported Barwick CJ’s conclusion of
"justiciability".^ McTiernan J, reaffirmed the opinion which he and 
Latham CJ had expressed thirty years earlier in the Pharmaceutical
oBenefits Case, that whether or not an Appropriation Act was "for 
the purposes of the Commonwealth" was a non-justiciable issue. ^
Other judgments in the Australian Assistance Plan Case either 
reserved, or were ambiguous on, the point of justiciability but tended 
to favour the conclusion that the point was not justiciable.^ The 
issue of justiciability was closely connected with the issue of the 
meaning to be attributed to the phrase "for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth". McTiernan, Mason and Murphy JJ considered that the 
phrase "purposes of the Commonwealth" meant such purposes as 
Commonwealth Parliament determines. This interpretation was supported 
by these main points. First, that the (sole) function of the 
provision was to declare the British constitutional principle of 
Parliamentary control over executive spending of public monies.^ 
Secondly, that understood against the British background the word
1 (1975) 134 CLR 338, 364.
2 Id. 379-380.
3 (1945) 71 CLR 237, 256, 273-274 respectively.
4 (1975) 134 CLR 338, 368-369.
5 GA Rumble Op cit 362.
6 AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338, 396 per Mason J. Although Stephen J 
decided the case on the basis that the plaintiffs, Victoria and 
its Attorney-General, had no standing to challenge the 
Appropriation Act or expenditure thereunder by seeking a 
declaration (id. 390-391), his judgment tends to reveal a 
perception of s81 similar to that contained in Mason J's judgment.
(Id. 386-387, 391.).
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"Commonwealth" meant the people of the Commonwealth who indicate their 
purposes through their elected representatives in Parliament.^- 
Barwick CJ and Gibbs J construed s81 as being a declaration of a 
federal rather than a British principle.^ For them the phrase "for 
the purposes of the Commonwealth" meant for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth as a body politic with powers and functions defined and 
limited by the Constitution. (As Gibbs J commented, this was the 
view heavily favoured by the balance of judicial opinion.)^ Barwick 
CJ’s reasoning and discussion involve propositions about the very 
basis of Australian federation.
Barwick CJ's first proposition was that ss81 and 83 could not be 
taken as being simply and exclusively a declaration of the British 
principle of Parliamentary control of Executive spending.^
According to Barwick CJ, it was not necessary to declare that 
principle expressly, as it would have been part of the Commonwealth's
l:inheritance of British common law. The words "for the purposes of 
the Commonwealth" could not be dismissed as being mere surplusage. 
They had a meaning and a function and that meaning and function could 
be as certained by placing "the financial provisions of the 
Constitution in the setting of the period in which federation was 
mooted and achieved".^
1 PB Case (1945) 71 CLR 237, 255-256 per Latham CJ and approved in 
the AAP Case (1975) 134 CLR 338 by McTiernan J (368-369) Mason J 
(396) and Murphy J (417, 421).
2 Id. 354, 374 respectively.
3 Id. 360-363, 371-374 respectively.
4 Id. 373.
5 Id. 354.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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The federal goal of establishing a customs union-*- necessitated
the surrender to the Commonwealth of the colonies' powers to impose
2customs and excise duties. The assumption and expectation in the 
"plan of federation" was that the revenues collected by the 
Commonwealth would be shared between the Commonwealth and the 
States. Even though no permanent formula could be agreed for the 
distribution of revenue the federal nature of the financial provisions 
of the Constitution could not be denied.^
It was as necessary then in 1975 as it had been when the 
principles of federation were in negotiation to recognize and respect 
the principle of s94.^ The principle of s94 was (despite the 
absence of mandatory terms therein) that the Commonwealth be obliged 
to make available to the States any surplus of Commonwealth 
revenues.^ Barwick CJ then construed ss81 and 83 as being 
provisions designed to support s94 by limiting Commonwealth 
expenditure and thus tending to ensure that there would be surplus 
revenue available to be shared through s94 amongst the States.^
Barwick CJ was not at all perturbed by the fact that ss81, 83 and 
94 do not in fact achieve the federal purposes which he attributed to 
them. It will be recalled that Barwick CJ was similarly, not 
deflected by the current reality of a Senate acting as a party house,
1 Discussed further in the s90 and s92 Chapters.
2 Id. 354-355.
3 Id. 355.
4 Id. 356.
5 Id. 357.
6 Id. 358-359 citing New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1908) 7 CLR 
179.
7 Id. 357, 359.
165.
from construing provisions relating to Parliament by reference to the 
intended federal role for the Senate as a States House.^ In both 
cases of course, Barwick GJ was strictly complying with the 
proposition that it is the intention of the Imperial Parliament in 
1900 which is determinative. There was, however, something 
unrealistic about Barwick CJ’s resolute determination to protect a 
provision - s94 - which was a dead letter, is a dead letter and had 
been a dead letter since 1908.
Barwick CJ reinforced his conclusion that s81 was limited to 
appropriation for purposes referable to Commonwealth power, by a more 
specific line of reasoning which was quite remarkable. Barwick CJ 
commenced thus: Section 81 could not be construed as vesting in the
Commonwealth a power to spend money on any purpose whether or not 
itself relevant to Commonwealth power, as that would enable the 
Commonwealth "effectively to interfere ... in matters covered by the 
residue of governmental power assigned by the Constitution to the 
State".^ From this stage on, I set out Barwick CJ's discussion in 
full.
"It is perhaps worth remarking at this point that the doctrine of 
the Court established in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd has supported the exercise to the full 
of Commonwealth legislative power. But however large and generous 
the interpretation of those powers, the Constitution requires that 
the power of the Sta^^s with respect to the residue, not embraced 
in Commonwealth power as thus construed, should not be trespassed 
upon by the Commonwealth without the concurrence of the State. 
Participation by the Commonwealth in policy-making or of 
administration in connexion with matters of State concern, matters 
within the residue left to the States by ssl06 and 107, must, in 
my opinion, be confined to the use by the Commonwealth of s96
1 Above pp45ff.
2 Id. 358.
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which, as I have said, involves the consent of a State. The 
Commonwealth, in my opinion, activity under s96 apart, cannot 
enter that residual area left by the Constitution to the States, 
either by legislative or by executive act."*
What distinguishes this from the reserved powers doctrine? There 
is the notion that a possible construction of Commonwealth power 
should be rejected if it would encroach on the areas left to the 
States by ssl06 and 107. All that seems to be lacking is the use of 
the words "reserved powers". Barwick CJ speaks instead of the 
"assigned residue".
......... 2F - Intergovernmental immunity after the Engineers Case 
(i) Federal Implications
What follows is intended to be read as a continuation of the 
earlier discussion of intergovernmental immunity up to and including 
the Engineers Case.
The Engineers Case declared against the making of 
implications of intergovernmental immunity and proposed a simple 
scheme with both the Commonwealth and the States subject to one 
another's laws and with the only "immunity" to be that accruing
1 Ibid.
2 R Sackville "The Doctrine of Immunity of Instrumentalities in the
United States and Australia: A Comparative Analysis" (1969) 7
MULR 15. LR Zines The High Court and the Constitution Chapter 
14.
3 Above pp88ff. The development of this topic was postponed pending 
the preceding section's analysis of post-Engineers principles of 
characterisation. Some judges including Barwick CJ have tried to 
deal with intergovernmental immunity solely by application of 
general principles of characterisation. Below ppl85-187.
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to the Commonwealth through sl09. Dixon J and Evatt J in particular 
did not accept that the Engineers Case had totally barred the making 
of implications drawn from the federal spirit of the Constitution.
In 1947 Berwick KC appeared in the State Banking Case a case
central to the identification of possible approaches to
2intergovernmental immunity.
The State Banking Case
The law which Barwick was briefed to challenge in this case 
prohibited private banks from providing banking facilities to State 
governments. Barwick put a succession of submissions in the 
alternative with a view to establishing the invalidity of the law.
First, Barwick submitted that the Commonwealth law in issue, s48 
of the Banking Act 1945, was not in substance a law with respect to 
banking under s51(xiii), as the prohibition on provision of private 
banking facilities to State governments was imposed without reference 
to any banking consideration.^ Although this submission abided by 
the Engineers Case interdiction of federal implications of 
intergovernmental immunity, it involved an approach to 
characterisation of laws (as being with respect to a Commonwealth 
subject matter) which was similar to the characterisation branch of 
the reserved powers doctrine. That branch of the reserved powers 
doctrine was the only part of the pre-Engineers scheme not to receive
1 West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 657, 681, 
6887
2 (1947) 74 CLR 31. The case is analysed in JD Holmes, "Back to 
Dual Sovereignty'* ( 1947) 21 ALJ 162.
3 Id. 36.
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a direct repudiation by the Engineers Case and its status and the 
general issue of characterisation were relatively unexplored at this 
stage. ^
Secondly Barwick submitted that the federal structure of the 
Constitution impliedly precluded certain kinds of intergovermental 
interference. If federal implications were to be made, it did not 
matter, Barwick submitted, whether the category of prohibited action 
was discriminatory action by one sphere of government against the 
other , or interference with an essential function of government“^ 
or, more widely, any substantial intergovernmental interference 
whether discriminatory or not, and whether with an essential 
governmental function or not^. It did not matter which category of 
implied prohibition the Court was willing to acknowledge, and the 
Court did not have to commit itself to one category of implied 
prohibition to the exclusion of others, because the suspect law was a 
substantial discriminatory interference with an essential State 
governmental function and therefore offended all of the suggested 
implications.^
The law was held invalid by majority. The sole dissentient 
McTiernan J held, s48 to be a law with respect to banking under 
s51(xiii),^ applied the Engineers Case declaration against the 
making of vague political implications and held the States to be 
subject to this law'7. The majority judges were Latham CJ,
1 Above ppl04ff
2 Id. 36, 41.
3 Id. 36.
4 Ibid.
5 Id. 38.
6 Id. 94.
7 Id. 88.
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Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ. The "true" basis for the 
majority decision was, however, far from clear as there were 
variations in the grounds for deciding that s48 was invalid and in the 
attitudes expressed to the questions of whether any and if so what 
federal implications should be made.
Latham CJ (who had been amongst counsel arguing for the 
recognition of federal implications in the Engineers Case itself)^- 
purported to abide by and accept the Engineers Case declaration 
against the making of federal implications". There was, however, 
ambiguity in Latham CJ's discussion.
As Chief Justice, Barwick claimed that Latham CJ’s judgment in 
the State Banking Case treated the resolution of problems of 
intergovernmental interference as being a matter for the application 
of ordinary principles of characterisation. (This interpretation 
corresponded to the characterisation submission of Barwick set out 
above).
This interpretation of Latham CJ's judgment was consistent with 
the passage where Latham CJ said
"In my opinion the reason why such discriminatory legislation 
is invalid is that what is called 'discrimination' shows that 
the legislation is really legislation by the Commonwealth 
with respect to a State or State function as such and not 
with respect to the subject in respect of which it is sought 
to bind the State ..."^
1 (1920) 28 CLR 129, 134-137.
2 (1947) 74 CLR 31, 61.
3 Payroll Tax case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 383.
4 (1947) 74 CLR 31, 61 also a similar statement at 62.
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Earlier in his judgment, however, Latham CJ had said ”... the argument 
that s48 is not legislation with respect to banking should not be 
accepted...“. An alternative interpretation^ of Latham CJ’s 
judgment is to attribute it to a reliance on the phrase "peace, order 
and good government" appearing in the introductory words of s51.
These had been the terms in which some years earlier in Wests Case, 
Latham CJ had discussed intergovernmental discriminatory 
interference. If this were the "true basis" of Latham CJ’s 
decision in the State Banking Case, then it was essentially dependent 
on a federal principle, the federal division of government into 
different spheres. Indeed Latham CJ's judgment contains reference to 
the federal background to the problem.^
Rich and Starke JJ,^ considered s48 to be a law with respect to 
banking. The discussion^ of Dixon J did not expressly hold that s48 
was a law with respect to banking, but did repudiate the assumptions 
about general principles of characterisation involved in Barwick KC's 
first line of argument. Williams J did not comment directly on 
Barwick's submission around the words "with respect to" but he did 
include as one of his grounds for decision a reference to the phrase 
"peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth".^
1 Id. 50.
2 Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 402 per Windeyer J discussed 
below pl90.
3 (1937) 56 CLR 657, 669. See also Williams J in the State Banking 
Case (1947) 74 CLR 31, 99-100.
4 Id. 55, 60.
5 Id_. 65, 69 respectively.
6 Id. 78-80.
7 Id. 99-100.
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Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ all clearly endorsed the 
proposition that the federal nature of the Constitution gives rise to 
some intergovernmental immunity.  ^ All of these judges thought that 
discrimination was important when considering the compatability of a 
law with the federal principle of the Constitution but again, there 
was variation - this time in the weight given to the presence of 
discrimination in s48.
The decisions of Rich and Starke JJ seemed to hold s48 invalid 
because of its conflict with a general federal principle. According to 
these judges there was a federal principle in the Constitution that 
the Commonwealth and the States should each continue to exist.^ For 
Rich J the corollary of this principle (so far as is relevant to s48) 
was that the Commonwealth could not take action (whether 
discriminatory or not), which prevented or impeded States or State 
agencies from performing "the normal and essential functions of 
government".^ His Honour considered that "the power freely to use 
the facilities provided by banks, under modern conditions, must be 
regarded as essential to the effective working of the business of 
government...".^
Starke J spoke of an implication preventing either sphere of 
government from abolishing the other or substantially curtailing the 
other's exercise of its constitutional powers.^ Although not willing 
to draw distinctions between categories of activities (some to be 
entitled to immunity and some not)^, Starke J was willing to take
1 Id_. 65-66, 70-75, 81-83, 99-100 respectively.
2 _Id_. 66, 75, 78-79, 99 respectively.
3 Id. 66, 70 respectively.
4 Id. 66.
5 Id. 67.
6 Id. 70. Also First Uniform Tax Case (1942) 65 CLR 373, 442; 
Exp Victoria (1942) 66 CLR 488, 515.
7 (1947) 74 CLR 31, 74-75.
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account of the nature of the activity affected and, in deciding that 
s48 was invalid, noted that "The management and control by the States 
and by local governing authorities of their revenues and funds is a 
constitutional power of vital importance to them."^
The willingness of Rich J and Starke J to recognize a federally 
derived intergovernmental immunity seemed difficult to reconcile with 
the sweep of the main Engineers majority judgment to which they 
themselves had been party a generation beforehand, and the continuing 
authority of which they accepted.
Rich J attempted to reconcile the federal principles he applied in 
the State Banking Case with the Engineers Case by saying that the 
Engineers Case was only about implications and had nothing to say 
about express constitutional limitations. Section 51 provided that 
Commonwealth powers were "subject to the Constitution" and, according 
to Rich J, the Constitution provided for the continued existence of 
the States "as such". Rich J did not identify the express 
provisions which he claimed predicated the continued existence of the 
States "as such". Many provisions of the Constitution assume the 
continued existence of States. Section 106 provides for the 
continuation of the Constitutions of each State and sl07 provides for 
the continuation of State powers but no provision expressly provides 
for the continued existence of the States "as such". Those two words 
seem to carry a guarantee of a certain status and position beyond mere 
formal existence.
Starke J who had also been party to the main majority judgment in 
the Engineers Case, simply asserted that the Engineers Case had not
1 Id. 75.
2 Id. 66.
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precluded the making of federal implications into the Constitution.^- 
Starke J made no attempt to explain the apparent conflict between the 
broad implication he discerned in the State Banking Case and the 
Engineers Case broad declaration against federal implications. On 
examination Starke J's formulation differed from the pre-Engineers 
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity in that it did not postulate 
freedom from all interference from the other sphere of government as 
the starting assumption of the Constitution. The authors of the 
original doctrine had considered it inappropriate for the High Court 
to try to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable burdens. Therefore 
all interferences were prima facie prohibited. Starke J saw no 
such difficulty in distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable 
interferences. He was willing to approach it as a practical question 
with the facts of each case relevant.
Dixon and Williams JJ agreed with Starke J that any federally
derived intergovernmental immunity was a matter of implication rather
than express provision.^ Like Rich and Starke JJ, Dixon and
Williams JJ, considered that the Constitution predicated the continued
existence of the States as independent entities.-* Dixon and Williams
JJ, however, based their decision that s48 was invalid on its
£discriminatory aspect.
Like Starke J, Williams J simply asserted that the making of 
federal implications was compatible with the Engineers Case.^ Dixon
1 D*Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 118.
2 State Banking Case (1947) 74 CLR 31, 75.
3 Id. 81-82. Also West's Case (1937) 56 CLR 657, 681-682 per Dixon 
J. (1947) 74 CLR 31, 99 per Williams J.
4 Li_. 82, 99 respectively.
5 Id. 82-84, 99-100 respectively.
6 Id. 99.
7 Id. 70, 73.
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J's discussion was more elaborate and continued the development of a 
theory he had introduced in earlier cases.^
Dixon J rejected the Engineers Case proposition that no political 
implications could be drawn from the federal nature of the 
Constitution. How, Dixon J asked, could political considerations be 
excluded from the construction of a political document? Although 
rejecting that central part of the reasoning in the Engineers Case, 
Dixon J accepted the case as having authoritatively established that
'iCommonwealth law can prima facie bind the States.
Dixon J’s framework struck a compromise between the authority of 
the Engineers Case declaration against vague unpredictable 
implications and the inherent force of the federal argument of the 
pre-Engineers doctrine by elaborating a precise and specific set of 
federal implications. Dixon J argued that the Engineers Case main 
judgment itself reserved intergovernmental interference by taxation or 
with prerogative and furthermore had nothing to say to 
discrimination.^ Dixon J considered that in these areas, the 
federal nature of the Constitution would prima facie preclude 
intergovernmental interference.^
1 For greater depth, LR Zines, "Sir Owen Dixon's Theory of 
Federalism” (1965) 1 FL Rev 221.
2 West's Case (1937) 56 CLR 657, 681-682; State Banking Case (1947) 
74 CLR 31, 81-82.
3 Id. 78.
4 Essendon Corporation v Criterion Theatres Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 1, 22- 
23. State Banking Case (1947) 74 CLR 31, 78-79. This 
interpretation of the main judgment in the Engineers Case is open 
to criticism. G Sawer "Implication and the Constitution" (1948- 
1950) 4 RJ 15, 85.
5 Previous note, case references.
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The federal implications in favour of the States might, however, 
be displaced by the special nature of the Commonwealth power in 
issue. (In this, Dixon J's theory was similar to, though not 
supported by reference to the pre-Engineer’s doctrine. ) The 
implications were moreover to be much stronger to protect the 
Commonwealth than they were to protect the States. This lack of 
symmetry in the implied immunity occurred, according to Dixon J, 
because the Commonwealth’s dominance was recognised by sl09 of the 
Constitution and because the Commonwealth was given express grants of 
power which impliedly carried with them everything necessary for their 
full effectuation.
These then were the range of approaches to federal implications 
which had been brought into focus in the State Banking Case.^
The topic was raised again in later cases but no conclusive Court 
attitude emerged.
Arguments based on intergovernmental immunity were included 
amongst the grounds for attacking the Commonwealth scheme for 
nationalising private banks in the Bank Nationalisation Case.^  A 
central provision of the scheme, s46 of the 1947 Banking Act, gave
1 State Banking Case (1947) CLR 31, 81.
2 Compare the Steel Rails Case (1908) 5 CLR 818.
3 State Banking Case (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82-83. (One might have 
thought that the availability to the Commonwealth of the power to 
free itself through sl09, of annoying State laws would have tilted 
the balance of the implied immunities in favour of the States).
4 Latham CJ (id_. 62-63) and Williams J (id. 101) also considered 
that s48 was inconsistent with sl05A of the. Constitution. Starke J 
(id. 75-76) and McTiernan J (id. 95) considered that it was not 
and Rich J and Dixon J made no comment on this point which was not 
apparently argued (Id. 62 per Latham CJ).
5 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 45-46 per Hudson KC.
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the Commonwealth Treasurer power to order any private bank to cease 
banking. This law which gave power to deny private banking facilities 
to all seemed therefore to have exactly the same effect on the States' 
access to banking facilities as the law held invalid in the State 
Banking Case.
McTiernan J was the only member of the Court to uphold s46.^ Of 
the majority judges who held s46 to be invalid, none included 
intergovernmental interference amongst their grounds for decision. In
otheir joint judgment Rich and Williams JJ reserved, and made no 
comment on, the arguments of intergovernmental immunity.
Dixon J accepted that a law not involving discrimination (or 
taxation or preogative) could offend a Federal implication, but 
considered that that possibility was irrelevant to the case before him 
"where the law relates to the form to be taken by part of the 
established organization of the community affecting all alike".
Starke J shifted ground from his position in the State Banking Case 
and came closer to Dixon J's framework. Starke J reaffirmed his view 
that general laws of one sphere of government substantially curtailing 
the exercise of powers by the other sphere of government would be 
invalid,^ but then held that the law in the Bank Nationalisation
1 Id. 393.
2 Id. 283.
3 _Id_. 338. In acknowledging the possibility that a law "without
discrimination" might be beyond Federal power, Dixon J made 
reference to New York v United States (The Saratoga Springs Case) 
326 US 572; 90 Law Ed 326 (1945). In that case the United States
Supreme Court (by majority) upheld the application of general 
Federal tax to a State activity. It is not clear whether the 
"possibility" which Dixon J saw as being suggested (presumably by 
the dicta) in this case was the possibility reserved by 
Frankfurter J - of a tax general on its face in fact being 
discriminatory because it operated by reference to a criterion 
uniquely associated with States. (326 US 583-583; 90 Law Ed 333-
334) - or whether it was that possibility reserved by Reed, Murphy 
and Burton JJ -of a general tax being an undue interference with 
States. (326 US 586-587; 90 Law Ed 336).
4 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 326.
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Case was not curtailing or impeding any power or function of the 
States.^- Starke J purported to distinguish the law held invalid in 
the State Banking Case by referring to that law’s discriminatory 
aspect.^ This ground for distinction failed to take account of the 
fact that Starke J's judgment in the State Banking Case had emphasised 
that law's effect on the State, rather than its discriminatory 
aspect^ and Starke J offered no basis for distinguishing the effect 
of the law before him in the Bank Nationalisation Case.
Whatever the true interpretation of his judgment in the State 
Banking Case, in the Bank Nationalisation Case Latham CJ clearly 
accepted that the State Banking Case had established that the 
Constitution contained federal implications.1 23456^ Latham CJ considered 
that the presence of discrimination in the State Banking Case law 
distinguished that decision^ and, while, apparently accepting that 
the effects on a State of a non-discriminatory law could offend a 
federal implication, considered that the denial to the States of 
access to private banking facilities did not constitute an offensive 
burden given the freedom of the States to establish their own 
banks.^
In the Second Uniform Tax Case Sir Garfield Barwick QC, 
representing Victoria set up this federal scheme. The federal 
structure itself involved inherent immunity for both the Commonwealth 
and the States from one another's laws. The grant of residual non­
specific law making power to the States did not detract from the 
Commonwealth's prima facie immunity. On the other hand the specific
1 Id. 325-326.
2 Id. 326.
3 Above ppl71-173.
4 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 242-243. Also Wenn v Attorney-General (Vic)
(1948) 77 CLR 84, 113.
5 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 243.
6 Id. 243.
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powers granted to the Commonwealth were to be construed as sufficient 
to offset the States' prima facie federal immunity. Despite the grant 
of specific powers to the Commonwealth, the federal principle was not, 
however, completely displaced and the States had some immunity derived 
from the federal structure itself. (To this point, and as stated in 
the abstract, Barwick QC’s federal scheme was very similar to the pre- 
Engineer's doctrine of implied intergovernmental immunity.)^ Citing 
the State Banking Case, Barwick QC submitted that the federal 
structure of the Constitution "prevents any law of the Commonwealth 
operating to destroy or weaken the independence or integrity of a 
State or to place a particular disability or burden upon an operation 
or activity of a State and more especially upon the execution of its 
constitutional powers". The resolution of the case did not, 
however, give the Court an opportunity to settle the question of the 
appropriate framework for dealing with intergovernmental interference 
and that issue remained when Barwick was appointed to the Court.
The Payroll Tax Case
In 1971, Barwick's High Court was asked whether a Commonwealth law 
imposing tax on the payment of wages could apply to the wages of State 
government employees, and whether an associated Commonwealth law 
obliging employers to pay the tax could apply to State governments as 
employers. Taxation was one of Dixon J's three specific categories of 
intergovernmental immunity. In Essendon Corporation v Criterion 
Theatres Ltd Dixon J had based his decision that the Commonwealth 
executive was not able to pay rates for its occupancy of land, on his 
proposition that it was inherent in the federal principle of the 
Constitution that neither the Commonwealth nor the States could tax 
the other. (Other members of the Court were able to decide the 
case, without reference to Dixon J's propositions about 
intergovernmental immunity, either as a simple matter of construction
1 Above pp88ff.
2 Victoria v Commonwealth (1956) 99 CLR 575, 581, 586.
3 (1947) 74 CLR 1, 19.
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1 9of the State legislation in issue or by application of sll4. )
-aThe Payroll Tax presented the opportunity for a choice to be made 
between the different approaches to intergovernmental interference 
which had been set out in the State Banking Case and to consider Dixon 
J's proposition that there was inherent intergovernmental immunity 
from taxation.
The members of the 1971 Court were unanimous that the laws in 
issue could validly apply to wages of State employees and to States as 
employers. The judgments did not, however, provide a clear cut 
victory for any approach to intergovernmental immunity. There seemed 
to be general agreement that discrimination would tend to result in 
invalidity but this conclusion was reached by different routes.^
Menzies, Walsh and Gibbs JJ presented a framework with these 
essential elements. The Engineers Case established a prima facie rule 
that States were bound by Commonwealth laws otherwise valid. Problems 
of intergovernmental interference were not, however, capable of 
resolution simply by application of general principles of 
characterisation.-* The federal nature of the Constitution gave rise 
to implication, the existence of which was recognized by precedent, 
preventing some interference by the Commonwealth with the States. ^
The three specific categories - prerogative, taxation and 
discrimination - central to Dixon J's framework, could not be
1 Id. 15-16 per Rich J; 28-29 per McTiernan J; 30 per Williams J.
2 Id_. 13-14 per Latham CJ So far as is relevant, s.114 provides "A
State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament ... 
impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the 
Commonwealth, ...".
3 Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353.
4 Id. 372 per Barwick CJ (Owen J concurring); 385 per McTiernan J;
391-392 per Menzies J; 403 per Windeyer J; 411 per Walsh J; 424
per Gibbs J.
Id. 386
J.
per Menzies J; 405 per Walsh J; 420-421 per Gibbs
Id. 386 per Menzies J; 406 per Walsh J; 417-418 per Gibbs J-.
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accepted as a satisfactory or exhaustive list to indicate when federal 
implications would provide intergovernmental immunity. (There was no 
need to comment on the prerogative.)^- There was no automatic implied 
immunity from tax laws. On the other hand, although discrimination 
against the States was impliedly prohibited and was an indicator of 
invalidity, its absence did not automatically indicate the validity of 
a Commonwealth law. General Commonwealth laws could be invalid in 
their application to the States.
There was, according to Gibbs J, a general underlying implication 
prohibiting the Commonwealth from preventing the States from 
continuing "to exist and function as such."  ^ Menzies J acknowledged 
that such a general implication probably did exist and Walsh J 
acknowledged that it could exist. Menzies and Walsh JJ did not 
however, commit themselves on that matter.^ All three judges 
perceived the imprecise content of such an implication and the 
difficulties of definition which would arise should it involve a 
necessity to distinguish between essential and non-essential functions 
of government.^ Their Honours found no need to explore those 
difficulties of definition, however, as they concluded that on any 
approach that might be taken to those issues, it could not be said 
that the Commonwealth tax in issue was destroying or threatening the 
continued existence of the States.^
1 Id. 424 per Gibbs J.
2 Id. 392 per Menzies J; 408-409 per Walsh J; 423-424 per 
Gibbs J.
3 Id. 391-392 per Menzies J; 411 per Walsh J; 424 per Gibbs
J.
4 Id. 424.
5 Id. 93 per Menzies J; 422, 412 per Walsh J.
6 Id. 392 per Menzies J; 410-419 per Walsh J; 424-425 per 
Gibbs J.
Id. 392-393 per Menzies J; 413 per Walsh J; 424-425 per 
Gibbs J.
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T h i s  f ram ew ork  had c e r t a i n  a t t r a c t i o n s .  I t  s e p a r a t e d  g e n e r a l  
p r i n c i p l e s  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n ,  u n d e r  which h e a d i n g  some d e g r e e  of  
c e r t a i n t y  and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  had by t h i s  s t a g e  been d e v e l o p e d , ^ - f rom 
t h e  s p e c i a l  p r o b le m  of  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  In  r e l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  s p e c i a l  p r o b le m ,  i t  a cknow ledged  t h e  f o r c e  of  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  must  be t a k e n  t o  be g u a r a n t e e i n g  a c o n t i n u e d  
e x i s t e n c e  f o r  t h e  S t a t e s .
I t  m igh t  be s a i d  a g a i n s t  t h e  f ram ew ork  t h a t  i t s  f e d e r a l
i m p l i c a t i o n  i s ,  l i k e  t h e  p r e - E n g i n e e r s  i m p l i c a t i o n  of
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  im m u n i ty ,  vague  and d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e .  The
u n c e r t a i n t y  of  t h e  new d o c t r i n e  ( o r  of  t h i s  new v e r s i o n  of t h e  o l d
d o c t r i n e )  does  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  d o m in a t e  A u s t r a l i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  law t o
t h e  same d e g r e e  t h a t  t h e  p r e - E n g i n e e r s  d o c t r i n e  d i d .  The o l d  d o c t r i n e
s e t  up S t a t e  im m unity  as  a s t a r t i n g  a s s u m p t i o n ,  e x c e p t i o n  t o  wh ich
m igh t  be e s t a b l i s h e d .  The new d o c t r i n e  a c c e p t s  t h e  E n g i n e e r s  Case as
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h a t  t h e  S t a t e s  a r e  p r im a  f a c i e  bound by Commonwealth
l aw ,  and t h e n  adds  S t a t e  imm unity  from Commonwealth a c t i o n  a s  a
p r o v i s o  t o  come i n t o  o p e r a t i o n  i n  e x t r e m e  c a s e s .  The new d o c t r i n e  h a s
t h e r e f o r e  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  which  comes f rom  t h e  u n l i k e l i h o o d  of  i t s  b e i n g
c a l l e d  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n .  Tha t  c e r t a i n t y  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  v u l n e r a b l e .  A
High C our t  minded t o  im prove  t h e  s t a t u s  of  t h e  S t a t e s  c o u ld  s t a r t
o
u s i n g  t h e  p r o v i s o .
The judgm en t  o f  W indeye r  J  was s i m i l a r  i n  i t s  e s s e n t i a l s  t o  t h a t
of  M e n z i e s ,  Walsh and Gibbs J J .  Windeyer  J  e x p r e s s l y  r e j e c t e d  a
C a n a d ian  s t y l e  a p p r o a c h  o f  a t t r i b u t i n g  laws t o  one m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  
3
l i s t  or  a n o t h e r  and e x p r e s s l y  s a i d  t h a t  he r e g a r d e d ,  t h e  S t a t e
1 Above p p l 0 4 f f .  M enz ie s  J  d i d  no t  make t h i s  b r e a k  as  c l e a r l y  a s  
d i d  Walsh J  and Gibbs J .
2 Compare t h e  s 92  e x p e r i e n c e  where  t h e  p r o v i s o  t o  t h e  P r i v y  
C o u n c i l ’s d e c l a r a t i o n  of  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  h a s  been g i v e n  f o r c e .  
Below p p 3 8 9 f f .
3 I d .  400.
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Banking Case law as a law with respect to banking.^- Windeyer J 
considered it quite appropriate for the Court to look in the 
Constitution for implications to explain or limit the express terms of 
the Constitution in accordance with what was assumed. His Honour 
emphasised that the Court's role was not to make implications but 
rather to reveal what was implicit. Windeyer J had no trouble in 
accepting that the federal character of the Constitution was 
implicit and that the Constitution assumed 'the continued existence 
of the States as constituent elements in a federation."^
These assumptions did not for Windeyer J require automatic 
immunity from laws on particular subject matters (such as taxation). 
They required rather, immunity from exercises of power in particular 
ways. In the end Windeyer J said that the appropriate way to express 
a conclusion that a Commonwealth law had offended a federal assumption 
would be to say that although the law might be with respect to a 
particular Commonwealth subject matter, it was not, in accordance with 
the formula governing s51, a law for the peace order and good 
government of the Commonwealth.^ Windeyer J considered that it was 
on this point, rather than the point of the character of the law in 
issue, which provided the basis for the decision of Latham CJ in the 
State Banking Case.^  This construction of Latham CJ's judgment went 
some way to resolve the conflict noted^ above between a statement by 
Latham CJ that the law was a law with respect to banking^ and his
1 Id. 402, 403-404.
2 Id. 401-402.
3 Id. 402.
4 Id. 397.
5 Id. 403.
6 Id. 402.
7 Id. 421.
8 (1947) 74 CLR 31,
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eventual conclusion that the law was invalid because it was in 
substance with respect to a subject (State governmental function) not 
within Commonwealth power.^
McTiernan J had been the only member of the Court in the State 
Banking Case to uphold the Commonwealth provision discriminating 
against States. Without indicating whether he considered himself 
bound by that decision, McTiernan J declared this Commonwealth payroll 
tax to be valid in its application to the payment of remuneration by 
the States to their employees. McTiernan J did comment that if the 
tax had been "laid on the appropriation of revenue to pay for 
services" then he might have had to examine the legislation
ofurther. McTiernan J seemed to be assuming that something like 
Latham CJ's approach to characterisation should be applied to any 
Commonwealth law taking as the criterion of operation some activity 
not normally carried on between subject and subject.^ If a 
Commonwealth law did have such a feature then it seems that McTiernan 
J contemplated the possibility that the law might, (though, presumably 
from his conclusions in the State Banking Case, would not inevitably) 
be held to be "in substance a law with respect to the States".^
The judgment of Barwick CJ (with which Owen J agreed) raises many 
questions. In answer to the argument (accepted by four of his 
brethren) that cases since the Engineers Case had established the 
existence of federal implications, Barwick CJ said:- that the cases 
had not established the existence of federal implications - that his 
task was to construe the Constitution not earlier judgments - that the 
Constitution did not contain federal implications. (Although Barwick 
CJ asserted that it was his duty to construe the Constitution rather
1 Id. 61.
2 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 386.
3 Id. 385.
4 Id. 385-386.
5 Id. 385.
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than earlier judgments, he somewhat inconsistently spent a great deal 
of time construing the Engineers Case to identify the principle that 
could be derived from that decision, on criticising Dixon's 
interpretation of the Engineers Case and on identifying the "true 
basis” for decision in the State Banking Case).-*-
As to the first point, the state of the authorities:- Barwick CJ 
without a doubt was correct to construe the Engineers Case as an
uncompromising declaration against the making of federal implications.
2Barwick CJ was, similarly, undoubtedly right to dismiss the 
reference in the Engineers Case to the taxation power as falling far 
short of the well-considered express exception to the prima facie rule 
of State subjection to Commonwealth law, which Dixon J had discerned. 
Barwick CJ was less convincing in his attempt to dismiss the Engineers 
Case express reservation of the power of the Commonwealth to bind a 
State in the exercise of its prerogative power as being inserted 
solely to indicate an awareness of an issue in Canada, which obviously 
(according to Barwick CJ) can not arise in Australia.
Barwick CJ asserted that the "real ground of decision" in the 
State Banking Case was that the Commonwealth law prohibiting banks 
from providing banking services for States, was not a law with respect 
to any Commonwealth head of power.^ As has been noted above, there 
was some support for this approach in Latham CJ's judgment and it was 
on Latham CJ's judgment that Barwick CJ principally relied to justify 
his interpretation of the decision.^ As was also noted above, 
however, there was ambiguity in Latham CJ's position and the other
1 Id. 376-383.
2 Id. 378-379.
3 Id. 378-380.
4 Id. 382.
Id. 373, 382.5
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State Banking Case majority judgments either rejected or were silent 
on the "real ground" which Barwick CJ discovered.
Barwick CJ undoubtedly misconstrued some of the State Banking Case 
judgments when he tried to dismiss references therein to the 
Constitution’s contemplation of the continued existence of the States, 
as being, either inessential introduction by the judges identifying 
what they believed to be the likely historical explanation for the 
omission from the Commonwealth’s list of powers of an express power 
with repect to the custody of State funds, or a mere paraphrase of the 
conclusion that the law was in substance not with respect to a 
Commonwealth head of power . *
Apart from the question of whether or not Barwick CJ correctly 
identified the real ground for decision in the State Banking Case, his 
statement that the "characterisation" interpretation he put on that
ocase was the only "acceptable" basis for the decision is very 
difficult to reconcile with his approach to characterisation in other 
cases. Consider this passage from the judgment of Barwick CJ in the 
Payroll Tax Case. Commenting on a statement of Dixon J in the State 
Banking Case to the effect that the law denying States access to 
private banks was not justified by s51(xiii), Barwick CJ said
"That followed, in my opinion, because such a law was not in 
substance a law with respect to banking: but on the contrary, had
the States and the banking of their funds as its subject. Of 
course, a law may be at the same time thought to be a law with 
respect to either of two of the topics enumerated in s51 and it 
may be satisfactory in such a case not to trouble to say with 
respect to which of the two subject matters the law should 
preferably be regarded. But when a law may possibly be regarded as 
having either of two subjects as its substance, one of which is 
within Commonwealth power and the other is not, a decision must be 
made as to that which is in truth the subject matter of the law. 
Although usually not an appropriate course in determining whether 
a law is a law on an enumerated topic, in such a case, the
1 Id. 382.
2 Id. 373, 382.
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decision of what is the subject matter of the law may be 
approached somewhat in the manner the validity of a law claimed to 
be within one of the two mutually exclusive lists in the Canadian 
Constitution is determined. The law must be upon one or other of 
the subjects. It cannot be on both.”^
In the Fairfax Case^ decided before the Payroll Tax Case and the 
Murphyores decision decided after Payroll, Barwick CJ took 
approaches to characterisation incompatible with any use of Canadian 
principles. There was, admittedly some ambiguity in Barwick CJ’s 
position in Fairfax. There was, however, no such ambiguity in his 
position in Murphyores where he was associated with a clear rejection 
of the proposition that a decision of the substance of the law had to 
be made when it touched both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth subject 
matters. After Murphyores it was beyond doubt that a law which 
prohibited banking was a law with respect to banking. Yet Barwick CJ 
in Payroll asserted that the law in the State Banking Case prohibiting 
the provision of banking services to States was not a law with respect 
to banking.
Barwick CJ did say in Payroll that the Canadian approach was not 
usually appropriate but was only appropriate in "such" a case. If 
Barwick CJ meant that that was the appropriate approach whenever a law 
may possibly "be regarded as having either of two subjects as its 
substance," then the conflict with Fairfax and Murphyores remained.
If Barwick CJ meant tha - Canadian principles were only appropriate 
when dealing with a Commonwealth law discriminating against the 
States, then the inconsistency with Fairfax and Murphyores is resolved 
but a new inconsistency immediately appears. This time the 
inconsistency is with other parts of Barwick CJ's discussion in 
Payroll itself.
1 Id. 382.
2 (1965) 114 CLR 1; above ppllOff.
3 (1976) 136 CLR 1; above ppll4ff.
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The whole thrust of Barwick CJ’s judgment in Payroll was to deny 
that State interests had any special claim to be taken into account 
when assessing the validity of Commonwealth law and to assert that the 
validity of a Commonwealth law affecting a State was determined by the 
same principles which determined the validity of any Commonwealth law. 
If the proviso, "in such a case", is read in the way suggested, then 
Barwick CJ proposed the use of different principles of 
characterisation when a Commonwealth law discriminated against 
States.
Why would Barwick CJ propose such an awkward and aberrant 
framework? He knew well enough the alternatives as he had built 
alternative submissions around them when he himself appeared before 
the High Court in the State Banking Case and the Second Uniform Case. 
Whatever the motivation, the result of Barwick CJ’s framework was to 
give the Commonwealth a power over the States which fell short of 
being a complete power only to the extent required by the decision in 
the State Banking Case of barring the Commonwealth from legislating 
specifically for the annihiliation of the States.
Although not on the scale of the conflict between Barwick CJ on 
characterisation in Payroll and Barwick CJ on characterisation in 
Fairfax and Murphyores, there was other inconsistency involved in 
Barwick CJ’s behaviour. Barwick CJ had found fault with the federal 
implication proposition because it was "incapable of exact expression 
and certainty of practical application." Barwick CJ's framework for 
dealing with discrimination could hardly be said to indicate clear 
conclusions. Barwick CJ did not regard discrimination as something 
which would automatically lead to invalidity. There was 
discrimination involved in the legislation before him. It gave an 
exemption to wages paid to teachers at private schools and did not 
make that exemption available to wages paid to teachers at State 
schools.* This discrimination was insufficient to justify a
1 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 374-376.
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conclusion that the legislation was not with respect to taxation.^- 
The question of the substance of the law was a question of degree 
with the extent of the impact of the law upon the States in the 
exercise of their powers and functions a factor to be taken into 
account.^ It is difficult to conceive of a more impressionistic and 
arbitrary criterion.
Barwick CJ had said that the formula proposed in argument -undue 
interference with State functions - "provides but a question begging 
formula."“^ How then did Barwick CJ’s formula differ when it 
involved an examination of the extent of impact on the States to see 
whether the impact was sufficient to justify a conclusion as to the 
substance of a law?
When dealing on its merits with the argument that the Constitution 
necessarily involved federal implications, the judgment of Barwick CJ 
accepted many of the submissions of the Commonwealth Solicitor-General 
Ellicott QC^ and involved a reiteration cum expansion of the points 
made half a century before in the main majority judgment in the 
Engineers Case. According to Barwick CJ-*:- The Crown in right of 
the State was bound by Commonwealth laws referable to subject matters 
of Commonwealth power because the one indivisible Crown, had assented 
to be bound by laws made under the Commonwealth Constitution, an 
enactment of the Imperial Parliament. The validity of laws relying on 
the authority of the Constitution depended, therefore, solely on the
1 Id. 375-376
2 Id. 373-374
3 Id. 382.
4 Id. 358 ff.
5 Id.
152-
364-367
-154.
quoting from the Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129,
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application of ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. A 
federal implication to protect the States from the Commonwealth could 
not and should not be drawn because it involved "concepts incapable of 
exact expression and certainty of practical application."*
Any notion that the making of implications was necessary to 
prevent abuse in the use of Commonwealth power against the States was 
misguided; first, because abuse of power was a matter for the 
electorate not the judiciary, secondly because it assumed a status 
for the States which was not intended by the Constitution.
In relation to this second point, the intended status of the 
States, Barwick CJ went a good deal further than had the Court in the 
Engineers Case. The Court in Engineers Case had noted that the 
Constitution was the compact of the Australian people and this compact 
was enacted into law by the Imperial Parliament,^ but had not 
directly developed any proposition from that fact. Barwick CJ drew 
this significance from that fact:- The Commonwealth Constitution does 
not contain, and was not intended by the Imperial Parliament to 
operate as, a treaty of union between, or a confederation of, 
independent States. The Constitution is a statutory Constitution 
under the Crown set up to fulfil the wish of the people to be 
united.^ Whatever the status of the colonies pre-federation, the 
Imperial Parliament had the power to alter that status and did alter
1 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 382-383. Cf Engineers Case (1920) 28 CLR 129,
159.
2 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 365 relying on the Engineers Case (1920) 28 
CLR 129, 152.
3 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 371.
4 (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142, 152. The preamble to the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act recites the agreement of the people of 
all the Australian colonies (except Queensland) to join together 
in the Commonwealth.
5 Id. 370.
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that status by terminating the existence of the colonies. The 
Constitution could not be treated as the union of pre-existing States 
because the States ’derived their existence from the Constitution 
itself.” 1
The dominance that Barwick CJ was asserting for the Commonwealth 
is indicated in these passages.
”... by their union in one Commonwealth, the colonists became 
Australians ... of course, that Act [the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 63 & 64 Viet, c.12.] must be construed in the 
light of its antecedent history. But the outstanding fact that 
the Act created the Commonwealth as the embodiment of the people 
of Australia and gave it, amongst other things, legislative power 
over the enumerated subject matters cannot be gainsaid."^
The Commonwealth is referred to as the embodiment of the 
Australian people rather than just one of the embodiments of the
'iAustralian people. Separate status as Queenslander or Victorian is 
apparently, a matter of "antecedent history." The reference to the 
Commonwealth's list of powers is made not to acknowledge that the list 
is limited and that the States also have power but rather to emphasise 
the fact of Commonwealth power.
Complementing Barwick CJ's framework of Commonwealth dominance 
over the States, was his Honour’s acceptance in Payroll Tax Case^ 
and other cases, of the proposition that the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth has an inherent immunity from State laws. The 
proposition and its derivation are now discussed.
1 Id. 371.
2 Id. 371. Emphasis added.
3 Compare McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316, 431 per Marshall 
CJ "In the legislature of the Union alone are all represented.
The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by 
the people with the power of controlling measures which concern 
all, in the confidence that it will not be abused."
4 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 373.
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(ii) The Commonwealth as a Graeco/Roman Goddess - the doctrine of 
total immunity for the Crown in right of the Commonwealth
In Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation  ^the Court examined 
a New South Wales law depriving the Crown in right of the Commonwealth 
of its prerogative right to priority in payment from an insolvent 
debtor. A majority of the Court held the law to be valid.
Dixon J dissented on the basis that the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth had not been subjected to State law making power.
"The Colony of New South Wales could not be said at the 
establishment of the Commonwealth to have any power at all with 
reference to the Commonwealth. Like the goddess of wisdom the 
Commonwealth uno ictu sprang from the brain of its begetters [Sic] 
armed and of full stature. At the same instant the colonies 
became States; but whence did the States obtain the power to 
regulate the legal relations of this new polity with its subjects?
It formed no part of the old colonial power. The Federal 
constitution does not give it."^
Fifteen years later in the Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty Ltd  ^the 
Court by majority overruled Uther. The majority judges, Dixon CJ, 
Kitto, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ (with McTiernan and Taylor JJ 
dissenting) endorsed Dixon J’s Uther dissent. The decision in 
Cigamatic might have been confined to a finding of inherent immunity 
for Commonwealth prerogative rights^ or to governmental (as opposed 
to business) activities.^
1 (1947) 74 CLR 508.
2 Id. 529-530. In Grecian mythology the goddess Athenae (Minerva to 
the Romans), goddess of wisdom and warlike prowess, came into 
being by emerging from the forehead of Zeus (Jove).
3 (1962) 108 CLR 372.
4 jtd_. 378 per Dixon CJ; 389-390 per Menzies J. See also Uther
(1947) 74 CLR 508, 530 per Dixon J. "It is a question of the 
fiscal and governmental rights of the Commonwealth...". WMC 
Gummow, "The Nature and Operation of Prerogative Powers in the 
Federal System" (1964) 4 SLR 435. G Evans "Rethinking 
Commonwealth Immunity" (1972) 8 MULR 521.
5 RD Lumb, "Constitutional Relations between the Commonwealth and 
the States" (1963) 4 UQLJ 332, 334.
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In  b e tw een  t h e  U ther  and C ig m a t ic  d e c i s i o n s  t h e r e  was t h e  c a s e  of 
Commonwealth v B o g le .  ^ O b i t e r  d i c t a  i n  t h e  judgm ent of F u l l a g a r  
J z w hich  r e c e i v e d  t h e  c o n c u r r e n c e  of Dixon CJ , Webb J “4 and 
K i t t o  J , ^  to o k  t h e  im m unity  a l o t  f u r t h e r  t o  i n c l u d e  im m unity  f o r  
a l l  Commonwealth e x e c u t i v e  a c t i o n .
" . . .  t h e  S t a t e  P a r l i a m e n t  h a s  no power o v e r  t h e  Commonwealth. The 
Commonwealth -  o r  t h e  Crown i n  r i g h t  of t h e  Commonwealth, o r  
w h a te v e r  you ch o o se  t o  c a l l  i t  -  i s ,  t o  a l l  i n t e n t s  and p u r p o s e s ,  
a j u r i s t i c  p e r s o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  a j u r i s t i c  p e r s o n  w hich  i s  
s u b j e c t e d  e i t h e r  by any S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  by th e  Commonwealth 
C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power o f  any S t a t e  P a r l i a m e n t .
I f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  had  n e v e r  e n a c t e d  
s . 5 6  of t h e  J u d i c i a r y  Act 1903-1950 , i t  i s  s u r e l y  u n t h i n k a b l e  t h a t  
t h e  V i c t o r i a n  P a r l i a m e n t  c o u ld  have  made a law  r e n d e r i n g  t h e  
Commonwealth l i a b l e  f o r  t o r t s  com m itted  i n  V i c t o r i a .  The 
Commonwealth may, of c o u r s e ,  become a f f e c t e d  by S t a t e  law s . . .  But 
I  s h o u ld  t h i n k  i t  i m p o s s ib l e  t o  h o ld  t h a t  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  o f  
V i c t o r i a  c o u ld  l a w f u l l y  p r e s c r i b e  t h e  u s e s  w hich  m igh t be made by 
t h e  Commonwealth of i t s  own p r o p e r t y ,  t h e  te rm s  upon w hich  t h a t  
p r o p e r t y  m igh t p r o v id e  accom m odation  f o r  im m ig ra n ts  i n t r o d u c e d  
i n t o  A u s t r a l i a . " ^
T here  w ere  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h i s  d o c t r i n e  -  f i r s t  i t  o n ly  p r o t e c t e d  t h e  
Crown i n  r i g h t  of t h e  Commonwealth and s e c o n d ly  i t  o n ly  s to p p e d  S t a t e  
law s  f ro m  b i n d i n g ,  a s  a g a i n s t  m e re ly  a f f e c t i n g ,  t h e  Crown i n  r i g h t  of 
t h e  Commonwealth.^ The d o c t r i n e  d id  h o w e v e r ,  r e p r e s e n t  a l a r g e  
s h i f t  i n  t h e  b a la n c e  of i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e l a t i o n s .
1 (1 9 5 3 )  89 CLR 229.
2 I d .  2 5 9 -2 6 0 .
3 I d .  249 .
4 I d .  255.
5 I d .  274.
6 I d . 2 5 9 -2 6 0 .  F u l l a g a r  J  r e a f f i r m e d  t h i s  v iew  i n  A s i a t i c  Steam 
N a v ig a t io n  Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1957) 96 CLR 397, 424 and 
Commonwealth v A nderson  (1960 )  105 CLR 303, 313.
7 LR Z i n e s , The High C ourt  and t h e  C o n s t i t u t i on 271 -2 7 4 .  C Howard, 
"Some P rob lem s of  Commonwealth Immunity and E x c lu s iv e  L e g i s l a t i v e  
Power" (1972 )  5 FL Rev 31.
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In the Payroll Tax Case Barwick CJ seemed to take it for granted 
that the Cigamatic/Bogle doctrine of Commonwealth immunity was valid 
and established. In Maguire v Simpson the Court was asked to 
reconsider the Cigamatic/Bogle doctrine^ but found it unnecessary to 
decide whether the doctrine was valid.^ Although not committing 
himself finally, Barwick CJ indicated support for the doctrine when he 
said "it would be difficult, in my opinion, to conclude that a State 
could legislate directly to bind the Commonwealth in any of its 
manifestations or emanations."^
In 1979 in Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of 
Stamps (SA), Barwick CJ in dissent would have held the Superannuation 
Fund Investment Trust set up by the Commonwealth for its employees to 
be immune from State stamp duty legislation on transfers of land. 
Barwick CJ's decision proceeded on the basis that the Crown in right 
of the Commonwealth could only be subject to State taxation if it were 
subjected to such taxation by Commonwealth legislation.^ Such an 
assumption was compatible with the Cigamatic/Bogle doctrine but 
Barwick CJ made no reference to that or any other explanation for his 
assumption of inherent Commonwealth immunity from State taxes.
The other members of the Court, who concluded that the Trust was 
subject to State taxation, all did so without deciding whether or not 
the Crown in right of the Commonwealth had any inherent immunity from 
State taxation. For the members of the majority that issue was
1 (1970) 122 CLR 353, 373.
2 (1977) 139 CLR 362.
3 Id. 365 McLelland QC.
4 Jacobs J did think it worth recording criticisms of the 
doctrine. Id_. 404.
5 Id. 368-369.
6 (1979) 26 ALR 99, 101-102.
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avoided either by a conclusion that the Trust was not part of the 
Crown in right of the Commonwealth^ or by a conclusion that there 
was to be discerned in Commonwealth legislation an intention to 
subject the Trust to State tax of the kind in issue.^ (Barwick CJ 
came to contrary conclusions on both of these points.)J
Also in 1979 in Bank of New South Wales v Deputy Commissioner of 
Taxation1 23456^ Barwick CJ went out of his way, again obiter dicta to say 
that the decision in Cigamatic should not be reopened. (In the 
context, Barwick CJ’s reference to the decision in Cigamatic would 
only seem to go to Commonwealth prerogative rights and might indeed be 
confined to prerogative rights to priority.)
"In the first place, in my opinion, the decision was right in 
principle: and secondly, in any case, it was a decision of seven
justices and has now stood for some time."^
(I do not wish to explore the question of Barwick CJ's attitude to 
precedent. I would, however, say this in relation to the second 
point. Two of the seven justices in Cigamatic dissented and none of 
the others adverted to provisions in the Judicature Act which would 
seem to have picked up the State provisions and given them the force
zlof Commonwealth laws.)0
Barwick CJ’s first point - "the decision was right in principle" 
is the point of immediate interest. Barwick CJ’s endorsement of the 
decision in Cigamatic on the constitutional point involves conflict 
with other parts of Barwick CJ’s overall framework.
1 Id. 110 per Stephen J; 125 per Aickin J; contra id. 101 per 
Barwick CJ, 117 per Mason J with Murphy J not deciding.
2 Id. 117-118 per Mason J; 118-119 per Murphy J.
3 Id. 101, 102-103 respectively.
4 (1979) 145 CLR 438.
5 Id. 444.
6 Maguire v Simpson (1977) 139 CLR 362, 402 per Mason J; 403- 
404 per Jacobs J.
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At the the core of the Cigamatic doctrine was Dixon CJ/J's 
proposition that the power to regulate the legal relations of the 
polity, the Commonwealth, with its subjects was (a) - not part of the 
old colonial power and (b) - not given by the Federal 
Constitution. ^
The rhetoric with which Dixon J surrounded his discussion in Uther 
suggested that the pre-federation colonies had no power with respect 
to the Commonwealth because the Commonwealth did not exist pre­
federation. Dixon J could not have been deriving Commonwealth 
immunity from the mere fact that the Commonwealth did not exist as a 
legal person when the colonies were first given their law-making 
powers. There is nothing in the nature of the grant of power to make 
laws with respect to a geographical area which immunises legal persons 
- natural or artificial - who come into existence after the grant of 
power.^ Dixon J seems to have been relying on the fact that the 
Commonwealth did not exist as a polity before federation. That is, 
Dixon J seems to have been concerned with the principle that the Crown 
is not bound by a statute unless it assents to being bound by the 
Statute.
Such a rationale for total immunity for the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth from State legislation, conflicts with the Engineers Case
•3theory of Crown indivisibility. According to the reasoning in that 
case the Crown in right of each State was subject to any authority to 
bind the Crown vested by the Commonwealth Constitution in the 
Commonwealth, because the Imperial Crown had assented to the
1 RP Meagher and WMC Gummow manage to identify and debunk eleven 
propositions which have been put forward to support the doctrine 
of total Commonwealth immunity. "Sir Owen Dixon's Heresy’* (1980) 
54 ALJ 25, 28-29.
2 G Evans, "Rethinking Commonwealth Immunity" (1972) 8 MULR 521, 
524.
3 wE Cuppaidge, "The Divisibility of the Crown" (1954) 27 ALJ 595.
196.
Commonwealth Constitution.^- The doctrine of indivisibility dictated, 
and the main judgment in the Engineers Case accepted, that because 
the one indivisible Crown assented to the colonies being given their 
law-making powers, the Commonwealth being but another emanation of 
that one indivisible Crown, should have been bound by that assent 
regardless of when the Commonwealth came into existence.
In the Payroll Tax Case Barwick CJ relied on the Engineers Case 
doctrine of Crown indivisibility to justify the recognition of 
Commonwealth power to subject States to Commonwealth legislation.“^
Yet in the same case^ and in the cases in 1979 mentioned above, ^ 
without acknowledging the passage in the Engineers Case to the 
contrary and without reconciling his position with the doctrine of 
Crown indivisibility, Barwick CJ asserted the lack of State power to 
bind the Commonwealth.^
Even if it were relevant that the Commonwealth did not exist when 
the colonies were vested with law-making power that point should have 
been answered for Barwick CJ by the Commonwealth Constitution itself. 
Barwick CJ reasoned in the Payroll Tax Case that the States were new 
bodies created by the Constitution and were not just the colonies with
Qa new name. On this approach, why was not the vesting of power
1 (1920) 28 CLR 129, 146-147, 152-153.
2 (1920) 28 CLR 129, 155.
3 G Sawer "State Statutes and the Commonwealth" (1961) 1 Tas Uni L 
Rev 580, 583.
4 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 366-367.
5 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 373.
6 Pp193-194.
7 The doctrine of Crown indivisibility is not without its critics 
(Eg the discussion of WMC Gummow, "The Nature and Operation of 
Prerogative Powers in the Federal System" (1964) 4 SLR 435, 442- 
444.) The point is that Barwick CJ was not consistent in his 
attitude to the doctrine.
8 (1971) 122 CLR 353, 371.
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i n  t h e  S t a t e s  w hich  was e f f e c t e d  by th e  Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n  
i t s e l f  ( s l 0 6  and 10 7 ) ,  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b in d  th e  Commonwealth w hich  was 
b r o u g h t  i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  by th e  same document as b ro u g h t  th e  S t a t e s  i n t o  
e x i s t e n c e ?  B arw ick  CJ s im p ly  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  i t  was t h e  f a c t  t h a t  " th e  
Crown [ in  r i g h t  of th e  Commonwealth] has  n o t  by th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
s u b m i t t e d  i t s e l f  to  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  o f  th e  S t a t e s " . ^
T here  i s  one way to  i n t e r p r e t  th e  B o g le /C ig a m a t ic  d o c t r i n e  to  
b r i n g  i t  i n t o  some k i n d  o f  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  w i th  t h e  E n g in e e r s  C a s e .
One can  a c c e p t  t h a t  t h e  a s s e n t  o f  th e  one i n d i v i s i b l e  Crown to  th e  
v e s t i n g  o f  law -m ak ing  a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  C o l o n i e s / S t a t e s  bound th e  
Commonwealth. The q u e s t i o n  s t i l l  r e m a in e d ,  how ever ,  to  what had th e  
Crown a s s e n t e d .  The Commonwealth " im m unity"  m igh t be drawn from  a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  th e  S t a t e s ’ law -m ak ing  p o w e rs .  Im m e d ia te ly  f o l l o w i n g  
th e  key  p a s s a g e  from  U th e r  w h ich  h as  been  s e t  o u t  a b o v e ,  Dixon J  s a i d
" S u r e ly  i t  i s  f o r  t h e  p e a c e ,  w e l f a r e  and good governm ent of th e  
Commonwealth, n o t  f o r  t h e  p e a c e ,  w e l f a r e  and good governm en t of 
New S ou th  W ales to  sa y  what s h a l l  be th e  r e l a t i v e  s i t u a t i o n  o f  
p r i v a t e  r i g h t s  and o f  t h e  p u b l i c  r i g h t s  o f  th e  Crown r e p r e s e n t i n g  
th e  Commonwealth, w here  th e y  come i n t o  c o n f l i c t .
T h is  c o u ld  be t a k e n  as m eaning  t h a t  even  i f  th e  Commonwealth were 
bound by th e  i n d i v i s i b l e  Crow n’s a s s e n t  to  th e  v e s t i n g  i n  th e  S t a t e  o f  
a power to  make law s f o r  t h e  p e a c e ,  w e l f a r e  and good governm ent of t h e  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  t e r r i t o r y  w hich  i s  New S ou th  W ales ,  t h a t  power w as , on a 
" p r o p e r "  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e a c h  th e  Commonwealth. I t  
m igh t  f o r  exam ple be r e a s o n e d  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  " p ro p e r "  to  c o n s t r u e  
S t a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power as  b e in g  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b in d  th e  Crown i n  r i g h t  
of t h e  Commonwealth as law s b i n d in g  th e  Commonwealth " c o n c e rn  a l l  th e
1 I d .  373.
2 (1920 )  28 CLR 129, 153-154 .
3 (1947 )  74 CLR 508, 530.
198.
people of the Commonwealth and the entire territory of the
Commonwealth, and therefore a law purporting to affect [the powers,
rights and functions of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth] can
not be for the peace, order and good government of the State
alone."^ As counsel in the Second Uniform Tax Case Barwick had
offered a similar federal theory. There Barwick had submitted that
the federal structure, itself implied a prima facie total
intergovernmental immunity. The States' immunity was, however,
significantly but not entirely, displaced by the grant to the
Commonwealth of specific law making powers. Commonwealth immunity was
not displaced because, properly construed, State general law making
2powers were insufficient to displace Commonwealth immunity.
There is, indeed, some force in pointing out the national impact 
of a State law binding the Commonwealth. (Such a point was part of 
the basis for the pre-Engineers doctrine of immunity for the 
Commonwealth from State legislation. ) This point can hardly be 
said, however, to provide a completely satisfactory reconciliation of 
the Bogle/Cigamatic doctrine with the Engineers Case (and of Barwick 
CJ's acceptance of both) as the "peace, order and good government" 
argument inevitably depends on federal and political considerations 
which Barwick CJ eschewed. Furthermore any attempt to justify 
Commonwealth immunity as being based simply on the "proper" 
construction of State law - making power, serves only to conceal the 
issue and the basis for judicial recognition of the doctrine.
1 LR Zines, The High Court and the Constitution 276.
2 Above pp177-178. WMC Gummow op cit 440-441, 446.
3 D1 23Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 113-115 per Griffith CJ, Barton 
and O'Connor JJ adopting with approval the discussion of Marshall 
CJ in McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316, 428-432. Also
D'Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 120 "In our judgment the 
operations of the Commonwealth, and the acts of its agents as 
such, ought , so far as regards State control to be considered on 
the same footing as if they did not occur within the territorial 
limits of any State." Also Payroll Tax Case (1970) 122 CLR 353, 
403 per Windeyer J, discussed above pl82. G Sawer Op cit 583.
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G - Federal Balance - Themes and Patterns in Barwick's behaviour
For the issues of this Chapter there was no apparent connection 
between Barwick's submissions as counsel and opinions as Chief 
Justice. As counsel in the State Banking and Bank Nationalisation 
Cases Barwick had proposed an approach to characterisation which was 
inconsistent with the approach to characterisation which he supported 
in the Murphyores decision. As counsel in the State Banking Case and 
in the Second Uniform Tax Case Barwick argued that the federal nature 
of the Constitution implied certain immunity for the States from 
Commonwealth action. As Chief Justice Barwick held in the Payroll Tax 
Case that the federal structure did not imply any immunity for the 
States from Commonwealth action. It seems that there was at least the 
link that as counsel, in the Second Uniform Tax Case, Barwick 
suggested that the Commonwealth was immune from State legislation and 
as Chief Justice Barwick endorsed that proposition. Even in that link 
there were significant differences - as counsel Barwick had drawn 
Commonwealth immunity from an implication from the nature of 
federalism, whereas as Chief Justice Barwick directly said that the 
Commonwealth immunity was not founded in federal implication.
Barwick's contribution to the establishment of certain and 
predictable (and, in terms of the Engineers Case judgment's values, 
appropriate) principles of characterisation was less than 
wholehearted. He supported certain and predictable principles in the 
Fairfax and Murphyores decisions. Barwick CJ's support for that 
certainty and predictability was, however, not absolute even in those 
decisions themselves and was clouded further by his Payroll Tax Case 
view that Commonwealth action discriminating against States could be 
held invalid by the application of unpredictable tests of 
characterisation which are inconsistent with the Fairfax and 
Murphyores principles.
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Various weaknesses in reasoning within particular judgments of 
Barwick CJ and some failures of consistency in expressed reasoning 
across cases have been exposed through the Chapter. The proposition 
that the Huddart Parker decision was based on the ’unacceptable" 
reserved powers doctrine begged the question of whether the decision 
was right or wrong on "acceptable" grounds. Construing Commonwealth 
powers so as not to render other powers otiose was an acceptable 
principle when construing the marriage power but not when construing 
the external affairs power. Preserving the State sphere of exclusive 
power was an acceptable consideration, and taking account of national 
need was an unacceptable consideration, when determining the ambit of 
incidental powers, implied national power and Commonwealth spending 
power but the converse applied when dealing with issues of 
intergovernmental immunity and determining the content of the 
corporations and external affairs powers.
Leaving aside Barwick CJ's expressed reasons for decisions can any 
consistent pattern be identified? Barwick CJ's decisions were 
relatively favourable to Commonwealth power to regulate economic 
activities through ss51(i), s51(xx) and s51(xxix) but relatively 
niggardly towards Commonwealth power to deal with social issues 
through s51(xxi) and implied national power. It must be remembered, 
however, that sections 51(i) and 51(xxix) could not, and section 
51(xx) may not, be confined to laws merely implementing economic 
policy. The Murphyores decision itself represented the use of s51(i) 
to implement environmental policy. Looked at from another perspective, 
Barwick CJ's position hindered the "socialistic" Commonwealth 
activities of government trading (Port Hedland Case) and social 
welfare funding (The Australian Assistance Plan Case). Barwick CJ 
supported, however, the establishment of unlimited Commonwealth taxing 
power (Fairfax) and showed no interest in submissions that taxes were
unconstitutional on the grounds that the proposed application of the
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r e v e n u e  r a i s e d  by a t a x  was i n v a l i d ^ - or  on t h e  g rounds  of 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  be tw een  S t a t e s  i n  t h e  means of  c o l l e c t i o n .  Barwick  
CJ a l s o  j o i n e d  a d e c i s i o n  u p h o l d i n g  a Commonwealth p r o v i s i o n  g i v i n g
p r i o r i t y  f o r  t a x e s  owed t o  t h e  Commonwealth o v e r  s e c u r e d  c r e d i t o r s  of
3
an i n s o l v e n t  d e b t o r .  That  s u p p o r t  f o r  wide Commonwealth t a x i n g  
power was h a r d l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  any a n t i - s o c i a l i s t  c r e e d .  Barwick  CJ 
made no s e c r e t  of  h i s  a t t i t u d e  t o  t a x a t i o n .  In  t h e  c a se  of  C u l l e n  v 
T r a p p e l l , c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  w h e t h e r  o r  no t  a l l o w a n c e  s h o u ld  be made f o r  
income t a x a t i o n  i n  damages a s s e s s m e n t s  i n  t o r t  a c t i o n s ,  he s a i d :  "The
community a p p e a r s  a l r e a d y  t o  be aware  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of  income t a x  has  
become d e s t r u c t i v e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  i n i t i a t i v e  and e f f o r t  a n d ,  f u r t h e r ,  
h a s  a t e n d e n c y  t o  und e rm in e  much of  t h e  s e n s e  of  m ora l  r e c t i t u d e  on 
which a community so much d e p e n d s . " ^
Some might  a r g u e  t h a t  Barwick  CJ more t h a n  o f f - s e t  h i s  a c c e p t a n c e  
of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  wide  t a x i n g  power by h i s  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t a x a t i o n  l e g i s l a t i o n . ^
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Barwick  CJ seemed t o  have  managed t o  e x c l u d e  h i s  d i s l i k e  
of  t a x a t i o n  f rom  h i s  d e c i s i o n s  on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t s  of  t h e  
Commonwealth’s power t o  t a x .  The n e x t  C h a p t e r  w i l l  show t h a t  Barwick  
CJ d i d  n o t  t a k e  up s i g n i f i c a n t  o p t i o n s  u n d e r  s 90  t o  r e d u c e  S t a t e  power 
t o  t a x .
1 Logan Downs P ty  Ltd v FCT (1965)  112 CLR 177.
2 Conroy v C a r t e r  ( 1 9 6 8 )  118 CLR 90.
3 Commonwealth v B a rne s  (1975)  133 CLR 483.
4 (1980)  29 ALR 1, 6.
5 D Marr  Barwick  293-294 .
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Chapter V : Excise Duties under Section 90
Section 90 holds an important place in the Australian federal 
structure of revenue and economic management. It provides that
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power of the 
Parliament to impose duties of customs and excise, and to grant 
bounties on the production or export of goods, shall become 
exclusive.^
Section 90 does not operate to vest any power in the Commonwealth. It 
merely declares that certain of the Commonwealth's powers shall 
"become exclusive". The function of the section is to deny those 
powers to the States. The focus of the ensuing discussion is the 
contribution of Barwick as counsel and Chief Justice to the High 
Court's exploration of the extent of the denial of power effected by 
the inclusion in s90 of the word "excise". (There is little case law 
about the other parts of the section.)
The word "excise" is one of the most inscrutable in the 
Constitution. The word has been used with a wide range of meanings 
through history and the meanings themselves are vague and imprecise. 
Not even Barwick CJ has suggested that the meaning of the word as it 
appears in s90 is self-evident. The word presents, therefore, both a 
challenge and an opportunity for the High Court to develop a doctrine 
to "explain" the meaning of the word. The Court's performance has, so 
far, been characterized by a high level of disagreement within the 
Court and by the emergence of a multiplicity of theories. It seems 
that much of the difficulty the Court has had in dealing with "excise" 
can be traced to the Founders' not having any clear idea about why 
they were denying to the States power to levy excise duties and about
1 It also contains transitional provisions
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how che terms of s90 could effect their purpose. Before the discussion 
turns to the detail of the attempts by the Court to explain "excise", 
it is therefore necessary to consider s90's role in the scheme of the 
Constitution.
A - Section 90*3 Place in the Constitutional Framework 
(i) The Purpose of the Founders
Barwick CJ explained in the AAP Case
"One of the mainsprings of the movement in the colonies for 
federation was the need to have a common external tariff and to 
remove border customs and other impediments to trade over the 
colonial boundaries. This is evidenced by ss.86, 88, 90 and 92 of
the Constitution « 1
An examination of the Convention Debates bears out Barwick CJ's
statement. If anything the "need" referred to by Barwick seemed to be
2the main mainspring.
These two principles - intercolonial free trade and a unified 
external trade protection policy - were recognized in the four basic 
principles for federation moved by Parkes at the start of the 1891 
Convention. The second of the four basic principles declared in terms 
very similar to what is now s92.
1 Victoria v Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338, 354-355.
2 Eg_ in relation to giving the control of the external tariff to the 
Commonwealth, Australasian Federation Conference 1890 (henceforth 
referred to as Melbourne 1890), 89, 104; Debates of the 
Australasian Federal Convention second session Sydney 1897 
(henceforth referred to as Sydney 1897) 1058; Debates of the 
Australasian Federal Convention Third Session Melbourne, 1898 
(henceforth referred to as Melbourne 1898) Voll, 828-829, 857,
865, 955, 1244. In relation to establishing free trade between 
the colonies Melbourne 1890, 69, 154, 161, 229.
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"That the trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, 
whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be 
absolutely free."
The third principle declared
"That the power and authority to impose customs duties shall be 
exclusively lodged in the Federal Government and Parliament 
subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as shall 
be agreed upon."^
The two principles were sometimes subsumed by saying Australia
2should be customs union and synonyms for customs union such as 
"uniformity of trade" and "equality of trade" appear with great
frequency through the Debates on topics such as bounties and railway 
3rates.J
It is to be noted there was no reference to excise (or bounties) 
in the four basic principles of 1891.^ When the Convention came to 
consider the third principle dealing with customs, Deakin proposed to 
move by way of amendment.
"That after the word ’customs’ the words ’and excise’ shall be 
introduced."
Deakin withdrew his amendment at the request of Gordon who then moved 
a long amendment which, significantly, associated customs, excise, 
bounties, railway rates, inter-State free trade and revenue 
sharing.^
1 National Australasian Convention Debates (henceforth referred to 
as Sydney 1891) 23.
2 E£ Melbourne 1890, 89. At Melbourne 1898 Voll, 794 there is a 
reference to commercial unity.
3 Eg Melbourne 1898, Voll, 910-987 (bounties); Sydney 1891, 354; 
Melbourne 1898, Voll, 1268 into 1522 of VolII (Railway rates).
4 The first principle related to the continuation of State power and 
territory; the fourth principle to defence.
5 Sydney 1891, 351.
6 Sydney 1891, 351-352.
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Gordon later withdrew his amendment^ and Deakin then proposed to 
amend the basic resolution by "insertion after the words customs
duties of the words and duties of excise upon goods the subject of
2customs duties. That amendment was agreed to as also was a
oproposal to add the words "and to offer bounties".
The 1891 Convention later approved as part of the full draft 
Constitution presented by Sir Samuel Griffith a clause in these terms
Cl4 The Parliament of the Commonwealth shall have the sole power 
and authority, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, to 
impose Customs duties, and duties of Excise upon goods for the 
time being the subject of Customs duties, and to grant bounties 
upon the production or export of goods ...".
The parts emphasised are the most significant variations from the 
general proposal approved by the convention.^ In Adelaide in 1897 
the words "upon goods for the time being the subject of Customs 
duties" were deleted^ and there were no further motions directly 
concerned with the inclusion of the word excise in the clause which 
became s90.
1 Sydney 1891, 361.
2 Sydney 1891, 368.
3 Sydney 1891, 368.
4 When the clause came up for approval the only discussion related 
to the transitional provisions included in cl4. Sydney 1891, 789- 
801.
Australasian Federal Convention, First Session Adelaide 1897 
(henceforth referred to as Adelaide 1897) 836.
5
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Some commentators have taken the inclusion of the word excise in 
s90 as having been intended to prevent State interference with 
Commonwealth decisions about the appropriate level of protection for 
local producers from foreign competition.^ Against this view Coper 
points out that most of those who spoke to the 1891 motion for 
inserting the words ’duties of excise upon goods the subject of 
customs duties" addressed themselves only to the question of the 
appropriateness of giving to the Commonwealth a power to levy such 
duties and ignored the question of the desirability of excluding the 
States from the area. At the start of the 1891 proceedings when 
discussion was still directed to general principles, that approach of 
delegates to the matter was understandable. There was, however, by 
the end of 1891 an inclusion within cl52 of Chapter I of the full 
draft, under the heading Powers of the Parliament, a grant of power in 
these terms.
"2. Customs and Excise and bounties, but so that duties of 
Customs and Excise and Bounties shall be uniform throughout the 
Commonwealth, and that no tax or duty shall be imposed on any 
goods exported from one State to another.
It was a little surprising therefore that the only argument put in 
1897 to support the motion to delete the words "upon goods for the 
time being the subject of Customs duties" was that it would be 
inappropriate to retain that limitation on the Commonwealth’s 
power.^ As Coper points out that argument which ignored the grant
1 PJ Hanks, Fajgenbaum and Hanks’ Australian Constitutional Law (2nd 
ed), 566; P Joske, Australian Federal Government (3rd ed), 126;
G Sawer, "The Future of State Taxes: Constitutional Issues", in R
Mathews (ed), Fiscal Federalism: Retrospect and Prospect, 193,
199.
2 M Coper, "The High Court and Section 90 of the Constitution"
(1976) 7 FL Rev 1, 21-23.
3 Sydney 1891, 952. Subsection 3 gave power with respect to 
"Raising money by any other mode or system of taxation; but so 
that all such taxation shall be uniform throughout the 
Commonwealth."
Adelaide 1897, 835-836.4
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of power in cl52(2) misconceived the function of the clause which was 
to become s90.'*‘ Given that the Draft settled on by the end of 1891 
and under discussion in 1897, gave the Commonwealth power with respect 
to customs, excise and bounties in cl52(2) of Chapter I, the function 
of s90's predecessor would have seemed to have been to exclude the 
States rather than to give power to the Commonwealth. Coper concludes 
"The theory that section 90 [Presumably Coper means the inclusion of 
"excise" in s90] was intended to prevent the States from obstructing 
Commonwealth tariff policy may well be right, but it does not appear 
clearly from the Debates".^
The absence of any extensive discussion of "excise in s90", based 
on an understanding of the negative function of s90, is readily 
explained. Excise duties had not been and were not expected to be 
very important to revenue or external trade policy. Although when the 
Constitution speaks of "customs duties" it relates only to duties on 
importation from abroad, 'customs" duties in the wider sense of 
duties on importation both from abroad and from other colonies were 
what held the attention of the Convention.^ Such customs duties had 
dominated colonial revenues and had dominated the intercolonial trade 
war.
Those who were anxious to end intercolonial warfare and those who 
were concerned with the general debate - free trade versus 
protectionism - had no reason to be worried about colonies inflicting 
injuries on themselves by imposing excise duties on their own
1 Op cit 23.
2 Op cit 25.
3 Commonwealth Oil Refineries v South Australia (The COR Case)
(1926) 38 CLR 408, 435, 438; Carmody v FC Lovelock Pty Ltd (1970) 
123 CLR 1.
4 Melbourne 1890, 69, 117, 121; Sydney 1891 348, 528; Sydney 1897, 
28, 39-57; Melbourne 1898, Voll, 848; Melbourne 1898 VolII, 854, 
856, 865.
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producers. Those who were concerned about State revenues paid little 
attention to what they regarded as a relatively unimportant source of 
government funds. ^ It is indicative of the perception of the 
importance of excise duties that proposals to require the Commonwealth 
to impose uniform excise duties at the same time as it imposed uniform 
customs duties were rejected on the grounds that the Commonwealth 
might see no need to impose excise duties.
Yet although there was little direct discussion at the Conventions
of the function of the word "excise" in s90, Coper's point that therefkewas an absence of discussion of^function of denying power to the 
States should not lead one to conclude that s90's inclusion of excise 
was based on the belief that s90 had a function of granting power to 
the Commonwealth. Despite the confusion in the discussion when 
motions dealing with "excise"in s90 were under consideration there can 
be little doubt that it was clearly understood by the end of 
proceedings that s90's sole function was to deprive the States of 
power. No sooner had the specific motion dealing with excise in s90 
(at that stage cl82) been dealt with in 1897 than Higgins and Isaacs 
drew attention to the apparent conflict between the words of the draft 
clause 82 which seemed to vest an exclusive power in the Commonwealth 
and the words of cl50(2) (cl52(2) of the 1891 draft) which vested a 
corresponding concurrent power. When the clause came up for 
consideration in 1898 it was amended without much fuss to its present 
form which contains no suggestion that s90 itself vests power in the 
Commonwealth.^ It would seem open to infer that in the months
1 Sydney 1891, 118, 347, 675, 678; Sydney 1897, 150; Melbourne
1898 Voll, 834, 865; 1080 ff.
2 Melbourne 1898, Voll, 647, 940.
3 Adelaide 1897, 837.
4 Melbourne 1898, 909, 936-938. With even less fuss the grant to 
the Commonwealth of an express power in cl50 to impose duties of 
customs and excise had simply disappeared, presumably considered 
redundant given the inclusion of the general power of taxation 
given to the Commonwealth by cl50(2) following cl52(3) of 1891.
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between the 1897 and 1898 sessions consideration was given to the s90 
clause and other associated provisions (some of which were amended in 
1898) and that a decision was made to retain the word excise without 
any limitation tying it to tariff policy (whatever the misconceived 
reasons for originally Including it) because it was found to be a 
desirable provision.*
It appears clearly from what was said at various stages of the 
Conventions that there was an understanding that excise duties can 
interact with customs duties to affect the position of local producers
orelative to foreign competitors. That fact and the fact that 
excises were but rarely mentioned in relation to the principle of 
freedom of intercolonial trade does not, however, mean that 
delegates saw these duties as being only of relevance to external 
competition and does not dictate the conclusion that the Delegates 
would not have been concerned with the effect of excise duties on the 
ability of producers of one State to compete with producers from other 
States.
At the very least it can be said that retention of the word excise 
without any limitation expressly tying it to tariff policy was 
consistent with the wider principle (which subsumes the principle of 
giving the Commonwealth exclusive control of tariff policy) of
1 The words of limitation introduced in 1891 and deleted in 1897 - 
"Upon goods for the time being the subject of Customs duties" - 
were even too narrow to guarantee the Commonwealth control of 
tariff policy. A Commonwealth decision to expose local producers 
to overseas competition without any distortion by taxation would 
be disrupted by a State excise tax on local production. As the 
clause stood in 1891, the States could have disrupted a 
Commonwealth policy of fiscal inaction (free trade) by taxing 
goods, the competing imports for which, were (ex hypothesi) not 
subject to customs duties.
2 The references are collected in M Coper Op cit 20-24.
Sydney 1891, 347; Adelaide 1897, 841; Melbourne 1898 Voll, 976, 
1244.
3
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making Australia a Customs Union. The circumstantial evidence is that 
the word was retained because of a positive decision that it had a 
role to play in making Australia a Customs Union.
(ii) Judicial Perceptions of the purpose of s90 and of the 
inclusion of excise in s90.
Counsel and judges have at times set out to reason from what they 
perceive to be the purpose of s90. Sir Garfield Barwick QC in Browns 
Transport Pty Ltd v Kropp asked the Court to accept this notion of the 
purpose of s90.
"... the way is open to give effect to the emphasis which is in 
the Constitution. There are three elements in that emphasis. One 
is the correlative nature of customs and excise in relation to 
fiscal policy not in relation to the gathering of money, but in 
relation to the use of taxation as an instrument of policy. The 
second is that there is bracketed with customs and excise, 
bounties which also relate to fiscal policy. The third is the 
exclusiveness of the power over all three given to the 
Commonwealth. These considerations yield the notion that behind 
the word "excise" is the policy of having one single fiscal policy 
in relation to dealings in commodities, from the point of time of 
importation or manufacture down to consumption."^-
Some judges had previously perceived that or a similar general 
purpose in s90 (or considered that it was desirable that s90 be so 
construed.) Rich J in the COR Case said
"One authority [the Commonwealth] should exercise the 
complementary powers of customs, excise and bounties without 
hindrance, limitation, conflict or danger of overlapping from the 
exercise of a concurrent power by another authority vested in the 
States^
1 (1958) 100 CLR 117, 124.
2 Commonwealth and Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v South Australia 
(1926) 38 CLR 408, 437.
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Against that background his Honour rejected a proposed narrow 
definition of the word "excise" under which "the fiscal policy of the 
Commonwealth may be hampered".^
2Dixon J in Parton spoke of an intention in s90 to give the 
Commonwealth a "real control of the taxation of commodities and to 
ensure that the execution of whatever policy it adopted should not be 
hampered or defeated by State action". Barwick CJ twice cited this 
passage as representing a view similar to his own.
In these statements from Rich J, and Dixon J (endorsed by Barwick 
CJ) there was a tendency to assume that the purpose of s90 is too 
obvious to need elaboration. Rich J assumed that the reader knows 
what he means by fiscal policy. Dixon J assumed that the reader knows 
how bounties, customs and excise can be used to implement policy. The 
reader cannot however, know how many of the different kinds of effects 
of bounties, customs and excises their Honours had in mind.* 4
1 Ibid.
2 (1949) 80 CLR 229, 260.
3 Western Australia v Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd (1969) 121 CLR,
17; Dickenson’s Arcade Pty Ltd v Tasmania (1974) 130 CLR 177,
185.
4 Some judges have given some indication of their understanding of 
the ways bounties, customs and excises can interact. For example, 
Latham CJ in Homebush Flour Mills Case (1937) 56 CLR 390, 396 and 
McTiernan J in Parton v Milk Board (Vic) (1949) 80 CLR 229, 265 
when discussing the purpose of s90 seemed to treat the phrase 
"fiscal policy" as a short-hand way of describing the use of 
taxation to affect the competitive position of home produced goods 
relative to imports. Whether or not their Honours considered that 
"protective" is synonymous with or merely an example of "fiscal" 
was not clear. Mason J on the other hand has looked to the 
"fiscal" relationship between excises and bounties. In MG Kailis 
Pty Ltd v Western Australia (1974) 130 CLR 265, 295 Mason J stated 
that the power to impose excise duties had been taken from the 
States so as to make the Commonwealth's power with respect to 
bounties effective.
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(iii) Economic Management
The first wave of effects of bounties, customs and excise is their 
artificial distortion of the relative competitive positions in 
markets. Each changes the competitive position of local producers 
relative to producers of the same product in other States or abroad. 
Each changes the competitive position of one product (for example, 
butter) relative to a substitutable product (margarine) whether 
produced in the same State, another State or abroad. Each changes the 
competitive position of producers who use as an input a commodity 
whose price is affected by a customs, excise or bounty, relative to 
producers who do not use that input. Each changes the competitive 
position of producers of the affected commodity as purchasers of an 
input relative to other buyers of the input.
As well as the fairly distinct category of market distortion, 
there are other miscellaneous effects of bounties, customs and 
excises. For example, each affects external balance of payments, 
foreign exchange rates, income distribution and inflation and 
employment levels.
Whether the purpose of including (retaining) "excise" in s90 was 
(as this writer sees it) to make Australia a Customs Union or whether 
it was merely to give the Commonwealth effective control of tariff 
policy, the effect was in some ways much wider than either. The 
States are denied the power to impose duties of excise (and the power 
to impose duties of customs and to grant bounties) not only as tools 
for distorting competitive positions but also as tools for affecting 
income distribution, inflation and employment levels.
On the other hand s90 is not in itself sufficient to guarantee 
that the Commonwealth will be able to control market relativities.
The first principle of Federation moved by Parkes in 1891^ was the 
continuity of State powers. The second and third related to making
1 Sydney 1891, 23.
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Australia a customs union. Thus the Founding Fathers set out to 
divide the tools of economic management - giving the Commonwealth 
power to influence behaviour indirectly by making activities more or 
less financially rewarding while leaving to the States the power to 
influence behaviour directly by prohibiting, empowering or requiring 
activities. The States are not prohibited from frustrating the policy 
behind the Commonwealth’s use of economic tools of economic 
management.
Barwick CJ stated the contradiction without acknowledging that
it is a contradiction.
"I have reached the conclusion in this case without any reasoning 
founded on the purposes [of s90] ... But the conclusion I have 
reached is conformable, in my opinion, to those purposes and 
consistent with the control of the national economy as a unity 
which knows no State boundaries by a legislature without direct 
legislative power over that economy as such."1
(iv) The revenue aspects of s90.
Customs and excise duties are not just tools for implementing 
government policies. Customs and excise duties are also sources of 
government revenue. At the end of the nineteenth century, customs 
were the main source of government revenue and those drafting the 
Constitution did not foresee any other significant source of revenue 
developing. It was accepted that power with respect to customs had to 
be exclusively vested in the Commonwealth so that the Commonwealth
1 Western Australia v Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd (1969) 121 CLR
1, 17. Emphasis added. It is not entirely clear from this 
passage whether Barwick CJ regarded "the control of the national 
economy as a unity" etc as the purpose of s90 or simply as a 
desirable goal. (Compare Rich J in the COR Case quoted in the 
text above p.210. A similar discussion in Dickenson’s Arcade Pty 
Ltd v Tasmania (1974) 130 CLR 177, 185 when Barwick CJ set out to 
"repeat" the point he made in Chamberlain does not resolve the 
ambiguity.
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c o u ld  s e t t l e  t h e  e x t e r n a l  p r o t e c t i o n / f r e e  t r a d e  q u e s t i o n .  The l o s s  t o  
t h e  S t a t e s  of  t h i s  r e v e n u e  was s e e n  a s  an u n d e s i r a b l e  s i d e - e f f e c t  and 
a g r e a t  d e a l  of t im e  was s p e n t  on t r y i n g  t o  d e v i s e  s p e c i f i c  g u a r a n t e e s  
f o r  t h e  Commonwealth t o  pay i t s  s u r p l u s  r e v e n u e  t o  t h e  S t a t e s . ^ -
Barw ick  CJ h a s  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  r e v e n u e  a s p e c t  of  s 90  i n  t h r e e  no t
2
e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  s t a t e m e n t s .  I n  an  e x t r a  c u r i a l  a d d r e s s  i n  1968 
he  d e s c r i b e d  s 90  a s  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  a compact  t h a t  t h e  main “s o u r c e s  of  
governm ent  r e v e n u e  s h o u l d  go t o  t h e  c e n t r e " .  His Honour a l s o  n o t e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  was no pe rm anen t  a g re e m e n t  a s  t o  how t h e  r e v e n u e  would be 
s h a r e d .  At t h e  t im e  Barwick  CJ was i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  which  h a d ,  i n  h i s  o p i n i o n ,  k e p t  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  f e d e r a t i o n  
s t r o n g  and s t a b l e .  His  Honour i d e n t i f i e d  s 90  and t h e  Uniform Tax 
Cases  ( g i v i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  main s o u r c e s  of  government  r e v e n u e  t o  
t h e  c e n t r a l  g o v e rn m e n t )  and s 96  ( g i v i n g  t h e  power t o  impose n a t i o n a l  
s t a n d a r d s  a s  c o n d i t i o n s  of  g r a n t s  of  r e v e n u e  t o  t h e  S t a t e s )  a s  
b e i n g  f u n d a m e n t a l  i n  t h e  de v e lo p m en t  and m a i n t e n a n c e  of  n a t i o n a l  
i d e n t i t y .  The i n f e r e n c e  seems t o  be t h a t  t h e  e s s e n c e  of  s 9 0 ,  t h e  
f u n d a m e n t a l  p u r p o s e  of  s 9 0 ,  was t o  g i v e  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  government  
c o n t r o l  of  t h e  main s o u r c e s  of  government  r e v e n u e .
Of c o u r s e  t h e  p u r p o s e  of s90  was n o t  t o  g i v e  t h e  power ove r  
cus tom s  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  government  b e c a u s e  cus to m s  were t h e  main s o u r c e  
of  r e v e n u e .  I f  c o n t r o l  ove r  c o l l e c t i o n  of  r e v e n u e  was t h e  " p u r p o s e ” 
of  s 9 0 ,  why would t h e  s e c t i o n  a l s o  p r o h i b i t  t h e  S t a t e  g r a n t  of  
b o u n t i e s ?
1 Sydney 1891, 55, 370,  529 ,  530 ,  671 f f ; A d e l a id e  1897, 1057-1070 ;  
Sydney 1897,  5 3 - 1 0 8 ;  Melbourne  1898 V o l l  773-900 ,  1076-1080 ,
1244.
2 (1968 )  28 P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  3.
3 Above p p 158 -161 .
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In the extract already quoted from his argument in 1958 in Browns 
Transport Pty Ltd v Kropp Barwick, then Sir Garfield Barwick QC had, 
with respect, stated the "emphasis" of the Constitution more 
accurately. There he said that the "correlative nature of customs and 
excise" was "not in relation to the gathering of money, but in 
relation to the use of taxation as an instrument of policy".*
As Chief Justice in 1975, Barwick CJ took a similar approach in
2the Australian Assistance Plan Case. In the passage set out above, 
Barwick CJ referred to the "mainspring" of the federation movement as 
being "the need to have a common external tariff and to remove border 
customs and other impediments to trade over the colonial 
boundaries". His Honour then pointed out that the handing over of 
power over "customs" was related to those main purposes and was in 
spite of rather than because of the power's revenue implications.
It is apparent from the history of the proposals for federation 
that the plan of federation involved, and essentially involved, 
the sharing or ,distribution of the revenues of the 
Commonwealt h."
In the 1968 address "The failure to agree upon a permanent formula 
for distributing the revenue", seemed to have been cited as a factor 
indicating that government revenue was a national matter. In 1975 
that failure was brushed aside as not denying "the essentially federal 
nature of the financial provisions of the Constitution".^
1 100 CLR 117, 124. Above p.210.
2 Above p.203.
3 (1975) 134 CLR 338 , 354-355.
4 Id. 355, emphasis added.
5 Id. 356.
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A lth o u g h  t h e  p u r p o s e  of  s90  was no t  t o  deny  r e v e n u e  s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  
S t a t e s ,  s90  h a s  t h a t  e f f e c t .  T h i s  r e v e n u e  a s p e c t  of  s90  p u t s  p r e s s u r e  
on t h e  h i g h  C our t  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e a s o n s .
The demands of  v o t e r s  f o r  government  a c t i v i t y  and government  
e x p e n d i t u r e  have  become more v a r i e d .  Taxes on goods h o l d  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  a t t r a c t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  a l l o w  a wide s p r e a d i n g  of  t h e  t a x  
b u r d e n  and can  be e x a c t e d  f rom  t h e  t a x p a y e r s  i n  s m a l l  am o u n t s ,  There  
i s  t h u s  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  S t a t e  gov e rn m e n ts  t o  d e v i s e  means t o  r a i s e  
r e v e n u e  f rom  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  goods and f o r  S t a t e  a d v i s e r s  t o  t e s t  s90  
and t h e  High C o u r t .
There  i s  a n o t h e r  r e v e n u e  a s p e c t  of  s90  which p u t s  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  
High C o u r t .  Barwick  as  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  e x p l a i n e d  some of  t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  s90  t o  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s  P ty  Ltd v 
V i c t o r i a . ^
"To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  g r e a t  A u s t r a l i a n  c o n t e n t  of  t h i s  i n  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  s e n s e ,  t h e  Commonwealth and t h e  S t a t e s  have  i n  t h e  l a s t  
two y e a r s  or  so r e a c h e d  an  a r r a n g e m e n t  o r  a f i n a n c i a l  f o r m u l a  by 
which  t h e  u n i f o r m  t a x  p r o c e e d s  c o l l e c t e d  by t h e  Commonwealth a r e  
r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  S t a t e s  i n  c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t i o n s .  To f i n d  s u d d e n ly  
t h a t  ' e x c i s e '  r e c e i v e d  a c o n s t r u c t i o n  which  t o o k  f rom  t h e  S t a t e s  
an a r e a  of  r e v e n u e  and c a s t  i t  e x l u s i v e l y  i n t o  t h e  hands  of  t h e  
Commonwealth would make an enormous d i f f e r e n c e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  
f o r m u l a . ”
The knowledge  t h a t  p r e v i o u s  High Cour t  d e c i s i o n s  on s90  have  been  
r e l i e d  on i n  t h e  w ork ing  ou t  of  f e d e r a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  
i n h i b i t s  j u d g e s  a s k e d  t o  r e v i e w  t h o s e  d e c i s i o n s .  A g a i n s t  t h i s  
b a c k g ro u n d  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  of  s t a b i l i t y  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  d o c t r i n e  of 
p r e c e d e n t  h a s  more t h a n  i t s  u s u a l  f o r c e .
1 [1962]  AC 25,  36.
2 J a c o b s  J  i n  HC S l e i g h  Ltd v South  A u s t r a l i a  (1977)  136 CLR 475,
513 commented:  "The d i f f i c u l t  and d e l i c a t e  b a l a n c e  be tw een  t h e
Commonwealth and t h e  S t a t e s  on f i s c a l  m a t t e r s  may be c u r r e n t l y  
b e i n g  p r e s e r v e d  upon t h e  d e c i s i o n s  p r e v i o u s l y  g i v e n  by t h i s  
C o u r t . "
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(v) Relevance of the "purpose” of s90 to judicial behaviour
Barwick has been one of the few Judges to claim an understanding 
of the purpose s90. He (and some others) have, when deciding how to 
apply s90, reasoned from those purposes or strengthened their 
conclusion by reference to those purposes. There are basic 
difficulties with this approach.
First, those relying on the premise seldom commit themselves to an 
expression of their understanding of the purpose. When attempts have 
been made to state the purpose, the statements have been fairly ragged 
with only a limited perception of the relevance of bounties, customs 
and excises to economic management being revealed. Secondly, whatever 
purpose behind s90 can be discerned, s90 does not expressly declare a 
social policy to be maintained as does the nearby s92. Section 90 in 
its terms prohibits three specific kinds of government action.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly of all, is that s90 is based on 
last century's notions of economic management.
In the nineteenth century to give to the Commonwealth exclusive 
control of bounties, customs and excise was to give to the 
Commonwealth exclusive control of the means of dealing with what would 
then have been considered the appropriate concerns of governmental 
economic management. The understanding of the economic 
interdependence of private and government actions and the notions of 
the appropriate concerns for government economic manipulation have 
changed greatly since the 1890's. Ironically although the purpose of 
s90 may well have been to give the Commonwealth an effective power to 
control economic management with the removal from the States of power 
to raise revenue being regarded as an undesirable side effect, the 
States are free to interfere with Commonwealth economic mamagement so 
long as they do not do so while raising revenue.
Most judges have not claimed any knowledge of the purpose of s90. 
Indeed, Stephen J when asked to preserve the "clear constitutional 
intent" of s90 and to invalidate a State law on account of its 
"reality", replied that the argument was based on the assumption
that the exclusive nature of the federal parliament's power to 
impose duties of excise can readily and with accuracy be explained 
by reference to constitutional purpose or historical reason...
Yet experience in the past suggests that neither source offers 
certain guidance.
This then is the uncertainty underlying the judicial disorder.
The discussion now turns to the detail of the High Court's attempts to 
explain the extent of the prohibition on the State levy of excise 
duties.
1 ÜC Sleigh Ltd v State of South Australia (1977) 146 CLR 475, 497.
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B - "Duty'* ~ To be an excise the law must be imposing a duty 
(i) The link between s51(ii) and s90
Section 90 denies power to the States indirectly by declaring that 
the Commonwealth's power to impose duties of excise shall become 
exclusive. There is no specific Commonwealth head of power with 
respect to "the imposition of duties of excise".^- The reference in 
s90 to the Commonwealth power to impose duties of excise, is a 
reference to part of Commonwealth power under s51(ii) which empowers
othe imposition of taxation.
The standard definition of taxation is as follows
"It is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for 
public purposes, enforceable at law, and is not a payment for 
services rendered.”
A State law will not be held to have breached s90 unless the 
Commonwealth could therefore, have enacted the same provision as part 
of its power under s51(ii) to impose taxation (or as part of its power 
to grant bounties under s51(iii) as the case may be). The judgment of 
Dixon J in Vacuum Oil Pty Ltd v Queensland provides an example of this 
approach.
1 Nor is there any specific power with respect to the imposition of 
duties of customes. There is a specific head of power, s51(iii), 
with respect to "Bounties on the production or export of goods".
2 Burton v Honan (1952) 86 CLR 169. There was for a while in the 
Drafts express power with respect to customs and excise. Above 
p206 and note 4 p208.
3 I will follow the example of most members of the High Court and 
use "tax" and "duty" interchangeably. In Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v 
Victoria, Fullagar J indicated his belief that there is a 
difference between the two when he said, "It is probably correct 
to say that every duty is a tax, but not every tax is a duty." 
(1960) 104 CLR 529, 552.
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"The power of the Commonwealth Parliament to impose duties of 
customs and of excise, which s90 makes exclusive, is conferred by 
s51(ii) as part of the power to make laws with respect to 
taxation. I cannot think that, in the exercise of that power, the 
Commonwealth Parliament could pass such an enactment as that 
contained in the Queensland Motor Spirit Vendors Act 1933.”
It followed, according to His Honour, that the Queensland provisions 
in question did not offend s90.
As stated the principle is unequivocal and referable to the 
language of the Constitution. Whatever other attributes a State law 
must have to be an excise (and therefore invalid) it must be such a 
provision as the Commonwealth could enact as a tax . It is beyond the 
scope of this discussion to review every aspect of the definition of 
taxation and characterisation of tax laws. It is, however, pertinent 
to note some of the aspects of the concept of taxation which interact 
with s90 in particular to affect the States’ capacity to raise revenue 
by taxing goods.
(ii) A Compulsory acquisition of property is not a tax
A compulsory acquisition of property is not a compulsory exaction
of money. Thus the States can put themselves in funds without
offending s90 by acquiring produce, selling it themselves, and then
paying any or indeed no compensation to the dispossessed 
oproducers.
In the Homebush Flour Mills Case a State stretched this option 
too far. The Court held to be an excise a New South Wales Act which 
compulsorily acquired flour produced by millers, required the millers 
to keep the flour acquired at their own risk and expense until the
1 (1934) 51 CLR 108.
2 Crothers v Sheil (1933) 49 CLR; Hopper v Egg and Egg Pulp 
Marketing Board (1939) 61 CLR 665.
3 (1937) 57 CLR 390.
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Grown called for it, and then gave the millers an "option" to 
repurchase the flour from the Crown at a price which tended to be 
higher than the compensation which was to be paid to them for the 
acquired property. Even in the face of this blatant attempt to evade 
s90, the members of the Court (with the possible exception of Evatt 
J)* did not base their decision of invalidity on any notion of the 
purpose of s90. They held simply that the practical compulsion on 
producers to repurchase what had been their own produce was sufficient 
compulsion to constitute a "compulsory exaction". With the other 
elements of the definition of tax present, and with there being little 
doubt that if this law was a tax, then the other elements of excise 
were present, the law was held to offend s90.
(iii) A Payment for services is not a tax
OAfter some leniency in Hartley v Walsh'1 23where the Court was 
willing to allow fees to be extracted from producers to cover the 
costs of a marketing authority on a fairly vague notion of the service 
being rendered to the feepayer by the authority^ more rigorous 
approach was introduced in Parton v Milk Board (Vic).^  The majority 
held in Parton that a charge could only be characterised as a fee for 
services if it was for specific services rendered to the feepayer. As 
the charge made in Parton was for the general costs of the Milk 
Board's activities and some of the activities of the Board, such as 
general promotion of the product, did not directly benefit particular 
feepayers, the fee could not be characterised as a fee "for" services. 
This decision has not been challenged since.
1 Id. 417.
2 (1937) 57 CLR 372.
3 (1949) 80 CLR 229
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In  Harper  v S t a t e  o f  V i c t o r i a '*' Barwick  CJ was p a r t  of  a c o u r t
which c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  "payment  f o r
s e r v i c e s  i s  n o t  a t a x "  t o  V i c t o r i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  egg
m a r k e t i n g .  The V i c t o r i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  p r o h i b i t e d  t h e  s a l e  of  eggs
u n l e s s  t h e y  had been  g r a d e d  f o r  s i z e  and q u a l t i y  and s tamped  by t h e
V i c t o r i a n  M a r k e t i n g  B o a rd .  The main d e c l a r a t i o n  s o u g h t  by t h e
p l a i n t i f f  was t h a t  s92  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  Act f rom a p p l y i n g  t o  h i s  s a l e s  of
u ng rade d  eggs  i m p o r t e d  f rom  New South  W ale s .  Barwick  CJ was t h e  o n ly
member of  t h e  C our t  who was i n  f a v o u r  of  so d e c l a r i n g .  The o t h e r
j u d g e s ,  M cT ie rnan ,  T a y l o r ,  M enz ies  and Owen J J  r e j e c t e d  t h e  s92 
2
a t t a c k .
The p l a i n t i f f  a l s o  s o u g h t  a d e c l a r a t i o n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  
g r a n t  by t h e  V i c t o r i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  of  power t o  t h e  Board t o  c h a rg e  a 
f e e  f o r  g r a d i n g  and s t a m p i n g  was an e x c i s e  and i n v a l i d  b e c a u s e  o f  s 9 0 .
M cTie rnan ,  T a y l o r ,  Menzies  and Owen J J  r e j e c t e d  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  based  
on s 9 0 .  The main g round  of  d e c i s i o n  of  t h e  m a j o r i t y  was t h a t  t h e  
f e e  a l t h o u g h  c om pu lso ry  was f o r  s e r v i c e s  r e n d e r e d  and t h e r e f o r e  was 
no t  a t a x . ^  The m a j o r i t y  c o n c l u s i o n  was s t a t e d  w i t h o u t  s u p p o r t i n g  
r e a s o n i n g .  Because  of  t h e  v iew he  t o o k  on t h e  s92  a r g u m e n t ,  i t  was 
no t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  Barwick  CJ t o  d e c i d e  t h e  s 90  p o i n t .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  
h i s  Honour d i d  r e c o r d  h i s  " c o n s i d e r a b l e  doub t  as  t o  w h e t h e r  a f e e  
p a y a b l e  by s t a t u t e  i n  r e s p e c t  of  a c t s  t o  which t h e  s u b j e c t  i s
1 (1966)  114 CLR 361.
2 Below p p 3 8 3 -3 8 5 ,  448 -449 .
3 In  Permewan W righ t  C o n s o l i d a t e d  P ty  Ltd v T r e w h i t t  (1979)  27 ALR 
182 t h e  High Cour t  was a s k ed  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  Harpe r  bu t  on ly  on t h e  
s92  p o i n t .  H a rpe r  was a f f i r m e d  w i t h  Barwick  CJ and A i c k i n  J  
d i s s e n t i n g .  Below p p 3 8 3 - 3 8 5 ,  452.
4 I d . 377 p e r  McTie rnan  J ;  328 p e r  T a y l o r  J ;  378 p e r  Menzies  J ;  
and 382 p e r  Owen J .
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compelled to submit can be regarded as a payment for services rendered 
... when considering whether an exaction is or is not a tax."*
(iv) A licence fee can be a tax
A common administrative device for collecting revenue is to 
prohibit engaging in an activity without a licence and impose a fee on 
issue of the licence. No one would doubt that the States can prohibit 
activities absolutely without offending s90. One might have thought if 
a State chose to charge for any relaxation of its prohibition, that 
such a charge could be characterised as the "price" of a licence, or 
the "price" for a service rendered. Such notions have been brushed 
aside by the Court. The Court has always assumed that a "price" for 
relaxing a prohibition of an activity, is a tax on that activity. One 
might ask, could the Commonwealth set up a licence system for an 
activity otherwise beyond Commonwealth power and support it as an 
exercise of s51(ii) because there was a fee involved? Surely not. We 
can suspect that the rule relating to licence fees is grounded on some 
perception of the purpose of s90 rather than on any strict approach to 
characterisation of laws as taxes within the meaning of s51(ii).
1 Id. 376. It seems that the majority, although allowing this
charge , would not allow a State to impose charges without limit 
for the provision to a person of a service that the State 
compelled the person to receive. Owen J pointed out that the Act 
required the amount of the fee to be determined by the Board 
according to the expenses that the Board calculated it had 
incurred in providing such services. Id. 382. Taylor J said the 
Board would be acting ultra vires the Act if it set a fee which 
bore "no relation to the expenditure" actually incurred by it.
Id. 378. These cryptic comments should be understood against the 
background of the rules developed under s92 for allowing some 
taxation of inter-State trading activities. In that context 
States have been allowed to exact taxes for the use by traders of 
facilities such as roads so long as there is a close connection 
between the use of the facility and the charge. Compare Permewan 
Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt (1979) 27 ALR 182, 192 per 
Gibbs J; 207-208 per Mason J. The rules developed for the 
purposes of s92 for ascertaining which taxes are compatible with 
the freedom guaranteed by s92 may not be directly applicable to 
s90 when the question is whether an exaction is a tax.
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(v) Summary of “Duty''
I t  can be seen  from th e  above d i s c u s s io n  t h a t  th e  Court has 
r e j e c t e d  some a t te m p ts  by th e  S t a t e s  to  d e v is e  laws to  r a i s e  revenue 
w ith o u t  th e  laws b e in g  c l a s s i f i e d  as " d u t i e s " .  The key p o in t s  to  be 
no ted  a r e  as f o l l o w s .  F i r s t ,  we can s u s p e c t  t h a t  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
t a x a t i o n  has  been a f f e c t e d  by p e r c e p t io n s  of th e  purpose  of s90 and by 
r e lu c t a n c e  of members of th e  Court to  a l lo w  s90 to  be e a s i l y  avoided  
by d e v ic e s .  S uspec t  as we may, th e  Court has on ly  t a lk e d  in  term s of 
th e  meaning of th e  word t a x a t i o n .  S eco n d ly ,  th e  c u r r e n t  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
t a x a t i o n ,  a l b e i t  q u i t e  w ide ,  i s  no t wide enough to  p re v e n t  a l l  S ta t e  
income p ro d u c in g  a rran g em en ts  h in d e r in g  th e  e f f e c t u a t i o n  of 
Commonwealth f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  The r e l a t i v e l y  s im ple  d e v ic e  of 
compulsory a c q u i s i t i o n  i s  beyond th e  re a c h  of s90 (so  long  as no 
p r e s s u r e  i s  pu t on th e  d i s p o s s e s s e d  owner t o  r e p u rc h a s e  th e  g o o d s) .  
T h i r d ly ,  th e  High Court judgm ents  in  t h i s  a r e a  have been c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by a h ig h  deg ree  of consensus  w i th i n  th e  C o u r t .  F o u r th ly ,  in  th e  one 
c a s e ,  H arper v V i c t o r i a , when Barwick CJ was p a r t  of a Court asked to  
c o n s id e r  th e  d e f i n i t o n  of t a x a t i o n  in  a case  in v o lv in g  s9 0 ,  h i s  Honour 
in d i c a t e d  t h a t  he was i n c l i n e d  to  g ive  t a x a t i o n  (and t h u s ,  s90) a 
w ider d e f i n i t i o n  th a n  d id  th e  o th e r  members of th e  C o u r t .
The law r e l a t i n g  to  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of " d u t i e s "  i s  no t 
in te rd e p e n d e n t  w i th  th e  law r e l a t i n g  to  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
p a r t i c u l a r  d u t i e s  as " e x c i s e s "  and th e  two q u e s t io n s  can be s e p a r a t e d .  
In W estern A u s t r a l i a  v Cham berla in  KA A ick in  QC askecj th e  High Court 
to  app ly  th e  te c h n iq u e s  used  in  Homebush ( to  d e f in e  t a x a t i o n )  to  th e  
problem of i d e n t i f y i n g  a d u ty  as an e x c i s e .*  Menzies J  p o in te d  out 
t h a t  th e  q u e s t io n s  a r e  s e p a r a t e  and Homebush i s  t h e r e f o r e  not in  p o in t  
when c o n s id e r in g  th e  second q u e s t i o n .  I t  w i l l  be argued  l a t e r  t h a t  
one im p o r ta n t  i s s u e  in  th e  case  of D ickensons Arcade shou ld  have been 
t r e a t e d  as  a m a t te r  of th e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t a x a t i o n  r a t h e r  th a n  as a 
problem of c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  an e x c i s e .
1 (1970) 121 CLR 1, 8.
2 Id .  25.
3 Below p p 2 9 5 ff .
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C - "Excise” - What kind of duties are excises?
Since the High Court first considered s90 there has been 
acceptance of the general proposition - an excise is a tax on goods. 
This general proposition has spawned more specific subpropositions 
intended to explain the generality. Some of these more specific 
propositions have been accepted by some and rejected by others. Some 
are still so general as to be acceptable to all. An attempt will be 
made to determine whether a proposition goes to the questions of 
characterisation subsumed by the word "on" and when to the matters of 
definition subsumed by the word "goods". The idea here is to use a 
framework, similar to that used when asking whether a Commonwealth law 
is within a head of power. There are two steps involved when asking 
whether, for example, a law is within power under s51(i) as being a 
law with respect to overseas trade. First one must decide what 
"overseas trade" means (a matter of definition), then one must decide 
whether the law in question is one "with respect to" overseas trade (a 
matter of characterisation). Similarly the ensuing discussion will be 
broken down into the questions. Taxes on which dealings with goods 
constitute "excises"? (Definition). When will a tax be said to be 
"on" a relevant dealing with goods? (Characterisation).
There is no sharp analytical division. Some judges treat some 
things as matters of definition which others treat as matters of 
characterisation. Some merge the two aspects and few judges draw the 
distinction between the two inquiries.
Barwick CJ, however, drew the distinction and indicated his 
willingness to be guided by the pupose of s90 at both levels.
"I continue to regard the evident purpose of the grant of 
exclusive power to impose duties of customs and of excise as of 
significance both in deciding the connotation of the word ’excise’ 
in s90 of the Constitution and in deciding whether in its
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operation a State statute does impose a duty of excise ... in 
determining both connotation and denotation, the constitutional 
purposes of the grant or exclusive power must be kept in 
mind."^
There is one issue/proposition which falls both across matters of 
definition and across matters of characterisation and which has 
affected other issues of definition and characterisation.
(i) The link between excise duties and indirect taxes
The first High Court of Griffith CJ, Barton and O'Connor JJ took
2it for granted that an excise tax is an indirect tax and adopted 
for the purposes of s90 of the Australian Constitution, the 
distinction between direct and indirect taxes adopted by the Privy 
Council for the purposes of the Canadian Constitution. Under the 
Canadian Constitution it is necessary to distinguish between direct 
and indirect taxes. Under the Canadian Constitution these categories 
are treated as being mutually exclusive. In that context excise duty 
is often given as an example of an indirect tax.^ The Privy Council 
had incorporated into Canadian doctrine the distinction between direct 
and indirect offered by JS Mill.
"Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which 
is demanded from the very persons who it is intended or desired 
should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from 
one person in the expectation and intention that he shall 
indemnify himself at the expense of another, such are the excise 
or customs. The producer or importer of a commodity is called 
upon to pay a tax on it, not with the intention to levy a peculiar 
contribution upon him, but to tax through him the consumers of the 
commodity, from who it is supposed that he will recover the amount 
by means of an advance in price."
1 Dickenson's Arcade Pty Ltd v Tasmania (1974) 130 CLR 177, 185.
2 Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497, 511.
3 Id. 512.
4 Eg, Attorney-General for Manitoba v Attorney-General for Canada 
[1925] AC 561, 566.
5 Brewers and Maltsters * Association of Ontario v Attorney-General 
of Ontario [1897] AC 231, Bank of Toronto v Lambe, 12 App Cas 575, 
582.
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Within the Canadian framework to say that a tax was "on goods", to 
say that a tax was indirect, meant that it was intended to be passed 
on by the taxpayer to the person purchasing the goods from him. If it 
was not intended to be passed on then the tax fell into the category 
of direct tax and was a tax "on the person", the taxpayer.
In cases up to and including Parton v Milk Board (Vic) in 1949 the 
linking of (Canadian) indirectness and (Australian) excise was, 
generally, assumed.^- Not long after Par ton, H Arndt published an 
article in the Australian Law Journal demonstrating that the 
direct/indirect distinction of nineteenth century political economy 
was not particularly meaningful or precise when exposed by economic 
analysis.
In Browns Transport v Kropp"* Sir Garfield Barwick QC framing his 
submission to meet the Court's previous incorporation of Canadian 
"indirect" into the definition of "excise, argued that the tax in 
question was "indirect" because it was in its nature "susceptible of 
being passed on".^ The next step in Barwick's submission was to say 
that the fact that the tax was "indirect" was sufficient to 
demonstrate that it was an "excise".
1 In Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263, 285 
Starke J had challenged the linking of the two concepts but had 
received no support. Contrast "Customs and excise are essentially 
indirect taxes". Id. 277 per Latham CJ, McTiernan J concurring.
2 "Judicial Review under s90 of the Constitution. An Economist's 
view." (1952) 25 ALJ 667, 706.
3 (1958) 100 CLR 117.
4 Id. 125.
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The Court need only have responded, as did counsel defending the 
tax, that "not all indirect taxes are excise duties".^ The Court in 
a joint judgment of Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar, Kitto, Taylor and 
Windeyer JJ went out of its way, however, to downgrade the "indirect” 
test. Their Honours, although finding that the tax in question was 
not an excise, removed "indirect” from the essential elements of the 
definition of excise by saying:
"It would perhaps be going too far to say that it is an essential 
element of a duty of excise that it should be an 'indirect ' 
t ax."^
Immediately after this severing of "excise" and "indirect" the 
Court added the qualification:
"But a duty of excise will generally be an indirect tax, and, if a 
tax appears on its face to possess that character it will 
generally be because it is a tax upon goods rather than a tax upon 
persons."
That proviso, which was explained by setting out a Canadian 
explanation of "indirect", may have been added out of deference to the 
earlier High Court decisions which had treated "indirect" as being 
part of the definition of "excise" and had incorporated Canadian 
doctrine accordingly. The proviso may represent a compromise 
concealing a lack, of real agreement about the point amongst the 
parties to the joint judgment. This approach of giving the concept of 
indirectness the status of "relevant but not conclusive" allows judges 
to ignore or rely on the test of indirectness as they wish.
1 Id. 126.
2 Id. 129.
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Whatever the evolution of this passage it did little to clarify
the notion of "excise". Consider for example the Dennis Hotels
decision.^ Two judges, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ, who had been
parties to the joint judgment in Rropp ignored the compromise reached
there. McTiernan J reverted to the old position that indirectness is
an essential aspect of an excise (and found it was present). At
the other extreme, Fullagar J considered indirectness a meaningless
3and irrelevant concept.
The remaining judges behaved consistently with the Kropp solution 
of treating indirectness as relevant but not conclusive. Dixon J and 
Windeyer J were aided in their decision that the taxes in question 
were excises by their conclusion that the taxes were indirect.^
Kitto and Taylor JJ were aided in their decision that the taxes were 
not excises by their conclusion that the taxes were not indirect.^ 
Menzies J decided that the two taxes in question were indirect but 
that nevertheless one of the taxes was not an excise anyway.^
Barwick had an opportunity to comment on the matter in his first 
constitutional case as Chief Justice, Andersons Pty Ltd v Victoria.  ^
Without citing the Kropp dicta, Barwick CJ took a similar position.
If a tax is not intended to or cannot be passed on that "may assist to 
demonstrate" that it is not upon goods. If a tax does tend to enter 
the cost of the goods, that may assist to demonstrate that it is upon
1 (1960) 104 CLR 529. Below pp245ff.
2 Id. 549.
3 Id. 553-554.
4 Id. 540, 545-546 per Dixon CJ, 594-595, 597 per Windeyer J.
5 Id. 559-560, 556-567 per Kitto J; 575-576 per Taylor J.
6 Id. 590-591.
7 (1964) 111 CLR 353.
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goods. The tendency to be passed on was merely a "circumstance”, not 
a "criterion".1 234567- Barwick CJ expressed his preference for forgetting 
about attempts, like the direct/indirect test, to find synonyms for 
the "accepted formulation".“ Of the other members of the Court in 
Anderson, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ, had also 
been involved in the Dennis Hotels. Their Honours either reaffirmed 
or acted consistently with their respective positions in Dennis 
Hotels.-^ The other member of the Court, Owen J, who had, like 
Barwick CJ joined the Court after Dennis Hotels, ignored the dicta in 
Kropp and said that an excise is an indirect tax.^
Since Anderson the fashion among members of the High Court has 
been, with a few exceptions, to say nothing about the relevance or 
irrelevance of indirectness to characterising a tax as an excise.
This does not mean, however, that the doctrine is defunct. Both in 
the joint judgment in Kropp and in judicial statements up to and 
including Anderson, the general position adopted has been to say that 
indirectness is not an element in the definition of excise but is 
relevant to revealing the character of a tax. More recently, Stephen 
J expressly relied on lack of indirectness in Dickenson's Arcade  ^
and MG Kailis Pty Ltd v Western Australia.^ Since Kropp only two . 
members of the court have expressly completely repudiated 
indirectness.^
1 Id. 365.
2 Ibid. The "accepted formulation" is discussed below pp266ff.
3 (1964) 111 CLR 353, 370, 374-375, 376, 377-378, 379 respectively.
4 Id. 382.
5 (1974) 130 CLR 177, 231.
6 (1974) 130 CLR 245, 262.
7 Fullagar J in Dennis Hotels (1960) 104 CLR 529, 553-554. And 
Gibbs J in Dickenson's Arcade citing Fullagar J. Gibbs J 
described the incorporation of the Canadian cases on "indirect" as 
being a regrettable intrusion of irrelevant matter. (1974) 130 
CLR 177, 222.
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The concept  of " i n d i r e c t n e s s "  has  t o  be borne i n  mind, not  only  
because  i t  i s  s t i l l  a p p a r e n t l y  r e l e v a n t  even i f  not  c o n c l u s i v e ,  but  
a l s o  because  th e  i n t r u s i o n  of t h a t  concept  has had some l a s t i n g
e f f e c t s  on t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  law on t h e  s p e c i f i c  problems of f l a t
1 2  3t a x e s ,  consumption t a x e s  and t im e - l a g g e d  t a x e s .  Fur therm ore
th e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of Canadian  case  law about  m u tu a l ly  e x c l u s i v e
c a t e g o r i e s  and M i l l ’s p o l i t i c a l  economy approach  which c o n c e n t r a t e d  on
th e  " e x p e c t a t i o n  and i n t e n t i o n "  of  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  may go some way to
e x p l a i n  High Court  r e f e r e n c e s  t o ,  and r e a s o n i n g  based on,  the
"su b s t a n c e "  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  and i n q u i r i e s  i n t o  what the  law was "aimed
a t "  when d e a l i n g  w i th  g e n e r a l  problems of s90 c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n .^
Barwick h im s e l f  i n t r o d u c e d  a concept  of " in te n d e d  o p e r a t i o n "  which
seems t o  be s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  Canadian expec ted  o p e r a t i o n . ^
( i i )  D e f i n i t i o n
Under t h i s  h e a d in g  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  w i l l  be on th e  q u e s t i o n  -  which 
d e a l i n g s  w i th  goods a r e  such t h a t  a t a x  on them w i l l  be an e x c i s e .  
The d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  be o rg a n iz e d  around t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  which have 
been put  from t ime t o  t ime t o  answer t h a t  q u e s t i o n .
(a )  An e x c i s e  i s  a t a x  on p r o d u c t i o n  of  goods
There a r e  s to n g  a rgum en ts ,  from th e  t e x t  of th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  
l i n k i n g  " e x c i s e "  t o  p r o d u c t i o n ^  and no judge  has  r e f u t e d  t h e  g e n e r a l
1 Below p p 2 4 2 f f .
2 Below pp237f f .
3 Below p p 2 4 5 f f .
4 Eg, P e te r s w a ld  v B a r t l e y  (1904) 1 CLR 497.  511 per  G r i f f i t h  CJ; 
Bar ton  and O'Connor J J ;  COR Case (1926) 38 CLR 408,  438 per  S ta rk e  
J ;  Matthews v Chicory  M arke t ing  Board (1938) 60 CLR 263, 302 per  
Dixon J .
5 Below p p 3 0 1 f f .
6 G e n e r a l l y ,  P e te r s w a ld  v B a r t l e y  (1904) 1 CLR 497 and t h e  judgment 
of F u l l a g a r  J  in  Dennis H o te l s  Pty Ltd v V i c t o r i a  (1960) 104 CLR 
529, 555-556.
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proposition that the word "excise” in s90 has something to do with 
production. Opinions have varied, however, on the exact relationship 
of production to the definition of excise.
Peterswald v Bartley 1904
The first High Court in Peterswald v Bartley suggested a simple,
clear and narrow definition of excise. For Griffith CJ, Barton and
O'Connor JJ, judges who were to develop the doctrine of reserved
powers, the word "excise" in s90 was to be read against the assumption
that the Constitution did not intend to deprive the States of their
power to regulate inter-State trade.'*' This discussion was not
2essential to the decision that the tax in issue was valid.
COR Case 1926
3In the COR Case the High Court was called on to determine 
whether a set of South Australian taxes offended s90 (as being customs 
duties in some operations and as being excise duties in other 
operations) and/or s92 (in their effect on inter-State trade). The 
main tax considered, calculated at the rate of threepence for every 
gallon of motor spirit sold, was levied on the first sale and delivery 
of motor spirit within the state "after the entry of such motor spirit 
into the State, or, as the case may be, after production within the 
State...".^
1 (1904) 1 CLR 497, 512.
2 The basis for decision is discussed below p242.
3 Commonwealth and Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v South Australia 
(1926) 38 CLR 408.
4 Ibid. Isaacs, Higgins, Powers and Starke JJ (with Knox CJ and 
Rich J not deciding and Gavan Duffy J dissenting) held that in so 
far as the law applied to tax first sale after import from abroad 
it was a tax on importation and therefore a customs duty and 
offensive to s90.
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The Court was asked to adopt a definition of "excise" wider than 
the 1904 Peterswald formula which confined excise to taxes on 
production. Knox CJ, Isaacs, Powers and Starke JJ adhered to the 
narrow definition but held the tax invalid by characterising a tax 
imposed by reference to sale by the producer as being a tax "on" 
production.* Higgins J also adhered to the 1904 definition but 
advocated an approach to characterisation which would make a tax 
imposed by reference to any dealing with goods, a tax on 
production. Rich J adopted a new wide definition of excise 
including within the concept, duties upon all dealings with goods.
(b) An excise is a tax on any dealing with goods
Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board 1938
In a wide ranging discussion (much of which was of marginal 
relevance to the issue before him) in Matthews v Chicory Marketing 
Board,^  Dixon J supported a wide definition of excise along the 
lines proposed by Rich J in the COR Case. Dixon J acknowledged that 
some sections of the Constitution, including s90 itself, associate 
excise with production. His Honour did not consider that that fact 
compelled him to confine excise to taxes on production.^ His Honour 
considered that
"The basal conception of an excise in the primary sense which the 
framers of the constitution are regarded as having adopted is a 
tax indirectly affecting commodities... The tax must bear a close 
relation to the production or manufacture, the sale or the 
consumption of goods and must be of such a nature as to affect 
them as the subjects of manufacture or production or as articles 
of commerce
1 Id. 419-421, 430, 436, 439 respectively.
2 Id. 435.
3 Id. 437.
4 (1938) 60 CLR 263.
5 Id. 292.
6 Id. 303-304.
234 .
This  p r o p o s a l  of  Dixon J  t o  expand t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  " e x c i s e "  t o  c a t c h
t a x e s  on a l l  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  goods a f t e r  p r o d u c t i o n  was d i c t a  no t  o n l y
i n  t h a t  t h e r e  were n a r r o w e r  b a s e s  f o r  d e c i s i o n  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e
1904 f o rm u la  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h a t  i t  d i d  no t  even  c o v e r  t h e  i s s u e  he had
t o  d e c i d e  which  r e l a t e d  t o  a t a x  on an a c t i v i t y ,  p l a n t i n g  a c r o p ,
b e f o r e  t h e  goods came i n t o  e x i s t e n c e . ^ - (The r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e
t a x  a f f e c t  t h e  goods " a s "  s u b j e c t s  of  m a n u f a c t u r e  or  " a s "  a r t i c l e s  of
2
commerce,  has  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n . )
Dixon J  d i d  n o t  s e e k  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  by any r e a s o n i n g  
based  on t h e  g r o u p i n g  o f  b o u n t i e s ,  cus toms and e x c i s e  d u t i e s ,  o r  t h e i r  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  i n  m a t t e r s  of  economic  management o r  on any p e r c e p t i o n  
of  t h e  p u r p o s e  of  s 9 0 .  He b a s e d  h i s  wide d e f i n i t i o n  on t h e  u s a g e  of
3
t h e  t e r m  i n  E n g l i s h  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d ,  t o  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  i n  some 
A u s t r a l i a n  c o l o n i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n . ^
Dixon J  a d v e r t e d  t o  t h e  u s a g e  i n  economic  w r i t i n g s  ( i n c l u d i n g  JS 
M i l l )  which  had used  t h e  word " e x c i s e "  t o  d e s c r i b e  t a x e s  on a r t i c l e s  
of  home p r o d u c t i o n . ^  For  Dixon J  such  a u s a g e  of  " e x c i s e "  was 
m ere ly  a c o n v e n i e n t  c o n v e n t i o n  so t h a t  " e x c i s e "  c o u ld  be used  i n  
c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  " c u s to m s "  when t h e  w r i t e r s ’ c o n c e r n  was t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  be tw een  b u r d e n s  upon d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  and upon 
i m p o r t a t i o n . ^  ( T h i s  t e n d s  t o  im p ly  a t  l e a s t  t h a t  Dixon J  d i d  no t
1 Rich J  who had  i n d i c a t e d  i n  COR h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  wide 
d e f i n i t i o n  found  i t  u n n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h a t  m a t t e r .  I d . 280-  
282. The m a t t e r  a c t u a l l y  d e c i d e d  i n  M a t t h e w s , i s  d i s c u s s e d  be low 
p p 2 6 6 f f .
2 Below p p 2 4 0 f f .
3 (1938)  60 CLR 263, 293-298 .
4 I d . 298 -299 .
5 I d .  297-298 .
6 I d .  297-298 .
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t h i n k  t h a t  " e x c i s e "  s h o u ld  be c o n s t r u e d  on t h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  
word " e x c i s e "  was i n c l u d e d  s o l e l y  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  e f f e c t  of  such  t a x e s  
on t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  of  l o c a l  p r o d u c e r s  r e l a t i v e  t o  f o r e i g n  
p r o d u c e r s . )  His Honour d i d  n o t  f e e l  c o m p e l l e d  by t h a t  s p e c i a l i s e d  
u s a g e  t o  c o n f i n e  e x c i s e s  t o  t a x e s  on goods which  a r e  home p r o d u c t s ,  
when he was c o n f i d e n t  t h e r e  had been  a w i d e r  u s a g e  of  t h e  word
" c o v e r i n g  i n ^ l a n d  t a x e s  on c o m m o d i t i e s ,  w h e t h e r  im p o r t e d  o r  p roduced
1 2 o r  m a n u f a c t u r e d  i n  E n g la n d "  b u t  l e f t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  open .
The r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  t a x e s  of  t h e  q u e s t i o n  -  s h o u ld
e x c i s e  be c o n f i n e d  t o  t a x e s  on a r t i c l e s  of  home m a n u f a c t u r e  -  i s
i n d i r e c t .  Even i f  " e x c i s e "  were  so c o n f i n e d  a t a x  which  a p p l i e d  t o
goods n o t  l o c a l l y  p ro d u ce d  c o u ld  t h e n  o f f e n d  s 90  a s  b e i n g  a cus tom s
3
d u t y ,  a t a x  on i m p o r t a t i o n .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  i s s u e  i s  t h a t  
i f  i t  i s  d e c i d e d  t h a t  e x c i s e  i s  t o  be c o n f i n e d  t o  t a x e s  on l o c a l l y  
p roduced  g o o d s ,  t h e n  t h e  a rgum ent  (which  Dixon J  was s e e k i n g  t o  
r e f u t e )  t h a t  e x c i s e  means t a x  on p r o d u c t i o n  i s  more c o n v i n c i n g . ^
P a r t o n  v M i lk  Board ( V i c t o r i a )  1949
In  t h i s  c a s e ^  t h e  High C our t  had f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  t o  d e c i d e  
w h e th e r  a t a x  imposed on a d e a l i n g  a f t e r  t h e  goods had l e f t  t h e  
p r o d u c e r ' s  hands  c o u ld  be an e x c i s e . ^  A V i c t o r i a n  r e g u l a t i o n
1 I d . 294.  A lso  299 i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  A u s t r a l i a n  u s a g e .
2 I d .  299.
3 COR Case (1926 )  38 CLR 408 above pp2 3 2 -2 3 3 .
4 Compare t h e  b e h a v i o u r  of  M enzies  J  below p242 n o t e  3.
5 (1949)  80 CLR 229.
6 The l e g i s l a t i o n  c h a l l e n g e d  i n  t h e  COR Case (1926)  38 CLR 408 had 
( a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  t a x  on f i r s t  s a l e ) ,  imposed a t a x  on t h e  use  
w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e  of  motor  s p i r i t  p u r c h a s e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  S t a t e .  
A l th o u g h  t h e  w i d e r  s t a t e m e n t s  of  H i g g i n s  and Rich  J J  above p233 
would make such  a t a x  an e x c i s e ,  n e i t h e r  t h e y  no t  any o t h e r  member 
of  t h e  Cour t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  t a x  i n  t h o s e  t e rm s  i n  t h i s  c a s e .
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empowered t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  of  a t a x ,  no t  e x c e e d i n g  l / 4 d  p e r  g a l l o n ,  on 
s e l l e r s ,  o t h e r  t h a n  p r o d u c e r s  o r  m i lk s h o p  p r o p r i e t o r s ,  of  m i l k .  In  
p u r p o r t e d  r e l i a n c e  on t h i s  power ,  l e v i e s  a t  1 / 1 Od and 1 / 8d p e r  g a l l o n  
had been  imposed a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s .  With Latham CJ and McTiernan  
J  d i s s e n t i n g ,  Dixon ,  Rich  and W i l l i a m s  J J  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  na r row  
m a j o r i t y  h o l d i n g  t h e  t a x  i n v a l i d .
Dixon J  b a s e d  h i s  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  m eaning of  e x c i s e  he had
p r o p o se d  i n  M a t t h e w s . (He d i d  however  p r o p o s e  t h a t  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n
be q u a l i f i e d  by w i t h d r a w i n g  t a x e s  on c o n s u m p t i o n . ) ^  Th is  t a x  was
imposed by r e f e r e n c e  t o  a com m erc ia l  d e a l i n g ,  s a l e  of  goods and was
t h e r e f o r e  w i t h i n  h i s  Matthews d e f i n i t i o n .  Th is  t im e  Dixon J  sough t
t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  on g rounds  o t h e r  t h a n  m ere ly  t h e  " a c c e p t e d
u s a g e "  he  had  r e l i e d  on i n  M a t t h e w s . His  Honour assumed t h a t  t h e
pu rp o se  of s90  i n  e x c l u d i n g  t h e  S t a t e s  f rom  bu y in g  d u t i e s  of  customs
and e x c i s e ,  was t o  g i v e  " t h e  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  a r e a l  c o n t r o l
of  t h e  t a x a t i o n  of  c om m od i t i e s  and t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  of
w h a t e v e r  p o l i c y  i t  a d o p t e d  s h o u l d  n o t  be hampered  or  d e f e a t e d  by S t a t e
a c t i o n . "  That  p u r p o s e  would be d e f e a t e d  i f  " e x c i s e "  " d id  n o t  go p a s t
m a n u f a c t u r e "  b e c a u s e  "a t a x  upon a commodity a t  any p o i n t  i n  t h e
c o u r s e  of d i s t r i b u t i o n  b e f o r e  i t  r e a c h e s  t h e  consumer p r o d u c e s  t h e
3
same e f f e c t  a s  a  t a x  upon i t s  m a n u f a c t u r e  on p r o d u c t i o n . "
In  a j o i n t  judgm en t  Rich  and W i l l i a m s  J J  p o i n t e d  ou t  t h e r e  was 
no d i r e c t  d e c i s i o n  c o n f i n i n g  " e x c i s e "  t o  t a x e s  on p r o d u c t i o n  and t a x e s
4
on f i r s t  s a l e  by p r o d u c e r s .  T h e i r  Honours  f i r s t  a d o p te d  t h e  
a p p ro a c h  of  H i g g i n s  J  i n  t h e  COR C a s e ^ which ( e c h o i n g  P e t e r s w a l d  v 
B a r t l e y  *s d e f i n i t i o n )  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  t o  be an e x c i s e  t h e  t a x  had t o  be
1 Below p p 2 3 7 f f .
2 (1949)  80 CLR 729, 261.
3 I d .  260.
4 I d .  251 -252 .
5 (1926)  38 CLR 408 Above p233.
237.
"imposed so as to be a method of taxing the production of goods" but 
allowed that requirement to be satisfied by a tax on any dealing with 
the goods where it was expected and intended that the taxpayer would 
pass the tax on.^ Having at this point accepted a narrow definition
coupled with a wide approach to characterisation, Rich and Williams
2JJ then also adopted the approach of defining excise widely. The
difference between the two routes to the same conclusion was not
immediately apparent on the facts in Parton but it can be significant
3and has been significant in later decisions.
C - The settling of the definition of excise - an excise is a tax on 
any dealing with goods except consumption
In Browns Transport v Kropp,^  Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v 
5 6Victoria and Bolton v Madsen, decided after Parton and before 
Barwick’s arrival on the Court, the wide definition of excise was 
generally accepted and seemed thus to be entrenched. The only issues 
of definition apparently outstanding were
- is excise to be confined to taxes on goods which are home 
produced
- are consumption taxes excises.
In its nature the first issue is not likely to come up squarely for 
decision in the context of s90. Barwick CJ was part of the court in 
Dickenson’s Arcade which was asked to consider the second issue.
1 (1949) 80 CLR 229, 252.
2 Id. 252-253.
3 Below pp241-242.
4 (1958) 100 CLR 117. Below pp267ff.
5 (1960) 104 CLR 529. Below pp245ff.
6 (1963) 110 CLR 264. Below pp264ff.
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Dixon J  o r i g i n a l l y  i n c l u d e d  c o n s um pt ion  t a x e s  i n  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  
of e x c i s e  p r o p o s e d  i n  M a t th e w s .  Then i n  P a r t o n  he p r o p o se d  t h a t  
c onsum pt ion  t a x e s  be w i t h d ra w n  from t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e .  The 
o n ly  e x p l a n a t i o n  g i v e n  by Dixon J  f o r  t a k i n g  consum pt ion  t a x e s  out  
of  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  was t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  1943 P r i v y  C o u n c i l  d e c i s i o n  i n  
A t l a n t i c  Smoke Shops v C o n l o n .^  In  A t l a n t i c  Smoke Shops t h e  P r iv y  
C o u n c i l  had d e c i d e d  t h a t  a c o n s u m p t io n  t a x  c o u ld  no t  be an  i n d i r e c t  
t a x  w i t h i n  t h e  meaning  of t h e  B r i t i s h  N o r th  America A c t .  The 
r e a s o n i n g  was t h a t  a c o n s u m p t io n  t a x  c a n n o t  be p a s s e d  on w i t h  t h e  
goods b e c a u s e ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  a consumer does  no t  p a s s  goods on.
The e x e m p t io n  of  c o n s u m p t io n  t a x e s  was r e i t e r a t e d  o c c a s i o n a l l y
a f t e r  P a r t o n . I t  was ap p ro v e d  by a j o i n t  judgment  of  Dixon CJ,  K i t t o ,
3
T a y l o r ,  M e n z i e s ,  Windeyer  and Owen J J  i n  B o l t o n  v Madsen . I t  was ,  
how ever ,  n o t  u n t i l  D ic k e n so n s  Arcade  P ty  Ltd v Tasmania  i n  1974^ 
t h a t  t h e  Cour t  was a s k e d  t o  d e c i d e  d i r e c t l y  w h e th e r  con s u m p t io n  t a x e s  
a r e  o u t s i d e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e .
By t h e  t im e  of  D ic ke nson  i t  was no l o n g e r  n e c e s s a r y  i f  a t a x  were 
t o  be h e l d  t o  be an ( A u s t r a l i a n )  e x c i s e  t h a t  i t  f i r s t  be h e l d  t o  be 
a ( C a n a d i a n ) ,  i n d i r e c t  t a x . ^  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  f i v e  of  t h e  s i x  members 
of  t h e  C our t  i n c l u d i n g  Barwick  CJ a c c e p t e d  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  of  
c onsum pt ion  t a x e s  f rom  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e .  No member of  t h e  
Cour t  r e l i e d  on t h e  r e a s o n i n g  i n  t h e  A t l a n t i c  Smoke Shops d e c i s i o n .  
S t e p h e n  J  came n e a r e s t  t o  d o i n g  s o ,  bu t  even  he was no t  w i l l i n g  t o  
pu t  i t  any h i g h e r  t h a n  " d i r e c t  t a x e s  a r e  i n h e r e n t l y  l e s s  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  goods t h a n  a r e  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  and a r e  t o  t h a t  e x t e n t  l e s s  
l i k e l y  t o  be found  t o  be d u t i e s  of  e x c i s e . . . " . ^
1 [1943]  AC 550.
2 I d .  563-564 .
3 (1963)  110 CLR 264,  271.
4 (1974)  130 CLR 177.
5 Above p p 2 2 6 f f .
6 (1974)  130 CLR 177, 231.
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The r e a s o n  g i v e n  by M e n z i e s ,  S t e p h e n  and Mason J J  f o r  a c c e p t i n g  
t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  of  c o n s u m p t io n  t a x e s  f rom  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e  was 
no more nor  l e s s  t h a n  a d e s i r e  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  d e g r e e  of  c e r t a i n t y  
which  had been  a c h i e v e d  by t h e  r e p e t i t i o n  of  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  s i n c e  
t h e  d i c t a  i n  P a r t o n . * Gibbs J  went t o  some t r o u b l e  t o  p o i n t  out
t h a t  t h e  e x e m p t io n  was a n o m a lo u s .  In  t h e  end ,  he t o o  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t
2
t h e  anomaly was e n t r e n c h e d .
Barwick  CJ a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  d u b i o u s  r e l e v a n c e  of  a P r i v y  
C o u n c i l  d e c i s i o n  a b o u t  t h e  meaning  of  i n d i r e c t  t o  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  
d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e .  His  Honour a c c e p t e d  t h e  e x e m p t io n ,  however  
" i n  d e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  views  e x p r e s s e d  by o t h e r  J u s t i c e s . . . " . ^
Whe ther  t h e  " o t h e r  J u s t i c e s "  r e f e r r e d  t o ,  a r e  B a r w i c k ' s  p r e d e c e s s o r s  
o r  t h e  o t h e r  j u d g e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  D ickenson  d e c i s i o n  or  b o t h ,  i s  
n o t  c l e a r .
Why d i d  Barwick  CJ a c c e p t  t h i s  anomalous ex e m p t io n  so 
d e f e r e n t i a l l y ?  I t  o n ly  had t h e  s u p p o r t  of  d i c t a . At no s t a g e  had 
d e v e l o p e d  r e a s o n i n g  been  s e t  ou t  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  anomaly .  The 
a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  anomaly  was n o t  i n  harmony w i t h  t h e  t o n e  of  Barwick  
C J ' s  s u r r o u n d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n .  S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  h i s  d e f e r e n t i a l  
a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  anomaly  Barwick  CJ s a i d
" I  c o n t i n u e  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  e v i d e n t  p u r p o s e  of  t h e  g r a n t  of 
e x c l u s i v e  power t o  impose d u t i e s  of  customs and e x c i s e  as  of 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  b o t h  i n  d e c i d i n g  t h e  c o n n o t a t i o n  of  t h e  word ’e x c i s e '  
i n  s90  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and i n  d e c i d i n g  w h e t h e r  i n  i t s  
o p e r a t i o n  a S t a t e  s t a t u t e  does  impose a d u t y  of  e x c i s e .
And s h o r t l y  a f t e r  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  anomaly  i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  
( c o n n o t a t i o n )  Barwick  CJ s a i d
1 I d . 209,  230,  239 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
2 I d .  217 -222 .
3 I d .  186.
4 I d .  185-186.
5 I d .  185.
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Unless ... the substance of the operation of the Statute, rather 
than merely its form, is treated as definitive of the relevant 
nature of the tax it imposes or exacts, a premium will be placed 
upon verbal sleight of hand and, in the end, the Constitution 
mocked.
If Barwick CJ was so anxious to protect the "spirit" of s90, why allow 
the definition of excise to be modified in a manner offensive to that 
"spirit"?
It may be that Barwick CJ had perceived that Menzies, Gibbs and
Stephen and Mason JJ were united and immovable in their acceptance
of the exemption. There was no such united alliance that could be
rallied against the exemption. McTiernan J held that consumption
taxes were not exempt but, somewhat inconsistently, continued to
regard "indirectness" as being of importance. Barwick CJ may have
decided, therefore, to concentrate on arguing with Menzies, Gibbs and
Stephen JJ on their own terms. He accepted their definition of excise
2but challenged them at the level of characterisation.
(iii) Characterisation
Under this heading the concentration will be on the question - 
when will a tax be held to be "on" a relevant dealing with goods. 
Although the issues of definition seemed to be fairly well settled 
before the appointment of Barwick to the Chief Justiceship, the same 
could not be said about issues of characterisation.
The basic issues of characterisation underlying s90 can be listed 
thus:
Is the character of a tax to be determined solely by reference 
to its terms or can its likely practical effect be taken into 
account? Can the legislature's purpose be taken into account 
either to invalidate or to redeem? Does each tax have one 
character and one character only so that a judical choice must
1 Id. 186.
2 Below pp295ff.
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be made as  t o  which  of  t h e  m a t t e r s  t o u c h e d  by a t a x  g i v e s  t h e  t a x  
i t s  c h a r a c t e r ?  Or can t h e  t a x  have  more t h a n  one c h a r a c t e r  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  m a t t e r s  i n  r e f e r e n c e  t o  which  i t  
o p e r a t e s ?  Or can t h e  t a x  have  more t h a n  one c h a r a c t e r  no t  on ly  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  m a t t e r s  i n  r e f e r e n c e  t o  which  i t  o p e r a t e s  
bu t  a l s o  i n  i t s  d i f f e r e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  f a c t s ?
Even i f  t h e  t a x  can  have  more t h a n  one c h a r a c t e r ,  i s  i t  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  s t i l l  open t o  q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  a t a x  a l t h o u g h  
o t h e r w i s e  an e x c i s e ,  i s  n o t  i n  s u b s t a n c e  an e x c i s e ?
Which a t t r i b u t e s  of  a t a x  a r e  c o n c l u s i v e  of  v a l i d i t y / i n v a l i d i t y  
which m e r e ly  r e l e v a n t  and which  t o t a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t ?
These a r e  t y p i c a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  t h e  i s s u e s  
have no t  a lw ays  been  f u l l y  i d e n t i f i e d ,  a rg u e d  o r  a n a l y s e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  s 9 0 .
I t  i s  n o t  a lw a y s  p o s s i b l e  t o  c l a s s i f y  p a r t i c u l a r  j u d g m e n ts  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  j u d g e s  l e t  a l o n e  d e c i s i o n s  of  t h e  Cour t  as  a w h o le ,  as  
b e i n g  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  an  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  one p r i n c i p l e  r a t h e r  t h a n  
a n o t h e r .  Opaque s t a t e m e n t s  such  as  -  t h i s  i s / i s  no t  i n  s u b s t a n c e  an 
e x c i s e  -  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  e n c o u n t e r e d .  F u r t h e r m o r e  p a r t i c u l a r  outcomes  
can be v a r i o u s l y  e x p l a i n e d  as  b e i n g  t h e  r e s u l t  of  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  or  
d e f i n i t i o n  A w i t h  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  Z or  of d e f i n i t i o n  B and 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  Y . *
B e f o re  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t u r n s  t o  t h e  way i n  which  t h e  i s s u e s  have
been d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  c a s e s ,  t h e  f ramework u sed  by Menzies  J  must
be o u t l i n e d  b e c a u s e  Menz ies  J ’s a p p ro a c h  was c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  outcome
of i m p o r t a n t  c a s e s  and b e c a u s e  Barwick  CJ e n d o r s e d  i t  i n  one of  h i s
2
l a s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of  s 9 0 .
Menzies  J  was n o t  c o n v in c e d  of  t h e  s o u n d n e ss  of  t h e  P a r t o n  
3
e x t e n s i o n  of  e x c i s e .  He d e s c r i b e d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  as  b e in g  m ere ly  
a " g l o s s "  on t h e  main p r o p o s i t i o n  of P e t e r s w a l d  v B a r t l e y  t h a t  an
1 Eg_ t h e  COR Case above  pp2 3 2 -2 3 3 .
2 Below pp293.
3 (1949)  80 CLR 229 above  p p 2 3 5 f f .
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excise is a tax on production.-^ For Menzies J Parton was a "high
water mark". Menzies J chose to ignore the wide definition route
to the majority conclusion in Parton - even though it had been the
sole basis of decision of Dixon J and a basis for decision of Rich
and Williams JJ. Menzies J concentrated on the second line of
reasoning used by Rich and Williams JJ which accepted the Peterswald
definition - tax on production - but characterised a tax imposed by
reference to an activity after production as being on production.
All that Menzies J was willing to accept Parton as establishing was
that taxes imposed by reference to activities after production could
3be but need not be characterised as taxes on production.
It is to be remembered when reading the discussions of Menzies 
J that he was asking whether a tax which does not operate by reference 
to production can be classified a tax on_ production. The terms of 
the legislation were just another circumstance to be taken into 
account in that question of degree. This (non) principle is 
inherently vague and unpredictable.
(a) A flat tax is not an excise - the requirement of a quantitative 
link
Although most of the statements in Peterswald v Bartley^ about 
the reach of the word "excise" have been abandoned as being too 
narrow, the actual decision has been upheld and followed. The tax 
challenged in Peterswald v Bartley was the annual fee on a licence
1 Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria (1960) 104 CLR 529, 590.
2 Western Australia v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [No 1] (1969) 120 CLR 
42, 66.
3 Dennis Hotel Pty Ltd v Victoria 104 CLR 529, 590-591. Hamersley 
[No 1] (1969) 120 CLR 42, 65. Consistently with his idea that 
excise was dominated by the effect of taxes on production, Menzies 
J argued that that limitation was necessary to keep customs and 
excise, as mutually exclusive categories as it is to be inferred 
from s55 that they must be mutually exclusive.
4 (1904) 1 CLR 497.
243.
t o  make b e e r  f o r  s a l e .  The f e e  was t h e  same no m a t t e r  what  t h e  l e v e l  
of  p r o d u c t i o n  m igh t  t u r n  ou t  t o  b e .  Even th o u g h  p r o d u c t i o n  of  goods 
was an e le m en t  i n  t h e  l i a b i l i t y  t o  pay t a x ,  t h e  Cour t  h e l d  t h a t  t h i s  
t a x  was no t  "on" g o o d s .
I t  ha s  a l r e a d y  been  n o t e d  t h a t  t h i s  Cour t  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  e x c i s e  
t a x e s  a r e  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  and a c c e p t e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  d o c t r i n e  a bou t  
t h e  meaning of  " i n d i r e c t "  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  Nor th  America A c t .  ^ I t  
was t h e  Canad ian  d o c t r i n e  a b o u t  t h e  meaning  of " i n d i r e c t " ,  wh ich 
p r o v i d e d  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  a f l a t  
l i c e n c e  f e e  f o r  p r o d u c e r s  i s  n o t  an e x c i s e .
The C a n a d ian  c a t e g o r i e s  of  d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  a r e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e .
To d e c i d e ,  as  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  had i n  Bank of  T o ro n to  v Lambe t h a t
a f l a t  l i c e n c e  f e e  i s  p r im a  f a c i e  n o t  i n t e n d e d  t o  be p a s s e d  on and
i s  t h e r e f o r e  d i r e c t ,  i m p l i e s  as  an i n e v i t a b l e  c o r o l l a r y  t h a t  such  a
t a x  i s  no t  i n d i r e c t .  When t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Cour t  s a i d  t h i s  f l a t  f e e
was "on" p r o d u c e r s  ( p e r s o n s )  and no t  "on" p r o d u c t i o n  ( g o o d s ) ,  i t  meant
3
t h e  f e e  was d i r e c t  and t h e r e f o r e  no t  i n d i r e c t .
Out of  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  -  a f l a t  f e e  i s  no t  an e x c i s e  -  (a m a t t e r  
of  d e f i n i t i o n ) ,  h a s  emerged as  a c o r o l l a r y  a p r o p o s i t i o n  wh ich  t e n d s  
t o  be more a m a t t e r  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  -  a t a x  i s  no t  an e x c i s e  
u n l e s s  i t  i s  m ea su red  by q u a n t i t y  o r  v a l u e  of  g o o d s . ^  A l th o u g h  t h e  
p r o p o s i t i o n  -  a f l a t  t a x  on d e a l i n g s  w i t h  goods i s  no t  a t a x  "on" 
goods -  and i t s  c o r o l l a r y  a r e  so c l e a r l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  f i r s t  
High C o u r t ’s i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of  " i n d i r e c t n e s s "  i n t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  
" e x c i s e "  and d e s p i t e  t h e  l a t e r  dow ngrad ing  of  " i n d i r e c t n e s s " ,  t h e  High
1 Above p226 .
2 (1887)  12 App Cas 575.
3 (1904)  1 CLR 497 ,  511 -512 .
4 Dennis  H o t e l s  Case (19 6 0 )  104 CLR 529, 556 p e r  F u l l a g a r  J .
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Cour t  h a s  r e a f f i r m e d  t h e  p r o p o s t i o n  w i t h  l i t t l e  d i s c u s s i o n .  In 
Anderson  Pty Ltd v V i c t o r i a  Barwick  CJ and o t h e r  members of  t h e  Cour t  
s im p ly  i g n o r e d  a s u b m i s s i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  does  no t  have t o  be a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i n k  be tw een  t h e  amount of  a t a x  and a d e a l i n g  w i t h  
goods .  In  Denn is  H o t e l s , D i c k e n s o n ’s A r c a d e -3 and HC S l e i g h 1 234 56
f l a t  t a x e s  were u p h e l d  on t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of  P e t e r s w a l d  v B a r t l e y . 
Barwick CJ was p a r t y  t o  t h e  D ickenson  and S l e i g h  d e c i s i o n s .
Only two j u d g e s  have  i n d i c a t e d  any d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
i n  P e t e r s w a l d  v B a r t l e y . One was F u l l a g a r  J  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s , who 
t h o u g h t  t h a t  any t a x  i n c l u d i n g  a f l a t  t a x  would be an e x c i s e  i f  
" p a y a b l e  by r e a s o n  o f ,  and by r e f e r e n c e  t o ,  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  or  
m a n u f a c t u r e  of  g o o d s . N o  member of  t h e  Cour t  h a s  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  
i s s u e  i n  t e rm s  of  t h e  e f f e c t  of  a f l a t  t a x  on r e l a t i v e  c o m p e t i t i v e  
p o s i t i o n . ^
1 (1964)  111 CLR 353, 359 p e r  Bowen QC.
2 (1960)  104 CLR 529.
3 (1974)  130 CLR 177.
4 (1977)  136 CLR 475.
5 (1960)  104 CLR 529,  556.  A s i m i l a r  a p p r o a c h  seemed t o  be i m p l i c i t
i n  t h e  ju dgmen t  of  S t a r k e  J  i n  Matthews  v C h ic o ry  M a r k e t in g  Board 
d i s c u s s e d  u n d e r  a l a t e r  h e a d i n g .  Below p p 261 -262 .
6 I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  a f l a t  t a x  and an 
ad v a lo r e m  o r  p e r  u n i t  t a x . A f l a t  t a x  would e n t e r  t h e  c o s t s  of  
p r o d u c t i o n  l i k e  a c a p i t a l  c o s t .  The h i g h e r  t h e  l e v e l  of  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e  low er  t h e  p e r  u n i t  i n c r e a s e  i n  c o s t  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
t o  t h e  t a x .  With  a p e r  u n i t  t a x ,  ex  h y p o t h e s i , t h e  p e r  u n i t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  c o s t  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  t a x  i s  t h e  same a t  a l l  l e v e l s  
of  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  f l a t  t a x e s  and p e r  u n i t  
t a x e s  does  no t  o f f e r  any r a t i o n a l e  based  on t h e o r i e s  a bou t  
r e l a t i v e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  ex e m p t io n  of  f l a t  
t a x e s .  A f l a t  t a x  can s t i l l  have  a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on r e l a t i v e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n .
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(b) A time-lagged tax is not an excise
This section examines the body of law which has grown up 
concerning taxes which are imposed in the form of fees for licences 
to deal with goods and which are quantified by reference to the level 
of a dealing with goods in an earlier period. I examine this topic 
at this point because, even though the law relating to time-lagged 
taxes has hardened into its own specialised rules, it was in the 
context of the consideration of a time-lagged tax that significant 
approaches to the general problem of characterising taxes for the 
purposes of s90 were developed.
Dixon J in Parton v Milk Board (Vic) was the first to suggest that 
a time-lag in the quantification of a tax might be of significance.^- 
The idea was tested in Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria.
Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria 1960
2In issue in Dennis Hotels were fees payable for licences for 
the sale and disposition of liquor under the Victorian Licensing Act
31928. There were two main taxing provisions. One related to 
annual licences and one to temporary licences. The plaintiff held 
an annual victualler ’s licence and had from time to time held 
temporary victualler's licences. These licences authorised the retail 
sale and disposal of liquor.^
The fee payable under an annual victualler’s licence was at the 
rate of "six per centum of the gross amount (including all duties 
thereon) paid or payable for all liquor which during the twelve months
1 (1949) 80 CLR 229, 263.
2 There is a useful note of this case by JG Wilkin at (1960) 2 MULR 
543.
3 (1960) 104 CLR 529. The relevant provisions of the 1928 Act were 
substantially similar to provisions in the 1958 Licensing Act 
which had repealed the 1928 Act after the case had commenced. Id. 
560.
4 Sections 8, 9.
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ended on t h e  l a s t  day of  June  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  d a t e  of t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  g r a n t  or  r e n e w a l  of  t h e  l i c e n c e  was p u r c h a s e d  f o r  t h e  
p r e m i s e s . . . " . ^  The f e e  p a y a b l e  on a t e m p o r a r y  l i c e n c e  was one pound 
f o r  e a ch  day of  t h e  l i c e n c e  p l u s  s i x  p e r  cen tum of  t h e  g r o s s  amount 
p a id  or  p a y a b l e  f o r  a l l  l i q u o r  p u r c h a s e d  f o r  s a l e  or  d i s p o s a l  unde r  
such  l i c e n c e . ^
Dixon CJ,  M cTie rnan  and Windeyer  J J  f a v o u r e d  h o l d i n g  b o t h  t h e  
a n n u a l  and t h e  t e m p o r a r y  f e e  i n v a l i d .  F u l l a g a r ,  K i t t o  and T a y l o r  J J  
h e l d  b o t h  v a l i d .  The v o t e s  of  Menzies  J  d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  m a t t e r .  He 
d e c i d e d  t o  h o l d  t h e  a n n u a l  f e e  v a l i d  and t h e  t e m p o r a r y  f e e  i n v a l i d .  
There  were  many l e v e l s  of  d i s a g r e e m e n t  and many d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h e s  
t a k e n .
The a p p r o a c h  of  F u l l a g a r  J  was q u i t e  s i m p l e .  F u l l a g a r  J  was i n
f a v o u r  of  a d o p t i n g  a d e f i n i t i o n  of " e x c i s e ” s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  p ro p o se d
by t h e  C our t  i n  P e t e r s w a l d  v B a r t l e y . F u l l a g a r  J  would have  r e j e c t e d
t h e  3 /2  d e c i s i o n  i n  P a r t o n  and c o n f i n e d  e x c i s e  t o  t a x e s  "on"
3
p r o d u c t i o n .  As n e i t h e r  t h e  a n n u a l  no r  t h e  t e m p o r a r y  f e e  was 
imposed "on" p r o d u c t i o n  t h e r e  was no e x c i s e  and t h e r e f o r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  F u l l a g a r  J  no b r e a c h  of  s 9 0 . ^
The o t h e r  ju d g m e n ts  a c c e p t e d  t h e  P a r t o n  e x t e n s i o n  of  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e ,  and t u r n e d  t o  t h e  i s s u e  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n .  
There  were two main a t t a c k s  on t h e  a n n u a l  l i c e n c e  f e e .  The f i r s t  was 
t h e  argument  t h a t  t h e  f e e  was a t a x  on s a l e s  made d u r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n c y  
of  t h e  l i c e n c e . K i t t o  and T a y l o r  J J  r e j e c t e d  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n .  T h e i r  
Honnours d i d  no t  r e f e r  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  P e t e r s w a l d  v B a r t l e y  but
1 S e c t i o n  1 9 ( l ) ( a ) .
2 S e c t i o n  1 9 ( l ) ( b ) .
3 I d .  555,  558.
4 I d . 558. A l t h o u g h ,  a g r e e i n g  w i t h  t h e  Cour t  i n  P e t e r s w a l d  v 
B a r t l e y  on t h i s  p o i n t  F u l l a g a r  J  i n d i c a t e d  h i s  d o u b t s  a b o u t  t h e  
a c t u a l  d e c i s i o n  i n  P e t e r s w a l d  u p h o l d i n g  a f l a t  t a x  on p r o d u c t i o n .  
I d .  556 above p244 .
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their reasoning is very reminiscent of the reasoning in that case.'*'
Their Honours emphasised that there was no quantitative relation
between the amount of the fee payable at the commencement of the
licence period and the levels of sales during the period. The licence
holder would not be able to apportion the fee in equal amounts to each
sale made during the period as he would not know until the end of the
period how many sales he had made. The fee was direct and therefore a
2tax "on" the occupation not "on" the activities carried on.
The more difficult question was whether the annual fee payable 
on renewal or grant was a tax "on" the sales of the goods purchased 
for sale at the premises in the prescribed period preceding the 
application for renewal or grant. The tax was quantified by reference 
to those purchases and so was not covered by the flat tax aspect of 
Peterswald v Bartley. Kitto and Taylor JJ both emphasised the history 
of liquor licensing to reinforce their conclusion that this tax was 
"on" the licence holder and not "on" the goods. In this context 
the fee was a reasonable measure of the value of monopoly rights.
Their Honours did not suggest that there was a sufficient quid pro 
quo in the grant of a licence to deprive the fee of its character as a 
"duty".^ Their point was that the licensing system with its fees 
was "a traditionally accepted method of regulating a trade which the 
public interest demands shall be subject to strict supervision". The 
fee was an adjunct to substantive regulatory provisions rather than 
the licensing framwork being a mere adjunct to a revenue statute.^
1 Above pp242-243.
2 Id. 563 per Kitto J; 575-576 per Taylor J.
3 Id. 567-568 per Kitto J; 576-578 per Taylor J.
4 Id. 563 expressly rejected by Kitto J. The point was conceded
by the State Id. 592.
5 Id. 576 per Taylor J.
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To r e i n f o r c e  t h a t  c o n c l u s i o n  t h e i r  Honours  p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  t h e
f e e  p a y a b l e  on r e n e w a l  of  t h e  l i c e n c e  f o r  t h e  p r e m i s e s  was p a y a b l e
no m a t t e r  who had p u r c h a s e d  t h e  l i q u o r  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  year . '* ’
Th i s  f a c t o r  was f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  l i c e n c e  was c o n c e r n e d  w i t h
t h e  p e r s o n  and p r e m i s e s  l i c e n s e d  and t h a t  t h e  f e e  was c o n c e r n e d  w i t h
t h e  v a l u e  of  t h e  l i c e n c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h  t h e  g o o d s .  K i t t o  J  a l s o
drew a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  o t h e r  f e e s  l e v i e d  by t h e  Act  which  he c l a s s i f i e d
2
as  t a x e s  "on '  o c c u p a t i o n s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t a x e s  "on" g o o d s .
S i n c e  t h e  Dennis  H o t e l s  d e c i s i o n  much h a s  been made of  a p a s s a g e  
i n  t h e  ju dgmen t  of  K i t t o  J .  K i t t o  J  s e t  ou t  t h i s  p r o p o s t i o n  t o  sum 
up h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  e a r l i e r  c a s e s .
"What i s  i n s i s t e d  upon may, I  t h i n k ,  be e x p r e s s e d  by s a y i n g  t h a t  a 
t a x  i s  n o t  a d u t y  of  e x c i s e  u n l e s s  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of  l i a b i l i t y  i s  
t h e  t a k i n g  of  a s t e p  i n  a p r o c e s s  of  b r i n g i n g  goods i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  
or  t o  a consumable  s t a t e ,  o r  p a s s i n g  them down t h e  l i n e  which  
r e a c h e s  f rom  t h e  e a r l i e s t  s t a g e  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  of  
r e c e i p t  by t h e  consum er .
K i t t o  J  went  on t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  i n s u p e r a b l e  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h e  
c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h e  a n n u a l  l i c e n c e  f e e  was " t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n  making each  
i n d i v i d u a l  p u r c h a s e  does  n o t  by d o i n g  so become l i a b l e  f o r  t h e  f e e  
or  any p a r t  of  i t " . ^  T a y l o r  J  a l s o  pu t  em phas i s  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
p u r c h a s e  of  s t o c k  d i d  n o t  c r e a t e  t h e  " r e l e v a n t  l i a b i l i t y ,  f o r  t h e  f e e  
i s  n o t  p a y a b l e  u n l e s s  and u n t i l  an  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e n e w a l  of  t h e  
l i c e n c e  i s  m a d e " .^
1 I d . 564 p e r  K i t t o  J ;  576 p e r  T a y l o r  J .
2 I d .  562-563 .
3 (1960)  104 CLR 529,  559.
4 I d .  565.
5 I d .  576.
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Did their Honours mean that a tax could only be an excise if the 
last thing required to give liability was the undertaking of one of 
the relevant dealings with goods?''' That interpretation would cover 
the conclusion of Kitto and Taylor JJ that the annual licence fee was 
not an excise. It would not, however, cover their conclusion that 
the temporary licence fee was not an excise either.
The temporary licence fee had two components. The first was a 
fixed amount. That was covered by the decision in Peterswald v 
Bartley. The second component was quantified by reference to the 
value of liquor purchased for sale under the licence. Taylor J merely 
commented that this fee was covered by the same considerations as 
determined the validity of the annual fee. Kitto J noted that the 
fee was measured by reference to purchases some or all of which may 
already have been made when the licence was granted. This aspect 
led him to conclude that MWhat attracts the liability is the 
acceptance of the licence. The tax is not on the liquor; it is on 
the licence - on the obtaining of authority to sell and dispose of 
liquor generally at the relevant function."^
Their Honours Kitto and Taylor JJ were, with respect, failing to 
state the steps in their conclusion. True enough,in so far as the 
temporary fee was quantified by reference to the value of liquor 
purchased before the licence was taken out, there was no liability
1 On this view a law might tax breathing. It could then quantify 
the tax by reference to the amount of goods produced by the 
breather the previous day. So long as a person who has produced 
goods did not breathe there would be no tax liability. Some might 
think this example is far-fetched. If people do not breathe they 
die - there is a practical compulsion to do the act which incurs 
the tax liability. (Compare Attorney-General (New South Wales)
v Homebush Flour Mill Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 390 above p220.) Yet 
similarly in Dennis Hotels if victuallers did not seek to renew 
their licences their businesses would die. There is a similar 
practical compulsion.
2 Id. 578.
3 Id. 569.
4 Id. 569.
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to pay until and unless the licence was taken out. In so far as the 
taxing provision applied to purchases made during the currency of the 
licence, however, the actual purchase created a liability to pay 
tax.^ Yet Kitto and Taylor JJ felt able to ignore this later 
operation of the tax.
To decide as Kitto and Taylor JJ did, that the fee was "on” the
licences, and not "on" the purchases on liquor tends to assume away
a significant and crucial issue - whether a tax can have more than
one character. Their Honours seem to assume that a tax can only have
one character, one substance. The reference of Kitto J to "the
criterion of liability" and the reference of Taylor J to the "relevant
criterion" were subordinate to their discussion of the substance of
these fees, as revealed by historical precedents for regulating trade
in liquor, and to their perception of the general purpose of the Act.
It will be necessary in a later section to consider this approach to
2characterisation more fully.
Menzies J regarded the extension made by the Parton decision as
a matter of characterisation rather than definition. Menzies J
considered that an excise is a tax "paid on the production or
3manufacture of goods...". His Honour reviewed the cases and 
concluded that the position had been reached that "a tax upon the sale 
or purchase of goods manufactured in Australia at any point before 
sale for consumption is to be regarded as a tax on production or 
manufacture;"^ Menzies J felt bound to accept that position 
"notwithstanding the reservations I would otherwise have about the 
glosses upon the main proposition".^
1 Compare id. 591 per Menzies J.
2 Below pp261ff.
3 Id. 582. Discussed above pp241-242.
4 Id. 590.
5 Id. 590.
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Menzies J concluded that the annual fee was not a sales or 
purchase tax because "a dealing with the goods does not expose the 
licensed victualler to liability for tax; the tax is upon the person 
seeking a licence to sell liquor upon particular premises in the 
future...”.'*' The tax was, according to Menzies J, the price for 
the franchise to carry on a business. On the other hand some of the 
fee payable under the temporary licence was attracted at the rate of 
six percent of purchase price of goods in fact purchased during the 
period of the licence. Menzies J felt bound by Parton to hold that 
fee to be to that extent an invalid excise. The invalid operation 
was inseverable and therefore the whole fee was invalid.
This then was the basis for the majority in Dennis Hotels
upholding the annual licence fee. The fact of a time-lag was of no
significance to Fullagar J and only of marginal relevance to Kitto and
Taylor JJ. The fact of a time-lag in the annual tax did tip the
scales to validity for Menzies J but the same judge was, in a later 
3case, to invalidate a tax with a time-lag. It is clear when one 
reads all the judgments of Menzies J in this area that as far as he 
was concerned a time-lag was not conclusive but was just another 
factor to be taken into account when answering the question of degree 
- whether the tax was directly affecting production or was too remote 
therefrom.
Dixon CJ and Windeyer J in the minority in relation to the annual 
income fee and the majority in relation to the temporary licence fee 
were not impressed with the point that there was no tax liability on 
an annual licence until and unless a licence was renewed. As far as 
they were concerned a tax could have more than one character and the 
conclusion that the tax was "on” an occupation did not preclude a
1 Id. 591.
2 Id. 591.
3 Below pp253ff.
252.
conclusion that the tax was also "on" goods.^ They both spoke in
terms of each tax's likely practical effect and of each tax's general 
2character.
McTiernan J in dissent in Parton felt constrained to accept that
decision as establishing that taxes on goods after production could be
excises. For his Honour "indirectness" was an essential attribute.
The percentage fees came within the concept of "excise" accepted by
McTiernan J. These fees were "payable on or in respect of goods" and
were reasonably "expected to be passed on and finally borne by the
consumer or user of the goods as part of the price which he pays for 3them".
Dickenson's Arcade Pty Ltd v Tasmania 1974
Dickenson's Arcade involved inter alia, a fee attached to a 
licence to retail tobacco.^ The fee was quantified by reference to 
the average value of tobacco handled per month for a six month period 
preceding the licence period. This method of quantification was 
similar to (although not identical to) that used for the permanent 
licence fee upheld 4/3 in Dennis Hotels.
Menzies J whose vote had settled the matter in Dennis Hotels saw 
no reason to reconsider his decision, and warned against accepting 
some of the wider statements about the reach of s90.^ Stephen J 
adopted Menzies J's discussion.^ Gibbs J adopted the reasoning of
1 Id. 541 per Dixon CJ; 602 per Windeyer J.
2 Id. 541-543, 547 per Dixon CJ; 595-597 per Windeyer J.
3 Id. 549.
4 (1974) 130 CLR 177. Other aspects of the case are considered 
above pp237ff and below pp295ff.
5 Id. 212-213.
6 Id. 236.
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K i t t o  and T a y l o r  J J  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e r n  of  
t h e  t a x  was t h e  b u s i n e s s  g e n e r a l l y  and no t  p a r t i c u l a r  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  
g o o d s . ^
The o t h e r  members of  t h e  C our t  e x p r e s s e d  no e n t h u s i a s m  f o r  t h e
r e a s o n i n g  of t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s . McTiernan  J  i n  d i s s e n t
o
i n  Dennis  H o t e l s , d i d  n o t  f e e l  c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  change  h i s  p o s i t i o n .
Mason J  a l t h o u g h  u n a b l e  t o  s e e  any r e a s o n  i n  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  g i v i n g
s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e  p r e s e n c e  of  a t i m e - l a g  i n  a t a x  f e l t  o b l i g e d  t o
f o l l o w  Denni s  H o t e l s  bu t  i n d i c a t e d  h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  c o n f i n e  t h e
d e c i s i o n  -  " i t  h a s  no n e c e s s a r y  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  f e e s  p r e s c r i b e d  f o r
3
a l i c e n c e  t o  m a n u f a c t u r e  o r  p r o c e s s  goods . . . " .
Barwick  CJ s t a t e d  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  o f  t h e  
s t a t u t o r y  m i n o r i t y  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s . ^  He went  on ,  how ever ,  t o  say  
t h a t  e ven  t h o u g h  he d i d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  h i m s e l f  "bound by any o f  t h e  
s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s "  g i v e n  by t h e  m a j o r i t y  j u d g e s  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s , he 
d i d  c o n s i d e r  h i m s e l f  bound by Dennis  H o t e l s  i n  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
s t a t u t o r y  and f a c t u a l  s i t u a t i o n s . ^  He c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  D ic ke nson  was so s i m i l a r  t o ,  a s  t o  be c o v e re d  by ,  t h e  Dennis  H o t e l s  
d e c i s i o n . ^
MG K a i l i s  P ty  Ltd v W e s te rn  A u s t r a l i a  1974
On t h e  same day '7 as  t h e  C our t  d e l i v e r e d  judgment  i n  D ickenson  
i t  handed  down MG K a i l i s  (1962)  P ty  Ltd v W e s te rn  A u s t r a l i a . ® The
1 I d . 225 -226 .
2 I d .  206.
3 I d .  240.
4 I d .  188.
5
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6 I d .  189.
7 A p r i l  1, 1974
8 (1974)  130 CLR 245.
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bench of five in this case was McTiernan, Menzies, Gibbs, Stephen and 
Mason JJ. (Barwick CJ did not sit but later had occasion to comment 
on the case).*
The case involved a tax in the form of a fee for a licence. The 
awkward drafting of the legislation involved, the Fisheries Act 1905— 
1971 (WA), confused the issue. Section 35G(1) provided simply that 
the fees payable for a processor’s licence "shall be assessed at a 
percentage of -
(a) the value of fish caught; and
(b) the moneys paid or payable for fish purchased",
by the processor for processing. If that provision had stood alone
2there would have been little doubt it constituted an excise.
Section 35G(2), however, seemed to "clarify" and limit the general 
formula in s35G(l) by making a detailed provision requiring any person 
taking out a processor's licence to pay a fee quantified by reference 
to the amount of fish caught and bought for processing in an earlier 
period. Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ stated clearly that s35G(2) must 
be understood as converting the tax imposed by s35G(l) into a time-
O  /lagged tax'1 23 and McTiernan J proceeded on the same assumption.4
There has been some confusion as to the interpretation which Menzies J
put on the legislation.'3
1 Below pp257-258.
2 Id. 253 per Menzies J; 259 per Gibbs J; 261 per Stephen J.
3 Id. 259, 261 and 264.
4 Id. 250.
5 Below pp257ff.
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M cTie rnan ,  Menzies  and Mason J J  h e l d  t h e  t a x  o f f e n d e d  s 9 0 .  Gibbs 
and S t e p h e n  J J  would have  u p h e l d  i t .
Gibbs and S t e p h e n  J J  ( i n  d i s s e n t )  c o u ld  s e e  n o t h i n g  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
t h i s  a n n u a l  t i m e - l a g g e d  l i c e n c e  f e e  f rom  t h e  pe rm anen t  l i c e n c e  f e e  
u p h e ld  4 t o  3 i n  Dennis  H o t e l s . ^  Gibbs J  o f f e r e d  no o t h e r  r e a s o n  
f o r  u p h o l d i n g  t h e  t a x .  S t e p h e n  J  seemed t o  t h i n k  t h a t  Dennis  was 
c o r r e c t l y  d e c i d e d .  There  was one main f e a t u r e  which S t e p h e n  J  
c o n s i d e r e d  j u s t i f i e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n  i n  Dennis  and a p p l i e d  
e q u a l l y  t o  t h e  c a s e  b e f o r e  h im.  A t i m e - l a g g e d  t a x  ca n n o t  be " p a s s e d
p
o n " .  That  l a c k  of  i n d i r e c t n e s s  seemed f o r  h i s  Honour t o  be
3
c o n c l u s i v e  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  was n o t  "on" any p a r t i c u l a r  g o o d s .  (To 
g iv e  such  w e i g h t  t o  t h e  l a c k  of  i n d i r e c t n e s s  w as ,  t o  say  t h e  l e a s t ,  
a n a c h r o n i s t i c .
McTiernan  J  who had been  i n  t h e  m i n o r i t y  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
s i m i l a r  t a x  i n  Denn is  H o t e l s  i g n o r e d  t h a t  d e c i s i o n .  Q u o t ing^  from 
Dixon J  i n  Matthews s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  Cour t  s h o u l d  l o o k  t o  t h e  
" s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f e c t "  of  a l e v y  and f rom  I s a a c s  J  i n  COR s a y i n g  t h a t  
s 90  c o u ld  be i n d i r e c t l y  t r a n s g r e s s e d ,  h i s  Honour h e l d  t h i s  t a x  
o f f e n d e d  s 9 0 .
Mason J  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  Dennis  H o t e l s  on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h i s  f e e  was 
a t t a c h e d  t o  a l i c e n c e  t o  " m a n u f a c t u r e  o r  p ro d u ce  g o o d s ’’ . ^  His 
Honour c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  i f  f e e s  such  as  t h i s  were u p h e l d ,  s 90  would be 
r ed u c e d  t o  "a f o r m a l  o p e r a t i o n ,  h a v i n g  l i t t l e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
i m p o r t a n c e .
1 I d .  259, 263.
2 I d .  262.
3 I d .  262.
4 Above p p 2 2 6 f f .
5 I d .  251.
6 I d .  265.
7 I d .  265.
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Menzies J had been in the majorities in Dennis Hotels and 
Dickenson upholding very similar time-lagged taxes. As far as Menzies 
J was concerned Dennis Hotels (and Dickenson) were distinguishable and 
this tax was invalid. The "real" basis for the decision of Menzies J 
is considered in the next case discussed.
HC Sleigh Ltd v South Australia 1977
Three years after Kailis when death had taken Menzies J from the 
bench, the Court had to consider another time-lagged tax in HC Sleigh 
Ltd v South Australia.^  This time the tax was in the form of a fee 
for a licence to carry on the business of selling petroleum products. 
The fee was calculated by reference to the amount of petroleum 
products sold by the licensee in a preceding twelve month period.
The Court upheld the tax. The only dissent came from Jacobs J
who could find no reasoning in Dennis Hotels and Dickenson to support
what he saw developing as the "virtual supersession of s90" by
"setting up a licensing system in respect of dealing in any commodity 
2at all...". His Honour would have distinguished and confined 
Dennis Hotels and Dickenson "upon the ground that in both of them 
there was present in the impugned legislation a concatenation of 
factors - the nature of the product - and the licensing of premises 
for the sale of the product -" which enabled the decision that the tax
owas no more than a licence fee. (This downgrading of the 
significance of a time-lag did, with respect, seem to accord with the 
actual reasoning of Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ in Dennis Hotels).
1 (1977) 136 CLR 475.
2 Id. 526.
3 Id. 536.
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Murphy J in the majority pursued his own unique theory of s90.^
The other members of the majority, Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen and
Mason JJ considered Dennis Hotels and Dickenson to be
2indistinguishable from the case before them. Barwick CJ 
acknowledged that "the result, as I think, tends to put a premium on 
drafting ingenuity and is a disregard of substance." Barwick CJ 
expressed general agreement with the judgment of Mason J. Mason J had 
proposed in Dickenson and applied in Kailis, an approach of striking 
down time-lagged taxes closely connected with production. In those 
cases his Honour had been anxious to preserve s90 as a section of 
substance. Now His Honour distinguished them on the basis that this 
tax was on selling not on production. With respect, this "distinction" 
is a distinction of form ignoring the substance that the sellers being 
taxed were also the producers.^
Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ (with Barwick CJ indicating general 
agreement with Mason J) all commented on the judgment of Menzies J 
in Kailis. Stephen J simply said the judgment of Menzies J turned 
upon the particular meaning which he assigned to the curious terms 
in which the legislation there in question was cast.^ Stephen J was 
presumably interpreting the judgment of Menzies J in the same way as 
Gibbs and Mason JJ who stated expressly their understanding of Menzies 
J’s basis for decision thus:
"... Menzies J, considered that the effect of the legislation, 
on its proper construction, was that the fee was to be assessed 
by reference to the fish acquired for processing during the period 
of the licence." (per Gibbs J).
1 Below p291.
2 (1977) 136 CLR 475, 488, 491-492, 496-497, 501.
3 Id. 488.
4 Cf. COR Case. Above p232.
5 (1977) 136 CLR 475, 496-497.
6 Id. 493. Emphasis added.
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" . . .  Menzies  J  . . .  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  l i c e n c e  f e e  was c a l c u l a t e d  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  q u a n t i t y  of m a t e r i a l s  p r o c e s s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
p e r i o d  f o r  wh ich  t h e  l i c e n c e  was h e l d . "  (p e r  Mason J ,  w i t h  
Barwick  CJ i n  a g r e e m e n t ) .
I f  i t  had n o t  been  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  such  em inen t  j u d g e s  had g i v e n  
t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  t h e  j udgm en t  of  Menzies  J ,  I  would have  th o u g h t  
i t  u n t e n a b l e .
There a r e  some a s p e c t s  of  t h e  judgment  of  M enz ies  J  wh ich  i f  t a k e n
i n  i s o l a t i o n  might  be t h o u g h t  t o  j u s t i f y  t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  For
exam ple ,  M enz ies  J  c o n c lu d e d  " I  r e g a r d  t h e  t a x  imposed by s35G as  one
2
upon t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  of  f i s h  c a u g h t  o r  p u r c h a s e d  f o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e . "
I t  i s  t o  be n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  h i s  Honour d i d  n o t  say  t h a t  he 
r e g a r d e d  t h e  t a x  as  b e i n g  imposed upon t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  of  f i s h  d u r i n g  
t h e  c u r r e n c y  o f  t h e  l i c e n c e . His  Honour a l s o  s e t  ou t  and r e j e c t e d  
a s u b m i s s i o n  t h a t  s35G(2)  q u a l i f i e d  s 3 5 G ( l )  and t h u s  b r o u g h t  t h e  t a x  
w i t h i n  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of  Dennis  H o t e l s . From what f o l l o w e d ,  h o w e ve r ,  
i t  becomes p l a i n  t h a t  M enzies  J  was m e r e ly  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  c a s e  was c o v e r e d  by Dennis  H o t e l s  and was no t  r e j e c t i n g  t h e
*3
p r e l i m i n a r y  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  s35G(2)  q u a l i f i e d  s 3 5 G ( l ) .
Menzies  J  e x p r e s s l y  n o t e d  and s e t  ou t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  s35G(2)  
r e q u i r i n g  t h e  l i c e n c e  f e e  t o  be p a i d  " i n  two m o i e t i e s  ’t h e  f i r s t  of 
which s h a l l  be p a i d  w i t h i n  t h i r t y  days  a f t e r  t h e  l i c e n c e  i s  g r a n t e d  
or  as  t h e  c a s e  may b e ,  renewed and t h e  o t h e r  w i t h i n  a p e r i o d  of s i x  
months t h e r e a f t e r '  . . . " . ^  His  H o n o u r ' s  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  
i s  t h e  key t o  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  h i s  j u d g m e n t .  F i r s t  i t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
h i s  Honour a c c e p t e d  t h a t  s35G(2)  d i d  q u a l i f y  s 3 5 G ( l ) .  S e c o n d ly ,  i t  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  h i s  Honour was n o t  b a s i n g  h i s  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  
a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  t a x  was on a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n c y  of  t h e
1 I d .  500.
2 (1974)  130 CLR, 245 254.
3 I d .  253-254 .
4 I d .  254.
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l i c e n c e .  I f  t h e  t a x  were  on t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n c y  of t h e  
a n n u a l  l i c e n c e  t h e n  t h e  f e e  p a y a b l e  would no t  be known u n t i l  t h e  end 
of t h e  l i c e n c e  p e r i o d .  Yet s35G(2)  e x p r e s s l y  r e q u i r e d  t h e  f e e  t o  be 
p a i d  i n  two " m o i e t i e s "  w e l l  b e f o r e  t h e  l i c e n c e  e x p i r e d .
I f  one c o n s i d e r s  a g a i n  t h e  judgmen t  of  M enz ies  J  i n  Dennis  
H o t e l s   ^ t h e  r e a l  b a s i s  f o r  h i s  d e c i s i o n  i n  K a i l i s  becomes p l a i n .  In  
Denni s  H o t e l s  Menzies  J  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  he u n d e r s t o o d  t h e  t e s t  t o  be 
w h e t h e r  t h e  t a x  was t o o  r e m o te  f rom  p r o d u c t i o n  t o  be an e x c i s e  or  
w h e th e r  i t  was i n  s u b s t a n c e  on p r o d u c t i o n .  I t  would seem i n  K a i l i s  
h i s  d e c i s i o n  was t h a t  t h i s  t a x  was i n  s u b s t a n c e ,  even  w i t h  i t s  t i m e -  
l a g ,  upon t h e  p r o c e s s i n g  of  f i s h .  The p o i n t  of  t h i s  e x c u r s i o n  i n t o  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  what Menzies  J  a c t u a l l y  d e c i d e d  i n  K a i l i s  i s  t h a t  i t  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  j u d g e ,  who had p l a y e d  such  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  
t h e  Denn is  H o t e l s  d e c i s i o n  d i d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h a t  c a s e  meant  t h a t  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  of  a t i m e - l a g  i n  a t a x  would g u a r a n t e e  ex e m p t io n  from 
s 9 0 .
Summary of  Barwick  C J ' s  p o s i t i o n  on t i m e - l a g g e d  t a x e s
I  q u o t e  a g a i n  t h e  words  o f  Ba rw ick  CJ i n  D ickenson :
U n le s s  . . .  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  of  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  t h e  S t a t u t e  r a t h e r  
t h a n  m e r e ly  i t s  f o rm ,  i s  t r e a t e d  as  d e f i n i t i v e  of t h e  r e l e v a n '  
n a t u r e  of  t h e  t a x  i t  imposes  or  e x a c t s ,  a premium w i l l  be p l a c e d  
upon v e r b a l  s l e i g h t  of  hand  a n d ,  i n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
mocked.
By j o i n i n g  i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a r u l e  which  a l l o w s  S t a t e s  t o  t a x  
any d e a l i n g  i n  goods a f t e r  p r o d u c t i o n  and t o  r e c e i v e  immunity  from t h e  
o p e r a t i o n  of  s 9 0  by t h e  s i m p l e  d e v i c e  of  i n t e r p o s i n g  a l i c e n c e  and a 
t i m e - l a g  i n  t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  t a x ,  Barwick  CJ was ,  as  he
h i m s e l f  acknowledged  i n  S l e i g h , a l l o w i n g  a r e s u l t  wh ich  " t e n d s  t o  pu t
3
a premium on d r a f t i n g  i n g e n u i t y  and i s  a d i s r e g a r d  of  s u b s t a n c e . "
1 Above pp2 5 0 -2 5 1 .
2 (1974)  130 CLR 177, 186.
3 (1977)  135 CLR 475, 488
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Barwick CJ "explained" this inconsistency between his stated 
principle and his actual decisions in this area as being forced upon 
him by the constraints of precedent in the form of the Dennis Hotels 
decision upholding the annual licence fee. Even if Barwick CJ were, 
under the constraints of the doctrine of stare decisis, to accept that 
decision which he considered to be wrong'*' there were options for 
confining that decision.
The dissent of Jacobs J in Sleigh pointed out the annual fee in 
Dennis Hotels had been accepted by some of the majority judges because 
it was part of a scheme for limiting and regulating the outlets of 
liquor, a special kind of commodity with a special history of 
regulation. By the time of Sleigh the time-lagged licence fee had 
become simply a device for collecting revenue.
In Kailis Mason J had distinguished Dennis Hotels on the basis
that the Dennis Hotels time-lagged tax was on purchase for retail sale
3while the Kailis time-lagged tax was on production. It would have 
been possible to develop and extend this basis for confining Dennis 
Hotels to the operation of the time-lagged tax on wholesaling
Aactivities in Sleigh where the taxpayer was also the producer.
Barwick CJ did not support either of these points for confining 
Dennis Hotels. Not only, however, did Barwick CJ not take either 
Jacobs J's or Mason J's point for confining Dennis Hotels, Barwick CJ 
also went the further step of supporting the erection of a rule that a 
time-lag will guarantee exemption from s90, a rule which no member of 
the Court in Dennis Hotels had supported. For Menzies J the presence 
of a time-lag was never more than just one factor in his test of 
degree and did not, on my interpretation, prevent Menzies J himself
1 (1974) 130 CLR 177, 188.
2 (1977) 136 CLR 475, 526.
3 (1974) 130 CLR 245, 265.
4 (1977) 136 CLR 475.
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h o l d i n g  a t i m e - l a g g e d  t a x  i n v a l i d  i n  K a i l i s . I t  seems t o  be an 
ex t r e m e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  s t a r e  d e c i s i s , f o r  Barwick CJ t o  have  f e l t  more 
c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s  t h a n  d i d  Menzies  
J  who had been  a p a r t y  t o  t h a t  d e c i s i o n .
C -  The s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  an  i n d i r e c t  q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i n k  and t h e  c r i t e r i o n  
of l i a b i l i t y  t e s t
The r u l e  r e l a t i n g  t o  t i m e - l a g g e d  t a x e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
s e c t i o n ,  h a s  become f i x e d  and i s  now i n d e p e n d e n t  of t h e  g e n e r a l  i s s u e s  
of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  u n d e r  s 9 0 .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  e x p l o r e  t h e  g e n e r a l  
i s s u e s  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  u n d e r  s 9 0 .
Matthews  v C h i c o r y  M a r k e t i n g  Board 1938
In  Matthews  v C h i c o r y  M a r k e t i n g  B o a r d '*' t h e  t a x  c h a l l e n g e d  was a 
t a x  on c h i c o r y  p r o d u c e r s  q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  number of  
a c r e s  t h e y  p l a n t e d  w i t h  c h i c o r y .  I t  was a r g u e d  and a c c e p t e d  by Latham 
CJ and McTie rnan  J  i n  d i s s e n t  t h a t  t h e  t a x  was no t  "measured  by 
q u a n t i t y  o r  v a l u e  of  goods"  and t h e r e f o r e  was no t  an e x c i s e .  As 
Latham CJ p o i n t e d  o u t  " t h e  y i e l d  of  e q u a l  a r e a s  may o b v i o u s l y  v a r y
3
v e ry  g r e a t l y  i n d e e d " .
The m a j o r i t y  j u d g e s  who h e l d  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  was an e x c i s e  were 
R i c h ,  S t a r k e  and Dixon J J .  T he re  was no common m a j o r i t y  p o s i t i o n .  
S t a r k e  J  d i d  n o t  seem t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  t a x
1 (1938)  60 CLR 263.
2 I d .  279, 304.
3 I d . 279.  His  Honour a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  would n o t  " n o r m a l l y  
and as  of  c o u r s e  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  p r i c e  of  t h e  goods so as  t o  be 
p a s s e d  on t o  t h e  p u r c h a s e r  or  consumer"  and was t h e r e f o r e  n o t  an 
i n d i r e c t  t a x .  I b i d .
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be l in k e d  to  amount or v a lu e  of goods p roduced . I t  seemed to  be
enough fo r  him t o  make t h i s  a t a x  on p ro d u c t io n  t h a t  nobody was l i a b l e
to  pay t a x  under th e  Act u n le s s  some of th e  p roduc t were a c t u a l l y
grown.^ This app roach  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  th e  d e c i s i o n  in  P e te rsw a ld
2
v B a r t le y  and th e  r u l e  a l lo w in g  f l a t  t a x e s .
There a re  ( a t  l e a s t )  two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of th e  grounds f o r  th e
d e c i s io n  of Rich and Dixon J J .  The d e f i n i t i o n  of e x c i s e  should  be
expanded to  in c lu d e  t a x e s  imposed and q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to
e s s e n t i a l  s t e p s  in  p ro d u c t io n  (such  as p l a n t i n g  a c ro p )a s  w e l l  as
ta x e s  imposed and q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to  amount or v a lu e  p roduced .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  and not i n c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  because  of th e  n a t u r a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between s t e p s  in  p ro d u c t io n  and amount p roduced ,  a t a x
imposed by r e f e r e n c e  to  a s te p  in  p ro d u c t io n  shou ld  be reg a rd ed  as
s u f f i c i e n t l y  connec ted  to  th e  amount produced to  be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a
3
t a x  "on” p r o d u c t io n .  The r e a l  b a s i s  f o r  th e  d e c i s i o n  in  Matthews 
has been a c o n t in u in g  i s s u e  ( though a t  t im es  unacknow ledged).
There was a n o th e r  im p o r ta n t  a s p e c t  of th e  judgment of Dixon J  in  
M atthews. As A t to rn e y -G e n e ra l  f o r  New South Wales in  th e  Newspaper Tax 
Case in  1920, McTiernan had argued  t h a t  a t a x  on th e  i s s u e  of 
newspapers was concerned  w ith  them as in fo rm a t io n  not as goods .^
That subm iss ion  was u n s u c c e s s f u l  but i t s  u n d e r ly in g  assum ption  was 
echoed by Dixon J  in  M atthew s. Dixon J ’s r i d e r  t h a t  to  be an 
e x c is e  th e  t a x  must be on goods "as . . .  s u b j e c t s  of m anufac tu re  or 
p ro d u c t io n  or as_ a r t i c l e s  of commerce" seemed to  co n tem p la te  a 
p o s s i b le  in q u i r y  i n t o  th e  s u b s t a n c e ,  or concern  of a s u sp e c t  t a x .
1 Id .  286.
2 Above p242.
3 I d . 281 p e r  Rich J ;  303 per  Dixon J .
4 John F a i r f a x  Sons Ltd v New South Wales (1927) 39 CLR 139.
5 (1938) 60 CLR 263, 304. Emphasis added.
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This idea also is traceable to the Canadian background for sorting out 
taxes into the mutually exclusive categories - direct and indirect. 
Earlier in his judgment Dixon J had quoted from the discussion in the 
Privy Council decision of Attorney-General for British Columbia v
Kingcome Navigation Co. The passage in Kingcome ^ that Dixon J
2quoted contained the following
"Customs and excise duties are, in their essence, trading taxes, 
and may be said to be more concerned with the commodity in respect 
of which the taxation is imposed than with the particular person 
from whom the tax is exacted."
Transport Cases 1930's
The 1930’s Transport Cases were mainly concerned with the 
compatability of State transport regulation and licensing systems with 
s92. An ancillary issue was whether a tax imposed on road use and 
calculated by reference to carrying capacity of vehicles and distance 
covered, was compatible with s90. The answer received had been that 
such taxes were compatible with s90.
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales 1953
In Hughes and Vale Ltd v New South Wales the Court was asked^ 
to reconsider the compatibility of road taxes with s90 in the light 
of the decision in Parton v Milk Board (Vic).^  The main issue in 
the case was the authority of the 1930’s Transport Case in the light 
of the Privy Council dicta in the Bank Nationalisation Case^
1 [1934] AC 45, 59 emphasis added.
2 (1938) 60 CLR 263, 301.
3 Eg 0 Gilpin Ltd v Commissioner for Road Transport (NSW) (1935) 52 
CLR 189.
4 (1953) 87 CLR 49, 58.
5 (1949) 80 CLR 229. Above p235.
6 [1950] AC 235; (1949) 79 CLR 497.
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r e l a t i n g  to  s9 2 .  The su b m iss io n  r e l a t i n g  to  s90 seems to  have been 
p r e s e n te d  r a t h e r  h a l f - h e a r t e d l y  and on ly  t h r e e  of th e  seven members 
of th e  Court r e f e r r ü 4 t o  i t .  Of th e s e  three ,W ebb m ere ly  c i t e d
a 1930 's  T ra n s p o r t  C a se , G i lp in s  C ase .^  W illiam s J  adop ted^  th e  
r e a s o n in g  of Dixon CJ who s a i d :
“In  answer to  t h i s  c o n te n t io n  i t  i s ,  I  t h i n k ,  enough to  say t h a t  
th e  tonnage r a t e  i s  no t a t a x  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t i n g  com m odities .  I t  
i s  c a l c u l a t e d  on th e  combined w eigh t of th e  v e h ic le  and w eigh t of 
th e  load  i t  i s  cap a b le  of c a r r y in g  and i s  payab le  in  r e s p e c t  of 
th e  employment of th e  v e h i c l e  upon a jo u rn e y  in d e p e n d e n t ly  of th e  
w eigh t or q u a n t i t y  of th e  com m odities c a r r i e d . I t  i s  a t a x  on th e  
c a r r i e r  because  he c a r r i e s  goods by motor v e h i c l e .
The f i r s t  s e n te n c e  in  t h i s  e x t r a c t  s t a t e s  th e  c o n c lu s io n .  The r e a s o n s  
f o r  th e  c o n c lu s io n  seem to  be s e t  out in  th e  second and t h i r d  
s e n te n c e s :  The p o in t  in  th e  second s e n te n c e  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  to
t h a t  in  th e  t h i r d  s e n te n c e .
B olton  v Madsen 1963
A t a x  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  in v o lv e d  in  Hughes and Vale was c h a l le n g e d  
in  B o lton  v Madsen. The t a x  was in  th e  form of a f e e  on a perm it 
to  t r a n s p o r t  goods by ro a d .  The fe e  v a r ie d  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  n a tu r e  
of th e  goods f o r  th e  c a r r i a g e  of which a pe rm it  was s o u g h t .  The 
r e l e v a n t  r a t e  in  B o lton  was t h a t  f o r  wool and was a t  th e  r a t e  of 3d 
p e r  to n m ile  on r e g i s t e r e d  c a r r y i n g  c a p a c i t y .  The pe rso n  o b je c t in g  
to  th e  payment of th e  f e e  was a p ro d u ce r  who had been charged  w ith  
t r a n s p o r t i n g  h i s  own produce w ith o u t  a p e rm i t .
1 (1953) 87 CLR 49, 90.
2 (1935) 52 CLR 189, 87 CLR 49, 87.
3 (1953) 87 CLR 49, 87.
4 I d . 75. Emphasis added .
5 (1963) 110 CLR 264.
6 Id .  270.
7 Id .  269.
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A i c k i n  QC l e a d i n g  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h e  t a x  i n  B o l t o n  s u b m i t t e d
t h a t  t h e  Matthews  d e c i s i o n  s h o u l d  g o v e rn  t h e  c a s e . ^  T h i s  seemed t o
2
be a f a i r l y  s t r o n g  a r g u m e n t .  The Cour t  i n  B o l t o n  i t s e l f  s t a t e d  
t h a t  i t  u n d e r s t o o d  t h e  r a t i o  of  Matthews t o  be c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  words 
of  Dixon J :
’’t h e  b a s i s  a d o p t e d  f o r  t h e  l e v y  h a s  a n a t u r a l  a l t h o u g h  n o t  a 
n e c e s s a r y ,  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  q u a n t i t y  of t h e  commodity p r o d u c e d . "
The B o l t o n  Cour t  a l s o  a c c e p t e d  t h e  wide d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e :
" f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p u r p o s e s  d u t i e s  of e x c i s e  a r e  t a x e s  d i r e c t l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  goods imposed a t  some s t e p  i n  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n  o r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e y  r e a c h  t h e  hands  of  c o n s u m e r s . "
K i t t o  J  i n  Denn is  H o t e l s  had  b r o u g h t  t o g e t h e r  t h e  Matthews  d e c i s i o n  
and t h e  wide  d e f i n i t i o n  of  e x c i s e  t o  g i v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  co m p o s i t e  
p r o p o s i t i o n .
" . . .  t h r o u g h  some m is c h a n c e  i t  may happen  t h a t  no goods i s s u e  f rom  
t h e  a c t i v i t y  t o  be p a s s e d  down t h e  l i n e  t o  t h e  c o n s u m e r , and 
t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  may be no o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p a s s  t h e  t a x  on .  But t h e  
im pos t  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  a d u t y  of  e x c i s e  i f  i t  o p e r a t e s  a s  a t a x  
upon t h e  t a k i n g  of  a s t e p  i n  a p r o c e s s  of  p r o d u c i n g  of  
d i s t r i b u t i n g  g o o d s .
One would have  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  B o l t o n  
Cour t  as  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  r a t i o  of Matthews  would have  a p p l i e d  m u t a t i s  
m u t a n d i s , t o  t h e  t a x  i n  B o l t o n  (and f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  t o  t h e  t a x  i n  
Hughes and Vale  P ty  Ltd v New S ou th  W a l e s ) i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  
movement of  goods f rom  p r o d u c e r  t o  consum er .  The t a x  t o o k  as  i t s
1 (1963)  110 CLR 264,  266.
2 I d .  272.
3 (1938)  60 CLR 263, 303.
4 (1963)  110 CLR 264, 271. Emphasis  added .
5 (1960)  104 CLR 529,  560. Emphasis  a dde d .
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" b a s i s  f o r  l e v y "  l o a d  c a p a c i t y  of  t r u c k s .  S u r e l y  l o a d  c a p a c i t y  of  
a t r u c k  (by r e f e r e n c e  t o  which  t h e  t a x  was c a l c u l a t e d )  h a s  a " n a t u r a l  
a l t h o u g h  n o t  a n e c e s s a r y  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  q u a n t i t y "  of  a commodity 
which can be d i s t r i b u t e d  (by t r u c k )  j u s t  a s  t h e  number of  a c r e s  
p l a n t e d  h a s  a n a t u r a l  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  amount which w i l l  be p r o d u c e d .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  C our t  i n  a unanimous j o i n t  judgment  h e l d  Matthew 
t o  be d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  and t h e  t a x  t o  be v a l i d .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
o f f e r e d  was t h a t  t h e  t a x  i n  B o l t o n  was i n d e p e n d e n t  "of t h e  w e ig h t  or  
q u a n t i t y  of  t h e  c o m m od i t i e s  c a r r i e d " .  The Cour t  was q u i t e
d e l i b e r a t e *  i n  e m p h a s i s i n g  and e n d o r s i n g  t h a t  one a s p e c t  of  t h e
2
judgment  of  Dixon CJ i n  Hughes and V a l e . I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s ee
how t h a t  p o i n t  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  M a t t h e w s . I n  Matthews  t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e
t a x  l i a b i l i t y  was a l s o  i n d e p e n d e n t  of  t h e  amount o r  v a l u e  of  t h e  
3
p r o d u c t .
An i m p o r t a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  judgment  i n  B o l t o n  i s  t h a t  i t ^  
a d o p te d  t h i s  p a s s a g e  f rom  t h e  judgm en t  of  K i t t o  J  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s :
" . . .  a t a x  i s  no t  a d u t y  o f  e x c i s e  u n l e s s  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of 
l i a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  t a k i n g  of  a  s t e p  i n  a p r o c e s s  of  b r i n g i n g  goods 
i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  or  t o  a  consumable  s t a t e ,  or  p a s s i n g  them down t h e  
l i n e  which  r e a c h e s  f rom  t h e  e a r l i e s t  s t a g e  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  
p o i n t  of  r e c e i p t  by t h e  c o n s u m e r . " ^
R e f e r e n c e  h a s  a l r e a d y  been  made t o  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  K i t t o  J  spoke  of  t h e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a_ c r i t e r i o n  of  l i a b i l i t y .  Th i s  
i m p l i e d  t h a t  a t a x  can  ha v e  o n l y  one " c r i t e r i o n  of  l i a b i l i t y ” , o n ly  
one r e l e v a n t  c h a r a c t e r .  So much was i m p l i e d ,  b u t  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l
1 (1963)  110 CLR 264,  272.
2 Above p264 .
3 D i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  be low  p290 .
4 (1963)  110 CLR 264, 273.
5 (1960)  104 CLR 529, 559.
6 Above p250 .
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point was not discussed or justified. From their behaviour in other 
cases it would seem that not all of the judges who in Bolton adopted 
this passage from Dennis Hotels were willing to accept such a 
principle of characterisation when the issue was raised directly. 
Barwick CJ repudiated the assumption when the opportunity presented 
itself.
Browns Transport v Kropp 1958
Decided after Hughes and Vale and before Bolton v Madsen was 
Browns Transport Pty Ltd v Kropp, the only reported decision where 
Barwick appeared as counsel to argue s90.^ A Queensland law 
prohibited carriage of passengers or goods without a licence. A 
licence condition was that the carrier pay 20% of gross revenue 
derived from the carrying on of the licensed carriage.
Barwick QC appeared for one plaintiff transport company, Downs, 
and Gibbs QC for another, Browns. The plaintiffs’ licences to carry 
goods had been cancelled because the licence fees had not been paid. 
The plaintiffs objected that the fees breached s90.
Barwick asked the Court to give s90 a wide application so as to 
give effect to the policy of s90 "of having one single fiscal policy 
in relation to dealings in commodities, from the point of time of 
importation or manufacture down to consumption". Barwick proposed 
to the Court that, as production was no longer "the focal point of 
excise", the concentration should be on price to the consumer as "It 
is the price to the consumer that will be the factor that will alter
1 (1958) 100 CLR 117. Barwick had appeared in Hughes and Vale Ltd v
New South Wales on its appeal to the Privy Council but the appeal 
only involved s92. (1954 ) 93 CLR 1; [1955] AC 241.
2 (1958) 100 CLR 117, 124.
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or  im p inge  upon t h e  f e d e r a l  p o l i c y . . . " . ^  Barwick  p r o p o s e d  t h i s  
s p e c i f i c  t e s t  t o  r e v e a l  w h e t h e r  a t a x  was " o n ” goods .
"The t a x  w i l l  be i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  commodity i f  i t  i s  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  an a c t  o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a commodity,  which  a c t  o r  d e a l i n g  t e n d s  
t o  a f f e c t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  p r i c e  t o  t h e  consumer i n  a s p e c i f i c  
w a y ."
Barwick was a s k i n g  t h e  Cour t  t o  a d o p t  a t e s t  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  l i k e l y  
p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  t h e  l aw .  I f  t h e  Cour t  had a c c e p t e d  t h e  
s u b m i s s i o n ,  t h e n  i t  would n o t  have  been  t o o  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  c o u r t  
t o  t a k e  a n o t h e r  s t e p  and c o n c lu d e  t h a t  a t a x  on t h e  c a r r i a g e  of  goods 
would t e n d  t o  a f f e c t  " t h e  u l t i m a t e  p r i c e  t o  t h e  c o n s u m e r" .
3
The s u b m i s s i o n  was r a t h e r  a m b i t i o u s  bu t  t h e  e f f e c t  of  P a r t o n  
had n o t  y e t  been  a p p r a i s e d  ( a p a r t  f rom  t h e  s h a l l o w  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  
Hughes and V a l e ) .  The s u b m i s s i o n  d i d  have  t h e  p rob lem s  of  any 
a rgum ent  ba sed  on t h e  p u r p o s e  of  s 9 0 . ^  On t h e  o t h e r  hand  t h e  
s u b m i s s i o n  had i t s  s t r e n g t h s .  The i d e a  of s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  t e s t ,  
f a m i l i a r  f rom  t h e  t e s t s  f o r  " i n d i r e c t n e s s " ,  " t e n d e n c y  t o  be p a s s e d  on 
t o  t h e  c onsum e r" ,  was c a l c u l a t e d  t o  g i v e  e f f e c t  t o  t h e  p o l i c y  of  s90  
was a c l e v e r  p i e c e  of  advoc ac y  t o  d r e s s  up a s u b m i s s i o n  wh ich  was 
b a s i c a l l y  t h a t  t h e  C our t  s h o u l d  a c c e p t  " i n d i r e c t n e s s "  as  b e i n g  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a d u t y  was an e x c i s e .  C l e v e r ,  bu t  as  i t  
t u r n e d  o u t ,  no t  c l e v e r  e n ough .  Barwick  must  have  been  a l i t t l e  
d i s a p p o i n t e d  when c o u n s e l  d e f e n d i n g  t h e  t a x  was s t o p p e d  by t h e  
C o u r t , ^  i n d i c a t i n g  c l e a r l y  t h a t  Ba rw ick*s  s u b m i s s i o n  had been 
r e j e c t e d  o u t r i g h t .
1 I d .  124.
2 I d . 125. Th i s  f o r m u l a  i n c o p o r a t e s  " d e f i n i t i o n "  as  w e l l .
3 Above p235 .
4 Above p p 2 0 3 f f .
5 (1958)  100 CLR 117, 126.
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In a j o i n t  judgm ent,  th e  Court of Dixon CJ, M cTiernan, F u l l a g a r ,
K i t t o ,  T ay lo r  and Windeyer J J  r e j e c t e d  B a rw ick 's  su b m iss io n .  Even
i f  t h i s  t a x  was an i n d i r e c t  t a x ,  a m a t te r  no t d e c id e d ,  i t  was in  t h e i r
H onours’ o p in io n  no t ” ’u p o n ’ goods, or ’ in  r e s p e c t  o f '  goods, or ' i n
r e l a t i o n  t o ’ g o o d s . T h e  d e c i s i o n  could  have been based on th e
re a s o n in g  of Dixon CJ in  Hughes and Vale which was to  be adopted  in  
2
B olton  v Madsen. The re a s o n s  g iven  in  Kropp, however, w ere :
"Here th e  e x a c t io n  i s  imposed w ith o u t  m ention o f , and w ith o u t  
r e g a rd  t o ,  any commodity or c l a s s  of com m odities . The pe rso n  
taxed  i s  no t tax ed  by r e f e r e n c e  t o ,  or by rea so n  o f ,  any r e l a t i o n  
betweem h im se lf  and any commodity as p ro d u c e r ,  m a n u fa c tu re r ,  
p r o c e s s o r ,  s e l l e r  or p u r c h a s e r .  The ta x e s  which s3 5 (2 )  
a u t h o r i s e s ,  c a l c u l a t e d  on one or more of a v a r i e t y  of b a s e s ,  a re  
payab le  w hether  th e  p e rso n  ta x ed  c a r r i e s  goods or p a s s e n g e r s ,  and, 
i f  he c a r r i e s  goods, w ha teve r  may be th e  n a tu r e  of th e  goods 
c a r r i e d .  The e x a c t io n  i s  in  t r u t h ,  as i t  p u rp o r t s  to  be , 
s im ply  a f e e  p ay ab le  as  a c o n d i t io n  of a r i g h t  to  c a r r y  on a 
b u s in e s s .  'A t a x  imposed upon a p e rso n  f i l l i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r  
d e s c r i p t i o n  or engaged in  a g iven  p u r s u i t  does not amount to  an 
e x c i s e ' :  Matthews v Chicory  M arketing  Board (1938) 60 CLR 263,
300 [per Dixon J] Cf P a r to n  v Milk Board (V ic) (1949) 80 CLR 229, 
259 [per Dixon J ] . "
This  was no doubt in te n d e d  to  d i s c r e d i t  co m p le te ly  B a rw ick 's  
su b m iss io n .  The Court may, how ever, have weakened th e  f o r c e  of th e  
d e c i s io n  as  a p r e c e d e n t .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l  which of th e  
c o n c lu s io n s  in  th e  l i s t  r e l a t e  to  a c c e p te d  grounds f o r  i n v a l i d i t y  and 
which r e l a t e  to  grounds which may or may not i n d i c a t e  i n v a l i d i t y  but 
which a re  not made out anyway. The passag e  seems to  su g g e s t  t h a t  on ly  
ta x e s  which ta x e d  p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s e s  of goods would be "on" goods and 
t h a t  ta x e s  which tax ed  a l l  goods g e n e r a l ly  would not be c l a s s i f i e d  
as  t a x e s  "on" goods. I f  t h a t  was th e  b a s i s  f o r  d e c i s i o n  th e n  th e  
Matthews t a x  which was only  concerned  w ith  one commodity was 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .  Such a n o t io n  i s ,  however, q u i t e  e x t r a o r d in a r y  f o r
1 Id .  129.
2 Above p266.
3 D esp ite  th e  su b m iss io n  of Gibbs QC I d . 123.
4 The p l a i n t i f f s '  l i c e n c e s  had been to  c a r ry  goods (no t p e r s o n s ) .
5 (1958) 100 CLR 117, 129-130.
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it implies that the indicator of invalidity is not the tendency or
capacity of the State tax to impinge on the use by the Commonwealth of
tools of fiscal policy but rather the intention of the State to
implement its own fiscal policy in relation to particular commodities.
Though that idea was to receive some support in Anderson Ts case* it
2was to be ignored in Chamberlain by both majority and dissenting 
judges concerned with a tax on receipts of payments for all goods.
Barwick as Chief Justice has been involved in cases which have 
raised again the basic issues underlying the Matthews, Kropp and 
Bolton decisions. Neither he alone nor the Courts of which he has 
been part have taken the opportunities to resolve the apparant 
conflict between Matthews on one hand and Kropp and Bolton on the 
other.
Andersons Pty Ltd v Victoria 1964
This was for Barwick as Chief Justice, his first case involving a 
point of constitutional law. In issue were provisions of the 
Victorian Stamps Act of 1958 taxing credit purchase, hire purchase and 
rental agreements which were defined to cover a range of credit 
arrangements associated with the transfer of property in goods.^ The 
Act required such agreements to be put in writing and stamped. The 
stamp duty payable on such instruments was quantified by reference to 
the amount of "credit” extended to the purchaser/bailee of the goods 
under the agreement.
1 Below pp270ff.
2 Below pp281ff.
3 (1964) 111 CLR 353.
4 "Credit purchase agreement" was defined to encompass certain kinds
of purchases of goods. "Hire purchase agreement" was defined to 
mean agreements for the bailment of goods with provision for 
rental payments to be credited to the bailee when and if he 
purchased the bailed goods. "Rental agreement" was defined to 
mean an agreement whereby after a specified number of payments,
a bailee could continue the bailment indefinitely making only 
nominal further payment or without making any further payment.
271 .
T here  w ere  two b a s i c  s t e p s  t o  t h e  main argum ent of Bowen QC who 
was c h a l l e n g i n g  t h e  t a x . ^  C r e d i t  and h i r e  p u r c h a s e  a g re e m e n ts  were 
m ethods of d i s t r i b u t i n g  g o o d s .  The law o p e r a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
m aking of such  a g r e e m e n t s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  t a x  w as , i n  Bowen’s 
s u b m is s io n ,  "on" d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g o o d s .  S u r p r i s i n g l y  Bowen r e f u t e d  
t h e  need f o r  t h e r e  t o  be a q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i n k  be tw een  t h e  t a x  and t h e  
g o o d s .  As r e p o r t e d ,  Bowen d id  n o t  p u t  any s u b m is s io n  i n  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  l i n k  i f  t h e  C ourt  th o u g h t  
one n e c e s s a r y .  I t  c o u ld  have  been  a rg u e d  f o r  exam ple t h a t  t h e r e  was a 
n a t u r a l  r e l a t i o n  be tw een  t h e  amount of c r e d i t  e x te n d e d  (w hich  was 
t a x e d )  and t h e  v a lu e  of t h e  g o o d s .  The amount of " c r e d i t "  u n d e r  an  
ag reem en t  n a t u r a l l y  can  n o t  e x c ee d  t h e  p u r c h a s e  p r i c e  of t h e  go o d s .
I f  such  an a rgum en t had been  p u t ,  B arw ick  CJ m igh t have  f e l t  i n c l i n e d  
t o  comment on B o l t o n . T here  t h e  t a x  was q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  
lo a d  c a p a c i t y  w hich  s e t  t h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  f o r  goods t h a t  c o u ld  be 
d i s t r i b u t e d .  Here t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was r e v e r s e d .  The p r i c e  of t h e  
goods s e t  t h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  f o r  t h e  a c t i v i t y  t a x e d .
The C ourt  of B arw ick  C J, M cT ie rn an , K i t t o ,  T a y l o r ,  M e n z ie s ,  
W indeyer and Owen J J  u n a n im o u s ly  r e j e c t e d  th e  c h a l l e n g e .  A d i v e r s i t y  
of  r e a s o n s  w ere  s t a t e d .  The c o m p a r iso n  of t h e  ju d g m e n ts  of B arw ick  CJ 
and K i t t o  J  ( w i th  whom T a y lo r  J  b a s i c a l l y  a g r e e d )  p r o v id e s  t h e  r e a l  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  c a s e .  Each te n d e d  t o  a d o p t  t h e  to n e  of c o u n s e l  
p u t t i n g  s u b m is s io n s  t o  t h e  o t h e r  as j u d g e .
Barw ick  CJ commenced h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  K i t t o  J ’s
D ennis  H o te ls  fo rm u la  e n d o rs e d  by t h e  C our t  of s i x  in  B o l to n  v 
3
M adsen. B arw ick  CJ was n o t  o n ly  " p re p a re d  t o  a d o p t"  t h e  K i t t o  
f o r m u la ,  he a l s o  v o l u n t e e r e d  t h a t  t h a t  fo rm u la  "commended" i t s e l f  t o  
him  ( B a rw ic k ) .^  The q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e th e r  a p a r t i c u l a r  im p o s t  was an
1 I d . 358. A s s i s t e d  by i n t e r  a l i a , KA A icken  QC.
2 I d .  359.
3 (1963) 110 CLR 264, 273. Above p266 .
4 (1964)  111 CLR 353, 364.
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excise was to be resolved by that established formula rather than by 
any attempt to substitute "supposed synonymous expressions".'*’ Kitto 
J had probably been wooed by too many "respectful" counsel to be 
lulled by this demure and deferential adoption of his formula by 
Barwick CJ.
On the other side, Kitto J attempted to justify his formula by
reference to the purpose of s90. "The reason [underlying the formula]
is that a duty of excise is, at bottom, a burden on home production or 
2manufacture". Thus taxes on dealings after production were excises
because "from the time the goods come into existence the law makes it
inherent in their nature, as goods requiring distribution in order to
become available to fulfil their purpose, that the tax shall be 
3paid". Next his Honour explained that the relevance of the 
frequent inquiries into the tendency of the tax to be "passed on", is 
that such a tendency "reflects back upon the production". This echoed 
the submission of Barwick QC as he then was in Kropp. Barwick QC had 
asked the Court in Kropp^ to accept tendency to affect the price to 
the consumer as the sole test of validity. Barwick QC had asked the 
Court to accept that simple test on the basis that all taxes affecting 
price to consumer would have a practical effect on production. (The 
submission of Barwick QC in Kropp and the judgment of Kitto J in 
Anderson both contained the same error. The easier it is for a 
producer or other distributor to pass the tax on, the less is the 
effect on production. When all the tax can be passed on there is no_ 
effect on production.)
1 Id. 365.
2 Id. 374.
3 Id. 374.
4 Above pp267-268.
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Now in  A nderson , Barwick as Chief J u s t i c e  s e t  about d i s t a n c in g
h im se lf  from such an ap p ro ac h .  The q u e s t io n  was a l e g a l  one not a
m a t te r  of economic t h e o r y .  The mere f a c t  t h a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  of law
( t h a t  a t a x  was in  s u b s ta n c e  upon th e  r e l e v a n t  d e a l in g  w ith  goods)
would s a t i s f y  th e  concern  of economic th e o ry  (w ith  th e  e f f e c t  of
e x c i s e s  upon p r o d u c t io n )  d id  no t mean t h a t  economic th e o ry  was th e
t e s t  of v a l id i ty . '* '  Barwick CJ r e j e c t e d  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of
c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  a t a x  as  an e x c i s e  because  " in  economic th e o ry  or in
f a c t "  i t  was a f f e c t i n g  th e  r a t e  of movement of goods in t o  
2consum ption . " . . . r e s o r t  t o  economic th e o ry  or s p e c u la t i o n  in  t h i s
f a s h io n  shou ld  no t be had in  o rd e r  to  r e s o lv e  th e  l e g a l  problem  as
3
to  th e  e s s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  of th e  im p o s t ."
In  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  was not an e x c i s e ,  bo th  Barwick 
CJ and K i t to  J  t a lk e d  g e n e r a l l y  about w hether  th e  t a x  was in  s u b s ta n c e
4
an e x c i s e .  T h e ir  Honours would p ro b ab ly  have been happy to  acc ep t  
as  a summary of t h e i r  c o n c lu s io n s  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  th e  t a x  was 
e s s e n t i a l l y  concerned  w ith  e n t e r i n g  c r e d i t  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  D esp i te  
t h e i r  agreem ent a t  t h a t  l e v e l ,  t h e r e  i s  c l e a r  d isag ree m en t in  th e  
p r i n c i p l e s  of c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  t h a t  th e y  s e t  o u t .
K i t to  J  f e l t  th e  need to  p a ra p h ra s e  h i s  own fo rm ula  approved in  
B o lton  v Madsen. In a new a t te m p t  to  e x p l a in  what h i s  fo rm ula  meant 
and what s i m i l a r  fo rm u las  meant when r e f e r r i n g  to  t a x e s  "upon" goods 
h i s  Honour r e v e a le d ,  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e ,  th e  assum ptions  upon which 
h i s  d e c i s i o n  and fo rm u la  in  Dennis H o te ls  were b ased .
1 Id .  365.
2 Id .  367.
3 Id .  367-368.
4 Id .  365 per  Barwick C J ; 375-376 per  K i t to  J
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’What is referred to may, I think , be described as a relation 
consisting in this, that some conduct is selected by the relevant 
legislation as_ being a step in the production, manufacture or 
distribution of goods and in that character is made of the essence 
of the tax.
A tax must necessarily be made payable by a person; but it is 
not a duty of excise, unless the criterion of the person's 
liability is the fact that some act of his possesses the quality 
of a contribution either to the physical character of goods as 
subjects of commerce or to the sequence of events which results in 
their being available, as in the hands of a consumer, to be put to 
their ultimate purpose."1
To be "on" goods a tax has to be quantified by reference to a
relevant step in the production or distribution of goods. Not only
must there be such a reference in the terms of the taxing Act, but
2also, that reference must contitute the essence of the tax. A tax 
can have only one essential character.
Barwick CJ, although decrying attempts to substitute "supposed
o  /synonymous expressions’0  for the "definitive exposition" of Kitto 
J's formula, was not himself reluctant to paraphrase the formula thus:
"...it ought now to be taken as settled that the essence of a duty 
of excise is that it is a tax upon the taking of a step in a 
process of bringing goods into existence or to a consumable state, 
or of passing them down the line which reaches from the earliest 
stage in production to the point of receipt by the consumer.’0
The words "the criterion of liability" did not appear.
Barwick CJ further "explained" what the definitive exposition 
accepted in Bolton v Madsen meant. Barwick CJ drew a list of factors 
relevant to the question of whether a tax was in substance upon a 
relevant step.
1 (1964) ill CLR 353, 373-374. Emphasis added. The decision in 
Dennis Hotels is discussed above pp245ff.
2 Also id. 375.
3 Id. 365.
4 Id. 364.
5 (1964) 111 CLR 353, 364.
275
" . . . f a c t o r s  which  may n o t  be p r e s e n t  i n  e v e r y  c a s e  and which  may 
have  d i f f e r e n t  w e i g h t  or  em p h a s i s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c a s e s .  The 
• i n d i r e c t n e s s ’ of  t h e  t a x ,  i t s  imm edia te  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  c o s t  of 
t h e  goods ,  t h e  p r o x i m i t y  of t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  i t  t a x e s  t o  t h e  
m a n u f a c t u r e  or  p r o d u c t i o n  or  movement of t h e  goods i n t o  
c o n s u m p t io n ,  t h e  fo rm  and c o n t e n t  of  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  im po s in g  t h e  
t a x  -  a l l  t h e s e  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . "  ■*•
The d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  K i t t o  J  became c l e a r e r  a s  Barwick  CJ 
c o n t i n u e d .  The c e n t r a l  q u s t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  t a x  i s  i n  s u b s t a n c e  a 
t a x  upon t h e  r e l e v a n t  s t e p ,  would no t  i n  Barwick  C J ’s o p i n i o n
" n e c e s s a r i l y  be r e s o l v e d  by t h e  fo rm of  t h e  t a x  or  by i d e n t i f y i n g  
what a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h a t  fo rm  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  has  made t h e  c r i t e r i o n  
of  i t s  i m p o s i t i o n ,  however  i m p o r t a n t  i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  t h e s e  
m a t t e r s  may b e . "
For  K i t t o  J  t h e  t a x  ne e ded  b o t h  t o  r e f e r  t o  an e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  i n  
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  or  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  goods and t o  be i n  e s s e n c e  a t a x  bn 
t h a t  e s s e n t i a l  s t e p .  The t a x  had  t o  be on goods b o t h  i n  fo rm  and i n  
s u b s t a n c e .  Barwick  CJ r e j e c t e d  t h e  f i r s t  r e q u i r e m e n t .  The form of 
t h e  law was ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Barwick  CJ,  j u s t  a n o t h e r  c i r c u m s t a n c e  g o i n g  
t o  s u b s t a n c e .  I t  was n o t  i n  i t s e l f  a s e p a r a t e  r e q u i r e m e n t .
The a p p l i c a t i o n  by Barwick  CJ of  h i s  g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t o  t h e  
t a x  i n  q u e s t i o n  i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  s h i f t  he was t r y i n g  t o  e f f e c t .  He 
m e t h o d i c a l l y  d i s c u s s e d  f a c t o r s ,  which  were of  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  o t h e r  
j u d g e s ,  as  b e i n g  r e l e v a n t  b u t  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e .
When u p h o l d i n g  t h e  t a x  i n  Kropp t h e  Court  had s a i d
"Here t h e  e x a c t i o n  i s  imposed  w i t h o u t  m en t io n  o f ,  and w i t h o u t  
r e g a r d  t o  , any commodity or  c l a s s  of  c o m m o d i t i e s . "
Barwick CJ was w i l l i n g  t o  t r e a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  was no t  
c o n f i n e d  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s  of  goods as  a f a c t o r  r e l e v a n t
1 I d .  365.
2 (1958)  100 CLR 117, 129-130.
3 I d .  368.
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a l t h o u g h  no t  c o n c l u s i v e ^  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  was no t  
i n  s u b s t a n c e  on e x c i s e .
Ano ther  f a c t o r  Barwick  CJ t h o u g h t  was r e l e v a n t ,  t h ough  no t  
c o n c l u s i v e ,  was t h e  s t a g e  of  t h e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  goods a t  wh ich  t h e  
d u t y  was e x a c t e d .  " . . .  t h e  d u t y  i s  l e v i e d  a t  a p o i n t  a f t e r  t h e  p r i c e  
of  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  goods or  t h e  t o t a l  of  t h e  r e n t a l  payments  t o  be p a i d  
t o  t h e  consumer h a s  been  f i x e d .  In  t h a t  s e n s e  i t  co u ld  be s a i d  t h a t  
t h e  t a x  i s  e x a c t e d  a f t e r  t h e  goods have  p a s s e d  i n t o  c onsum pt ion  and i s  
r a t e d  t o  t h e  amount  of  payments  t o  be made a f t e r  t h e y  have  p a s s e d  i n t o  
c o n s u m p t i o n . "  The f a c t  t h a t  Barwick  CJ t h o u g h t  t h i s  f a c t o r  
r e l e v a n t  bu t  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e ,  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  he was no t  t r e a t i n g  t h i s  
a s  a t a x  on c o n s u m p t io n .  He had  e a r l i e r  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  a t a x  on a 
d e a l i n g  a f t e r  r e c e i p t  by t h e  consumer was no t  an e x c i s e .  Lack of  a 
t e n d e n c y  t o  be p a s s e d  on ,  l a c k  of  i n d i r e c t n e s s  was a l s o  r e l e v a n t  bu t  
no t  c o n c l u s i v e . ^
Barwick  CJ was f o l l o w i n g  t h e  t im e - h o n o u r e d  j u d i c i a l  t r a d i t i o n s  of  
u n d e r m i n in g  p r e c e d e n t .  He a d o p t e d  t h e  l a n g u a g e  of  " s u b s t a n c e "  
f a m i l i a r  t h r o u g h  t h e  j u d g m e n ts  and gave i t  h i s  own m e a n ing .  When 
d e c i d i n g  what t h e  s u b s t a n c e  of  t h e  t a x  was Barwick  CJ looked  t o  t h e  
same f a c t o r s  a s  had been  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  i n  e a r l i e r  d e c i s i o n s .  The 
s u b t l e  bu t  i m p o r t a n t  s h i f t  was t h a t  w he re as  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  h i t h e r t o  had 
t e n d e d  t o  l o o k  a t  t h o s e  m a t t e r s  a s  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n d i c a t o r s  t h a t  a t a x  
was no t  an e x c i s e ,  Barwick  CJ r e d u c e d  them a l l  t o  r e l e v a n t  bu t  no t  
c o n c l u s i v e .
1 I d .  367.
2 I d . 368.  In  A n d e r s o n , b o t h  Windeyer  and Owen J J  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t a x  was n o t  c o n f i n e d  t o  t r a n s a c t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  
p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d s  of  goods a r e l e v a n t  i f  no t  c r u c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
i n  t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  t a x  was "on" p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d s  of  
c r e d i t  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  I d .  379 p e r  Windeyer  J ;  382 p e r  Owen J .
3 I d .  367.
4 I d .  364.
5 I d .  368.
277.
The other key feature of Barwick CJ's approach was that he was 
making this test of substance the only test. This is to be contrasted 
with Kitto J ’s requirement that a tax be an excise both in its terms 
and in its substance. The introduction by Barwick of this "technique” 
for accommodating earlier decisions without "overruling" them makes 
the law unpredictable and uncertain. Any decision made using this 
formula can be ignored/distinguished by later Courts on the basis that 
each case depends on the concatenation of all its relevant 
circumstances.
"all these are considerations of which I do not deny the relevance 
but no single one of them is to my mind of transcendent value in 
resolving the question as to the nature of the tax."
Barwick CJ and Kitto J were to find themselves in opposition in 
two more cases concerned with s90, the Receipts Tax Cases, before 
Kitto J left the court in 1970.
The Barwick/Kitto confrontation in the Receipts Tax Cases 1969, 
1970
In 1969 and 1970 the High Court decided three cases involving 
challenges to Western Australian stamp duties legislation. Section 
99(2) of the Western Australian Stamp Act required any person 
receiving any payment of money (with some listed exceptions) to make a 
stamped receipt. Section 16 and the schedule to the Act imposed a 
stamp duty on receipts quantified according to the amount acknowledged 
in the receipt. These provisions had been part of the Stamp Act since 
it was first enacted in 1922.
In 1966 ss99A and 99C had been added. These sections gave an 
option to persons otherwise required to make receipts to submit a 
monthly statement of payments received and make one payment of duty on 
the month’s total of payments received. Another provision had also
1 Id. 368.
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been added in 1966. Section 101A provided that where a payment for 
goods supplied or services rendered in the State by a person therein 
had been received or made outside the State, payment was deemed to 
have been received in the State by the person who supplied the goods 
or rendered the services, and that person was required to issue a 
receipt subject to usual stamp duty.
The cases which considered these provisions were Associated
Steamships Pty Ltd v Western Australia -^, Western Australia v
2Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [No 1] and Western Australia v Chamberlain 
Industries Pty Ltd. Both Associated Steamships and Hamersley [No 
1] were argued and their decisions delivered before Chamberlain was 
argued. Associated Steamships was argued a month before Hamersley 
[No 1] but the Associated Steamships judgments were delivered a month 
after the judgments in Hamersley [No 1], The point involved in 
Associated Steamships is, for our purposes, relatively simple and it 
is convenient to discuss this decision first.
Associated Steamships 1969
In this case^ the plaintiff was a carrier of goods. The 
challenge to the tax was based on s92. The plaintiff sought a 
declaration that s92 prevented the Stamp Act from compelling it to 
issue and/or pay stamp duty on receipts for money it received under 
contracts of inter-State carriage and that s92 also prevented the 
Stamp Act from compelling it to include payments under the optional 
system and/or pay duty on such payments. (The case is discussed 
further in the s92 Chapter). No attempt was made to use s90 to
1 (1969) 120 CLR 92.
2 (1969) 120 CLR 42.
3 (1970) 121 CLR 1.
4 (1969) 120 CLR 92.
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challenge the application of the Stamp Act to its receipts from all 
carriage of goods. Bolton and Kropp were not directly in point but 
may have been taken as an indication of the likely reception for any 
such challenge. The majority, McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer 
JJ, with Barwick CJ and Owen J dissenting, rejected the s92 challenge.
The well-known formula laid down by the Privy Council in the Bank
Nationalisation Case has two aspects to it.^ A law will only be
said to have offended s92 if it both directly affects inter-State
trade and, further, can not be said to be merely regulatory. Dixon
had developed a theory of "direct" which depended on the terms of the
legislation. According to Dixon a law could only be said to be
directly on inter-State trade if it was operating by reference to
either inter-Stateness or to some fact, event or thing forming an
2essential attribute of the conception of trade. Kitto J had 
supported this Dixon theory of direct. In relation to the facts in 
Associated Steamships, Kitto J (with the concurrence of Menzies J) 
considered that although receiving payments might be part of the 
business of an inter-State trader it was not part of the conception 
of inter-State trade and the law was therefore not directly on inter- 
State trade.
Barwick CJ had frequently attacked Dixon's theory of direct as 
being too narrow in confining itself to the terms of the law. In this 
case, however, Barwick CJ argued that even on Dixon's terms this tax 
was directly on inter-State trade. According to Barwick CJ the
1 Section 92 Chapter.
2 Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v Victoria (1953) 87 CLR 1, 17-18 
per Dixon CJ.
3 Id. 109-110. id. 107 and Windeyer J. Id. 118 the other members 
of the majority did not rest their decision on Dixon's direct 
theory. They seemed rather to look to the second leg of the 
Banking Case test in deciding that this legislation was not, as 
a matter of degree, so burdensome as to offend s92.
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receipt of money as payment for inter-State carriage is part of the 
conception of inter-State trade. This Act was imposing its liability 
by reference to the receipt of money and should, according to the 
Dixon theory of direct, be held to be directly burdening inter-State 
trade in its application to the plaintiff 's receipt of money which was 
in fact payment for activities of inter-State trade.*
The relevance of Associated Steamships to our discussion of s90
is in its demonstration of the analogies between the s90 and s92
issues. Barwick CJ, in fact, said that Associated Steamships (s92)
and Hamersley [No 1] (s90) involved the same issue. Was a tax on the
receipt of payment a tax on the activity for which the payment was 
9made?
Hamersley [No 1] 1969
In Hamersley [No 1] the Court had to consider the validity of
slOlA in its application to payments received by Hamersley Iron Pty 
3Ltd. The company had received outside the State, payment for iron4ore supplied in Western Australia.
1 Id. 104. Cf_ the attitude of Menzies J to receipts given in the 
course of inter-State trade Australian Coastal Shipping Commission 
v O'Reilly (1962) 107 CLR 46, 68-69.
2 (1969) 120 CLR 92, 104.
3 (1969) 120 CLR 42.
4 The question of whether or not the goods had actually been 
supplied in_ Western Australia was not gone into. KA Aickin AC, 
who was challenging the tax himself described delivering into a 
ship next to a Western Australian wharf as supply in Western 
Australia. (Id. 44.) With hindsight, in the light of the Seabeds 
Case (1975) 135 CLR 337 above pplOlff, the taxpayer might have 
been advantaged if he had looked closely at the facts to see 
whether or not these supplies were made in Western Australia. One 
would have thought it would have been a simple matter to arrange 
the "supply" so that it did not occur in Western Australia.
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The Court divided evenly on the question whether slOlA could 
validly apply to those dealings. Barwick CJ, Windeyer and Owen JJ 
held slOlA’s application to the money received by the plaintiff 
outside the State for goods supplied within the State to be a breach 
of s90. Kitto J, with whom McTiernan J concurred, and Menzies J held 
that slOlA could validly apply to those payments. By virtue of s23 of 
the Judiciary Act, the opinion of the Chief Justice prevailed in this 
evenly divided Court. Taylor J, who had also been part of the Court 
which heard the case, died before judgment was delivered. If Taylor J 
had lived, the decision would have been a little more authoritative as 
the judgment delivered by Barwick CJ had, according to Barwick CJ, 
been prepared by Taylor J as a joint judgment of himself and the Chief 
Justice.'*' In Hamersley [No 2], Kitto J referred to [No 1 ] in these 
terms.
"The decision has no application in this Court as against anyone 
but the defendant company, because the Court as constituted at the 
delivery of judgment was equally divided in opinion. Although 
s23(2) of the Judiciary Act (Cth) enabled an order to be made in 
the particular case in accordance with the opinion of the Chief 
Justice it does not make the decision 'a precedent which in this 
Court„has authority’: Tasmania v Victoria (1935) 52 CLR 157,
184."2
Chamberlain'sCase 1970
The Court was asked in Western Australia v Chamberlain Industries
3Pty Ltd to consider the validity of the provisions taxing payments 
made within the State.^ It would have tended to a clearer analysis 
of the issues if the validity of the central provisions taxing 
payments made within the State had been decided, before the Hamersley 
[No 1] case decided the validity of the provisions taxing payments
1 (1969) 120 CLR 42, 48.
2 (1969) 120 CLR 74, 82-83.
3 (1970) 121 CLR 1.
4 At the same time the Court heard argument in Victoria v IAC
(Wholesale) Pty Ltd in which it was asked to consider the validity 
of similar Victorian provisions.
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made o u t s i d e  t h e  S t a t e .  Most of t h e  ju d g m e n ts  i n  t h e  Ham ers ley  [No 1] 
d e c i s i o n  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  " i n c i d e n t a l "  p r o v i s i o n  s lO lA  seemed t o  
c a r r y  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  or  i n v a l i d i t y  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  
t a x i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  t a x i n g  payments  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e .
Given t h e  a t t i t u d e s  t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  p r o v i s i o n s  
which seemed t o  be i m p l i e d  f rom  ( o r  e x p r e s s l y  s t a t e d  i n )  t h e  ju d g m e n ts  
i n  Hamers ley  [No 1] i t  was t o  be e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  outcome of  t h e  
C ha m b e r l a in  d e c i s i o n  would depend on t h e  v o t e  of  t h e  new J u s t i c e ,
Walsh J ,  a p p o i n t e d  t o  r e p l a c e  T a y l o r  J .  Walsh J  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  
c e n t r a l  p r o v i s i o n s  were no t  o f f e n s i v e  t o  s 9 0 ,  bu t  i n s t e a d  of  b e in g  
a b l e  t o  p r o v i d e  a v o t e  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a m a j o r i t y  i n  f a v o u r  of  v a l i d i t y ,  
Walsh J  found  h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  m i n o r i t y .  M enz ies  J  who had d e c i d e d  i n  
Hamers ley  [No 1] t h a t  s lO lA  was v a l i d  now found  t h e  main p r o v i s i o n s  
t a x i n g  paymens w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e  t o  be i n v a l i d .  A p a r t  f rom  M enz ies  J  
who must  be d e a l t  w i t h  as  a s p e c i a l  case'*' ,  t h e  o t h e r  j u d g e s  saw t h e  
v a l i d i t y  of  s lO lA  and t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  p r o v i s i o n s  as  
r e l a t e d  i s s u e s  and t h e  e n s u i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  draws  t o g e t h e r  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  views  f rom  b o t h  c a s e s .
K i t t o  J  i n  d i s s e n t  i n  b o t h  Ham ers ley  [No 1] and C h a m b e r l a in  
answered  t h e  i s s u e  i n  a manner  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  
A n d e r s o n . The f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n s  em erge .  Whether  o r  n o t  a t a x  i s
an e x c i s e  i s  a q u e s t i o n  of  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r .  A t a x  can o n ly
2
have  one e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r .  P a r t i c u l a r  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  may, as  i n  Dennis  H o t e l s , be c a l l e d  on t o  i l l u s t r a t e
3
t h e  one t r u e  c h a r a c t e r  of  t h e  t a x  b u t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of  t h e  t a x  i s
a
d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t  a s  an e n t i r e  e x a c t i o n  .
Under s92  a law may t a k e  on d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r s  i n  i t s  c o n c r e t e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s .  K i t t o  J  a r g u e d ,  h o w e ve r ,  t h a t
1 A pendix .
2 C ha m b e r l a in  (1970)  121 CLR1, 20 -21 .
3 Hamers ley  [No 1] 58.
4 C ha m be r la in  20 -21 .
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the  t e c h n iq u e s  of c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  under s92 have no a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  
s90 .  S e c t io n  92 i s  conce rned  w i th  t h e  freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  r e l e v a n t  to  look  a t  th e  e f f e c t  of a law on p a r t i c u l a r  
i n d i v i d u a l s .  S e c t i o n  90 i s  concerned  w i th  denying  power t o  th e  S t a t e s  
t o  impose laws of a c e r t a i n  c h a r a c t e r . ^  I t  fo l l o w e d ,  a c c o rd in g  to  
K i t t o  J ,  t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  could  on ly  be a s c e r t a i n e d  from t h e  te rms
of th e  Act i t s e l f  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  "by a s c e r t a i n i n g  what c r i t e r i o n  of
2l i a b i l i t y  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  s e l e c t s " .
F u r th e rm o re ,  a c c o r d in g  to  K i t t o  J ,  even i f  a t a x  e x p r e s s l y
o p e r a t e s  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  a d e a l i n g  w i th  goods and makes i t  an element
i n  imposing th e  l i a b i l i t y ,  t h e  law i s  on ly  o f f e n s i v e  i f  th e  t a x  not
only makes a d e a l i n g  w i th  goods an element i n  th e  l i a b i l i t y  but  a l s o
3
makes t h a t  element th e  c r i t e r i o n  of l i a b i l i t y  . Thus, w i t h i n  K i t t o  
J ' s  t h e o r y ,  f o r  a t a x  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  an e x c i s e  i t  has  t o  o p e r t e  
e x p r e s s l y  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  a r e l e v a n t  d e a l i n g  w i th  goods and has t o  
be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as b e in g  p r e d o m in an t ly  concerned  w i th  goods.
The c e n t r a l  t a x i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  ( c o n s id e r e d  i n  C ham ber la in ) were 
v a l i d  because  of t h e  f i r s t  a s p e c t  of K i t t o  J ’s fo rm u la .  The t a x  d id  
not  o p e r a t e  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  any d e a l i n g  w i th  goods.  The i n c i d e n t a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  S101A ( c o n s id e r e d  in  Hamersley [No 1 ] ) d id  o p e r a t e  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  d e a l i n g s  w i th  goods but  was v a l i d  n e v e r t h e l e s s  because  of 
t h e  second a s p e c t  of K i t t o  J ’s fo rm u la .  S e c t i o n  101A was, a c c o rd in g  
to  K i t t o  J ,  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  concerned  w i th  p r e v e n t i n g  avo idance  of th e  
v a l i d  c e n t r a l  t a x i n g  p r o v i s i o n .
To s t a t e  K i t t o  J ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  th u s  i l l u s t r a t e s  how h i s  l e g a l i s m  
had a c q u i r e d  an a i r  of u n r e a l i t y .  The c e n t r a l  t a x  was v a l i d  because  
of i t s  g e n e r a l i t y ,  i t s  l a c k  of concern w i th  goods,  w h i le  a n o t h e r  t a x  
was v a l i d  even though s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e f e r r i n g  to  d e a l i n g s  w i th  goods 
on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  i t s  conce rn  was t o  p re v e n t  avo idance  of t h e  c e n t r a l  
t a x  "unconcerned"  w i th  goods .
1 _Idj_ 20.
2 Id .  19-20.
3 Hamersley [No 1] (1969) 120 CLR 42,  63.
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The proposition of Kitto J - that a tax can only be an excise if 
the tax is in its terms confined to relevant dealings with goods - 
would expose s90 to easy avoidance. Consider for example, the 
Matthews decision^ where a tax operating by reference to planting 
acres with chicory was held to be an excise. That case can be fitted 
into Kitto J's theory on the basis that planting with chicory has only 
one character and is an essential step in the producton of chicory. 
According to Kitto J’s theory, however, a tax on ploughing acres would 
not be an excise even in its operation on ploughing as part of a 
processof planting with chicory.
Kitto J's proposition requiring the tax in its terms be confined 
to relevant dealings with goods does not, moreover, follow from the 
fact that s90 is about the States' position vis-a-vis the 
Commonwealth. The fact that a State law may have a range of operations 
and effects seems insufficient to redeem it, if in one of its 
operations it has entered the field made exclusive to the 
Commonwealth. It could, in that field, be significantly interfering 
with the effectuation of the Commonwealth "fiscal policy".
Walsh J who joined the Court after the death of Taylor J 
participated in the second decision, Chamberlain. Walsh J gave strong 
support to Kitto J. Walsh J argued that unless the Court were to 
shuffle haphazardly from case to case, the formula adopted in Bolton v 
Madsen should be accepted and applied.
"Unless this Court sees fit in the future to reconsider the
statements of principles in Bolton v Madsen, its decision in this
case whether the duty has or has not the character of an excise
duty should be based upon the test by which the character of the
2duty is to be ascertained."
1 Above pp261ff.
2 Id. (1970) 121 CLR 1, 35
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The a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  B o l t o n  f o r m u la  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n v o l v e d  
i n  C h a m b e r l a in  was ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Walsh J  pu t  beyond any doub t  by t h e  
way i t  was a p p l i e d  i n  B o l t o n  i t s e l f  and by i t s  e x p l a n a t i o n  g i v e n  by 
i t s  a u t h o r ,  K i t t o  J ,  i n  A n d e r s o n .^
Walsh J  was i n  no d oub t  t h a t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  ( K i t t o )  d o c t r i n e  of
t h e  Cour t  meant  t h a t  he c o u ld  o n l y  h o l d  a t a x  t o  be an e x c i s e  i f  i t
o p e r a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  s o m e t h in g  which was a r e l e v a n t  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
2
g o ods .  I t  f o l l o w e d  m oreover  f rom t h o s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  f rom  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  B o l t o n  t h a t  a p r o v i s i o n  t a x i n g  a l l  
a c t i v i t i e s  of  p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d  ( c a r r i a g e ,  r e c e i p t  of  money) d i d  not  
t a k e  on a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of  c h a r a c t e r s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
s u r r o u n d i n g  t h a t  a c t i v i t y .  A t a x  c o u ld  o n l y  have  one p re d o m in a n t  
c h a r a c t e r  -  one c r i t e r i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y .  A t a x  o p e r a t i n g  by r e f e r e n c e  
t o  c a r r y i n g  c a p a c i t y  was a t a x  on c a r r y i n g  c a p a c i t y .  A t a x  o p e r a t i n g  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  a c t  of  r e c e i v i n g  money was a t a x  on t h e  a c t  of  
r e c e i v i n g  money. The f a c t  t h a t  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s  p e o p l e  who p a id  t a x  
on c a r r y i n g  c a p a c i t y  would be u s i n g  t h a t  c a p a c i t y  of  d i s t r i b u t e  goods 
on t h e i r  way t o  consumers  o r  t h a t  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s  p e o p l e  who p a id  
t a x  on t h e  a c t  of  r e c e i v i n g  money would be r e c e i v i n g  money as  payment  
f o r  goods s o l d  d i d  n o t  g i v e  t h e  t a x e s  i n  t h o s e  o p e r a t i o n s  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r  of  t a x e s  "on" g o o d s .
Walsh J  seemed t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  t h o s e  
members of t h e  Cour t  i n c l i n e d  t o  h o l d  t h e  t a x  i n v a l i d  when he  s a i d
” I f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t o  be r e g a r d e d  as  o v e r - r e f i n e d  t h e n  t h e  
t e s t s  which  have  been  a d o p t e d  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  o r  no t  a t a x  
i s  a  d u t y  of  e x c i s e  s h o u l d  be abandoned  or  m o d i f i e d .  I f  t h e y  be 
a c c e p t e d ,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h i s  c a s e  r e q u i r e d  a 
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  d u t y  p a y a b l e  . . .  i s  no t  a d u t y  of  e x c i s e . ”
1 I d . 3 5 - 3 7 .  Above p p 2 7 0 f f .
2 I d .  38.
3 I d .  42.
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That  i s ,  t o  h o l d  t h i s  t a x  i n v a l i d  a j u d g e  s h o u ld  e i t h e r  r e j e c t  t h e  
B o l t o n  f o r m u l a  o r  g i v e  good r e a s o n s  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e  B o l t o n  
d e c i s i o n .
Barwick  CJ abandoned  t h e  d e f e r e n t i a l  a p p r o a c h  t h a t  he had 
d i s p l a y e d  i n  A nderson  t o w a r d s  K i t t o  J  and h i s  f o r m u l a .  In  Anderson  
Barwick CJ had s a i d  t h a t  t h e  f o r m u l a  a p p ro v e d  i n  B o l t o n  v Madsen 
commended i t s e l f  t o  him and no a t t e m p t s  s h o u ld  be made t o  p a r a p h r a s e  
t h a t  a c c e p t e d  f o r m u l a .  In  C h a m b e r l a i n , h i s  Honour downgraded  and 
p a r a p h r a s e d  t h e  f o r m u l a  t h u s
" . . . t h e  p l a i n t i f f s  were p ro n e  t o  t r e a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  ’c r i t e r i o n  
of l i a b i l i t y ’ as  i t  i s  found  i n  j u d i c i a l  e x p o s i t i o n ,  a s  i f  i t  were 
a t e x t  w i t h  s t a t u t o r y  f o r c e  upon which  as  a f o u n d a t i o n  what might  
be t h o u g h t  t o  be l o g i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  c o u ld  be b u i l t .  But u s e f u l  
and o f t e n  d e f i n i t i v e  a s  such  g e n e r a l i z e d  e x p r e s s i o n s  may b e ,  t h e y  
m u s t ,  i n  my o p i n i o n ,  a lw a ys  be r e a d  and u n d e r s t o o d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
background  of  t h e  f a c t s  and c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of  t h e  c a s e  i n  which  
t h e y  were p ropounded  and as  c o n d i t i o n e d  and a t  t i m e s  l i m i t e d  by 
t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  a rg u m e n ts  which  p rompted  t h e i r  e x p r e s s i o n . r
The move was f rom  t h e  u n d e r m i n in g  a c t i v i t y  of A nderson  t o  d i r e c t  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  Howard c r i t i c i s e d  Barwick  CJ f o r  h i s  a t t a c k  on t h e  
B o l t o n  v Madsen f o r m u l a .  "T h is  was a d e p a r t u r e  f rom  t h e  unanimous 
s t a t e m e n t  of  p r i n c i p l e  i n  B o l t o n  v Madsen and i s  much t o  be r e g r e t t e d
b e c a u s e  i t  i m m e d i a t e l y  r e o p e n e d  i s s u e s  which  had a p p e a r e d  t o  be
2
s e t t l e d . "  Howard went on t o  a c c u s e  Barwick  J J  of  i n t r o d u c i n g
3
s u b j e c t i v e  q u e s t i o n s  of  d e g r e e  . In  Ba rw ick  C J ’s d e f e n c e  i t  needs  
t o  be p o i n t e d  o u t  f i r s t ,  t h a t  t h e  "B o l t o n " f o r m u l a  i t s e l f  r e q u i r e d  a 
s u b j e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  as  t o  which  of  a t a x ’s p r e c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  l i a b i l i t y  
was i t s  one c r i t e r i o n  of  l i a b i l i t y  ( t h e  o n l y  d i f f e r e n c e  was t h a t ,  as  
i n t e r p r e t e d  by K i t t o  J ,  t h e  B o l t o n  f o r m u l a  had  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
l i m i t a t i o n  t h a t  o n l y  a c o n d i t i o n  e x p r e s s l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  c o u ld  be t h e  
c r i t e r i o n  of  l i a b i l i t y ) ;  s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  t h e  B o l t o n  f o r m u la  d i d  no t
1 I d .  15.
2 C Howard, A u s t r a l i a n  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law (2nd e d ) ,  385.
3 I b i d
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g u a r a n t e e  any c e r t a i n t y  of r e s u l t .  Most of  t h e  j u d g e s  who were p a r t y  
t o  t h e  B o l t o n  unanimous  j o i n t  judgment  were a l s o  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
Dennis  H o t e l s  c a s e  where  K i t t o  J  had i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  f o r m u l a .  The 
d i v i s i o n  of  t h e  Cour t  i n  Denni s  H o t e l s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  K i t t o  J ’s 
f o rm u la  c o n t a i n e d  no p r e c i s e  c r i t e r i o n  of  v a l i d i t y .  I n  t h e  R e c e i p t s  
Tax Cases  t h e m s e l v e s ,  T a y l o r ,  M e n z ie s ,  Windeyer  and Owen J J ,  a l l  of  
whom had been  p a r t y  t o  t h e  B o l t o n  j o i n t  j u d g m e n t ,  a l l  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  
K i t t o  J , o n  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  t a x i n g  p r o v i s i o n s ) ^ ;  
t h i r d l y ,  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  i n  K i t t o  J ' s  f o r m u l a  t h a t  e a ch  t a x  can on ly  
have  one c h a r a c t e r  had  n o t  been  d i s c u s s e d  and was n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e  
r e a l l y  s e t t l e d  a t  a l l .
A l th o u g h  he  downgraded K i t t o  J ’s c r i t e r i o n  of  l i a b i l i t y ,  Barwick  
C J ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  t a x i n g  p r o v i s i o n  was i n v a l i d  d i d  no t  
r e q u i r e  a r e j e c t i o n  of  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  t e s t .  Barwick  CJ 
found  t h e  o f f e n c e  of  t h i s  t a x  i n  i t s  t e r m s ,  "The l a n g u a g e  of  t h e  
s t a t u t e  i s  c l e a r  e n o u g h . "  A c c o r d in g  t o  Barwick  CJ " t h e  c r i t e r i o n  
of  l i a b i l i t y  t o  pay t h e  t a x  w i l l  no t  be found  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  t h e  
v e r b a l  f o r m u l a e  of  t h e  s t a t u t e  . . .  t h e  b a s i s  of  l i a b i l i t y  can  o n l y  be 
a s c e r t a i n e d  by c o n s i d e r i n g  n o t  o n ly  how t h e  Act i s  e x p r e s s e d  bu t  how, 
t h r o u g h  t h o s e  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  i t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  and does  o p e r a t e . "  The 
g e n e r a l i t y  of  t h e  c e n t r a l  p r o v i s i o n  Act i m p o s in g  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  r e c e i v i n g  of  money and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Act c o u ld  
a p p l y  t o  t r a n s a c t i o n s  when no r e l e v a n t  d e a l i n g  w i t h  goods was i n v o l v e d  
d i d  no t  p r e v e n t  t h e  t a x  h a v i n g  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of  an e x c i s e  i n  i t s  
a p p l i c t i o n  t o  payments  which  were  i n  f a c t  payments  t o  a vendor  by a 
p u r c h a s e r  as  a  d i s c h a r g e  of  h i s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  t h e  ve ndo r  u n d e r  a 
c o n t r a c t  f o r  t h e  s a l e  of  go o d s ^ .
1 T h i s  p o i n t  i s  w e l l  made i n  " C u r r e n t  T o p ic s  -  S t a t e  F i n a n c e s  and 
t h e  E x c i s e  Power" (1969)  43 ALJ 597.
2 C h a m b e r l a in  (1970)  121 CLR 1, 16.
3 I d .  15.
4 I d . 16 -17 .  Windeyer  and Owen J J  came t o  t h e  same c o n c l u s i o n .  I d . 
29, 30, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  A l th o u g h  t h e  c e n t r a l  t a x i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  were 
n o t  d i r e c t l y  i n  i s s u e  i n  Hamers ley [No 1] Barwick  CJ made a 
s i m i l a r  comment a b o u t  them i n  t h a t  c a s e  (1969)  120 CLR 42,  55-56 .
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The c e n t r a l  t a x  o p e ra te d  by r e f e r e n c e  to  r e c e i p t  of money and
"The payment of money i s  never c o l o u r l e s s ,  nor i s  th e  r e c e i p t  of 
payment. I t  i s  a payment f o r  som eth ing  or of some d e f in a b le  k in d ,  
even i f  a g i f t  . .  each  and every  payment in  each and every  
c a te g o ry  of payments i s  in te n d e d  to  be s u b je c te d  to  th e  t a x  i f  
no t w i th in  an exem ption  in  th e  s c h e d u le ,  f o r  a l l  unexempted 
payments of money r e c e iv e d  a re  in te n d e d  to  be t a x e d ."
The p o in t  was s im p le .  The Act t a x e d ,  o p e ra te d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o ,  took  
as i t s  c r i t e r i o n  of l i a b i l i t y ,  th e  r e c e i p t  of money. The r e c e i p t  of 
money i s  sometimes p a r t  of an e s s e n t i a l  s t e p ,  s a l e ,  in  th e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of goods. This  r e a s o n in g  was adequa te  to  d is p o s e  of 
s101A as w e l l . ^
I t  has been argued  t h a t  Barwick C J 's  approach  was in  c o n f l i c t  w ith
3
th e  F a i r f a x  p r i n c i p l e  of c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  in  t h a t  Barwick CJ was 
going  beyond th e  te rm s of th e  Act to  c h a r a c t e r i s e  th e  t a x . ^  Once 
one acc ep ted  Barwick C J ’s assum ption  t h a t  payment of money i s  p a r t  of 
an e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  in  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of goods, th e n  th e  c o n c lu s io n  of 
Barwick CJ t h a t  th e s e  ta x e s  were in  t h e i r  te rm s o p e r a t in g  by r e f e r e n c e  
to  som eth ing  which i s  a r e l e v a n t  d e a l in g  w ith  goods was q u i t e  
c o n v e n t io n a l .^  The F a i r f a x  p r i n c i p l e  goes to  th e  problem of 
c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  a law as b e in g  w i th in  th e  g ra n t  of power in  s 5 1 ( i i ) .  
S e c t io n  90 in v o lv e s  a problem  of c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  a law as e n c ro a c h in g  
on a fo rb id d e n  f i e l d .  The g e n e r a l i t y  of S t a t e  laws o p e r a t in g  w i th in  a 
fo b id d en  f i e l d  does not save them when s52 and s !0 9  of th e
1 (1970) 121 CLR 1, 16.
2 Hammersley [No 1] (1969) 120 CLR 42, 56.
3 Above p p l l O f f .
4 PH Lane Case n o te  (1970) 4 4 ‘ALJ 169, 170. S im i l a r l y  MR Magarey, 
"E xcise  and R e c e ip ts  Tax" (1970) 3 A de la ide  L Rev 508, 512 who 
accu ses  Barwick CJ of lo o k in g  to  economic e f f e c t , and case  n o te  by 
GJ McC a t  (1977) 51 ALJ 780 e s p e c i a l l y  a t  780-781.
5 As f o r  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  t a x  would on ly  be a t t r a c t e d  when and i f
th e  s a l e  p r i c e  was r e c e iv e d ,  Barwick CJ s a i d :  "But to  say t h a t
a t a x  upon th e  a c t  by which a p u rc h a s e r  d is c h a rg e d  h i s  o b l i g a t i o s n  
to  a vendor under a c o n t r a c t  f o r  th e  s a l e  of goods i s  not a t a x  
upon th e  s a l e  i t s e l f  i s ,  in  my view, to  p la y  w ith  w o rd s ."
Hamersley [No 1] (1969) 120 CLR 42, 55.
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Constitution are involved. Nor does the generality of a provision 
save it under most theories of s92.
Logan Downs 1977
The Receipts Tax Cases ' results, in the end, depended on the 
majority's interpretation of the criterion of liability formula. The 
case of Logan Downs in 1977 gave an opportunity for Barwick CJ to 
develop his general approach to s90 characterisation and gave the 
Court an opportunity to reconcile the Matthews decision with the Kropp 
and Bolton decisions.
In Logan Downs Pty Ltd v Queensland * the High Court had to
2consider the validity of a tax imposed by the Queensland Stock Act.
The tax was an annual tax imposed and quantified by reference to 
ownership of "cattle, horses, sheep and swine" whether or not the 
owner himself had been involved in the "production" or "processing" of 
the animals and no matter for what purpose the animals were owned.
The plaintiff taxpayer, "owned large numbersof sheep and cattle, some 
pigs and some stock horses. The cattle were kept for fattening and 
sale of meat, or for breeding and only ultimately for sale for meat; 
the pigs for fattening for sale, some sows being used for breeding 
purposes and only ultimately being sold for meat, the sheep were kept 
for their wool and sooner or later for sale for meat. The horses wereqused for working the company's properties ..."
The case could have been taken by the Court as an opportunity to 
resolve or at least clarify the issues of characterisation. Was
1 (1977) 137 CLR 59.
2 It was argued that the money exacted which was paid into a Fund 
used to cover the expenses of administering the Act and providing 
husbandry services was a fee for services and therefore not a tax.
Id. 60. This argument received no support and the question was 
whether the tax was an excise.
3 Id. 59. In Matthews Dixon J had quoted ((1936) 60 CLR 263, 300- 
301), apparently with approval, a statement from the Privy Council 
in Attorney-General for British Columbia v Kingcome Navigation
Co [1934] AC 42, 59 to the effect that a dog tax is not an 
excise.
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Matthews to be accepted as deciding that a law operating by reference 
to something which is not part of a relevant dealing with goods could 
be held to be an excise because of the likely practical effect on a 
relevant dealing with goods, of taxing a connected activity? If 
Matthews did so decide, how was it to be reconciled with the decision 
in Bolton where a tax imposed by reference to carrying capacity was 
held not to be an excise despite the connection between carrying 
capacity and amount that could be distributed?
Did the reconciliation lie in the proviso of Dixon J in Matthews
that an excise was a tax affecting goods "as" articles of commerce or
manufacture?  ^ On this basis Matthews and Bolton could have been
reconciled even it it were accepted that they both operated by
reference to a relevant dealing with goods. In Bolton another element
in the quantification of the tax liability was distance travelled.
This could have been taken as an indication that the law was not
concerned with the goods as_ articles of commerce but rather as_ loads,
2relevant to wear and tear on roads. Was there some other 
3reconciliation?
The Court in Logan Downs divided three/three with Barwick CJ, 
Stephen and Mason JJ holding that the tax was an excise in some of its 
operations and Gibbs, Jacobs and Murphy JJ holding that the tax was 
not an excise in any of its operations. The Chief Justice’s opinion 
prevailed. The case was heard in Brisbane and was only argued for 
part of a day. The judgments were not handed down until eight months 
after the case was argued but do little more than state the 
protagonist’s positions. There is little in the way of thoroughgoing 
analysis or discussion of the opponents' viewpoint.
1 Abov ^«262-263.
2 The difficulty with that reconciliation is that the rate also 
varied according to the kind of goods being carried.
3 PH Lane suggested in his note of Bolton at (1963) 37 ALJ 267 that 
a possible distinction lay in the concern of s90 with the use of 
excise duties to encourage and discourage production of goods.
In Matthews the effect of the tax was to put a similar tax on all 
chicory. In Bolton only road transport of wool was taxed. Wool 
transported by rail, sea or air went untaxed.
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Murphy J  i n  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  m i n o r i t y  i n  f a v o u r  of u p h o ld in g  t h e  t a x ,  
c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  s90  was o n ly  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t a x e s  w i th  a ' t e n d e n c y  t o  
d i s c r i m i n a t e  be tw een  goods l o c a l l y  p ro d u ce d  and o t h e r  goods".'* ' His 
Honour c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  as t h e  t a x  a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  s t o c k  in  Q ueens land  
w h e th e r  i t  had  b een  p ro d u ce d  i n  Q ueens land  o r  n o t  and r e g a r d l e s s  of 
w here i t s  p ro d u c e  m igh t be u s e d ,  t h e  t a x  was i n o f f e n s i v e .  No o t h e r  
member o f  t h e  C ourt  gave any c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h i s  t h e o r y  o f  s 9 0 .
The o t h e r  two members of t h e  s t a t u t o r y  m i n o r i t y ,  Gibbs and Ja c o b s  
J J  a p p ro a c h e d  t h e  p ro b le m  much a s  K i t t o  J  m igh t have  d o n e .  T h is  t a x
was on o w n e r s h ip .  O w nership  i s  n o t  an e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  i n  p r o d u c t i o n .
2
The t a x  was t h e r e f o r e  n o t  on an e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  .
3
Gibbs J  n o te d  t h a t  M atthew s was o n ly  a m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n  and 
t h a t  B o l to n  v Madsen was a j o i n t  judgm ent of t h e  C o u r t . ^  One 
s u s p e c t s  t h a t  i f  h i s  Honour had had t o  choose  be tw een  t h e  two 
d e c i s i o n s  he would have  a c c e p t e d  t h e  j o i n t  judgm en t of t h e  C ou rt  i n  
B o l to n  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  mere m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n  i n  M a tth e w s .
N e v e r th e l e s s  h i s  Honour f e l t  no c o m p u ls io n  t o  choose  a s  he found  a way 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  M atthews t a x  from  th e  Q ueens land  s t o c k  t a x .  In  
M atthews a l t h o u g h  t h e  t a x  was q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  a c r e s  p l a n t e d  
r a t h e r  t h a n  amount p ro d u c e d ,  o n ly  p e o p le  who a c t u a l l y  p ro d u ce d  
s o m e th in g  were l i a b l e  t o  pay t a x .  The Q ueens land  s t o c k  t a x ,  t a x e d  a l l  
s t o c k  w h e th e r  u sed  f o r  p ro d u c e  o r  n o t . ^ T hat i s ,  Gibbs J  r e l i e d  on 
t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  o f  t h e  law j u s t  a s  K i t t o  J  had done i n  h i s  d i s s e n t  i n  
C h a m b e r la in .
J a c o b s  J  seemed t o  c o n te m p la t e  t h a t  even  i f  o n ly  p r o d u c e r s  had 
been l i a b l e  t o  pay t h e  s t o c k  t a x ,  i t  would s t i l l  n o t  have  been  an
1 (1977)  137 CLR 59, 84.
2 I d . 64-64 p e r  Gibbs J ,  i d . 82-83  p e r  Ja co b s  J .
3 IcL_ 66.
4 I d .  63.
5 I d .  66 -67 .
292.
excise.1 2345 This attitude of Jacobs J parallels the reasoning of Kitto
2J in Hamersley [No 1] .
Jacobs J spoke in terms of the "criterion of liability" of the 
•alegislation. Gibbs J was willing to acknowledge the existence of a 
difference of opinion as to the importance of the Bolton v Madsen 
formula. His Honour considered, however, that there was no doubt 
about the decision in the case which he took to be that a tax was only 
an excise if it was on a step in the production or distribution of 
goods. Both Gibbs and Jacobs JJ considered, that mere ownership was 
not the taking of an essential step.
Gibbs and Jacobs JJ stated flatly that the fact that some of the 
goods taxed might be on the course from production to consumption, did 
not make the tax on the ownership of those goods, pro tanto, an 
excise.^ Unfortunately the report of argument does not indicate 
whether the Court was referred to the decision in Chamberlain, and 
Gibbs J and Jacobs J did not refer to that case let alone make any 
attempt to reconcile it with their approach.^
Barwick CJ agreed with the conclusions and reasoning of Mason J 
who qualified the "criterion of liability" formula away to nothing. 
Mason J noted there was difficulty of reconciling the reasoning in 
Bolton v Madsen with the decision in Matthews. Mason J stated the 
problem thus. Was Matthews to be regarded as an isolated case, an 
aberration from the principle summarised in the criterion of liability
1 Id^ 82-83.
2 Above p280.
3 Id. 82.
4 Id. 67, 82-83 respectively.
5 Compare the decision, for the purposes of s92, that a law 
operating by reference to possession of kangaroo skins was held to 
be (Dixon) directly affecting the activity of inter-State trade in 
its application to the possession of skins in the course of inter­
state trade on the basis that the possession of the skins was 
inseparable from the activity of inter-State trade in the skins 
Fergusson v Stevenson (1951) 84 CLR 421.
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fo rm ula  of B o l to n ? His Honour concluded  t h a t  th e  cases  of 
1 2Dickenson and K a i l i s  in d i c a t e d  t h a t  on th e  c o n t r a r y ,  Mth e  
c r i t e r i o n  of l i a b i l i t y  fo rm u la te d  in  B o lton  v Madsen has l im i t e d  
a p p l i c a t i o n . . . ” . C h am b er la in , which in  some of i t s  a s p e c t s ,  seemed to  
be a more d i r e c t  c o n f r o n ta t i o n  to  th e  c r i t e r i o n  of l i a b i l i t y  fo rm ula  
th a n  would e i t h e r  of th e  ca se s  c i t e d ,  i s  not m entioned by Mason J .
The e s s e n t i a l  weakness of th e  " c r i t e r i o n  of l i a b i l i t y "  fo rm ula  as
3
a u n iv e r s a l  t e s t  cou ld  be t r a c e d ,  Mason J  argued  to  some rem arks of 
Dixon J  in  M atthew s. The passage  t h a t  Mason J  quo ted^  c o n ta in s  
comments to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  t e s t s  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  ta x e s  as e x c i s e s  
shou ld  be a p p l ie d  f l e x i b l y  so as not to  expose s90 to  easy  e v a s io n .
The passage  quo ted  a l s o  c o n ta in s  th e  words
"The t a x  must b ear  a c lo s e  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  p ro d u c t io n  or 
m a n u fa c tu re ,  th e  s a l e  or th e  consum ption of g o o d s . . . "
Mason J  used t h i s  p assag e  to  j u s t i f y  t r e a t i n g  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of 
a t a x  as  an e x c i s e  as  b e in g  a m a t te r  of th e  d eg ree  of c lo s e n e s s  of 
r e l a t i o n  of th e  a c t i v i t y  ta x e d  to  a r e l e v a n t  a c t i v i t y .  By add ing  to  
t h a t  background of vague p r i n c i p l e  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  th e  b a s a l  
concern  of s90 i s  p r o d u c t io n ,  Mason J  had no d i f f i c u l t y  in  
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  Dennis H o te ls  and B olton  v Madsen. Those ca se s  
in v o lv ed  ta x e s  on goods a f t e r  p ro d u c t io n .  As th e  b a s a l  concern  of s90 
i s  p ro d u c t io n ,  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of th e  t a x  to  p r o d u c t io n  w i l l  be more 
e a s i l y  p e rc e iv e d  when, as in  th e  case  b e fo re  him, th e  s u f f i c i e n c y  of 
c o n n ec t io n  w ith  p r o d u c t io n  i s  sought to  be made out d i r e c t l y  and not 
i n d i r e c t l y  th ro u g h  a c o n n e c t io n  w ith  s a l e  or d i s t r i b u t i o n .  The 
r e a s o n in g  of Mason J  and th u s  v i c a r i o u s l y  Barwick CJ, can be 
e p i to m ise d  as th e  k ind  of judgment Menzies J  might have d e l iv e r e d  i f  
he had had to  d e c id e  Logan Downs.
1 Below p p 2 9 5 ff .
2 Above p p 2 5 3 ff .
3 (1977) 137 CLR 59, 76-77.
4 (1938) 60 CLR 263, 304.
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The o th e r  member of th e  s t a t u t o r y  m a jo r i t y ,  S tephen  J  combined 
and a p p l ie d  Matthews and C ham berla in . C i t in g  Matthews -  "The t a x  has 
a t  l e a s t  a ' n a t u r a l 1 23, a l th o u g h  no t perhaps  always a 'n e c e s s a r y '  
r e l a t i o n  to  th e  q u a n t i t y  of th e  commodities produced and i s  upon an 
e s s e n t i a l  s te p  in  p r o d u c t io n " .^  And "This C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in  th e  
Cham berlain I n d u s t r i e s  Case a l s o  d is p o s e s  of any s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  
because  th e  t a x  imposed by th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  w i l l  not in  e v e ry  in s t a n c e  
be a du ty  of e x c i s e ,  f o r  exam ple, in  th e  case  of th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  s to c k  
h o r s e s ,  t h a t  shou ld  le ad  to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  i t  i s  no t in  any 
in s t a n c e  void  as  im posing a du ty  of e x c i s e :  see  e sp .  per  Barwick
CJ". His Honour ig n o red  th e  fo rm u la  in  B o l to n . The on ly  r e f e r e n c e  
made to  th e  case  i s  in  th e s e  te rm s .
" I t  i s  a t a x  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  th o s e  commodities and imposed 
a t  some s te p  in  t h e i r  p ro d u c t io n  b e fo re  re a c h in g  th e  hands of 
consum ers ."  B o lton  v Madsen (1963) 110 CLR 264, 271.
The use of th e  word " a t"  in  t h i s  way in v o lv e s  a r a t h e r  l a r g e  s h i f t  in  
meaning. In  B o lton  v Madsen, th e  Court was i n t e r e s t e d  no t in  th e  
q u e s t io n  a t  what tim e does th e  t a x  happen to  be in c u r r e d  but r a t h e r  by 
r e f e r e n c e  to  which even t i s  th e  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  imposed.
This s o r t  of d i r e c t  a p p l i c a t i o n  of Matthews and Cham berlain i s  
th e  k ind  of t h i n g  t h a t  we might have ex p ec ted  from Barwick CJ. The 
f a c t  t h a t  Barwick CJ chose to  adopt th e  re a so n s  of Mason J  r a t h e r  th an  
th o s e  of S tephen  J  may mean on ly  t h a t  Mason J  had c i r c u l a t e d  h i s  d r a f t  
and r e c e iv e d  Barwick C J 's  endorsem ent b e fo re  S tephen  J  c i r c u l a t e d .
In th e  r e s u l t  th e  case  s e t t l e d  none of th e  q u e s t i o n s .  Gibbs and 
Jacobs J J  k ep t  a l i v e  K i t to  J ' s  ap p ro ac h .  Mason J  w ith  th e  concu rrence  
of Barwick CJ r e v e r t e d  to  th e  P e te rsw a ld  d e f i n i t i o n - t a x  on p ro d u c t io n  
-  and adopted  th e  te c h n iq u e s  of Menzies J  which c o n f in e  each d e c i s io n  
of i t s  own f a c t s  and red u ce  th e  law to  u n c e r t a i n t y  and 
u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y .
1 _Id_!_ 70.
2 Id .  71.
3 (1977) 137 CLR 59, 70 em phasis added.
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(d) Characterising a tax as being on consumption
Dickenson's Arcade 1974
Some aspects of this case have already been considered'*’. Our
current interest is in the problem of characterising a tax as being
"on" consumption, for, of the Court of six, only McTiernan J
considered that consumption taxes are excise duties. Barwick CJ,
Menzies, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ all accepted that consumption
2taxes are not excise duties. These judges had to consider whether 
the tax before them was on consumption and therefore valid or on 
purchase and therefore an invalid excise. The case provided a very 
unsatisfactory exploration of the possibility for the States to raise 
revenue using consumption taxes.
The Tasmanian Act and regulations in issue were awkwardly and 
ambiguously drafted and it is not clear exactly what assumptions the 
judges were making about the meaning of the legislation and whether 
indeed, they were all making the same assumptions. The case is as 
notable for the points and arguments that were not dealt with, either 
by counsel or the Bench, as for the arguments that were considered.
Section 3 of the Tasmanian Act in issue imposed a tax on the 
consumption of tobacco. The section required further that the tax 
be paid within seven days of consumption. The section also referred 
to the possibility of tax being paid "in respect of" the consumption 
of tobacco without the tobacco having been consumed.
s3(5) Where the tax has been paid in respect of the consumption 
of any tobacco and, on application being made to him 
within three months of that tax being paid, the 
Commissioner is satisfied that that tobacco has not been, 
and wfl.1 not be, consumed, he shall refund the amount of 
that tax to the person by whom it was paid or, if he has 
died, his legal personal representative.
1 (1974) 131 CLR 177. Above pp237ff and p252ff.
2 Discussed above p237ff.
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There is no explanation on the face of the Act of how a person could 
pay tax "in respect of the consumption of any tobacco” before that 
tobacco had been consumed. Section 7 authorised the making of 
regulations forthe collection of the consumption tax and one must look 
to the regulation to "explain" the parent Act.
Regulation 2 gave an option for payments of tax to be made either 
to a collector before consumption or to the State Taxation 
Commissioner after consumption.'*' Regulation 2 was in these terms;
"(1) Subject to sub-regulation (2) of this regulation, payments 
of tax shall be mde to a collector or a person authorized by him 
to receive payments o?tax on his behalf.
(2) Where tobacco is consumed without the tax on the consumption 
thereof having been paid that tax shall be paid to the 
Commissioner.
(3) ..."
Regulation 3 of the 1972 Tobacco Regulations empowered the State 
Taxation Commissioner to appoint collectors. Regulation 4 prohibited 
the carrying on of a retail tobacco business unless the Commissioner 
had appointed a person to act as collected of tax for tobacco sold for 
consumption from those premises.
The power in Regulation 3 to appoint collectors was expressed to 
be "subject to these regulations". As Regulation 4 dealt in detail 
with the making of arrangements for people to act as collectors of the 
tax payable in respect of the consumption of tobacco sold from
1 Or at least this was the construction of regulation 2 assumed by 
Aickin QC (id. 183) defending the tax, not challenged by those 
attacking the tax and assumed by the members of the Court. (If 
the meaning assumed was intended then the regulation was expressed 
in a rather roundabout fashion. It seems particularly inapt to 
say that the obligation in subregulation (1) to do something 
before consumption was subject to the possibility of payment under 
sub-regulation (2) which could only happen after consumption.)
297.
particular premises, it would seem to be implied in the regulations 
that people could only be appointed collectors in relation to 
particular premises.*
Regulation 17 provided that where a person was in possession of 
tobacco, in respect of the consumption of which no tax had been paid, 
otherwise than for the purpose of sale or delivery to a person for 
sale, he had to give written notification of that fact to the 
Commissioner and provide details of the circumstances of his 
possession.
Barwick CJ held the Act (and thus, also, the regulations) invalid
as constituting a tax or purchase and therefore an excise. Mason J
held the Act to be a valid consumption tax but the regulations to be
ultra vires the Act in that they were attempting to convert the tax
into an invalid purchase tax. McTiernan J (who regarded consumption
2taxes as excise duties) held the Act and its regulation invalid.
These three, Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Mason JJ thus provided a 
statutory majority holding the regulations (but not the Act) invalid. 
The minority, Menzies, Gibbs and Stephen JJ, held the Act and the 
regulations valid.
The resolution of the question in this case - were these payments
excise duties - had more to do with the definition of tax than with
the principles of characterisation relevant to deciding which taxes
are excise duties. The issue was really - were payments made at the
time of purchase, taxes. Even though both the Act (s3(5) and the
regulations (eg regulation 2) labelled such payments as "taxes" they
need not have been so regarded for constitutional purposes. For
constitutional purposes a tax is a compulsory exaction of money for 
3public purposes.
1 Id. 243 per Mason J.
2 Id. 196.
3 Above p219.
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Deane QC a t t a c k i n g  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  came c l o s e  t o  t h e  m a t t e r  when
he a rg u e d  t h a t  paym ents  made a t  t h e  t im e  of  p u rc h a s e  were "com pu lso ry
e x a c t i o n s " ^ .  He drew  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s  on a
p u r c h a s e r  t o  pay a t  t h e  p o i n t  of p u r c h a s e  and th u s  a v o id  t h e
in c o n v e n ie n c e  o f  s e n d in g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  by r e g  17 and making
2
payment a f t e r  c o n s u m p t io n .  The c a se  o f  Homebush F lo u r  M i l l s  was
c i t e d .  In  t h a t  c a s e  i t  was h e ld  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l  c o m p u ls io n  i s
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  "c o m p u ls io n "  w hich  i s  p a r t  of t h e
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t a x a t i o n .  A ic k in  QC d e f e n d in g  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e p l i e d
o n ly  by p o i n t i n g  ou t  t h a t  t h e r e  was no c o m p u ls io n  a t  law  t o  pay a t  th e
3
p o i n t  of p u r c h a s e .
The s t a t u t o r y  m i n o r i t y ,  M e n z ie s ,  Gibbs and S te p h e n  J J ,  assum ed 
t h a t  t h e  l i k e l y  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  was t h a t  
p u r c h a s e r s  would o p t  t o  pay t h e  c o n su m p tio n  t a x  a t  t h e  p o i n t  of 
p u rc h a s e  r a t h e r  t h a n  go t o  t h e  t r o u b l e  of f i l l i n g  i n  t h e  fo rm s t h a t  
r e g u l a t i o n  17 r e q u i r e d  of  p e o p le  t a k i n g  p o s s e s s i o n  of t o b a c c o  w i t h o u t  
h a v in g  p a id  t h e  t a x  (and  of f i l l i n g  i n  t h e  f u r t h e r  p a p e rs  t h a t  
r e g u l a t i o n  2 (3 )  r e q u i r e d  f o r  p e o p le  p a y in g  a f t e r  c o n s u m p t io n ) .^  For 
t h e s e  ju d g e s  t h e  l i k e l y  b e h a v io u r  o f  p u r c h a s e r s  d id  n o t  change t h e  
l e g a l  n a t u r e  of t h e  t a x  im posed  by t h e  Act on c o n s u m p t io n ,  and t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  w hich  were m e re ly  a c o n v e n ie n t  mode of c o l l e c t i o n  of a 
v a l i d  t a x ,  d i d  n o t  d e p r i v e  t h e  t a x  o f  i t s  v a l i d i t y .  An im p o r ta n t  
p o i n t  f o r  t h o s e  ju d g e s  was t h a t  p e o p le  were n o t  u n d e r  co m p u ls io n  by 
law t o  pay a t  t h e  p o i n t  of  p u r c h a s e . ^
Only S te p h e n  J  t r i e d  t o  r e c o n c i l e  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  w i th  t h e  Homebush 
F lo u r  M i l l s  c a s e .  S te p h e n  J  s t a t e d  t h a t  n o t  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  c o m p u ls io n  
i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b r i n g  Homebush F lo u r  M i l l s  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n .  S te p h e n  J  
seemed t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  co m p u ls io n  was o n ly  s u f f i c i e n t  i f
1 I d ^  180-181 .
2 (1937)  56 CLR 390. Above p220 .
3 (1974 )  131 CLR 177, 183.
4 I d . 209 p e r  M enzies  J ,  215 p e r  Gibbs J ;  232 p e r  S te p h e n  J .
5 I d .  210 p e r  M enzies  J ,  224 p e r  Gibbs J ,  233 p e r  S te p h e n  J .
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t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  had c r e a t e d  th e  c o n te x t  of law s g e n e r a t i n g  th e  
p r a c t i c a l  c o m p u ls io n  i n  a way w hich  was " a r t i f i c i a l l y  and p u r p o s e l y  
onerous" . '* '  T h is  p r a c t i c a l  c o m p u ls io n  was n o t  " a r t i f i c i a l l y  and 
p u r p o s e ly  o n e r o u s " .  The o n e ro u s  pape rw ork  w hich  c o u ld  be a v o id e d  by 
p a y in g  a t  t h e  t im e  of p u r c h a s e  was s im p ly  a r e a s o n a b l e  way of 
a d m i n i s t e r i n g  t a x  on t h e  c o n su m p tio n  of t h i s  k in d  of  c o m m o d ity .“
A c a se  t h a t  c o u ld  have  been  c a l l e d  i n  a id  by t h e  d e f e n d e r s  of t h e  
t a x  was Moore v Commonwealth. To be t a x  an e x a c t i o n  must be " f o r  
p u b l i c  p u r p o s e s " .  I f  a payment i s  n o t  " f o r  p u b l i c  p u r p o s e s "  th e n  even 
i f  i t  i s  t o  governm en t and even  i f  i t  i s  a co m p u lso ry  e x a c t i o n ,  i t  i s  
n o t  a t a x .  In  Moore v The Commonwealth D ixon , Webb, F u l l a g a r  and 
K i t t o  J J  h e ld  t h a t  an e x a c t i o n  w hich  was t o  be a p p l i e d  t o  d i s c h a r g e  
f u t u r e  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  and f u t u r e  p r o v i s i o n a l  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  w i th  any 
e x c e s s  t o  be r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  " t a x p a y e r "  was n o t  an e x a c t i o n  f o r  p u b l i c  
p u rp o s e s  and t h e r e f o r e  was n o t  a t a x .  That d e c i s i o n  would have  seemed 
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  D ickenson  a s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  m i n o r i t y ’s 
i m p l i c i t  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  paym ents  made a t  t h e  t im e  of  p u r c h a s e  w ere  n o t  
t h e m s e lv e s  t a x e s  b u t  m e re ly  paym ents  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of a t a x  
l i a b i l i t y  l i k e l y  t o  be i n c u r r e d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .
The r e a s o n i n g  g iv e n  by Mason J  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  c o n c lu s i o n  t h a t  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n s  w ere  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  t u r n  t h e  A c t ’s v a l i d  c o n su m p tio n  t a x  
i n t o  a p u r c h a s e  t a x  was u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  w e a k .^  His Honour 
seemed t o  say  no more t h a n  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  u n d e r  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  
money was p a id  a t  t h e  t im e  of  p u r c h a s e  made i t  a t a x  on_ p u r c h a s e .  I t  
can p r o b a b ly  be i n f e r r e d  t h a t  H is Honour meant t h a t  t h e  money was 
b e in g  e x a c t e d  u n d e r  p r a c t i c a l  c o m p u ls io n  a t  t h e  p o i n t  of p u r c h a s e  and 
t h a t  p r a c t i c a l  c o m p u ls io n  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  co m p u ls io n  
i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t a x .  S u p p o r ta b l e  a s  such  a p o s i t i o n  m igh t be by
1 I d .  233.
2 Id^ 233-234.
3 (1951) 82 CLR 547. Ap->a n d,X.
4 I d .  243
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r e f e r e n c e  t o  Homebush F lo u r  M i l l s , i t  f a i l s  t o  answ er t h e  Moore v 
Commonwealth p o i n t  -  n o t  a l l  co m p u lso ry  e x a c t i o n s  a r e  t a x e s .  The 
d e f e n d e r s  of t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  o n ly  had t o  d e c id e  t h a t  one e le m en t  of 
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t a x  was a b s e n t  ( a t  t h e  t im e  of p u r c h a s e ) .  To h o ld  
t h e  payment was a t a x  (on p u r c h a s e )  Mason J  needed  t o  f i n d  t h a t  a l l  
t h e  e le m e n ts  o f  t a x  w ere  p r e s e n t  ( a t  p u r c h a s e ) .
Mason J  d id  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  t a x  was c a l c u l a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  " to  t h e
r e t a i l  s a l e  p r i c e " . ^  T h is  was n o t  a p p a r e n t l y  t h e  key  t o  t h e  o f f e n c e
of t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  as  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  b r i n g i n g  r e t a i l  p r i c e  i n t o  t h e
c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  was c o n ta i n e d  i n  s6  of  t h e  Act and
2
Mason J  h e ld  t h e  Act v a l i d .
B arw ick  CJ r e p e a t e d  p r o p o s i t i o n s  w hich  he had i n t r o d u c e d  i n  
e a r l i e r  c a s e s  -  e s p e c i a l l y  A nderson  and C h a m b e r la in .
"The q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  a  s t a t u t e  im poses  a d u ty  of e x c i s e  i s  a 
m a t t e r  of s u b s t a n c e  i n  w hich  i t s  i n t e n d e d  o p e r a t i o n  a s  w e l l  a t  i t s  
fo rm  i s  of i m p o r t a n c e . "
None o f  B arw ick  C J ' s  d e c i s i o n s  u n d e r  s9 0  had depended  on g o in g  beyond 
t h e  te rm s  of t h e  s u s p e c t  law and i n  t h e  e v e n t  he c la im e d  n o t  t o  have  
t o  go beyond t h e  m eaning  o f  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  h o ld  i t  i n v a l i d .
B arw ick  CJ found  w h im s ic a l  v i s i o n s  of t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w hich  
p e o p le  consume to b a c c o  " c ro w d in g  i n  upon h i s  m ind"^  What of t h e  
e l d e r l y  g e n t le m a n  i n  t h e  p a rk  who was g iv e n  some to b a c c o ?  Did t h e  Act 
i n t e n d  t o  t a x  h i s  c o n su m p tio n ?  S u r e ly  n o t .  B arw ick  CJ s t a t e d  f l a t l y  
t h a t ,  w h a te v e r  t h e  Act s a i d ,  he c o u ld  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  i n t e n d e d  t o
1 I d .  243.
2 S e c t i o n  3 o f  t h e  Act im posed t h e  c o n su m p tio n  t a x  a s  a p e r c e n ta g e  
of t h e  v a lu e  of to b a c c o  consumed. S e c t i o n 6  ( 1 )  p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e  
v a lu e  of to b a c c o  s h o u ld  be deemed t o  be " th e  p r i c e  a t  w hich  
to b a c c o  of t h a t  k in d  . . .  i s  o r d i n a r i l y  s o ld  by r e t a i l " .
3 I d .  186.
4 I d .  191.
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tax anyone but purchasers.^- Furthermore, his Honour continued,it
would be so difficult and uneconomical to collect other than at the
point of purchase, that the Act must be understood as intending that
the only tax collected should be tax collected in the way provided for
in the regulation - from the purchaser by the addition of the tax to
2the purchase price.
Barwick CJ reduced his conclusion to conventional language.
"Upon its proper construction, the Act imposes a tax not upon 
consumption of tobacco in any and all circumstances by any person, 
but only upon the consumption by or at the instance of a purchaser 
of tobacco purchased by retail."
That is, Barwick CJ claimed that he was not resting the invalidity 
of the tax on the practical effect of a law inoffensive in its terms. 
The law was, according to Barwick CJ, offensive in its terms (albeit 
in its implied terms) and the only difference between Barwick CJ and 
the statutory minority was, on this approach, in their understanding 
of what the Act meant.
Barwick CJ had said at the outset that the Court must look to the 
"intended operation" as well as the "form" of the legislation. If he 
merely meant by this that one must look to the implied terms as well 
as the express terms of the legislation then his judgment is quite 
unremarkable. Surely even Kitto J would have accepted that 
proposition.
Barwick CJ’s claim to orthodoxy was, however, an unjustified 
claim. Or to put it in his words, despite the orthodox "form" of his 
reasoning, the "substance" of his reasoning was quite unorthodox. 
Barwick CJ was claiming to rest his conclusion on the construction of 
the legislation. That conclusion was based, however, on a discussion 
of "intended operation" a phrase which Barwick CJ was using in a 
manner calculated to deceive the unwary.
1 Id. 192.
2 Id. 193.
3 Id. 193.
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The course that his Honour took, involved the following misleading 
use of the words "intended operation". It is an orthodox proposition 
that when one looks for the "intention" of legislation, one is 
concerned with the rights and obligations created by the legislation. 
The word "operation" is also usually used, in reference to 
legislation, to mean the rights and obligations created by the 
legislation. There was, therefore, nothing unorthodox in Barwick CJ 
describing an inquiry into the "intended operation" of legislation as 
an exercise in construction.'*' The shift however, came when he 
equated the "intention" of the legislation with the practical effect 
that Parliament expected the legislation would have. That is, his 
Honour seemed to equate the practical effect expected by the 
legislature with the legal rights and obligations intended by the 
legislature. These are two very different things. The mere fact that 
the Court might be able to decide that Parliament would have realised 
the difficulties in collecting from consumers after consumption is in 
no way conclusive that Parliament did not, nevertheless, "intend" to 
impose a tax liability on consumption.
The kind of "intended operation" that Barwick CJ is talking about 
seems to have an ancestor in Canadian indirectness and its adoption of 
JS Mill's definition of indirectness.
"Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in 
the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at 
the expense of another, such are the excise or customs."
In the context of applying that test, the character of indirectness 
was determined not by the "intended operation" in the sense of the 
rights and obligations created by a law, but rather by the "intended 
operation" in the sense of the practical effect that the legislature 
contemplated would flow from the rights and obligations it created by 
its law.
1 There were, indeed, strong arguments available on which one could 
have attacked the legislation in terms of the rights and 
obligations it created. See Appendix. Barwick CJ did not, 
however, advert to those specifics.
2 Above p226.
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The g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  of t h e  High Cour t  h a s  been t o  a v o i d  making t h e  
m o t i v e s  of P a r l i a m e n t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of  v a l i d i t y .  I f  Barwick  CJ wanted  
t o  i n t r o d u c e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  m o t i v e s  as  a r e l e v a n t  i n q u i r y  t h e n  i t  
wou ld ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t ,  have  been  more a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  do so by d i r e c t  
s t a t e m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  by u s i n g  o r t h o d o x  t e r m s  w i t h  an a l t e r e d  m ean ing .  
I f  h i s  Honour w ishe d  tomake p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  t h e  law i t s  c r i t e r i o n  
of  v a l i d i t y  t h e n  a g a i n  i t  would have  seemed more a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  say  
what he was d o i n g  o p e n l y .  I t  would a l s o  seem somwhat i n c o n g r u o u s  f o r  
Barwick CJ t o  a d o p t  t e c h n i q u e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  u s e d  i n  t h e  Canad ian  
c o n t e x t  when he had agreed'*'  t o  s e v e r i n g  t h e  l i n k i n g  of  ( A u s t r a l i a n )  
e x c i s e  and ( C a n a d ia n )  i n d i r e c t n e s s .
D -  C o n c l u s i o n s  o f  s 90  C h a p t e r
Barwick CJ h u f f e d  and p u f f e d  a b o u t  p r o t e c t i n g  s90  and n o t  a l l o w i n g  
i t  t o  be e a s i l y  e v a d e d .  A g a i n s t  h i s  own c r i t e r i o n  of  " p r o t e c t i n g "  
s 9 0 ,  h i s  p e r f o r m a n c e  was ,  h o w e v e r ,  p a t c h y .
Barwick  CJ was p a r t  of  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n  C h a m b e r l a in  h o l d i n g  t h a t  a 
Stamp Act a p p l y i n g  t o  a l l  r e c e i p t s  of  money ( e x c e p t  t h o s e  e x p r e s s l y  
e xem pted )  was p r e v e n t e d ,  by s 90  from a p p l y i n g  t o  payments  r e c e i v e d  by 
t h e  p l a i n t i f f  f o r  t h e  s u p p l y  of  g o ods .  Some may r e g a r d  t h a t  v i c t o r y  
as  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n c l u d e d  Menzies  
J .  Menzies  J  had  p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d  h i s  l a c k  of  e n t h u s i a s m  f o r  t h e  
e x t e n s i o n  of  " e x c i s e "  made by t h e  P a r t o n  d e c i s i o n  and had u p h e ld  t a x e s  
on r e c e i p t s  i n  H am ers ley  [No 1 ] , There  i s  no i n d i c a t i o n ,  how ever ,  
t h a t  M enzies  J* v o t e  f o r  i n v a l i d i t y  i n  C h a m b e r l a in  was a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  
t h e  f o r c e f u l n e s s  of  Barwick  C J ’s r e a s o n i n g .
There  a r e  some i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  Barwick  CJ h i m s e l f  d i d  no t  r e g a r d  
t h e  C ha m b e r l a in  d e c i s i o n  as  e s t a b l i s h i n g  any i m p o r t a n t  b a s a l  p r i n c i p l e  
of  s 9 0 .  In  t h e  Logan Downs d e c i s i o n  when C h a m b e r l a in  seemed t o  be i n  
p o i n t ,  Barwick CJ,  a l t h o u g h  p a r t  of  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  m a j o r i t y  h o l d i n g  t h e  
t a x  i n v a l i d ,  d i d  n o t  r e l y  on C h a m b e r l a i n . Barwick  C J ’s e n t h u s  ia sm  i n  
C ha m be r la in  f o r  i n v a l i d a t i n g  t h e  t a x  i n v o l v e d  may in d e e d  be
1 Above p 2 2 9 f f .
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a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  th e  ana logy  t h a t  he drew between th e  r e s p e c t i v e  
e f f e c t s  of s90 and s92 on th e  t a x  q u e s t i o n .  Around th e  same tim e as 
Cham berlain was d e c id e d ,  Barwick CJ was in  th e  m in o r i ty  when th e  same 
l e g i s l a t i o n  was h e ld  to  be co m p a tib le  w ith  s92 .
Barwick CJ was a l s o  p a r t  of th e  s t a t u t o r y  m a jo r i ty  in  Dickenson *s 
Arcade h o ld in g  r e g u l a t i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  c o l l e c t i n g  a t a x  on 
consum ption to  be o f f e n s iv e  to  s90 .  Again t h i s  was h a rd ly  a Barwick 
v i c t o r y .  Apart from th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Court s p l i t  t h r e e  t h r e e ,
Barwick CJ in  no way dom inated th e  o th e r  members of th e  s t a t u t o r y  
m a jo r i t y ,  McTiernan and Mason J J .  McTiernan J  in  f a c t  was, on t h i s  
o c c a s io n ,  more r e s o l u t e  t h a t  Barwick CJ in  p r o t e c t i n g  s9 0 .  McTiernan 
J  h e ld  t h a t  t h e r e  was no re a s o n  f o r  exem pting comsumption t a x e s  from 
s9 0 .  D esp i te  th e  absence  of any th e o ry  f o r  exem pting consumption 
t a x e s  and d e s p i t e  th e  absence  of any d e c i s i o n  exem pting  consum ption 
ta x e s  Barwick CJ bowed to  th e  " w e ig h t” of d i c t a  and a c c e p te d  th a t  
exem ption . His Honour compensated to  some d eg ree  by going  on to  f in d  
th e  t a x  b e fo re  him, d e s p i t e  th e  g e n e r a l i t y  of i t s  te rm s ,  on ly  in te n d e d  
to  ap p ly  to  p u rc h a s e r s  and was t h e r e f o r e  an i n v a l i d  t a x  on p u rc h a s e .  
This  c o n c lu s io n  was n a rro w ly  based on th e  n a tu re  of to b a cco  and 
p r a e n t s  no g e n e r a l  t h r e a t  by Barwick CJ to  consum ption t a x e s .  Even in  
t h a t ,  Barwick CJ f a i l e d  to  c a r r y  th e  t h i r d  member of th e  m a jo r i t y ,  
Mason J .  Mason J  c o n s id e re d  th e  Act im posing th e  t a x  to  be what i t  
p u rp o r te d  to  be ,  a t a x  on consum ption and t h e r e f o r e  exempt from s90 . 
Mason J  c o n s id e re d  t h a t  th e  r e g u l a t i o n s  p ro v id in g  f o r  c o l l e c t i o n  were 
i n v a l i d  because  th e y  tu rn e d  th e  ( v a l i d )  consum ption t a x  in t o  an 
i n v a l i d  t a x  on p u rc h a s e .
Barwick C J 's  la c k  of r e s o l u t i o n  was of g r e a t e s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  
th e  a re a  of t im e - la g g e d  t a x e s .  The f i r s t  tim e t h a t  any s i g n i f i c a n c e  
had been a t t a c h e d  to  a t i m e - l a g  in  a t a x  was in  th e  Dennis H o te ls  
d e c i s i o n .  In  t h a t  case  fo u r  of th e  seven ju d g es  in v o lv ed  had h e ld  th e  
annua l  l i q u o r  l i c e n c e  fe e  which was c a l c u l a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  to  
p u rch ases  f o r  s a l e  on th e  l i c e n s e d  p rem ises  made in  an e a r l i e r  p e r io d  
no t to  be an e x c i s e .  The m a jo r i t y  was com prised of F u l l a g a r , K i t t o ,
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Taylor and Menzies JJ. Fullagar J did not rely on the time-lag at 
all. Kitto, Taylor and Menzies JJ did think the time-lag significant. 
Kitto and Taylor JJ in particular, however, made it plain that they 
considered the time-lag just another factor indicating that the fee 
was in substance part of the traditional framework for regulating 
liquor outlets. Their Honours would have also upheld the temporary 
licence which was not time-lagged. Their reasoning depended very much 
on the special nature of liquor. In HC Sleigh Jacobs J drew attention 
to that aspect of the majority reasoning in Dennis Hotels but found 
himself the only member of the Court willing to distinguish and 
confine Dennis Hotels on that basis. Barwick CJ had, on the authority 
of Dennis Hotels, already accepted the time-lagged tax on retail sale 
of tobacco in Dickenson's Arcade and accepted the time-lagged tax on 
wholesale of petrol in HC Sleigh.
Barwick CJ also gave no support to the possibility for confining 
Dennis Hotels suggested by the Kailis decision invalidating a time- 
lagged tax on acquisition of fish for processing. In that case Mason 
J expressly distinguished Dennis Hotels on the basis that the Kailis 
fee was imposed on the production stage. Menzies J did not 
expressly distinguish Dennis Hotels on that basis but held this tax to 
be an excise despite the time-lag. The clear inference is that 
Menzies J considered time-lagging just another factor to be considered 
in his inquiry of whether a tax was in substance remote from or on 
producton. Barwick CJ was not involed in Kailis. When in HC Sleigh 
Mason J himself distinguished the tax in issue, a time-lagged tax on 
wholesalers' turnover, from Kailis on the basis that it was not on 
production, Barwick CJ simply treated the case as being covered by 
Dennis Hotels. Allowing time-lagged taxes, as Barwick CJ did, allows 
s90 to be set at nought in relation to State taxation of any commodity 
which in its nature tends to be sold by continuing businesses.
And what of Barwick CJ's contribution to providing a theoretical 
framework for s90? He stated a willingness to look to the purpose 
of s90 at three levels. First in defining with which dealings with
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goods s90 is concerned. Secondly in characterising taxes as being on 
relevant dealings. Thirdly, to find an offence to s90 in a law’s 
practical effect.
Barwick CJ’s theory can perhaps be drawn together thus. A tax 
will constitute an excise duty if it is imposed by reference to 
something which is an essential step, or is part of an essential step 
in the production, distribution or movement of goods into consumption. 
(Taxes on consumption are tolerated out of deference to the views of 
others.) A tax can have more than one character arising from its 
different conditions of liability. A tax can also have more than one 
character arising from the distributive operations of one condition of 
validity. Barwick CJ also threatened to invalidate taxes (query any 
law) which even if not an excise within the tests already stated has 
the same practical effect as an excise. Barwick CJ claimed not to 
have needed to rest any decision on the basis of its practical effect 
though he seems, despite his protestations, to have been doing so in 
Dickenson’s Arcade.
Barwick CJ’s theory should be contrasted with Kitto J ’s and 
Menzies J’ approaches. For Kitto J a tax could only be an excise if 
it expressly referred to an essential step in production, distribution 
or movement into consumption and the law was concerned with that step 
as a step in manufacture or commercial dealing. A tax could only have 
one character. Thus, however many conditions precedent to liability a 
tax had, only one condition could be the criterion of liability giving 
the tax its one character. Furthermore, a tax could not be given 
different characters in thedistributive operations of one condition of 
liability. In comparison with Barwick CJ, Kitto J put a premium on 
drafting ingenuity and leaves s90 with little scope.
For Menzies J the question was not whether the tax was on any 
dealing from production through to the movement of the goods into 
consumption but solely whether the tax was on production. This is a 
question of degree, fact and substance. Whereas Kitto J put an
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emphasis on th e  form of th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  and th u s  on d r a f t i n g  
in g e n u i ty ,  Menzies J  looked  a t  a l l  th e  r e l e v a n t  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  of th e  
case  and th u s  in t ro d u c e d  u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y .  Barwick C J ’s fo rm ula  
tended  to  be in  between th e  K i t to  and M en z ie s ’ t h e o r i e s  u n t i l  Logan 
Downs when Barwick CJ ag reed  w ith  th e  judgment of Mason J  which 
adop ted  Menzies J f th e o r y .
The t a b l e  of v o t in g  p a t e r n s  on s90 i s s u e s  s e t  out in  an Appendix 
shows th e  v o t in g  beh av io u r  in  ca se s  in v o lv in g  th e  c o m p a ta b i l i ty  of 
t a x e s  w i th  s90 when Barwick CJ was p a r t  of th e  C o u r t .  The sample i s  
q u i t e  sm a ll  and no c l e a r  in f e r e n c e s  can be drawn from i t .  The 
fo l lo w in g  p o in t s  a re  w orth  m e n tio n in g .
Barwick CJ was in  th e  m a jo r i t y  in  th e  c o n c lu s io n  f o r  each of th e  
e ig h t  t a x e s  c o n s id e r e d .  Of th e  s i x  o c c a s io n s  when th e  Court d iv i d e d ,  
i t  was ev en ly  s p l i t  on t h r e e  o c c a s io n s  w i th  Barwick C J’s c a s t i n g  v o te  
as Chief J u t i c e  d e c id in g  th o s e  c a s e s .  On a n o th e r  o c c a s io n  Barwick 
C J ’s v o te  p ro v id ed  th e  m a jo r i t y  f o r  a f o u r / t h r e e  d e c i s i o n .  That i s  to  
s a y ,  of th e  s i x  o c c a s io n s  when th e  Court d iv id e d ,  B arw ick 's  v o te  
d e te rm ined  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  of th e  case  on fo u r  o c c a s io n s .  In th e  o th e r  
two ca se s  when th e  Court d iv id e d  McTiernan J  was th e  lone  d i s s e n t i e n t  
in  one and Jacobs J  th e  lone  d i s s e n t i e n t  in  th e  o t h e r .  On each of 
th e s e  two o c c a s io n s  th e  lone  d i s s e n t i e n t  would have h e ld  i n v a l i d  a t a x  
which th e  m a jo r i ty  ( in c l u d in g  Barwick CJ) a c c e p te d .
W indeyer, Owen and Mason J J  who each s a t  w ith  Barwick CJ on fo u r  
cases  in v o lv in g  s90 c h a l le n g e s  ag reed  w ith  Barwick CJ on each 
o c c a s io n .  The b a re  f i g u r e s  do no t i n d i c a t e  t h a t  any of Barwick C J ’s 
b r e th r e n  had had a c l e a r  cu t p ro p e n s i ty  to  d i s a g r e e  w ith  him. On each 
o c c a s io n  when e i t h e r  K i t t o ,  M enzies, Walsh, G ibbs, S tephen  or Murphy 
J J  d is a g re e d  w ith  Barwick CJ, t h a t  ju d g e  was in  fav o u r  of u p ho ld ing  a 
t a x  t h a t  Barwick CJ c o n s id e re d  i n v a l i d .  These f i g u r e s  r e v e a l  t h a t  
Barwick CJ has been s l i g h t l y  more i n c l in e d  to  ho ld  ta x e s  o f f e n s iv e  to  
s90 th a n  have th e  o th e r  ju d g e s  in v o lv e d .  The f i g u r e s  do n o t ,  however, 
mark Barwick CJ as an e x t r e m i s t .  For exam ple, he not on ly  d i s a g re e d
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with McTiernan J and Jacobs J in holding invalid taxes that they 
considered valid, but also in holding valid, taxes that they 
considered invalid.
The most significant feature of this outline of voting behaviour 
remains the extraordinary division of the Court into four against 
three in one case and three against three in three cases. That 
division is symptomatic of the failure of the Court not only to 
resolve but also to analyse, fundamental issues.
The confusion within the Court generally and the key to Barwick 
CJ’s lack of resolution in defending the purpose of s90 and the 
related vagueness of his position on a theory of s90 may ultimately be 
the aspect of s90 discussed at the start of this chapter. It is not 
at all clear exactly why the Founders prohibited the imposition of 
excise duties, and it is quite clear that the presence of the word 
"excise" in s90 was not a particularly logical basis for a division of 
power over economic management.
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Chapter VI: Section 92
Section 92 is the most frequently litigated provision of the 
Constitution. It provides -
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, 
and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal 
carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.
(The Section also contains transitional provisions relating to customs 
duties on goods imported before the imposition of uniform duties of 
customs.)
The key to the difficulty of s90 has been that its specific 
provisions do not readily fulfil any of the purposes which have been 
suggested as underlying or ’explaining” s90. The essential difficulty 
of s92 is its generality. Section 92’s language is general enough 
(and incomplete enough) to be filled out by reference to any of the 
purposes which have been put forward as underlying the section.
A. Section 92?s issues
On the face of s92 two main inquiries present.
What kind of freedom is guaranteed to "trade, commerce and 
intercourse among the States"? and
What is "trade, commerce and intercourse among the States"?
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If it is added that it was early established as part of the answer to 
the first inquiry that s92 was intended to give freedom from certain 
kinds of government action^ then the third main level of inquiry 
arises.
When will legislative or executive action be said to be affecting
"trade, commerce and intercourse among the States”?
Perceptions of the purpose of s92 have most relevance to the first
constructional issue - the kind of freedom guaranteed by s92. There
has been disagreement amongst the Judiciary about the purpose of s92.
If the High Court were to look to the evidence of the Convention
Debates then I agree with Beasley that it would find that that
evidence indicates that s92 was intended to establish free trade
2between the States. The High Court has hitherto denied itself 
access to such material to solve the constructional issues of s92.
The three constructional issues interact to determine the reach of 
s92. It is not possible to understand a particular judge's position 
in relation to s92 without knowing his position in relation to each of 
the three issues. In some formulations which have been proposed over 
the years the inquiries, especially the first and third inquiries, 
merge. The judicial options for each inquiry are now briefly 
outlined.
1 In Pilkington v Frank Hammond Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 124, 198-199 
(Emphasis added) Jacobs J suggested that s92 might control the 
actions of private citizens as well as governments when he said. 
"In particular s92 created not only the economic but also the 
social entity. No act of legislature, executive, corporation or 
individual was, after imposition of uniform duties of customs, to 
be able to fragment the newly created Commonwealth in its economic 
and social aspects."
See also Duncan's Case (1916) 22 CLR 556, 619 per Isaacs J.
2 Appendix
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(i) What kind of freedom is s92 guaranteeing?
This is the most difficult issue and the one that takes the Court 
furthest from traditional legal formulae and techniques and more into 
political and philosophical concepts.
The main alternatives are -
1 Freedom from pecuniary imposts. There is a case for this
interpretation but it has had little support. In Duncan v
Queensland  ^Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ acknowledged the
strength of the arguments supporting this interpretation but
accepted the rejection of this interpretation by their
brethren who had been members of the Constitution Drafting
2Conventions. This narrow theory seemed to be defunct
until Murphy J adopted it with the further limitation that
3only discriminatory financial imposts offended s92.
2 Free Trade. For economists the expression free trade is a 
term of art which connotes a freedom from protectionist 
action.^ Against this background s92 can be understood to
1 (1916) 22 CLR 556, 639.
2 In argument in James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1, 26 RG Menzies 
confessed that if the matter were free from authority he would 
support this narrow notion of s92's freedom. Lord Wright of 
Durley argued for the adoption of this interpretation in "Section 
92-A Problem Piece" (1954) 1 SLR 145.
3 Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110, 132-133; HC Sleigh Ltd v South 
Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475, 527.
4 It is theoretically possible that a burden could be imposed on an 
inter-State aspect of a trading activity without that having a 
protectionist effect. For example, a tax on the introduction to a 
State of commodities which have no local competitors, ex 
hypothesi, provides no protection for local producers. Such 
examples are rare. Even a Tasmanian tax on pineapples provides 
protection albeit difficult to detect, for the foodstuffs which 
Taswegians substitute for pineapples. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to equate free trade with a freedom from interferences 
conditioned on the connection of an activity with more than one 
State.
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be d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  t r a d e  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e  among t h e  
S t a t e s  s h a l l  be a b s o l u t e l y  f r e e  o f  c o n t r o l  imposed on such  
a c t i v i t i e s  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e i r  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  more t h a n  
one S t a t e ,  t h a t  i s ,  f r e e  of  a c t i o n  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  a g a i n s t  
i n t e r - S t a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .
T h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  r e c e i v e d  t h e  s u p p o r t  of  G r i f f i t h  CJ i n
Duncan v Queens la nd   ^ and Gavan Duf fy  J  i n  W & A McArthur
2
Ltd v Q ueens land  and o f  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  E v a t t  i n  h i s  
s u b m i s s i o n s  t o  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  t h e  Bank N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
C a s e . As a J u s t i c e  o f  t h e  High Cour t  E v a t t  a l s o  t a l k e d  
a b o u t  f r e e  t r a d e  bu t  gave i t  a d i f f e r e n t  meaning t o  t h a t  s e t  
o u t  h e r e . ^
3 Freedom f rom  S t a t e  A c t i o n . The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Supreme Cour t
h a s  drawn from t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  t h e  C o n g r e s s ’s commerce power 
an i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i s  f r e e  o f  S t a t e  l a w s .  
T h i s  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  need  f o r  u n i f o r m i t y  of  economic  r e g u l a t i o n .  ( T h i s  
i m p l i e d  p r i n c i p l e  of  n a t i o n a l  u n i f o r m i t y  i s  no t  a b s o l u t e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  and can  be o f f s e t  by a s u f f i c i e n t  S t a t e  
i n t e r e s t . ) ^
There  a r e  r e f e r e n c e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
C o n v e n t io n  D e b a te s  t o  p r i n c i p l e s  of  e q u a l i t y  o r  u n i f o r m i t y  of 
t r a d e . ^  Only once h a s  a High Court  J u s t i c e ,  I s a a c s  J  i n
1 (1916)  22 CLR 556,  574, 580-581 .
2 (1920)  28 CLR 530, 568-569 .
3 (1949)  79 CLR 497.  Below p p 3 4 0 f f .
4 Below p p 3 1 8 f f .
5 Cooley v Board o f  P o r t  Wardens 12 How 299 (US 1 8 5 1 ) %
6 S90 C h a p t e r  and a p p e n d i x
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Exp Nelson, expressed the view that s92 frees inter-State 
trade from all State laws.^ This view was based on the 
assumption that s92 did not bind the Commonwealth, an 
assumption which was rejected by the Privy Council in James v 
The Commonwealth in 1936. Of course, to deny to the 
States power to regulate inter-State trade does not result in 
national uniformity of economic regulation. It results only 
in national uniformity in the regulation of inter-State 
trade. The diversions of trade which might occur from that 
discrimination between inter- and intra-State trade could 
well result in a damaging misallocation of the nation’s 
resources.
4 Freedom from all Government control. No judge has ever 
argued that s92 establishes anarchy.
5 Ordered freedom for individual inter-State traders as 
individuals/laissez-faire freedom for individual inter-State 
traders. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States each declare, inter alia, 
that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law ..." For a period from 
the 1890s running well into the twentieth century the United 
States Supreme Court found in that guarantee of due process,
a laissez-faire standard of reasonableness against which both
3Federal and State controls of trade were measured.
1 (1928) 42 CLR 209, 224, 242.
2 (1936) 55 CLR 1.
3 Schwartz, Constitutional Law (2nd ed), Chapter 6. PE Nygh, "The 
Police Power of the States in the United States and Australia", 
(1967) 2 FL Rev 183, 183-187 discusses the doctrine of Police 
Power which performed a similar function in relation to State 
action before the Fourteenth Amendment made the States subject to 
the due process requirement.
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An individual liberty basis for s92 was first set out clearly 
in the dissenting judgments of Barton and Isaacs JJ in Duncan 
v Queensland.  ^ The individual liberty interpretation was 
fundamental to the important theories of Dixon and Barwick.
6 Freedom from interferences incompatible with federalism. The 
federal nature of the document in which s92 appears might 
support such an approach. The American balance between 
national and State interests referred to under heading (3) 
above, is clearly a federal solution. There is, however, no 
universal definition of federalism and no particular 
definition of freedom can be said to be inexorably dictated 
by the federal context. Most would agree that federalism 
required "free trade" (as defined above), but beyond that 
there is room for disagreement. Barwick CJ argued that his 
individual liberty interpretation was dictated by the federal
3principle of the Constitution.
7 Freedom as defined by precedent. I add this interpretation 
to make the point that a judge may feel obliged to follow 
decisions based on a definition of freedom that he does not 
necessarily accept and may indeed feel obliged to fashion 
some hybrid definition of freedom to encompass both his own 
definition and the decided cases.
Precedent may not, of course, uniformly manifest any one 
particular definition of freedom. A judge committed to 
"following" the decided cases could easily find himself 
applying a "definition" of freedom which consists of a 
collection of unconnected rules.
1 (1916) 22 CLR 556, 592-593 per Barton J; 619-621 per Isaacs J.
2 DJ Rose, "Federal Principles for the Interpretation of s92 of the 
Constitution" (1972) 46 ALJ 371. The essence of this approach is 
suggested by KH Bailey, "Inter-State Free Trade" (1932) 6 ALJ 248, 
249.
3 Samuels v Readers Digest Assoc Pty Ltd (1969) 120 CLR 1, 14.
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I have made the above list to identify what I see as the main 
possible interpretations of "free". No matter what definition of 
freedom is adopted it is always open to argue that it is only a prima 
facie principle which can be displaced by necessity (or some lesser 
justification.)^ Some judges, Evatt J and Mason J for example, have 
spent more time talking about the acceptable bases for interferring 
with inter-State trade, than they have in identifying s92fs prima 
facie freedom. No definition of freedom is complete until both 
offensive burden and justifiable interference are indicated.
(ii) What is inter-State trade?
This is, conceptually, the easiest of the three inquiries 
involving straightforward case by case definition. In its nature it 
does not involve the development of general principles.
(iii) When will government action be said to be on inter-State 
trade?
The issues under this heading are manifold. Is the test effect or 
purpose or both? If the test is "effect", is it only legal effect 
that is relevant or can practical effect be taken into account as 
well? If legal effect is the test, is that to be determined solely by 
asking whether a law operates by reference to something which is part 
of inter-State trade or is the inquiry into the pith and substance of 
the law?
If the test is purpose, how is the purpose to be ascertained? If 
the prima facie test is effect, can government action prima facie 
offensive because of its effect on inter-State trade be redeemed 
because of its purpose?
1 Compare the comments of Stephen J on judicial options in Permewan 
Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt (1979) 27 ALR 182, 194-195.
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These t h e n  a r e  t h e  g e n e r a l  i s s u e s  which i n t e r a c t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e
r e a c h  of  s 9 2 .  On B a r w i c k ' s  e n t r y  t o  t h e  s92  l i s t s  as  c o u n s e l  i n
1945,* t h e  s c e n e  was s e t  f o r  a c o n t e s t  be tw een  t h e  t h e o r y  of  Dixon
J  on one s i d e  a n d ,  on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e ,  t h a t  of  E v a t t  who had been a
j u s t i c e  of  t h e  High Cour t  t h r o u g h  t h e  1930’s bu t  who was Commonwealth
2
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  by t h i s  s t a g e .
B. The Theory o f  Dixon J
The t h e o r y  of  Dixon J  owed a g r e a t  d e a l  t o  t h e  judgment  of  I s a a c s
3
J  ( d i s s e n t i n g )  i n  Duncan ’s c a s e  and t h e  j o i n t  judgment  of  Knox CJ, 
I s a a c s  and S t a r k e  J J  i n  McArthur  ’s c a s e . ^  In  h i s  f i r s t  s92  c a s e  as  
a member of  t h e  High C o u r t Peanut  Board v Rockhampton Harbour  
Boa rd ,  Dixon J  d e c l a r e d  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  s92  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
g u a r a n t e e i n g  a f r e e d o m  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f rom government  
r e s t r a i n t . ^  ( I n  so d e c l a r i n g ,  Dixon J  n o t e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g
1 G ra tw ic k  v Johnson  (1945)  70 CLR 1 Below p p 3 3 0 f f ;  Airways  Case 
(1945)  71 CLR 29 Below p p 3 3 3 f f .
2 The p r e - 1 9 4 5  d e v e lo p m e n t s  a r e  w e l l  summari sed  and a n a l y s e d  by PE 
Nygh, "The Concept  of  Freedom i n  I n t e r s t a t e  Trade"  (1967)  5 UQLJ 
3 1 7 ,3 3 3 - 3 4 0 .  A lso  G S a w e r , "The P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  The High Cour t  and 
S e c t i o n  92" (1947)  1 RJ 155.
3 Duncan v Q ueens land  (1916)  22 CLR 556, 6 0 5 f f .
4 W & A McArthur  v Queens la nd  (1920)  28 CLR 530,  5 3 9 f f .
5 S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  h i s  a p p o in t m e n t  t o  t h e  Cour t  i n  1929 Dixon had had 
an o p p o r t u n i t y  as  c o u n s e l  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  High Cour t  on s92  when 
b r i e f e d  t o  d e f e n d  s 20  of  t h e  Sou th  A u s t r a l i a n  Dr ied  F r u i t s  Act i n  
James v Sou th  A u s t r a l i a . He a p p a r e n t l y  a t t e m p t e d  t o  d e fe n d  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  (and a t t e m p t e d  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y )  s o l e l y  on t h e  b a s i s  of 
a s u g g e s t e d  l a c k  of  High Cour t  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  (1927)  40 CLR 1, 12, 
13.
6 (1933)  48 CLR 266, 287.
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u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  Commonwealth was no t  bound by s 9 2 .   ^ When t h e
2
P r i v y  C o u n c i l  l a t e r  h e l d  i n  James v The Commonwealth t h a t  t h e  
Commonwealth was bound by s 9 2 ,  Dixon J  d i d  n o t  r e v i s e  h i s  n o t i o n  of  
t h e  k i n d  of  f r e e d o m  g u a r a n t e e d  by s 9 2 . )
The t h e o r y  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  a f ramework  which  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e d u c e  s92
p rob le m s  t o  l e g a l i s t i c  a lm o s t  m e c h a n i c a l  i n q u i r i e s .  There  were two
b r a n c h e s  t o  t h i s  t h e o r y .  A c c o r d in g  t o  Dixon J  a law would o n l y  o f f e n d
s92  i f  i t  o p e r a t e d  d i r e c t l y  on s o m e t h in g  which  was i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e -
3
and i t  c o u ld  n o t  be a c c e p t e d  a s  b e i n g  m ere ly  r e g u l a t o r y .
Dixon J  c l a i m e d  t h a t  h i s  f o r m u la  e x c l u d e d  any i n q u i r y  i n t o  t h e  
p u r p o s e  of c h a l l e n g e d  l e g i s l a t i o n . ^  In  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  f i r s t  b r a n c h  
of  h i s  f ram ew ork ,  Dixon J ’s c l a i m  was u n d e n i a b l y  t r u e .  For  Dixon J ,  
b e f o r e  a law c o u ld  be h e l d  t o  be d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ,  i t  had 
t o  be shown t h a t  t h e  law o p e r a t e d  i n  i t s  t e r m s  by r e f e r e n c e  e i t h e r  t o  
t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  c o n n e c t i o n  o r  t o  s o m e t h in g  which  was p a r t  of  t r a d e  (o r  
i n t e r c o u r s e ) .  Thus a law which  o p e r a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  movement 
would be d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  as  movement i s  w i t h i n  t h e  
c o n c e p t  of  t r a d e .  Thus a l s o ,  a law which  o p e r a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
i n t e r - S t a t e  o r i g i n  of  goods would be d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
By c o n t r a s t  a law o p e r a t i n g  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  was no t  
d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  b e c a u s e  p r o d u c t i o n  p r e c e d e s  t r a d e . ^
1 I d .  286.
2 (1936)  55 CLR 1.
3 A l though  Dixon J ' s  f i r s t  s92  d e c i s i o n  Peanu t  Board v Rockhampton 
Harbour  Board (1933)  48 CLR 266 d i d  n o t  s e t  ou t  t h i s  f ramework  
(and i s  i n d e e d  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b r i n g  w i t h i n  t h i s  f r a m e w o rk ) ,  i t s  
e l e m e n t s  were e v i d e n t  i n  Dixon J ’s second  s92  judgment  i n  W i l l a r d  
v Rawson (1933)  50 CLR 30,  60,  68 and G i l p i n ’s Case (1935)  52 CLR 
189, 204-207 .
4 W i l l a r d  v Rawson (1933)  48 CLR 316, 332. V i z z a r d ’s C a s e (1 9 3 3 )  50 
CLR 30, 60.
5 G i l p i n ’s Case (1935)  52 CLR 189, 204-206 .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  
be tween  movement and t r a d e  and p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  
below p p 4 3 1 f f  and p p 4 5 4 f f .
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On the other hand, an inquiry into purpose seemed inevitably to
underlie Dixon J's proposition that a law directly on inter-State
trade could be held to be merely regulatory. Dixon J attempted to
turn the issue - offensive burden or acceptable regulation - into a
legal inquiry by asking whether a burden was imposed "in virtue of"
any of the "essential qualities which are connoted by the description
'trade, commerce and intercourse among the States'."^ Given that
this inquiry only commenced once it had been concluded that the law
was direct, that is, once it had been concluded that the law was
operating (inter alia) by reference to one of the "essential
qualities which are connoted by the description 'trade, commerce and
intercourse among the States'", it was obvious that Dixon J's test
involved a decision as to which of a law's criteria of operation was 
2the dominant one.
C. The theory of Evatt J
Evatt J was emphatic that the purpose of s92 was not to give 
individuals engaged in inter-State trade immunity from government
o /control, that the principle of s92 was not laissez-faire. Trade 
could be free even if taken over entirely by the government.
According to Evatt J the principle of s92 was to be derived from "the 
resolve of the people of the pre-Federation colonies to suppress those
1 Gilpin's Case (1935) 52 CLR 189, 206. Discussed further below 
pp368ff.
2 Discussed further below pp368ff.
3 R v Vizzard; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30, 71-95 especially 
93.
4 Milk Board (NSW) v Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd (1939) 62 
CLR 116, 151.
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evils, so conspicuous at the colonial boundaries, which were at once 
summed up and condemned in the picturesque phrase, 'the barbarism of 
borderism'. ” The principle to be derived was the "well-known
2economic doctrine and ideal", the rule of inter-State free trade.
Evatt J was not using the expression "free trade" to indicate
simply an absence of interference with trade based on an inter-State
discrimination. While emphasising the concern of s92 with the
eradication of discrimination, Evatt J’s concept of free trade
included freedom from Commonwealth or State action taken for the
3purpose of restricting all trade. This was a rather strange 
definition of free trade which Evatt J may have adopted to accommodate 
inconvenient precedent.^
Just as important as Evatt J’s vague definition of free trade was 
his vague subjective purpose approach to characterisation. Evatt J 
considered that the characterisation of a law as being "on" inter­
state trade required an inquiry into the purpose of the provision and 
a decision as to its substance. His free trade principle interacted 
with this purpose approach to characterisation to reduce s92 to one 
issue - was the State or Commonwealth attacking trade (including
1 Peanut Board v Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 
CLR 266, 298
2 R v Vizzard; Ex parte Hill (1933) 50 CLR 30, 86.
Milk Board (NSW) v Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd (1939) 62 CLR 
116, 151
3 Peanut Board v Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 CLR 266, 295
citing James v Cowan [1932] AC 542; (1932) 47 CLR 386 discussed
below pp325-326; Milkboard (NSW) v Metropolitan Cream Pty Ltd 
(1939) 62 CLR 116, 151 citing James v The Commonwealth discussed 
below pp326ff.
4 Discussed further below pp320ff.
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i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ) ,  or  was i t  d i r e c t i n g  i t s  a c t i o n  t o  some o t h e r  
p u r p o s e .  A law had t o  be d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  of  h o s t i l e  
t o ,  t h e  f lo w  of  goods i n t e r - S t a t e  b e f o r e  i t  co u ld  i n  E v a t t  J ’s v iew ,  
o f f e n d  s 9 2 . *
D. The S t a t e  o f  t h e  A u t h o r i t i e s  t o  1945
P e r h a p s  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  c a se  on s92  i n  t h e  f i r s t  t w e n t y - f i v e
y e a r s  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ’s o p e r a t i o n  was t h e  c a s e  of  W & A McArthur  v
2
Q u e e n s l a n d . A m a j o r i t y  of  t h e  Cour t  t i e d  t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  s92  
d i d  no t  b ind  t h e  Commonwealth,  t o  an  o r d e r e d  l i b e r t y  t h e o r y  of f reedom  
and a p p l i e d  t h a t  c o n c e p t  of  f r e e d o m  t o  p r e v e n t  S t a t e  p r i c e - f i x i n g  
l e g i s l a t i o n  a p p l y i n g  t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  c o n t r a c t s .
When E v a t t  J  was a p p o i n t e d  t o  t h e  High Cour t  i n  1930 he d i d  n o t  
r e p u d i a t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  McArthur  d i r e c t l y .  In  t h e  main he j u s t  d i d  
no t  b r i n g  t h e  c a s e  i n t o  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n s .  I t s  p r e s e n c e  as  an a u t h o r i t y  
p r im a  f a c i e  b i n d i n g  t h e  Cour t  may, h o w e ve r ,  have  a c t e d  as  some 
c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of s92  t h a t  he f e l t  a b l e  t o  s e t  o u t .
1 Peanu t  Board v Rockhampton Harbour  Board ( 1933) 48 CLR 266, 297-  
299;  II v V i z z a r d  Exp H i l l  ( 1933)  50 CLR 30, 8 7 - 9 5 ;  s e e  a l s o  
s u b m i s s i o n s  o f  E v a t t  a s  c o u n s e l  i n  Roughley  v New South  Wales 
(1928)  42 CLR 162, 170 and Exp N e l son  [No 1] (1928)  42 CLR 209, 
212-214 .  PE Nygh comments t h a t  t h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  
o f  " l e g i t i m a t e "  p u r p o s e  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  e f f e c t  of  a law on i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  b r o u g h t  E v a t t ’s f o r m u la  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  t h e  American 
d o c t r i n e  of  p o l i c e  power .  "The P o l i c e  Power of  t h e  S t a t e s  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and A u s t r a l i a "  (1967)  2 FL Rev 183, 207-208 .
2 (1920)  28 CLR 530.
3 I d . 5 39 f f  p e r  Knox CJ,  I s a a c s  and S t a r k e  J J  w i t h  Rich  J  c o n c u r r i n g  
569-570 .  H i g g i n s  J  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  Commonwealth was p r o b a b l y  no t  
bound by s92  ( I d . 5 6 3 ) .  His Honour a l s o  found  t h a t  t h e  S t a t e  law 
o f f e n d e d  s92  bu t  d i d  so by a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  a p p r o a c h  ( I d .  5 6 5 . )  
Gavan Duf fy  J  d i s s e n t e d  b e c a u s e  of  h i s  f r e e  t r a d e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of  s 92 ( I d .  5 6 7 - 5 6 8 . )
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On the other hand although McArthur provided an obstacle to Evatt
J's theory of the kind of freedom guaranteed by s92, there was
authority for Evatt J ’s approach to characterisation based on purpose.
In Duncan v Queensland^- decided before McArthur a majority of the
Court had upheld a Queensland law prohibiting the removal of cattle
from the State. That law might, therefore, have been held to offend a
free trade basis of s92 as it was discriminating against inter-State
trade. Most of the majority judges considered, however, that the
object, the substance, of the law was to reserve stock for the
Imperial army, not to restrain inter-State trade, and was therefore
valid. (The dissenting judges Barton and Isaacs JJ based their
dissents on the proposition that s92 is a guarantee of an ordered
3freedom for individuals).
Some members of the Court in McArthur considered that they were
overruling Duncan.^  Nevertheless in Roughley v New South Wales a
majority held that a State law prohibiting the carrying on without a
licence of business as a produce agent, could apply to agents selling
goods of inter-State origin.^ Again the object of the law was a
£significant factor. Evatt as counsel attacking the law presented
1 (1916) 22 CLR 556.
2 Id. 581 per Griffith CJ, 641 per Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ, 647 per 
Powers J. Higgins J also upheld the legislation but not on this 
basis. Barton and Isaacs JJ dissenting.
3 Id. 592, 596-599 per Barton J, 620 per Isaacs J.
4 (1920) 28 CLR 530, 555-556 per Knox CJ, Isaacs and Starke JJ, 569- 
570 per Rich J.
5 (1928) 42 CLR 162. Knox CJ, Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Powers JJ, 
Isaacs and Starke JJ dissenting.
6 The object was perceived by Knox CJ for example to be honest 
dealing. Id 177.
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his theory to the Court in his case.^ Higgins J (with whom Powers J
concurred) strongly supported Evatt’s approach to characterisation,
and expressly endorsed the introduction of the techniques of
characterisation used in the Canadian context of mutually exclusive
legislative powers, that is, endorsed inquiry into the object of law
to reveal its one substance. Drawing as well on the American
distinction between laws directly affecting trade and laws indirectly
affecting trade, Higgins J reduced the s92 inquiry to the question
whether the law was "directly aimed at, in his (Canadian) sense of
3being "with respect to", trade.
A significant development came with the 1932 Privy Council
decision in James v Cowan.^  Until this decision the 1915 High Court
decision in the Wheat Case  ^had been accepted as establishing that
compulsory acquisitions of goods could not offend s92. In that case
some of the goods acquired had been committed to inter-State trade £when acquired and the State Government admitted that its intention 
was to stop the goods leaving the State.^ The High Court decision 
that neither the legislative grant of power to acquire nor its 
particular executive exercise offended s92 was rested on the 
proposition that although s92 gave the owner of goods certain 
freedoms to deal with his goods, s92 had nothing to say about State
oaction affecting ownership of commodities.
1 Id. 170.
2 Id. 194.
3 Id. 199-201.
4 [1932] AC 542; (1932) 47 CLR 386.
5 Commonwealth v New South Wales (1915) 20 CLR 54.
6 Id. 67 per Griffith CJ.
7 Id. 69.
8 Id. 68 per Griffith CJ, 80 per Barton J, 100 per Isaacs, 105 per
Gavan Duffy J, 107 per Powers J, with Rich J concurring with Gavan
Duffy J at 111.
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James v Cowan involved the South Australian Dried Fruits Acts of 
1924 and 1925. That legislation had earlier been considered by the 
High Court in James v South Australia. .^ Section 20 of the 
legislation had authorised the Board to determine where and in what 
quantities dried fruit could be sold and the Board had made 
determinations limiting quantities to be sold within Australia. The 
High Court had held that that section and the determinations made 
thereunder offended s92. James v Cowan involved acquisitions made 
under another section of the legislation, s28.
The High Court accepted that the Wheat Case had put acquisitionsqbeyond the reach of s92. It therefore made no difference that the
purpose of the executive in making this particular acquisition was to
force surplus dried fruit off the Australian market so as to avoid a
glut, that is to achieve the same result as that of the government
3action held invalid in James v South Australia.
On appeal the Privy Council was asked by counsel defending the 
legislation, in an argument echoing Evatt J's theory, to confine s92 
to "interference with inter-State commerce 'as such'" and to accept 
that "legislation which applied equally to commerce within the State, 
as well as to inter-State commerce, and was designed for the welfare 
of the State, was not affected by s92,^ and that, therefore, James v 
South Australia was wrongly decided. The Privy Council expressly 
reserved the question of the nature of the freedom guaranteed by s92. 
Their Lordships considered that even on the narrow test proposed s 20 
and the determinations thereunder "were directed at inter-State 
commerce as such" and that therefore James v South Australia was 
correctly decided.^ As for the s 28 acquisitions which were
1 (1927) 40 CLR 1.
2 (1930) 43 CLR 386.
3 Id. 390-391.
4 [1932] AC 542, 555; (1932) 47 CLR 386, 393.
5 Ibid.
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directly in issue - the purpose of "forcing the surplus off the 
Australian market" necessarily involved first, fixing a limited amount 
for Australian consumption and then preventing the sale of the balance 
in Australia. Viewed in this way the "direct object of the exercise 
of the powers was to interfere with inter-State trade". As the power 
of acquisition was expressly subject to s92, and this purpose 
offended s92 even on the narrow view proposed, the acquisitions by the 
executive were ultra vires the Act because of the executive's 
purpose.^
Even though the acquisitions were thus invalidated by the Privy 
Council, the decision did no harm to Evatt J's proposition as to the 
kind of freedom guaranteed by s92. As noted the question of the kind 
of freedom guaranteed was expressly reserved by the Privy Council.
The decision was even consistent with a discrimination theory of s92 
because the plaintiff, a South Australian producer and buyer, sold 
most of his fruit inter-State. (Evatt J, however, never sought to 
explain the decision on that basis.)
On the other hand Evatt J drew positive support for his principles 
of characterisation from dicta in the case. Their Lordships had, 
strictly speaking, only held particular executive acquisitions to be 
invalid. Their Lordships did not need to decide whether a legislative 
grant of a power of acquisition was outside the reach of s92 as the 
Wheat Case suggested. Their Lordships commented, however, that they 
could not accept that all legislative grants of powers of acquisition 
were outside the reach of s92. They considered that -
"If the real object of arming the Minister with the power of 
acquisition is to enable him to place restrictions on inter-State 
commerce, as opposed to a real object of taking preventive 
measures against famine or disease and the like, the legislation 
is as invalid as if the legislature itself had imposed the 
commercial restrictions.
1 Id. 558-559; 396-397.
2 Id. 558; 396.
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Thus t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  a l b e i t  i n  d i c t a  had e n d o r s e d  an i n q u i r y  i n t o  
t h e  " r e a l  o b j e c t "  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  and had assumed t h a t  t h e r e  would be 
m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  of  laws a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  " r e a l  
o b j e c t s . "
E v a t t  J  a s sum ed ,  as  d i d  most  of  h i s  b r o t h e r  j u d g e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  
1 9 3 0 ' s ,  t h a t  i f ,  a s  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  had s a i d ,  i t  was p e r m i s s i b l e  t o  
i n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  r e a l  o b j e c t  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  r e v e a l  i t s  i n v a l i d i t y ,  
i t  was a l s o  p e r m i s s i b l e  t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  l e g i s l a t i o n ' s  r e a l  o b j e c t  t o  
r e v e a l  t h a t  i t  was of  a c h a r a c t e r  i n o f f e n s i v e  t o  s 9 2 .  Through t h e  
1930 ' s  E v a t t  J  found  h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  (and Dixon J  found 
h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  m i n o r i t y )  i n  a s e r i e s  of  c a s e s  which  came t o  be known 
as  t h e  T r a n s p o r t  C a s e s , u p h o l d i n g  S t a t e  laws which  e x c l u d e d  r o ad  
h a u l i e r s  f rom  c o m p e t in g  w i t h  t h e  S t a t e  r a i l w a y  sy s te m s  f o r  c a r r i a g e  
( i n c l u d i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e ) . ' * '  These  d e c i s i o n s  seemed t o  be 
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  an i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t  b a s i s  t o  s 9 2 .
On t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  Dixon J  found  h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  ( w i th
E v a t t  J  d i s s e n t i n g ,  i n  Peanu t  Board v Rockhampton Harbour  Board
h o l d i n g  i n v a l i d  a c om pu lso ry  a c q u i s i t i o n  as  p a r t  of  a Queens land
o
m a r k e t i n g  scheme f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  c rop  of  p e a n u t s  i n  t h e  S t a t e .  The
3
m a j o r i t y  ju d g m e n ts  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  " i n d i v i d u a l  f reedom "  t h e o r y .
1 W i l l a r d  v Rawson (1933)  48 CLR 316;  R v V iz z a r d  Exp H i l l  (1933)
50 CLR 30;  0 G i l p i n  Ltd v Commiss ioner  f o r  Road T r a n s p o r t  and
Tramways (NSW) (1935)  52 CLR 189; B e s s e l l  v Dayman (1935)  52 CLR 
215;  t h e  c a s e  of  R i v e r i n a  T r a n s p o r t  P ty  Ltd v V i c t o r i a  (1937)  57 
CLR 327 i s  a l s o  c o u n te d  as  one of  t h e  1930' s  T r a n s p o r t  Cases  bu t  
needs  t o  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  a s  h a v i n g  been  d e c i d e d  a f t e r
t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  James v The Commonwealth had g i v e n  a g e n e r a l  
e ndo rse m en t  t o  E v a t t ' s  t h e o r y .  Below p p 3 2 9 f f .
2 (1933)  48 CLR 266.
3 I d . 277 p e r  Rich J ,  285 p e r  S t a r k e  J ,  287-288 p e r  Dixon J ,  312-314 
McTiernan  J .
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How was i t  t h e n  t h a t  some of  t h e  j u d g e s  who i n  Peanu t  Board 
e n d o r s e d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e d o m  t h e o r y  of  s 9 2 ,  a l s o  j o i n e d  E v a t t  J  i n  
t h e  T r a n s p o r t  Cases  t o  u p h o l d  laws which  p r o h i b i t e d  ( i n d i v i d u a l )  r o ad  
h a u l i e r s  f rom c o m p e t in g  w i t h  (g o v e r n m e n t )  r a i l w a y s ?  The key  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  was t h e  g e n e r a l  a c c e p t a n c e  of  E v a t t  J ' s  i d e a s  * a bou t  
t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  a law as  b e i n g  "on" 
t r a d e .  T h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  c o u p le d  w i t h  a d i s t i n c t i o n  
be tw een  t h e  ( p r o t e c t e d )  a c t i v i t y  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  and t h e  
( u n p r o t e c t e d )  u s e  of  motor  v e h i c l e s ,  t h e  mere i n t e g e r s  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  T r a n s p o r t  C a s e s . 
A g a i n s t  t h i s  b a c k g ro u n d  members of  t h e  Cour t  c o u ld  l o o k  a t  t h e  r e a l  
o b j e c t  of  a law which  p r o h i b i t e d  t h e  u se  of  v e h i c l e s  t o  c a r r y  goods 
( i n t e r - S t a t e )  and d e c i d e  t h a t  i n  s u b s t a n c e  t h e  law was no t  "on" i n t e r ­
s t a t e  movement of  goods bu t  w as ,  r a t h e r  "on" t r a n s p o r t  c o -  
2
o r d i n a t i o n .  Thus by t h e  mid 1930fs E v a t t  J ’s a p p r o a c h  t o  
c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  a law as  b e i n g  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  had wide s u p p o r t  
and n e g a t e d  most of  t h e  s u p p o r t  t h a t  Dixon J  c o u ld  r a l l y  f o r  t h e  
p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  s92  was a g u a r a n t e e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y .
At t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  was a g a i n  c a l l e d  on t o  c o n s i d e r  
s 9 2 .  The Commonwealth s e i z e d  d r i e d  f r u i t  b e l o n g i n g  t o  James i n  
p u r p o r t e d  r e l i a n c e  on Commonwealth l e g i s l a t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  Sou th  
A u s t r a l i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  which  had been  p u t  f o rw a r d  as  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  
a c q u i s i t i o n s  h e l d  i n v a l i d  by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  James v Cowan. In  
t h i s  c a s e ,  James v The Commonwealth, t h e  High Cour t  d e c i d e d  t h a t  i t  
s h o u ld  r e g a r d  i t s e l f  a s  bound by t h e  d i c t a  i n  McArthur  ' s  Case t o  t h e
1 Above p p 3 1 9 f f .
2 Eg W i l l a r d  v Rawson (1933)  48 CLR 316,  326 p e r  S t a r k e  J ;  R v 
V iz z a r d  Exp H i l l  ( 1933)  50 CLR 30,  47 p e r  Gavan Duf fy  J ,  51 p e r  
Rich J  102 p e r  M cTie rnan  J .  Eg W i l l a r d  v Rawson (1933)  48 CLR 316,  
324 p e r  Rich  J ;  0 G i l p i n  Ltd v Commiss ioner  f o r  Road T r a n s p o r t  
and Tramways (NSW) (1935)  52 CLR 189 e s p e c i a l l y  a t  212-213  p e r  
E v a t t  and M cTie rnan  J J  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n c u r r e n c e  of  Gavan Duffy 
CJ and Rich  J .
327.
effect that the Commonwealth is not bound by s92.^ James appealed
to the Privy Council where it was held that the Commonwealth was bound
by s92 and that the Commonwealth's seizures offended s92 just as
surely as had the similar (State) acquisitions held invalid in James v 
2Cowan. In the course of so doing the Privy Council seemed to
3support the significant aspects of Evatt J's framework.
At a general level, one of the Transport Cases, Vizzard, was 
described by the Privy Council as being the "best example" of "an 
important series of cases" and reference was made to the "great 
importance" of the "elaborate judgment of Evatt J in that case".^
As Dignam commented, the fact that the Privy Council had refused leave 
to appeal in two transport cases - Duncan and Gilpin - also seemed to 
indicate that the Privy Council approved of those decisions.^
On the question of the kind of freedom guaranteed by s92, the 
Privy Council's decision was vague but seemed to involve a free trade 
approach.
1 (1935) 52 CLR 570. Professor KH Bailey had suggested that 
Commonwealth "immunity" from s92 be used in this way in 
"Interstate Free Trade. The Expropriation Power and Section 92" 
(1933) 7 ALJ 64, 66.
2 [1936] AC 578; (1936) 55 CLR 1. Robert G. Menzies had lucidly
argued the case for holding the Commonwealth bound by s92 in "The 
Commonwealth in relation to Section 92 of theConstitution" (1927) 
1 ALJ 36.
3 It might be said that the victory was as much Sir Robert Garran’s 
as Evatt J's. The language of the Privy Council in James v 
Commonwealth reflected that used by Garran in his submission for 
the Commonwealth intervening in Vizzard's Case (1933) 50 CLR 30, 
35-39.
4 (1936) AC 578, 621; (1936) 55 CLR 1, 50.
5 WJ Dignam, "The Privy Council Decision in James v The 
Commonwealth" (1936) 10 ALJ 124, 124.
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"The true criterion seems to be that what is meant is freedom as 
at the frontier or, to use the words of s 112 in respect of ’goods 
passing into or out of the State' ... The idea starts with the 
admitted fact that federation in Australia, was intended (inter 
alia) to abolish the frontiers between the different States and 
create one Australia. That conception involved freedom from 
customs duties, imposts, border prohibitions and restrictions of 
every kind: the people of Australia were to be free to trade with
each other and to pass to and fro among the States without any 
burden, hindrance or restriction based merely on the fact that 
they were not members of the same State. But it has become clear 
... that such burdens and hindrances may take diverse forms, and 
indeed appear under various disguises ... In every case it must be 
a question of fact, whether there is an interference with this 
freedom of passage."^
This passage seemed to declare a simple, discrimination basis to 
s92. Yet earlier their Lordships had said
"Nor does ’free’ necessarily connote absence of discrimination
between inter-State and intra-State trade. No doubt conditions
restrictive of freedom of trade among the States will frequently
involve a discrimination; but that is not essential or decisive.
An Act may contravene s92 though it operates in restriction both
of intra-State and of inter-State trade. A compulsory seizure of
goods, such as that in James v Cowan, may include indifferently
goods intended for intra-State trade and goods intended for trade
2among the States.
It is arguable that this passage was governed by the later 
discrimination oriented discussion and may merely have been intended 
to cover the possibility of disguised discrimination. In support of
1 Id_. 630; 58. Emphasis added.
2 Id. 628; 56.
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t h i s  argument  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  l a t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  
Covan and t h e  Peanu t  d e c i s i o n s  as  exam ples  of  d i s g u i s e d  h i n d r a n c e s .  
T h i s  p a s s a g e  was n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  an unambiguous  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  c r i t e r i o n  a s  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  s a i d  t h a t  
t h e  Cowan and Peanu t  d e c i s i o n s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  a c q u i s i t i o n s  co u ld  
o f f e n d  i f  " d i r e c t e d  w h o l l y  or  p a r t i a l l y  a g a i n s t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i n  
t h e  g o ods .
The " i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y "  t h e o r y  was i n d i r e c t l y  d i s c r e d i t e d  by t h e
P r i v y  C o u n c i l ’s c r i t i c i s m s  and e x p r e s s i o n  of " d o u b t s "  a b o u t  t h e
c o r r e c t n e s s  of  t h e  d e c i s i o n  and r e j e c t i o n  of  much of  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  and
2
d i c t a  i n  M c A r t h u r ’s C a s e . F u r t h e r m o r e  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p ’s 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h e  Commonwealth l e g i s l a t i o n  m o n o p o l i s i n g  p o s t a l  
s e r v i c e s  was c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a f r e e  t r a d e  t h e o r y  and i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
an  " i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y "  t h e o r y .  T h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  
p o s t a l  monopoly was c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  s92  b e c a u s e ,  i n t e r  a l i a , i t  m ere ly  
" c a n a l i z e d "  t h e  c o u r s e  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .
On t h e  p o i n t  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n , t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  t o o k  t h e  d i c t a  
f rom  James v Cowan a b o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  f i n d i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  
i n v a l i d  by an i n q u i r y  i n t o  i t s  " r e a l  o b j e c t " ,  t o  be t h e  b a s i s  f o r  
d e c i s i o n  i n  t h a t  c a s e . ^
Thus Dixon J ’s t h e o r y  seemed t o  be d e f e a t e d  and E v a t t  J ’s a p p r o a c h  
seemed t o  be e n d o r s e d  i n  b o t h  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  a s p e c t s .  There  was even  
t h e  s a m e - f u z z i n e s s  a b o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f f e n d i n g .  When i n  R i v e r i n a  T r a n s p o r t  Pty Ltd v V i c t o r i a  a 
c h a l l e n g e  was b r o u g h t  t o  S t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  e x c l u d i n g  r o a d  h a u l i e r s  
f rom c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  S t a t e  r a i l w a y s  even  Dixon J  a c c e p t e d  t h a t
1 I d .  630;  59. Emphasis  a d d e d .
2 I d .  620,  622, 625, 628-629 ,  631; 49,  51, 53--54, 5 6 -57 ,  59.
3 I d .  626;  54.
4 I d .  622-623 ; 51. The d e c i s i o n  i n  Cowan was a c t u a l l y  c o n f i n e d  t o
a f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  a c t i o n s  c h a l l e n g e d  were u l t r a  v i r e s  
t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  on which  t h e y  p u r p o r t e d  t o  r e l y .  Above pp 3 2 3 -  
324.
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Vizzard and Gilpin (cases in which he had dissented) must be taken as
establishing the validity of the legislation.^- Again in 1941 in
Andrews v Howell Dixon J acknowledged the rejection of his own
formula. Starke J who had supported Dixon J in some of the cases of
the 1930's referred to the matter in Home Benefits Pty Ltd v 
3Crafter. His Honour considered that James v The Commonwealth and
the Transport Cases precluded the adoption of Dixon J's Gilpin 
test.^ Starke J accepted that the established test looked at the 
true character of the legislation to see at what it was aimed.^
This then was the situation when Barwick first became involved 
with s92.^
E . Barwick and Dixon against Evatt
In 1945 Barwick already an established silk was briefed in the 
first s92 case since 1941.^ In issue in the case of Gratwick v
gJohnson was an order made under the (Commonwealth) National 
Security (Land Transport) Regulations. The order provided that -
1 (1937) 57 CLR 327, 362-363
2 (1941) 64 CLR 255, 279.
3 (1939) 61 CLR 701.
4 Id. 718.
5 Id. 717, 718.
6 For the outline of Barwick's record as counsel in s92 cases see 
Appendix.
7 The 1941 case was Andrews v Howell (1941) 64 CLR 255.
8 (1945) 70 CLR 1.
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"Except as otherwise provided in this Order no person shall 
without a permit travel by rail or by commercial passenger vehicle 
(a) from any State in the Commonwealth to any other State therein;
... Nothing in this Order shall apply to any person travelling in 
uniform on defence duty and holding a ticket issued in pursuance 
of a defence voucher.”
Johnson, a young woman had been charged for a breach of this order 
when, in an attempt to visit her fiance in Western Australia, she had 
travelled by train from Broken Hill to Perth without a permit. (She 
had applied for a permit and when it was refused had travelled without 
one. )
The war years had seen an exploration of the Commonwealth power in 
s51(vi) to make laws for the defence of the Commonwealth. The 
exploration of s51(vi) had involved a development and refinement of 
techniques for assessing laws when "purpose" is the criterion of 
validity. Against this background it was submitted for Johnson that 
the order could not be upheld if there was not a sufficient nexus 
between its operation and the defence of the Commonwealth.^
This argument was important to the Court’s decision that the order 
could not apply to Johnson. The argument went both to whether the law 
was supportable under s51(vi) and to whether the law was compatible 
with s92. If the prohibition on travel had only been to operate when 
the facilities were in fact required for defence personnel, the
1 Id. 6. Apparently Maughan, a senior silk, and not Barwick KC, put 
the case for Johnson.
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decision could well have been different.'*'
The concept of purpose applied in this case was more precise and
legalistic than that which had been involved in earlier s92
discussions. This legalistic test was more difficult to satisfy and
was eventually to be significant in overturning the actual decisions
oin the Transport Cases. The major s92 issues were, however, all to 
be reconsidered before the decisions in the Transport Cases were 
overruled.
The actual decision in the Gratwick case was reconcilable with 
Evatt J’s concept of freedom because the Order was expressly 
conditioned on the crossing of State borders. The threat to the Evatt 
J theory came in dicta from Starke J and Dixon J. Starke J asserted 
that the Privy Co.uncil’s favourable statements about Vizzard’s Case 
went no further than to endorse the criticism in Vizzard of the
owidest statements of freedom set out in McArthur's Case. Dixon J 
denied the existence of any workable formula for applying s92 and
1 Id_. 10 per Latham CJ, 19 per Dixon J. Dixon J seemed to
contemplate that even without a limitation in the terms of a law, 
evidence of the operation of a law could make out its validity.
In Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, 23 the 
joint judgment of Gibbs and Wilson JJ said "Gratwick v Johnson is 
one case which must have been decided differently if the 
circumstances in which the citizen was denied the right to travel 
inter-State had been such that all means of transport were 
required for troop movements." In the context it seems that their 
Honours meant that such a set of surrounding circumstances could 
justify the law even if it was not limited in its terms to 
operations in such circumstances. In the same case Barwick CJ, 
referring to Gratwick, said that individuals could find themselves 
prevented from engaging in private travel if troop movements had 
absorbed all travel capacity without, it seems, that involving any 
breach of their liberty. Id. 9.
2 Below pp363ff.
3 (1945) 70 CLR 1, 18.
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indicated that he would be guided only by the text of s92 itself and 
by the Privy Council decisions in James v Cowan and James v The 
Commonwealth and not by "abstract reasoning".^
Another s92 case was argued and decided in 1945. In the Airways
2Case Barwick KC was briefed to challenge the Commonwealth 
legislation which set up the Australian National Airlines Commission 
to engage (inter alia) in inter-State commercial air carriage and 
attempted to secure for that body a monopoly of such carriage. Most 
of Barwick's submissions were directed to arguing the insufficiency of 
the Commonwealth's power under s51(i) to support the legislation.
Those arguments were unsuccessful. Barwick's submissions in relation 
to s92 were, as reported, brief and did not reveal any developed 
theory.^
The monopoly provisions had been drafted in accordance with the 
theory of Evatt J who was by this stage Attorney-General of the 
Commonwealth. Existing Commonwealth legislation prohibited inter­
state air carriage without a licence. The new 1945 legislation set up 
the Commission, imposed a duty on the Commission to provide adequate 
air services and provided that so long as the Commission did provide 
adequate services, licences to engage in air carriage should cease to 
be operative.
Counsel defending the legislation called in aid the Transport 
Cases and argued that the legislation could not be said to be directed 
to reducing the amount of inter-State carriage as it positively
1 Id. 19.
2 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 
29, 32ff.
3 The body was also to engage in intra-territorial, Territory to 
Territory, State to Territory, and Territory to State carriage.
4 Id. 33-35, 46-47.
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required the Commission to provide adequate services.^ Barwick KC 
did not attack the Transport Cases. He merely suggested that they 
were distinguishable. This "straightout attempt to create a monopoly"
was, according to Barwick KC to be distinguished from the "transport
.. 2 co-ordination legislation upheld in the Transport Cases. Barwick
also suggested the Court distinguish the Transport Cases where the
legislation made under State power was general, and therefore not
directly on inter-State trade, and the Commonwealth legislation in
issue which either had as its subject matter inter-State trade and
commerce and was therefore offensive to s92 or was not with respect to
inter-State trade and commerce and was therefore not within the
3relevant head of power, s51(l).
The members of the Court agreed with Barwick that the Transport 
Cases were distinguishable and s92 did invalidate the legislation. 
Latham CJ and Starke J agreed with Barwick that this provision for 
setting up a simple monopoly could not be described as transport co­
ordination. Rich J acknowledged that canalization of trade might 
be compatible with s92 - the Privy Council had said so in James v The 
Commonwealth in its discussion of the Commonwealth posts monopoly - 
according to Rich J, however, that reference should be taken to 
indicate not that the posts monopoly was valid because it involved 
"canalization", but rather that the posts monopoly was a special 
problem. In any case this monopolisation was inconsistent with 
s92.^ Thus in these three judge's reasons Evatt's theory suffered a 
significant downgrading.
1 Id. 41 per Tait KC.
2 Id. 33.
3 Id. 46-47.
4 Id. 72-73.
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Dixon J adverted to Evatt J ’s flow theory but was unwilling to
take that theory as having been established by the Transport Cases.^
These cases could be distinguished because of the distinction drawn
by some of the judges involved in them between the activity of trade
and the use of motor vehicles, a distinction not relevant to the
2legislation in issue. Dixon J also stated that an application of
the Privy Council’s "freedom as at the frontier" test would result in
the conclusion that "it is because the business involves crossing the
. 3frontier that it is eliminated . This was to be contrasted with 
the postal monopoly which was apparently acceptable because the 
exclusion of private competitors was made "independently of State 
boundaries".^ The inference seemed to be that Dixon J would allow 
legislation to affect inter-State trade if the legislation were non- 
discriminatory.  ^ (Dixon J was soon in the Bank Nationalisation Case 
to disclaim discrimination as the exhaustive test.)
Apart from this legislation of 1945, the Court also held invalid a 
1940 amendment to regulation 79(3) of the licensing regulations. This 
1940 amendment gave a wide administrative discretion to withhold a 
licence. Barwick KC submitted that this regulation could not be 
supported as being a merely regulatory provision as the discretion to 
withhold licences was not limited to exercise on grounds such as
1 Id_. 85-88.
2 Id. 99.
3 Id. 90.
4 Id. 91. Dixon J offered another basis for distinguishing the
postal monopoly which was less problematical. The post office is, 
as he noted, a traditional function of government dealt with as 
such in the Constitution. Ibid.
5 Similarly Id. 109-110 per Williams J.
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a i r c r a f t  s a f e t y  and t h e  l i k e  -  wh ich might  have  g i v e n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  
t h a t  c h a r a c t e r . ^ - Aga in  B a r w i c k ’s a t t a c k  was s u c c e s s f u l  and t h e  
amendment was h e l d  i n v a l i d .  As i n  G ra tw ic k  v Johnson  t h e  Cour t  was 
a p p l y i n g  a p r e c i s e  c o n c e p t  of  " p u r p o s e ” .
Thus E v a t t  J ' s  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  
t r a d e  had n o t h i n g  t o  do w i t h  s 9 2 ’s f r e e d o m  and E v a t t  J ’s i m p r e c i s e  
c o n c e p t  of  p u r p o s e  had been  u n d e r m i n e d .  There  was as  y e t  no c l e a r  
e x p l o r a t i o n  of  t h e s e  i s s u e s  and no e s t a b l i s h e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  a n a l y s i s .  The Bank N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  Case was t o  t a k e  t h e  
m a t t e r  a good d e a l  f u r t h e r .
F.  The Bank N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  Case -  F r e e - t r a d e  o r  O rdered  L i b e r t y ?
The High C our t  go t  an  unambiguous  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  examine t h e  k i n d  
of  f r e e d o m  g u a r a n t e e d  by s92  when i t  was a sked  t o  make a d e c i s i o n  on 
Commonwealth l e g i s l a t i o n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  n a t i o n a l i s e  p r i v a t e  b a n k s .  In  
t h e  S t a t e  Bank ing  C a s e , f o r  r e a s o n s  u n c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  s 9 2 ,  t h e  High 
Cour t  had h e l d  i n v a l i d  a Commonwealth p r o v i s i o n  which  p r o h i b i t e d  
( p r i v a t e )  banks  f rom  p r o v i d i n g  b a n k in g  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  S t a t e  
gove rnm en ts  and i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s .  In  t h e  c o u r s e  of  h i s  judgment  
Dixon J  had commented t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  was o f f e n s i v e  b e c a u s e  i t  
d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  S t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t s .  While  e l a b o r a t i n g  t h i s  
p o i n t ,  Dixon J  commented t h a t  i f  t h e  Commonwealth were l a w f u l l y  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a monopoly i n  b a n k in g  t h e  S t a t e s  would have  t o  pu t  up w i t h
The Labour  Government  r e s p o n d e d  by e n a c t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  
p r o h i b i t  p r i v a t e  banks  from c a r r y i n g  on a l l  b a n k in g  b u s i n e s s  and by 
s e t t i n g  up an e l a b o r a t e  f ramework  f o r  t h e  Commonwealth t a k e o v e r  of  t h e
1 I d .  34.
2 (1947)  74 CLR 31.  Above p p l 6 7 f f .
3 I d .  84.
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businesses of the private banks. Private banks and the States of 
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia sought declarations 
that the legislation was ultra vires. The case reported under the 
name of the Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth became known 
variously as the Banks Case and the Bank Nationalisation Case. In the 
frequent references made to it in the ensuing discussion I will refer 
to it as BNC.
Argument before the High Court''’ took about forty sitting days 
spread over three months in 1948 and ranged over many issues. The 
plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining declarations that the central 
provision prohibiting private banks from carrying on their banking 
activities on receipt of a notice from the Treasurer to cease those 
activities offended s92, that various provisions for the Commonwealth 
takeover of the private bank’s businesses were invalid because they 
failed to provide just terms as required by s51(xxxi) and/or because 
of insufficiency of Commonwealth power and that the vesting in a 
Federal Court of Claims of exclusive jurisdiction for assessing 
compensation was in conflict with s75(iii).
2The Commonwealth appealed the s92 point to the Privy Council 
and at this stage received the support of New South Wales and 
Queensland intervening. There the respondents challenged the Privy 
Council's jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Privy Council decided 
to hear argument on the s92 point before deciding the juridictional 
point and argument on the two issues took up about 35 days spread over 
four months of 1949. In the end the Privy Council decided that it did 
not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal but thought it 
appropriate in light of the amount of time spent arguing s92, to 
indicate that if it could have decided the s92 point it would have 
agreed with the High Court that the provision prohibiting banking 
offended s92.
1 (1948) 76 CLR 1.
2 [1950] AC 235; (1949) 79 CLR 497.
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Barwick briefed for the Bank of New South Wales led the argument
for the large team of counsel attacking the legislation in the High
Court and then put the respondents’ submissions on s92 to the Privy
Council.^ Attorney-General Evatt appeared before the High Court of
which he had been a member for nearly a decade and then before the
Privy Council to defend the legislation, his own theory of s92 and,
2indirectly, the government of which he was part.
The initial s92 issue was whether banking was trade. The Privy
Council considered, as had a majority of the High Court, that banking
3was trade and therefore an activity protected by s92. The 
discussion of Dixon J was expressly adopted by the Privy Council.
The ideas which prevailed were that trade should be defined widely 
to include movement of intangibles, that banking should be defined to 
include the movement of (intangible) credits and therefore banking in 
the form of inter-State transmission of bank credits should be 
regarded as inter-State trade.^
On the basis that banking was trade and that some banking was 
inter-State trade the next issue for Evatt and Barwick was whether a 
law which prohibited all private participation in that particular 
trade (including, but not confined to, inter-State trade) was 
offensive to s92.
1 From the Australian Bar, Barwick was supported by many 
distinguished barristers including three, Kitto, Taylor and 
Menzies, who were all later to share the High Court Bench with 
him. In England the local Bar provided inter alia Sir Walter 
Monckton and Kenneth Diplock.
2 In an interview a decade later, Barwick, by this stage Attorney- 
General in the Menzies Government, referred to the case as a 
crucial factor in the loss of office by the Labour Government. 
Times 9/11/59, "People to Watch".
3 (1948) CLR 1, 283-286 per Rich and Williams JJ, 306-309 per Starke 
JJ, 380-383 per Dixon J, Latham CJ and McTiernan J contra 233-234, 
397 respectively.
4 [1950] AC 235, 303; (1949) 79 CLR 497, 632-633. The concept of
trade is discussed below.
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Evatt submitted that s92 was based on the idea of relieving inter­
state trade from burdens imposed on account of its inter-State 
connection. "...there will be no infringement of s92, unless the 
person challenging the enactment shows that it is directed against 
goods or persons because of their passing into or out of the 
S t a t e . B a r w i c k  took the position that s92 was a guarantee of 
individual freedom, a guarantee to individuals of freedom to engage in 
inter-State trade. Barwick stated the issue and his position thus
"whether or not s92 is directed to trade and commerce in the 
abstract or whether it is, ... a right or immunity for the people 
of Australia as individuals ... Section 92 is a constitutional 
guarantee to the people ... it advances a right or immunity to the 
individual. Let there be no misconception in my use of the word 
’right* ... it is the individual’s freedom to move from place to
place and the individual's right to conduct his business across
2State-lines, which is protected by the Section."
Evatt's positive propositions in support of a free trade theory 
and Barwick’s direct responses to these propositions were these.
Evatt referred to the problem in nineteenth century Australia of 
the "barbarism of borderism" and the tensions arising from different 
attitudes to external customs duties. Against that historical 
background it should according to Evatt, be inferred that the mischief 
at which s92 was aimed was the elimination of border restrictions and
1. HCT, 16/3/48, 1516; similarly PCT 22/3/49, 44, 47. The initials 
HCT and PCT used in footnotes refer to transcript of argument in 
the High Court and Privy Council respectively.
2 HCT 17/12/48, 281; also PCT 5/4/49, 55ff; 6/4/49, 21; 26/4/49,
26-33, 28/4/49, 54.
3 PCT 14/3/49, 15; 22/3/49, 8-9.
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inter colonial trade war, and thus that the freedom guaranteed by s92
was freedom from government action directed against the "inter-
Stateness" of a trading operation.^ According to Evatt s92 laysdown,
broadly speaking, a regime of freetrade as opposed to a regime of
2protection as between its units.
Barwick acknowledged that Evatt had accurately identified a
problem which provided impetus for federation but stated that when the
question of how best to solve the problem of inter-State trade warfare
was considered a deliberate decision was taken, (inspired by the
American experience of an implied freedom for inter-State commerce
from (State Government) action) that a provision with a reach which
included but which was not exhausted by, freedom from burdens imposed
3on account of inter-State connection should be inserted.
Evatt argued that the authorities had established the free trade 
basis to s92. The Transport Cases were a manifestation of it (and 
were inconsistent with the individual liberty theory). The Privy 
Council in James v The Commonwealth supported it first by approving 
the Transport Cases and in particular by approving Evatt's own 
judgment in Vizzard's Case^ and secondly by their Lordship's 
expressed attitude to actual or hypothetical legislation not directly 
in issue but referred to for the purposes of discussion^ and finally 
by formulating the principle,freedom as at the frontier^which 
concentrated on the border.^
1 HCT 16/3/48, 1511A-1516; PCT 14/3/49, 15.
2 PCT 23/5/49, 37. Also PCT 29/3/49, 37.
3 PCT 6/4/49, 31, 40.
4 PCT 22/3/49, 4.
5 Eg Their Lordships indicated that the Commonwealth's postal 
monopoly (that is the exclusion of private individuals from 
carriage of mail for reward) was compatible with s92 because it 
"canalised" trade. (1936) 55 CLR 1, 54. PCT 16/3/49, 52; 23/3/49, 
30-35.
6 HCT 16/3/48, 1511A-1520. PCT 29/3/49, 11-20.
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As f o r  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of  t h e  T r a n s p o r t  Cases  Barwick  s u b m i t t e d  
r a t h e r  w e a k ly ,  t h a t  t h e  l a c k  of  any ground  common t o  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
j u d g e s  p r e v e n t e d  any g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  b e i n g  drawn from t h e m .^  More
t e l l i n g l y  Barwick  drew a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  more r e c e n t  Airways
2
d e c i s i o n .
When i t  came t o  t h e  a p p a r e n t  s u p p o r t  g i v e n  by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  t o  
V iz z a r d  ' s  Case and t o  E v a t t  J ’s l e a d i n g  judgm en t  i n  t h e  c a se  , a t  
f i r s t  Barwick  c o u ld  o n l y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  was o n ly  
a p p r o v i n g  so much of  E v a t t ’s judgmen t  a s  went  t o  c r i t i c i s i n g  t h e  w id e r  
s t a t e m e n t s  of  f r e e d o m  c o n t a i n e d  i n  M c A r t h u r ’s C a s e . As f o r  t h e  P r i v y  
C o u n c i l ’s d i s c u s s i o n  of  o t h e r  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  t e rm s  of a f r e e  t r a d e  
t h e o r y ,  Barwick was a b l e  t o  b r i n g  some of  t h e  examples  w i t h i n  h i s  
c o n c e p t  of  a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n ^  and d e s c r i b e d  t h e  o t h e r s  as  b e i n g  
s p e c i a l  c a s e s . ^
As f o r  t h e  James v The Commonwealth f o r m u l a  " f reedom  a s  a t  t h e  
f r o n t i e r " ,  Barwick  s u g g g e s t e d  t o  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  t h a t  t h a t  s t a t e m e n t  
was no t  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h e  k i n d  o f  f r e e dom  g u a r a n t e e d  by s 9 2 .  I t  was 
r a t h e r ,  t o  be u n d e r s t o o d  as  i n t e n d e d  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  w i d e r  s t a t e m e n t s  i n  
M c A r th u r ’s Case of  t h e  r a n g e  of  a c t i v i t i e s  p r o t e c t e d  by s92  and t o  r e ­
e m p h a s i se  t h a t  i t  was o n l y  t r a d e  which  was i n  f a c t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
t h a t  was p r o t e c t e d  and t h a t  t h i s  was p e r h a p s  t h e  p o i n t  f rom E v a t t  J ' s
l:
judgment  i n  V iz z a r d  which  was e n d o r s e d .  Even t h i s  seemed t o  be an 
o v e r a m b i t i o u s  a t t e m p t  t o  e x p l a i n  away t h e  1936 P r i v y  C o u n c i l ' s  
p o s i t i v e  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  E v a t t  J  i n  V i z z a r d .  Barwick  went  a s t e p  
f u r t h e r  and a r g u e d  t h a t  i n d e e d  James v The Commonwealth r e j e c t e d  t h e
1 HCT 1 4 / 4 / 4 8 ,  2247-2249 .
2 PCT 2 8 / 4 / 4 9 ,  42.
3 HCT 1 4 / 4 / 4 8 ,  2249.  Compare PCT 2 7 / 4 / 4 9 ,  5 4 -55 .
4 Below p p 348 -350 .
5 PCT 7 / 4 / 4 9 ,  2 7 / 4 / 4 9 ;  2 9 / 4 / 4 9 ,  21. ( P o s t s  m o n o p o ly . )
6 PCT 2 7 / 4 / 4 9 ,  42.
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free trade theory as their Lordships had said, and Evatt himself 
conceded, that a law which did not "discriminate"^ could offend s92. 
Evatt did not make particularly clear that what the Privy Council in 
James v The Commonwealth may have meant was that a law which did not 
discriminate on its face could be shown to be directed against inter- 
State trade. Thus Barwick's point stood because of lack of 
unequivocal rebuttal by Evatt.
Barwick’s most telling point against Evatt*s theory was to 
question its workability. How could a court, Barwick asked, assess 
the effect of government action on the flow of the totality of
trade? Evatt said that the Court was only asked to decide whether
a provision was directed at reducing the flow, not whether it would in 
fact reduce the flow. (Ultimately Evatt said that the "flow" formula 
was merely a test not in itself conclusive and that the conclusive 
consideration was whether the government action in question imposed a 
restriction on account of inter-State connection. This represented a 
significant modification of the formula of Evatt J and came closer to 
the general understanding of free t r a d e . H o w  then, asked Barwick, 
could a court inquire into the purpose of Parliament? Evatt pointed 
to the fact that there were many statements in the precedents 
recognizing the relevance of purpose/object. In particular the Privy 
Council in James v Cowan had said that Parliament’s purpose could be
examined.'* Barwick could not believe that the Privy Council had
intended to introduce "purpose" in the way that Evatt used the
1 PCT 28/4/49, 26-27; 311/3/49, 15.
2 PCT 23/3/49, 35-44.
3 PCT 6/4/49, 13.
4 PCT 29/3/49, 37; 31/3/49, 49,11; 26/5/49, 51.
5 PCT 22/3/49, 27.
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term.^ Evatt said the question was whether the Parliament was
deliberately interfering with inter-State trade, whether the
2Parliament was hostile to inter-State trade. That was leading to 
an inquiry into the bona fides of Parliament; an inquiry into the 
purpose or motive of executive action might, as Barwick pointed out,
be allowable but an inquiry into the purpose or motive of Parliament
3could not be contemplated.
Evatt thought the departure from what was generally allowable was 
quite reasonable given that s92 is a constitutional guarantee. 
Constitutional guarantees should not be allowed to be easily evaded by 
statutory devices. A law neutral in its terms must be subject to 
examination to see whether its purpose was in fact offensive. As a 
corollary, a law apparently offensive in its terms could be redeemed
4by its purpose.
Barwick exposed Evatt’s non sequitur. Just because it might be 
permissible to inquire into the purpose of a law neutral in its terms 
to show that it was in fact offensive to a constitutional guarantee, 
it did not necessarily follow that a law offensive in its effect could 
be redeemed by its purpose.^
Barwick could not, however, give any satisfactory answer to 
Evatt's examination of the problem of compulsory acquisitions. As 
Evatt said, on the authorities, purpose had to be considered when 
judging an acquisition. An acquisition made with the object of
1 PCT 7/4/49, 26; 26/4/49, 21.
2 PCT 16/3/49, 58.
3 PCT 6/4/49, 26; 26/4/49, 39; 27/4/49, 7-8, 20.
4 HCT 16/3/48, 1513; PCT 16/3/49, 12.
5 HCT 13/4/48, 2200.
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providing supplies for defence or with the object of avoiding famine 
would have exactly the same effect as an acquisition made with the 
object of reducing inter-State trade. Yet only the last example would 
offend s92.
If purpose was relevant to acquisition,^ then surely it was
relevant to the validity of other laws. Barwick could only reply that
acquisition cases gave rise to special problems and were not directly 
2relevant. Even he acknowledged that the validity of an acquisition 
would probably depend on the use to which the goods were to be put.
An acquisition of goods with a view to using them would be valid while 
an acquisition of goods with a view to selling them would be 
invalid.^
In the end, however, Barwickfs simple point remained. No matter 
what support there was in the precedents for inquiring into purpose, 
no matter what the arguments based on the special nature of 
constitutional problems, no Court was going to feel comfortable using 
a vague formula dominated by the need to come to a decision about 
whether a government was hostile to inter-State trade. Repeatedly the 
Privy Council asked Evatt exactly what he meant by his references to 
the legislature’s purpose and exactly how that purpose was to be 
ascertained.^ Evatt’s responses were vague. He did propose a list 
of relevant evidence including surrounding facts and executive action 
taken in reliance on the Statute and Ministerial statements'*
1 HCT, 16/3/48, 1507; PCT 16/3/49, 12.
2 PCT 5/4/49, 10; 27/4/49, 8, 20.
3 PCT 7/4/49, 51; 26/4/49, 22; 27/4/49, 12-13, 32.
4 Eg PCT 16/3/49, 12, 59; 22/3/49, 15-17; 23/3/49, 43.
5 PCT 22/3/49, 16-27; 30/3/49, 18, 29; 31/3/49, 14.
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but  t h e  u l t i m a t e  i s s u e  s t i l l  seemed t o  be one of  P a r l i a m e n t  fs bona 
f i d e s .  In  r e t r o s p e c t  i t  seemed a c l e a r  e r r o r  of judgment  f o r  E v a t t  
no t  t o  r e d u c e  h i s  f o r m u l a  t o  more c o n v e n t i o n a l  t e r m s .  He c o u ld  f o r  
example  have drawn a n a l o g i e s  f rom  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  t e s t s  d e v e lo p e d  f o r  
t e s t i n g  p u r p o s e  u n d e r  s 5 1 ( v i )  and o r  s 5 1 ( x x x i x ) .  He d i d  n o t  and 
B a r w i c k ’s p o i n t  s t o o d .
B a r w i c k ’s p o s i t i v e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  i n  s u p p o r t  of  an i n d i v i d u a l  
l i b e r t y  t h e o r y  (and E v a t t ' s  r e s p o n s e s  t h e r e t o )  were t h e s e .
F i r s t  Barwick  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  t h e o r y  was 
r i g h t  b e c a u s e  i t  was o b v i o u s l y  what  t h e  words of  s92  m e a n t .  From what 
was f r e e d o m  b e i n g  g r a n t e d ?  O b v i o u s l y ,  f rom  g o v e r n m e n ta l  a c t i o n .  To 
whom was f re e dom  t o  t r a d e  b e i n g  g u a r a n t e e d  by s92?  O b v i o u s ly ,  t o  
t r a d e r s .*
A s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h i s  a rgum en t  was t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  s92  g u a r a n t e e s
f re e dom  t o  " t r a d e ,  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e " .  " I n t e r c o u r s e "  i s  an
a c t i v i t y  which  i n  i t s  n a t u r e  i s  c a r r i e d  on by i n d i v i d u a l s .  I f  f r e e d o m
h e r e  means f r e e dom  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  i n t e r c o u r s e ,  s u r e l y  i t  must a l s o
2
mean f re e dom  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  when a p p l i e d  t o  t r a d e .
E v a t t  d i d  no t  d e a l  w i t h  e i t h e r  of  t h e s e  r e l a t e d  s im p l e  p o i n t s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  were s im p l e  a n s w e rs  r e a d i l y  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  b o t h .  A l th o u g h  i n e v i t a b l y  s92  i s  a g u a r a n t e e  of  f r e e dom  
t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h i l e  engaged  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  o r  i n t e r c o u r s e ,  
n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  i m p e l s  one t o  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  t h e  f reedom  
g u a r a n t e e d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  qua i n d i v i d u a l s .  E v a t t  
came c l o s e s t  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  when he p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  t h e  mere f a c t  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  had s u c c e e d e d  i n  s92  c h a l l e n g e s  d i d  no t  g i v e  any
1 PCT 2 8 / 4 / 4 9 ,  2 6 -33 .
2 PCT 2 8 / 4 / 4 9 ,  26.
3 Cf PCT 2 9 / 5 / 4 9 ,  12-14 .
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indication that s92 created individual freedom.^ In relation to the 
free trade, free intercourse connection Evatt should have had no 
difficulty in saying that in either case the dominant concern was 
freedom from restrictions imposed on account of an inter-State aspect 
of the activity.
Another element of Barwick's case based on the language of s92
itself concentrated on the word "free". For Barwick government
control and freedom were mutually exclusive concepts. How could you
say you were freeing an activity by cluttering it with bothersome
2regulation and administrative discretions? Evatt did not really
attempt to counter the emotional appeal associated with this point
until the closing stages of proceedings before the Privy Council.
Then he gave their Lordships a lecture on the eighteenth and
3nineteenth century writings on the concept of freedom and asked 
their Lordships to accept as historical fact that well before the end 
of the nineteenth century the laissez-faire doctrine had been 
abandoned and been replaced with the notion that
"freedom must be a social freedom, and ... you cannot have any 
true freedom in a society unless conditions in it are satisfactory 
from the community point of view, and from the point of view of 
the conscience of the community."^
1 PCT 23/3/49, 51ff; 31/3/49, 52.
2 Compare a 1972 address by Barwick when Chief Justice entitled "The 
Lot of the Director Today" published in 1973 Australian Director 
Vol 3 No 1 at p 51. There the Chief Justice exhorted directors to 
set up their own code of discipline so as to forestall legislative 
interference. Barwick CJ considered there was "too much tendency 
to rush in with legislative interference". (Id. 53) "Legislators 
do not always see the end point of legislative interference" and 
might lay "pitfalls for the unwary". Id. 51)
3 PCT 26/5/49, 48-51; 30/5/49, 5-8.
4 PCT 26/5/49, 49.
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Where Evatt failed in pressing this point was in drawing attention
to the matters of conscience, the social improvements at which the
banking legislation was aimed. At the start of proceedings before the
High Court he did adduce a lot of expert evidence on the relevance of
banking control to general economic management.^ Somewhat naively,
however, from then on he presented the virtue of the banking
legislation as being its elimination of the pursuit of private profit 
2(by bankers).
In another line of attack on Barwick’s individual liberty 
proposition Evatt made these points.
Everyone accepted that certain persons - bankrupts, lunatics,
infants, barristers - could be excluded from inter-State trade without
offence to s92. These individuals apparently had no constitutional
3right to engage in inter-State trade.
Furthermore in the case of Home Benefits v Crafter^ the High 
Court upheld a law which completely stopped inter-State trade in 
trading coupons.^ Similarly, could anyone doubt that inter-State 
trade in animals which were in fact diseased could be absolutely 
prohibited?^
1 (1948) 76 CLR 1.
2 PCT 31/5/49, 7; HCT 16/3/48, 149.
3 HCT 15/3/48; PCT 21/3/49, 48; 24/3/49, 58; 30/5/49, 10-11.
4 (1939) 61 CLR 701.
5 HCT 15/3/48, 1456.
6 PCT 30/5/49, 11-12; 24/3/49, 20-40.
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How could one argue that s92 gave a freedom to individuals to 
engage in inter-State trade when the examples given indicated that 
certain persons could be excluded from all inter-State trade and all 
persons could be excluded from certain inter-State trade? How could 
one argue that s92 gave a freedom to individuals when these examples 
demonstrated that public interest must prevail over the interests of 
individuals.
At first Barwick was inclined to take an extreme position. To a 
surprised High Court, Barwick had submitted that inter-State trade in 
diseased stock could not be prohibited.^- By the time the matter 
reached the Privy Council Barwick had modified his position. He 
expressly adopted and endorsed the discussion of "ordered liberty" 
contained in the (dissenting) judgment of Barton J in Duncan 's 
Case. In doing so Barwick mentioned, "just by the way", that, 
according to his biographer, Barton who had been so prominent in 
fostering the Constitution, had taken the majority decision in Duncan 
"very much to heart" as representing "a great wrong upon s92".^
1 HCT 18/2/48, 346-347A.
2 PCT 27/4/49, 27. "... that judgment, if I may say so, is a very
great judgment in relation to this subject." Also at greater 
length at 28/4/49, 56-58; 29/4/49, 3.
3 (1916) 22 CLR 556, 592-593.
4 PCT 29/4/49, 6. Barton's biographer quoted this passage 
commenting on the decision in Duncan from a letter which Barton 
had written to his wife. "I seldom take to heart the fact that a 
majority of the Bench is against my views, but on this occasion 
my sorrow is very real, for the meaning of the decision is that 
each State will have almost uncontrolled power of tampering and 
restricting trade between the States, and their citizens - a power 
the abolition of which was among the chief reasons for 
federation." John Reynolds, Sir Edmund Barton - 1849-1920 193.
The biography had first been published in 1948. It was reissued 
in 1979 with a foreword by Barwick in addition to the original 
foreword of RG Menzies.
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Barwick  e x p l a i n e d  t h e  o r d e r e d  l i b e r t y  f reedom  t h u s :
I f  one had t o  a p p r o a c h  t h i s  s e c t i o n  f r e e d  of  a u t h o r i t y  . . .  One 
would be bound t o  say  t h a t  f r e e d o m  i s  t h e  f r e e dom  of men who l i v e  
t o g e t h e r ,  and you e x p r e s s  t h e  l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r  by a r u l e  of  law 
i n  a d j u s t i n g  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t o  e ach  o t h e r  . . .  t h e r e  i s  an 
i d e a  of  f r e e d o m  i n  an  o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  which  p r e - s u p p o s e s  some 
r e g u l a t i o n s  . . . *
But was no t  t h i s  n o t i o n  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  same c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  Barwick  
had l e v e l l e d  a t  E v a t t ' s  t h e o r y ?  Was i t  no t  vague and unw orka b le ?  
Barwick  was c o n f i d e n t  t h e  C o u r t s  c o u ld  manage.
"However,  d i f f i c u l t  i t  i s  t o  draw t h a t  l i n e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s ,
t h e r e  i s  an i d e a  o r  a n o t i o n  wh ich  we have  which  we can  r e c o g n i s e ,
2
t h ough  p e r h a p s  n o t  d e f i n e . "
and
" I t  i s  no t  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  or  m e t a p h y s i c a l  c o n c e p t ,  i t  i s  a
3
p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t . "
As f o r  E v a t t ' s  exam ples  of  u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  l a w s ,  t h e y  d i d  
no t  d e m o n s t r a t e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Barwick  t h a t  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  or  
P a r l i a m e n t  ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  must  a lw ays  o v e r r i d e  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l .  R a t h e r  t h e y  p r o v i d e d  examples  of  t h e  k i n d  of  
o r d e r i n g  of  a s o c i e t y  which  c o u ld  be r e c o g n i s e d  as  b e i n g  no d e r o g a t i o n  
of  i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e d o m .
1 PCT 2 8 / 4 / 4 9 ,  54.
2 PCT 2 8 / 4 / 4 9 ,  54;  [1950]  AC 235,  274.
3 PCT 2 9 / 4 / 4 9 ;  [1950]  AC 235, 274.
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This notion of acceptable regulation even provided an answer for
the irony (pointed out by Evatt) involved in the theory of "individual
right" being called in aid by large and powerful banking corporations,
while no one apparently saw any problem with the provision in the
banking legislation which prohibited all natural persons from
being bankers.^ Barwick responded that the contrast was between
2constituted authority and legal persons. The exclusion of natural
persons from running banks could be regarded as mere regulation given
the disruption that would follow the "death" of a bank constituted by 
3a natural person.
In any case, once one accepted that the ordered liberty approach 
was proper, one need not for the purposes of the law in issue attempt 
to define the limits of acceptable regulation. No one could believe 
(and Evatt did not even submit in the alternative) that a law which 
set out to exclude all non-government persons from the trade of 
banking could be said to be a mere accommodation of individuals.
Moreover once one accepted Barwick’s proposition as to the kind of 
freedom involved, then it was not necessary for the purposes of the 
case to decide whether one characterised a law according to its 
purpose or according to its effect.
1 HCT 15/3/48, 1441. PCT 21/3/49, 48. Cf Barwick in argument HCT 
17/2/48, 325A "When I speak of an individual’s freedom ... I mean 
the freedom of the banking corporation".
2 HCT 17/2/48, 327-378, 18/2/48, 334; PCT 28/4/49, 31. At 6/4/49, 5 
Lord Porter suggested that Barwick use the word "person" to cover 
both natural persons and corporations. Barwick responded "If I 
lapse into the word ’individual’ it will be my infirmity." The 
word ’individual' of course, carries significant overtones which 
Barwick would not have wanted lost.
3 PCT 6/4/49, 28.
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If the test was purpose, the purpose of the law was to stop
private banking.'*' If the test was effect, the effect of the law was
2to stop private banking. If the test was effect, there was no need 
to decide whether practical effect could be taken into account or 
whether the inquiry was confined to legal operation, as this
3legislation in its terms prohibited all of a trading activity. 
Although it was not necessary to do so Barwick indicated his belief 
that a law could offend because of its practical effect.
The discussion hitherto has concentrated on the arguments that 
Barwick drew from the language of s92 itself. There were two other 
main strands of reasoning supporting his theory - the American 
background and the general nature of the Australian Constitution. 
These strands can be seen basically as counters to a series of points 
Evatt made about the incongruity of Barwick’s proposed individual 
rights.
Why, asked Evatt, would the Constitution create such a large gap 
in the totality of government power? Why if the Constitution was 
going to create a significant individual right would it be confined 
to individuals engaged in inter-State trade and why would it be 
created in indirect language not mentioning individuals.^ Why if 
the Constitution was going to create a significant individual right 
would it have conditioned it on the introduction of uniform customs - 
that is, why if this matter was considered so important were 
individuals to be unprotected until the introduction of uniform 
customs?^
1 HCT 17/2/48, 279.
2 Id. 21.
3 HCT 17/2/48, 280A.
4 PCT 24/3/49, 57; 30/5/49, 6.
5 PCT 24/5/49, 14; 30/5/49, 8.
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Barwick submitted that the individual liberty theory for traders
was implied into the American Constitution and the American
Constitution had provided the model for the Australian Constitution.
Section 92 had been intended to cover what was in America left to 
2implication. (No evidence was given to support this assertion.)
That was the agreement and it should be enforced no matter how
3inconvenient it might be.
Next Barwick submitted that the individual right theory was 
compatible with what he perceived to be a significant characteristic 
of the Constitution - the dominance of the will of the people. The 
Constitution was a bargain between the peoples of the different States 
effected by the Imperial legislature. There should be no presumption 
that there was to be a full parcelling out of the legislative powers 
that might be exercised in a unitary system. The presence of the 
power of amendment in section 128 (with no parallel in the Canadian 
Constitution for example) indicated the reservation of some power by 
the people and indicated the presence of gaps in Parliamentary power 
that the people might see the need to reduce. In this context it was 
also emphasised by Barwick that s92 was not the only provision in the 
Constitution which denied legislative power. Sections 116 and 117 
were mentioned as areas of power also withheld by the people from 
their Parliaments.^
These related points - the American background and the general 
people versus government nature of the Constitution received an 
impatient rebuttal from Evatt. In America the immunity of inter-State 
traders from State action was a corollary of the grant to the Federal 
legislature of power over inter-State commerce. That aspect of the 
American context provided, in Evatt’s submission, a significant basis
2
3
4
PCT 6/4/49, 33-34. 
PCT 6/4/49, 45.
PCT 6/4/49, 31-33.
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f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  A u s t r a l i a ' s  s 92  which  had been  h e l d  t o  b i n d  t h e  
Commonwealth as  w e l l  as  t h e  S t a te s . ' * '
Ano ther  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e  of  t h e  American  ba c kg round  was t h e  
t h e o r y  d e v e lo p e d  t h e r e  of  p o p u l a r  s o v e r e i g n t y  u n d e r l y i n g  a 
C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a v i n g  i t s  o r i g i n s  i n  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  a g a i n s t  B r i t i s h  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a u t h o r i t y .  The A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  depended  on and
s h o u ld  be u n d e r s t o o d  a g a i n s t  t h e  n o t i o n  of  s o v e r e i g n t y  of
2
P a r l i a m e n t .  There  w e r e ,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  e x p r e s s  g u a r a n t e e s  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t  i n  t h e  American  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  The A u s t r a l i a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  n o t h i n g  l i k e  t h e  American  B i l l  of  R i g h t s .  Barwick  
seemed t o  want  b o t h  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  drawn f rom  t h e  commerce c l a u s e  
and t h e  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  c o n t e n t  of  e x p r e s s  g u a r a n t e e s .  (The 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  e x p r e s s  g u a r a n t e e s  was p r e s u m a b ly  a r e f e r e n c e  t o  due 
p r o c e s s . ) ^  At t h i s  l e v e l  E v a t t ' s  a rg u m e n ts  were more c o n v i n c i n g  
t h a n  B a r w i c k ’s .
( i ) The D e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ^
The P r i v y  C o u n c i l  d e c i d e d  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t  have  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  
e n t e r t a i n  t h e  a p p e a l  on t h e  s92  r e l a t e d  i s s u e  b u t  c o n s i d e r e d  i t  
a p p r o p r i a t e  g i v e n  t h e  amount  of  t im e  t h a t  had been  s p e n t  a r g u i n g  t h e
1 HCT 1 6 / 3 / 4 8 ,  1476.
2 PCT 2 4 / 5 / 4 9 ,  11-13 .
3 PCT 2 4 / 5 / 4 9 ,  37. C o n t r a s t  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  (Commonweal th)  Ex r e l  
McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975)  135 CLR 1, 23-24 where Barwick  as  
C h ie f  J u s t i c e  e m p h a s i s e d  t h e  same d i s t i n c t i o n s  be tw een  t h e  
American  and t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  s i t u a t i o n s  as  E v a t t  had i n  BNC.
4 Above p313 .
5 [1950]  AC 235,  299;  (1949)  79 CLR 497,  629.
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s92 points to indicate how it would have decided the issue if it could 
have.^
On the issue of the kind of freedom guaranteed by s92, their
Lordships declared for the freedom of individuals and rejected the
flow theory. Their Lordships’ stated reasons for this conclusion were
very weak. First they stated that the Privy Council decisions in the
James Cases had established the individual liberty theory. How could
the individual liberty content of s92 be denied when "James was an
„3individual and James vindicated his freedom in hard-won fights?
During argument Evatt had explained to their Lordships and apparently 
got them to understand that nothing followed from saying that 
individuals could invoke s92. The issue was not whether individuals 
could invoke s92 but whether individuals could invoke s92 on account 
of being individuals.^
Their Lordships continued by asserting that the James Cases were 
in "direct conflict" with the flow theory. It is not clear exactly 
what facts their Lordships were assuming to support the latter 
proposition. They stated that
2 The understanding of Professor Geoffrey Sawer who had been
involved in the case on the Commonwealth’s side, is that the Privy 
Council took this action at the urging of the Commonwealth anr 
with the consent of the respondent banks. (Personal 
conversation.) There is some evidence in the transcript of 
Evatt’s urging the Privy Council to settle the issue once and for 
all. Eg 25/3/49, 43; 31/5/49, 26. It is difficult to see what
the Commonwealth hoped to gain by obtaining this advisory opinion. 
It is inconceivable that the Privy Council could have been so 
mischievous as to say that it would have overturned the High 
Court's decision on s92 if it could have. It should have been 
obvious that the Privy Council would only have felt able to 
comment on the substance of s92 issues it could not decide if it 
were in agreement with the High Court.
3 Id. 305; 635.
4 PCT 31/3/49, 52.
5 Id. 305; 635.
355.
"there the section [s92] was infringed though it was not the 
passage of dried fruit in general, but the passage of the dried 
fruit of James from State to State that was impeded."^
This was with respect to their Lordships, a very strange thing to say. 
In both cases the power of acquisition was used against James’ fruit 
for the purpose of forcing fruit off the Australian market. It is no 
doubt true to say that the James Cases were consistent with the 
individual liberty theory. Given however, that the Australian market 
for dried fruit was such that surplus producing States such as James' 
home State of South Australia exported their surplus to other States, 
the decisions were just as consistent with the flow theory.
The Privy Council’s second major basis for rejecting the flow test
was that it was "unreal and unpractical, for it is unpredictable
whether by interference with the individual flow the total volume will
be affected and it is incalculable what might have been the total
,2volume but for the individual interference. Evatt had not 
submitted that the Court had to decide what would in fact be the 
effect of challenged government action on the total flow. He had 
submitted that the governing principle was whether the government 
action imposed a burden because of the inter-State aspect of the 
activity and that the flow test only provided evidence and was not in 
itself conclusive. (This involved a change from the theory of 
Evatt J which had seemed to treat the flow criterion as the principle 
and had not confined s92’s prohibition to discrimination.) The 
concern in Evatt’s theory was not whether government action would in 
fact reduce the general flow of inter-State trade but whether it was 
aimed at reducing that flow. Their Lordships were to go on to reject 
the possibility of an inquiry into legislative purpose and in
1 Id. 305; 635.
2 Id. 305-306; 635.
3 PCT 29/3/49, 37.
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anticipation of that part of their discussion seem at this stage to 
have been answering a flow theory that was not even put to them.
The Privy Council's third major point for rejecting the flow 
theory was to draw attention to the word intercourse in s92. "...it
has not been suggested what freedom of intercourse among the States is 
protected except the freedom of an individual citizen . ..".^
And that was just about all their Lordships were willing to offer 
to justify their conclusion on the general issue of s92's freedom. 
There was no comment on Evatt's historical background of intercolonial 
trade war nor on Barwick's arguments based on the inherent meaning of 
the words in s92 nor on Barwick's reference to the American 
background.
The Privy Council did accept Barwick's exhortation to assert the 
role of the judiciary in maintaining the Constitution and rejected 
Evatt's equally fervent exhortation to give weight to Parliament's 
perception of public interest.
"For where the dispute is, as here, not only between Commonwealth
and intervening States on the one hand and citizens and States on
the other, it is only the Court that can decide the issue. It is
.2vain to invoke the voice of Parliament.
Their Lordships did not, however, comment on Barwick's proposal to go 
the further step and describe the Constitution as being dominated by 
the notion of the people versus government.
1 Id. 306; 635.
2 Id. 310; 639-640.
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On the major issue of the relevance of legislative purpose their 
Lordships took this position. The references to "object" and 
"intention" by the Privy Council in James v Cowan were admittedly 
"open to misconception". Whatever the range of proper inquiry when 
examining executive action, the only "purpose", "object" or 
"intention" of legislation which could be examined was "purpose", 
"object" or "intention in the sense of "necessary legal effect".^
That is, their Lordships seemed to be saying politely that if the 
dicta of the Privy Council in Cowan did mean to authorise an inquiry 
into the legislature's purpose, then that Privy Council had been in 
error.
On the question of other statements in the Privy Council seeming 
to support Evatt's theory -
The formula that had been offered in James v The Commonwealth, 
"freedom as at the frontier” was not really a statement of general 
principle after all.
"These words must (as must every word of every jugment) be
read secundum subjectam materiam. They were appropriate to their
2context and must be read in their context.
Nor should anyone go on thinking that the Privy Council's statements
in James v The Commonwealth apparently approving Evatt's judgment in
Vizzard's Case were an approval of the whole of Evatt's reasoning in 
3that case.
1 Id. 307; 636-637.
2 Id. 308, 637-638. Barwick had suggested this solution. PCT 
29/4/59, 19-20.
3 Id. 310; 639. Similarly at 313; 642.
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As for Evatt's examples of the accepted categories of persons who 
can be excluded from inter-State trade and of the activities of inter­
state trade which can be prohibited, without offending s92, the Privy 
Council followed Barwick's lead.
"...the conception of freedom of trade commerce and intercourse in 
a community regulated by law presupposes some degree of 
restriction upon the individual".'*'
The distinction between regulation and burden might be difficult to
2define but it was nevertheless a real distinction. Apart from
"dealing" with Evatt's case and settling the issue on which the case
turned - the kind of freedom involved - their Lordships declined to
enter upon the task of setting out a precise formula for dealing with
s92 problems. They emphasised that "In this labyrinth there is no
, 3golden thread , that the problem was not susceptible to a high 
degree of definition.^
"But it seems that two general propositions, may be accepted: (1)
that regulation of trade commerce and intercourse among the States 
is compatible with its absolute freedom and (2) that s92 is 
violated only when a legislative or executive act operates to 
restrict such trade commerce and intercourse directly and 
immediately as distinct from creating some indirect or 
consequential impediment which may fairly be regarded as 
remote.
1 Id. 310; 639.
2 Id. 312; 641.
3 Id. 310; 639.
4 Id. 313; 642.
5 Id. 310 639. Similarly at 313; 642.
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This two pronged formula closely resembled that which Barwick had 
offered in argument. Barwick had put it thus:
"The two problems which arise would be, one, has the particular 
activity of the man ceased to be free; that is to say, has 
whatever happened to him gone in mere adjustment or accommodation 
or has it invaded his freedom? The second problem one would have 
to ask oneself is, is that produced by the law? Is it ... within 
the operation of the law, or is it but a consequence or a 
repercussion?" ^
In these crucial matters the Privy Council echoed Barwick’s
submissions. Only one aspect of Evatt's case was reflected in their
Lordship's discussion. Towards the end of his final comments on s92
when querying the workability of Barwick's burden/regulation concept
which Barwick freely acknowledged involved questions of degree and
.. 2would have to take account of all the circumstances at the time , 
Evatt said:
"The line between 'burden' and 'regulation' changes with economic
and social conditions and cannot be ascertained by legal 
3considerations.
This submission's two elements - the notion that the line between 
burden and regulation changes - the relevance of general economic and 
social conditions - were both picked up by the Privy Council. First, 
their Lordships said:
1 PCT 28/4/49, 54-59. Also PCT 29/4/49, 26 "...one, what is the
operation of the law, where did the operation stop and consequence 
begin, and, two, is the law merely a regulation, or accommodation, 
or does it impair the freedom."
2 PCT 29/4/49, 4.
3 PCT 30/5/49, 12ff.
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The p ro b le m  t o  be s o l v e d  w i l l  o f t e n  be n o t  so much l e g a l  a s  
p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  or  ec o n o m ic .  Yet i t  must  be s o l v e d  by a c o u r t  
of  l a w .^
And l a t e r  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s ,  h a v i n g  j u s t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  e x c l u s i o n  of  
c o m p e t i t i o n  was no t  a v a l i d  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  p r o h i b i t i n g  
non-governm en t  b a n k i n g ,  added  t h i s  p r o v i s o -
Yet a b o u t  t h i s ,  a s  a b o u t  e v e r y  o t h e r  p r o p o s i t i o n  i n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  a
r e s e r v a t i o n  must  be made. For  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  do n o t  i n t e n d  t o
l a y  i t  down t h a t  i n  no c i r c u m s t a n c e s  c o u ld  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of
c o m p e t i t i o n  so  as  t o  c r e a t e  a monopoly e i t h e r  i n  a S t a t e  o r
Commonwealth a ge ncy  or  i n  some o t h e r  body be j u s t i f i e d .  Every
c a s e  must  be j u d g e d  on i t s  own f a c t s  and i n  i t s  own s e t t i n g  of
t im e  and c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  and i t  may be t h a t  i n  r e g a r d  t o  some
economic a c t i v i t i e s  and a t  some s t a g e  of  s o c i a l  dev e lo p m en t  i t
might  be m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  p r o h i b i t i o n  w i t h  a view t o  S t a t e  monopoly
was t h e  o n l y  p r a c t i c a l  and r e a s o n a b l e  manner  of  r e g u l a t i o n  and
t h a t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e  t h u s  p r o h i b i t e d
2
and t h u s  m o n o p o l i s e d  r e m a in e d  a b s o l u t e l y  f r e e . "
The a c c e p t a n c e  ( i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e s e  p a s s a g e s )  of  t h e  two e l e m e n t s  of
E v a t t ' s  comments ,  was of  no s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n  a f t e r  BNC.
E v e n t u a l l y  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  of  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  BNC were
d e v e lo p e d  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  an  a t t e m p t  t o  r e d u c e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t h e
3
f o r c e  of  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t  d e c l a r e d  by BNC. The 
u l t i m a t e  i r o n y  was t h a t  t h e  comment of  E v a t t  which  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  
key p a s s a g e s  was p e r i p h e r a l  and u n c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  h i s  main l i n e  of  
a r g u m e n t .
2 11950] AC 235,  310;  (1949)  79 CLR 497,  639.
2 I d .  311;  640 -641 .
3 Below p p 3 8 9 f f .
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( i i )  B a r w i c k ' s  V i c t o r y  o r  E v a t t ' s  L o s s ?
I t  does  no t  i n v o l v e  one i n  any g r e a t  c y n i c i s m  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
s u b m i s s i o n s  of  Barwick  and E v a t t  p r o b a b l y  had l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  
t h e  outcome of  BNC i n  t h e  High C o u r t .  There  most  of  t h e  j u d g e s  
t h r o u g h  f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  s92  had no doub t  a l r e a d y  s o r t e d  o u t  most of 
t h e i r  i d e a s  on t h e  t o p i c  b e f o r e  Barwick  and E v a t t  r o s e  t o  p u t  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  s u b m i s s i o n s .  In  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  t h e r e  was ,  how ever ,  no 
such  f a m i l i a r i t y .  That  f a c t  i n  i t s e l f  changed  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  
p r o b le m  f o r  c o u n s e l .  Add t o  t h a t  f a c t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  P r iv y  
C o u n c i l  i n  t h e  j u d i c i a l  h i e r a r c h y  and i t  becomes p l a i n  what  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  t h e r e  was f o r  a c o u n s e l  t o  pu t  h i s  mark on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d o c t r i n e .
The BNC h a s  been  h a i l e d  a s  a g r e a t  p e r s o n a l  t r i u m p h  f o r  Ba rw ick .  
There  i s  no doubt  t h a t  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  s t a t e m e n t  e c h o e s  h i s  own 
s u b m i s s i o n s  on most s i g n i f i c a n t  p o i n t s .  I ndeed  what  he o f f e r e d  was 
q u i t e  a t t r a c t i v e .  He o f f e r e d  a g e n e r a l  f o r m u la  which was couched  i n  
t e r m s  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f ,  and avowedly  p r o c e e d i n g  by a n a l o g y  w i t h ,  
t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  f o r m u l a t i o n s . ^ - E v a t t  was t r y i n g  t o  g e t  t h e i r  
L o r d s h i p s  t o  commit t h e m s e l v e s  t o  an  u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r m u l a  t o  c ove r  
a l l  c a s e s  t h a t  might  a r i s e .  E v a t t  was i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s '  
u n e a s i n e s s  a b o u t  h i s  p u r p o s e  a p p r o a c h  and f a i l e d  t o  o f f e r  a more 
c o n v e n t i o n a l  n o t i o n  of  l e g i s l a t i v e  p u r p o s e .  By way of  c o n t r a s t  
Barwick  c o v e re d  h i m s e l f  by p o i n t i n g  ou t  t h a t  even  i f  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  
s h o u ld  a c c e p t  E v a t t ' s  e m pha s i s  on i n t e r - S t a t e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,
government  monopoly was s t i l l  o f f e n s i v e  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s
2i t  c r e a t e d  f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  t o  go u n d e t e c t e d ,
1 PCT 2 7 / 4 / 4 9 , 3 1 .
2 PCT 7 / 4 / 4 9 ,  20
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(echoing Dixon J in dissent in Vizzard's Case.)^
A significant omission in Evatt’s Case was the lack of any
submission for overruling James v The Commonwealth and excluding the
2Commonwealth from the reach of s92. Evatt had of course in the 
past presented the subjection of the Commonwealth to s92 as being a 
corollary of the narrow kind of freedom for which he was arguing. 
James v The Commonwealth had seemed to tie the two matters. At the 
end of BNC the tie was broken and Evatt representing the Commonwealth 
had the worst of both matters.
In terms of style Barwick?s advocacy was much more likely to 
persuade. Whereas Evatt seemed anxious to point out to their 
Lordships how ignorant they were of Australia and its problems, 
Barwick played to the local audience with references to traffic 
regulation in Whitehall"1 2345 and free speech in Hyde Park. Evatt 
took twice as long to put his s92 submissions as did Barwick.^
1 (1933) 50 CLR 30, 59. See also McArthur's Case (1920) 28 CLR 
530, 545 where Knox CJ, Isaacs and Starke J refer to the 
possibility of outwardly neutral laws having a protectionist 
effect.
2 Starke J offered some encouragement to this line of argument at 
HCT 18/2/48, 352. "I agree that the Privy Council made an awful 
mess of the Constitution by subjecting the whole Constitution to 
s92." and HCT 12/3/48, 12/3/48, 1379. "It is very unfortunate 
that s92 bound the Commonwealth. It has been a great misfortune I 
think."
3 PCT 6/4/49, 4, 31.
4 PCT 28/4/49, 54; 29/4/49, 19.
5 This was due in part to the content of their submissions. Evatt 
sought to widen the inquiry to demonstrate that public interest 
had to come into s92 problems. Barwick was seeking to narrow the 
inquiry by arguing that whatever weight public interest might have 
in hypothetical cases it was not relevant to the legislation in 
issue.
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In the end, therefore, one must conclude that although Barwick 
presented a case notable for its simplicity and clarity, his task was 
undoubtedly made easier by the failures of his opponent.
(iii) The issues after BNC
The problem after BNC was to refine and explore the distinctions 
inherent in the Privy Council's framework - the distinction between 
regulation and burden - the distinction between indirect and direct 
effects. The discussion turns first to the regulation/burden 
question.
The exploration of the concept of regulation was complicated by 
the question of what authority should be accorded to pre BNC decisions 
affected by propositions rejected or discredited in BNC. In 
particular there was the question of the authority of the 1930's 
Transport Cases.^
G. The 1950's Transport Cases and Licensing as Regulation
2In BNC Barwick had criticised the Transport Cases. All he
3managed to elicit from the Privy Council in BNC was a statement 
that the Privy Council's approving reference in James v The 
Commonwealth to Evatt J's judgment in Vizzard was not to be taken as
1 HCT 17/3/48, 1572. During argument in the High Court this 
exchange had taken place between Evatt and Starke J. Evatt 
"...Your Honour, Mr Justice Starke discusses in the [Airways Case] 
the old Transport Cases. These ogres come up in every case.
Starke J "Like King Charles' head."
Evatt "Yes, your Honour but the head is still on. It has not yet 
been removed."
Starke J "I hope it soon will be."
Evatt "Your Honour did your best in the [Airways Case]; I submit 
in direct opposition to the decision of the Privy Council in James 
v The Commonwealth".
2
3
PCT 28, 4, 49, 11-14; [1950] AC 235, 271; 79 CLR 497, 563-564.
[1950] AC 235, 309; 79 CLR 497, 638.
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an approval of the "whole" of Evatt J’s reasoning.^ The implication 
seemed to be that some of what Evatt J had said in Vizzard was to be 
taken as approved.
2In McCarter v Brodie the High Court was asked in the light of 
BNC to reconsider the transport co-ordination legislation which had
n  /
been upheld in the Riverina Transport Case. By majority1 234 the 
Court decided to follow the 1930’s decisions. Dixon and Fullagar JJ 
dissented on the basis that those cases were inconsistent with 
BNC.5 678
In Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 1)5 the Court 
was asked to review the legislation upheld in Vizzard’s Case^
Qitself. The decision was 4/3 in favour of following Vizzard.
The majority depended, inter alia, on the vote of Dixon who 
had not changed his view of the merits of transport legislation of the 
kind in issue but who considered that stare decisis required him to 
follow the recent decision in McCarter. The case reached the Privy 
Council where it was held that Vizzard should be overruled and that a 
law prohibiting road carriage without a licence could not apply to
1 Even this echoed one of Barwick’s submissions. PCT 28/4/49, 21-
22; 79 CLR 497, 566.
2 (1950) 80 CLR 432.
3 (1937) 57 CLR 327 Above pp329-330.
4 Latham CJ, McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ.
5 Id. 465-468 per Dixon J, 487-499 per Fullagar J.
6 (1953) 87 CLR 49.
7 (1933) 50 CLR 30.
8 Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams and Webb JJ with Fullagar, Kitto and 
Taylor JJ dissenting.
9 Id. 70.
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i n t e r - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e  when t h e  g r a n t  of  t h e  l i c e n c e  was a t  t h e  
d i s c r e t i o n  of  an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c e r  and t h e  l i c e n c e  was s u b j e c t  t o  
payment  c a l c u l a t e d  as  t h i s  one was.'*'
Barwick  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  bu t  had no 
d i s c e r n i b l e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  j u d g m e n t .  T h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  p r o c e e d e d  by 
q u o t i n g  and e n d o r s i n g  l a r g e  s e c t i o n s  f rom  t h e  j u d g m e n ts  of  Dixon and 
F u l l a g a r  J J  i n  M cC ar te r  and from t h e  ju d g m e n ts  of  Dixon CJ and ( t o  a 
l e s s e r  e x t e n t )  T a y l o r  J  i n  Hughes & Vale (No 1) i t s e l f . ^  T h e i r  
L o r d s h i p s  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e y  t o o k  t h i s  c o u r s e  t o  pu t  beyond any doub t  
a t  a l l  t h a t  t h e y  were i n  a g re e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  M cCar te r  m i n o r i t y ' s  v iew 
t h a t  none of  t h e  r e a s o n s  g i v e n  f o r  u p h o l d i n g  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f f e r e d  
i n  t h e  1 9 3 0 ' s  T r a n s p o r t  Cases  were  v a l i d  a f t e r  BNC and t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  
d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  1930 ' s  c a s e s  were  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by BNC. Barwick  of  c o u r s e ,  made p o i n t s  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h o s e  t a k e n  by t h e  d i s s e n t i e n t s  i n  M cCar te r  v B r o d i e .  He went  
f u r t h e r ,  how ever ,  and p r o p o s e d  an  a p p r o a c h  t o  " r e g u l a t i o n " ^  on which  
t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  made no comment .^
The d e c i s i o n  i n  Hughes & Vale (No 1) gave r i s e  t o  a f l u r r y  of  
c a s e s  i n v o l v i n g  t r a n s p o r t  l e g i s l a t i o n .  By t h e  e a r l y  s i x t i e s  q u i t e  an 
i n t r i c a t e  s e t  of  r u l e s  had been  d e v e lo p e d  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  t a x e s  t h a t  
c o u ld  be imposed on r o a d  u s e r s  engaged  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ,  w i t h o u t  
o f f e n c e  t o  s 9 2 .  Barwick  was n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h a t  
d e v e l o p m e n t . ^
1 [1955]  AC 241;  (1954)  93 CLR 1.
2 I d .  294-305 ,  307;  2 1 -3 1 ,  33.
3 I d .  305-308 ;  31 -34 .
4 I d .  280.
5 That  s u b m i s s i o n  i s  d i s c u s s e d  Below p p 372 -373 .
6 He d i d  a p p e a r  t o  c h a l l e n g e  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a r o a d  u se  t a x  p r o v i s i o n  
i n  P i o n e e r  E x p r e s s  Pty Ltd v S ou th  A u s t r a l i a  (1958)  99 CLR 227 on 
t h e  g rounds  t h a t  t h e  t a x  a l t h o u g h  p e r h a p s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  r o ad  u s e  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
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The decade also saw the development of principles of general 
application and refinements of the concept of regulation. The 
following propositions had emerged.
Regulation could be in the form of an absolute prohibition on 
trading without a licence so long as the licensing system had the 
following features.
First, the applicant for a licence to trade had a right to the 
licence unless there were grounds relevant to the ordering of freedom 
for withholding a licence from him.^
Secondly, although the question of whether or not there were in
fact acceptable grounds for withholding a licence might initially be
committed to an administrative officer it was ultimately open for
decision by a Court. (This requirement of a judicial connection was
imposed because the compatibility of a law with s92 was (in this
2regard at least) a question of constitutional fact.)
Thirdly, the authorised grounds for withholding a licence were set 
out clearly and precisely. (This requirement was based on the idea 
that vagueness in the grounds for withholding a licence was in itself 
a burden on the trader. Vagueness made it difficult for a trader to 
challenge a decision to withhold and increased the possibility of a
decision to withhold being made on a basis not compatible with ordered 
3freedom.)
1 Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 1) [1955] AC 241,
301, 307; (1954) 93 CLR 1, 27 (Privy Council) Compare Willard v 
Rawson (1933) 48 CLR 316, 331 per Dixon J.
2 Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (1955) 93 CLR 127, 
162-163, 165-166 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ.
3 Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No 2) (1955) 93 CLR 
127, 157-159 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ.
367 .
F o u r t h l y ,  t h e r e  were  no p r a c t i c a l  im ped im en ts  t o  o b t a i n i n g  a 
l i c e n c e  such  as  l i m i t e d  o f f i c e  h o u r s  a n d / o r  g e o g r a p h i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of  l i c e n s i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s . ' * '
Barwick may be a l l o w e d  some c r e d i t  f o r  t h e s e  d e v e lo p m e n t s  a s  he
f o re s h a d o w e d  them i n  h i s  s u b m i s s i o n s  i n  BNC when he s u g g e s t e d  t h a t
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  c o u ld  v a l i d l y  be r e g u l a t e d  by p r o h i b i t i o n  o p e r a t i n g
on a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  or  by a l i c e n s i n g  s y s te m  so l o n g  as  t h e
g r a n t  of t h e  l i c e n c e  was c o n d i t i o n e d  on r e l e v a n t  m a t t e r s  such  as
s a f e t y  s t a n d a r d s  and so l o n g  as  a p p l i c a n t s  had a r i g h t  t o  a l i c e n c e  on
2
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  s t a n d a r d s .
In  t h e s e  d e v e lo p m e n t s  Dixon J / C J  was v e r y  much i n  t h e  f o r e f r o n t  
and much of  what he  s a i d  and d i d  i n  b o t h  t h e  1 9 30 ' s  and t h e  1950' s
3
T r a n s p o r t  Cases  r e c e i v e d  t h e  a p p r o v a l  of  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l .  I t  i s  
t o  be n o t e d ,  how ever ,  t h a t  no t  e v e r y t h i n g  t h a t  Dixon J / C J  s a i d  i n  
t h e s e  c a s e s  r e c e i v e d  t h e  a p p r o v a l  of  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l .  In  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  h i s  t h e o r y  of  when a law would be s a i d  t o  be d i r e c t l y  
a f f e c t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ^  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  comment.
These r u l e s  a b o u t  t h e  r e q u i r e d  c o n n e c t i o n  be tw een  a c c e p t a b l e  b a s e s  
f o r  r e g u l a t i o n  and t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  l i c e n s i n g  p r o v i s i o n s ,  were f a i r l y  
p r e c i s e .  They d i d  n o t ,  how ever ,  go t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of i d e n t i f y i n g  
a c c e p t a b l e  b a s e s  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n .
1 Chapman v S u t t i e  (1963)  110 CLR 321.
2 PCT 1 3 / 4 / 4 8 ,  2221-2222 ;  Also  PCT 5 / 4 / 4 9 ,  22, 28;  2 6 / 4 / 4 9 ,  6 -8 .
3 Hughes & Vale P ty  Ltd v New Sou th  Wales (No 1) [1955]  AC 241,
294-296 ,  302 -305 ;  (1954)  93 CLR 1, 21 -23 ,  28 -3 1 ;  F r e i g h t l i n e s  &
C o n s t r u c t i o n  H o ld in g  Ltd v New Sou th  Wales [1968]  AC 625, 670-674 ,  
676-679 ,  681 -683 ;  (1967)  116 CLR 1, 7 - 1 2 ,  14 -15 ,  19-21 .
4 Below p p 4 2 3 f f .
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H. D i s t i n g u i s h i n g  R e g u l a t i o n  f rom  Burden  -  The Theory
In  BNC t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  gave some examples  of what  would be 
a c c e p t a b l e  g rounds  f o r  e x c l u d i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  f rom i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e
" r e g u l a t i o n  of  t r a d e  may c l e a r l y  t a k e  t h e  form of  d e n y i n g  c e r t a i n  
a c t i v i t i e s  t o  p e r s o n s  by age or  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n f i t  t o  p e r f o r m  
them or  of  e x c l u d i n g  f rom  p a s s a g e  a c r o s s  t h e  f r o n t i e r  of  a S t a t e  
c r e a t u r e s  o r  t h i n g s  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  i n j u r e  i t s  c i t i z e n s . " ' * '
I t  was no t  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  c o n c e p t  of  
a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n  any f u r t h e r  as  t h e y  d i d  no t  c o n s i d e r  (and i t  had 
no t  been s u g g e s t e d )  t h a t  i t  was c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  any f re e d o m  of  
i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t r a d e ,  t o  e x c l u d e  i n d i v i d u a l s  f rom t r a d i n g  j u s t  t o  s t o p  
them co m p e t in g  w i t h  t h e  government  bank . T h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  warned  
a g a i n s t  t h e  f u t i l i t y  of  t r y i n g  t o  g i v e  t h e  c o n c e p t  of  r e g u l a t i o n  "a 
h i g h e r  d e g r e e  of  d e f i n i t i o n  t h a n  i t  w i l l  a d m i t " .  The p r o b le m  was 
t o  be a p p ro a c h e d  as  a m a t t e r  of  f a c t  and d e g r e e . ^
D e s p i t e  t h a t  w a r n i n g  a g a i n s t  a t t e m p t i n g  t o o  h i g h  a d e g r e e  of  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  a j o i n t  ju dgmen t  o f  Dixon CJ,  McTiernan  and Webb J J  i n  
Hughes and Vale  P ty  Ltd v New South  Wales (No 2 ) ^ r e v i v e d  a 
d e f i n i t i o n  of r e g u l a t i o n  t h a t  was p a r t  of  t h e  d i s s e n t  of  Dixon J  i n  
G i l p i n ’s C a s e . ^
In  G i l p i n ' s  Case Dixon J  had s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of a law as  b e i n g  a b u r d e n  depended  on w h e th e r  t h e  law o p e r a t e d  " i n  
v i r t u e  o f "  any of  t h e
1
2
3
4
5
[1950] AC 235,  312;  (1949)  79 GLR 497,  641.
I d .  311; 640
I d .  313; 642
I d .  312; 641.
(1955)  93 CLR 127, 163.
6 Above p317.
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"essential qualities which are connected by the description 
’trade, commerce and intercourse among the States’."^
If a law did so operate then it was imposing an unacceptable burden.
On this basis laws discriminating against inter-State trade would 
offend s92 because of their operation "in virtue" of the inter-State 
aspect of the activity, and laws prohibiting the carrying on of a road 
carriage business by reference to the effect of the road carrige on 
competing rail systems offend s92 because of their operation on the 
trading activity "in virtue" of its being trade.
In Hughes and Vale (No 2) Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ 
developed this theory for distinguishing acceptable regulation from 
unacceptable burden.
The matter in hand is the contrast between the central or
essential attributes of an inter-State transaction ... and the
incidents of the transaction which do not necessarily give it the
character of trade commerce or intercourse or of an inter-State 
2transaction.
Their Honours then listed, in this context of inter-State road 
haulage, things which they considered to be mere incidents. Included 
in their Honours’ list of mere incidents were the hours during which a 
journey is made, the axle-weight of the vehicle, the dimensions of
3the load, the crowding of vehicles and the keeping of records.
"Laws for the government of such incidents ’regulate’ the inter­
state transportation of goods by motor vehicle and are likely to 
be consistent with the freedom of trade commerce and intercourse
Aamong the States.
1 (1935) 52 CLR 189, 206.
2 (1955) 93 CLR 127, 163.
3 Id. 160.
4 Id. 163.
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I t  was acknowledged  t h a t  t h i s  t e s t  o n ly  r a i s e d  a p r e s u m p t i o n  of  
v a l i d i t y .
" . . .  f o r  a law which  u n d e r  t h e  g u i s e  of  r e g u l a t i n g  an  i n c i d e n t  
of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a n s p o r t  by r o a d  c r e a t e s  a r e a l  d e s t r u c t i o n  or  
impediment  t o  c a r r y i n g  i t  on does  i m p a i r  t h e  f r e e d o m  which  s92  
g u a r a n t e e s  . . .  i t  would be r a s h  t o  deny a n t e c e d e n t l y  t h a t  any 
l e g i s l a t i v e  s t e p  t h a t  may be im ag ined  c o u ld  n o t  i n  some 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  fo rm  p a r t  of  some d e v i c e  by which  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  of 
a r e s t r i c t i o n  upon i n t e r - S t a t e  commerce might  be 
a c c o m p l i s h e d . " ^
(The a p p e a r a n c e  of  t h e  words  " g u i s e "  and " d e v i c e "  r em inds  one t h a t  
E v a t t  had been r e b u f f e d  by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
p u r p o s e  i s  a dom inan t  c o n c e r n  u n d e r  s 9 2 . )
T h i s  was a l l  r a t h e r  f a n c y .  The f o r m u la  d i d  no t  i n d i c a t e  which  
of  t h e  many c r i t e r i a  of  o p e r a t i o n  of  a law (which  was ex  h y p o t h e s i  
o p e r a t i n g ,  i n t e r  a l i a , by r e f e r e n c e  t o  e i t h e r  " t r a d e "  or  " i n t e r ­
s t a t e " )  was t h e  r e l e v a n t  o n e .  The f o r m u la  d i d  n o t  i n d i c a t e  when t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  an i n c i d e n t  of  t r a d e  would be s u f f i c i e n t
2
t o  o f f s e t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  law was a l s o  d i r e c t l y  on t r a d e .
W hateve r  i t s  m e r i t s  and d e m e r i t s ,  t h e  Dixon d e f i n i t i o n  of  r e g u l a t i o n
h a s  no t  p r o v i d e d  a f o c u s  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  High C o u r t .  I t  h a s
3
s im p l y  f a l l e n  i n t o  d e s u e t u d e .
1 I d .  163-164
2 The q u e s t i o n  -  b e g g i n g  n a t u r e  of  D i x o n ' s  f o r m u l a  i s  exposed  by PE 
Nygh, "The Concept  of  Freedom i n  I n t e r s t a t e  T ra de"  (1967)  5 UQLJ 
317,  3 4 4 f f .  A lso  PE Nygh, "The P o l i c e  Power of  t h e  S t a t e s  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and A u s t r a l i a "  (1967)  2 FLRev 183, 210-212 .
3 I t  can j u s t  be d i s c e r n e d  i n  t h e  judgment  of  Gibbs J  i n  Permewan 
W righ t  C o n s o l i d a t e d  P ty  Ltd v T r e w h i t t  ( 1979)  54 ALJR 98, 102.
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The q u e s t i o n  which  was i m p o r t a n t  and which d i d  i n v o l v e  Barwick  as  
c o u n s e l  and b a r r i s t e r  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  -  whose i n t e r e s t s  c ou ld  
be t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e r s .  That  i s s u e  a r o s e  i n  t h i s  way.  As has  been  n o t e d ,  t h e  P r i v y  
C o u n c i l  i n  BNC f e l t  no need t o  e l a b o r a t e  on what  would d i s t i n g u i s h  
a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n  f rom o f f e n s i v e  b u r d e n .  No one d o u b t e d ,  however ,  
t h a t  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  had i n  mind some c o n c e p t  of  " o r d e r e d  l i b e r t y " .
The g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  of  o r d e r e d  l i b e r t y  have  changed  l i t t l e  
s i n c e  B a r to n  J  s e t  o u t  h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  t h e  c o n c e p t  i n  h i s  
d i s s e n t i n g  judgment  i n  D unc a n ' s  Case i n  1916.
" [F reedom]  means immuni ty  from a l l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  e x c e p t  such  as  may 
be p l a c e d  upon t h e  r i g h t s  of  a f r e e  c i t i z e n  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  g u a rd  a g a i n s t  i n f r i n g e m e n t  of  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  h i s  
n e i g h b o u r s . " *
In  s e t t i n g  ou t  t h i s  t h e o r y  B a r t o n  J  went  f u r t h e r  t h a n  he  needed
t o  t o  h o l d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n v o l v e d  i n v a l i d .  (The c a s e  c o n c e r n e d  a
p r o h i b i t i o n  on rem ov ing  goods f rom  a S t a t e  and might  have  been  d e c i d e d
on a f r e e  t r a d e  r a t h e r  t h a n  an o r d e r e d  l i b e r t y  t h e o r y  of  s 9 2 ' s  
2
f r e e d o m . )  In  a f o r e w o r d  t o  a r e - p u b l i c a t i o n  of  B a r t o n ' s  b i o g r a p h y
i n  1979 Barwick  CJ r e f e r r e d  t o  B a r t o n  J ' s  d i s s e n t  i n  Duncan as  "a
judgment  of  g r e a t  q u a l i t y  and of  l a s t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n c e "  and as
3
c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  a c c e p t e d  f o r m u la  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s 9 2 .
In  Hughes & Vale (No 2) t h e  j o i n t  judgment  of  Dixon CJ ,  McTiernan  
and Webb J J  pu t  i t  t h u s
1 (1916)  22 CLR 556,  593.
2 The m a j o r i t y ' s  r e a s o n s  f o r  u p h o l d i n g  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  
above p321.
3 J  R e y n o ld s ,  Edmund B a r to n  v ,  v i i i - i x .
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"...the freedom which is postulated by s92 for inter-State trade 
commerce and intercourse is freedom enjoyed in an ordered society 
where the relations between man and man and government and man are 
determined by law."^
and later
"In conception the distinction is clear between laws interfering 
with the freedom to effect the very transaction or to carry out 
the very activity which constitutes inter-State trade commerce or 
intercourse and laws imposing upon those engaged in such transac­
tions or activities rules of proper conduct or other restraints so
that it is done in a due and orderly manner without invading the
2rights or prejudicing the interests of others ...'.
At times, both as counsel and Chief Justice, Barwick seemed to 
take the extreme position that if, as BNC established, s92 is 
concerned to guarantee to individuals freedom to engage in inter-State 
trade, then the only consideration which can justify the restriction 
of one inter-State trader is the protection of the freedom of other 
inter-State traders. There was, indeed, some logical force in this 
idea.
It seems Barwick first put forward this proposition when briefed 
to appear before the Privy Council for the (successful) appellant in 
Hughes & Vale (No 1).
1 (1955) 93 CLR 127, 159. Echoing Dixon J in BN£ (1948) 76 CLR 1,
389. "The freedom of inter-State trade commerce and intercourse 
which s92 assures supposes an ordered society where the mutual 
relations of man and man and man and government are regulated by 
law."
2 Id. 160. emphasis added.
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” ’R e g u l a t i o n ' may be d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  making of  r u l e s  by which  
p e o p le  who a r e  by h y p o t h e s i s  f r e e  t o  c a r r y  on t r a d e  a r e  e n a b l e d  t o  
do s o . " 1 2
Not c o n t e n t  w i t h  l e t t i n g  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  s t a n d  or  f a l l  on i t s  own 
l o g i c a l  m e r i t ,  Ba rwick  found  a way t o  pu t  b e f o r e  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  some 
e v i d e n c e  of  what  t h e  d r a f t e r s  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  " r e a l l y  m ean t"  by 
s 9 2 .  He in fo r m e d  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  t h a t
" In  t h e  d r a f t  c o n v e n t i o n  which  p r e c e d e d  t h e  f r a m i n g  of  t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e  p h r a s e  was used  ' f r e e  f rom t h e  payment  of  cus toms
d u t i e s  and f rom  a l l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w h a t s o e v e r  e x c e p t  such
r e g u l a t i o n s  a s  may be n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  con d u c t  o f  t h e  
2
b u s i n e s s ' . "
1 [1955]  AC 241, 254.  (No r e p o r t  of argument  i n  (1954)  93 CLR 1 . )
S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  r e p l y ,  " w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  t e s t ,  t h e  laws 
i n  q u e s t i o n  must  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  c a r r y i n g  on of  t h e  
t r a d e  and must  be f u n d a m e n t a l l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  t r a d e ,  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  of made i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  t h e  t r a d e . "  I d . 280.  Th is  
p r o p o s a l  o f  Barwick  t o  l i m i t  r e g u l a t i o n  t o  m a t t e r s  r e l e v a n t  t o  
f a c i l i t a t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  echoed  a s u b m i s s i o n  which  he had 
pu t  i n  t h e  Airways  Case t o  r e s o l v e  what  some saw a s  t h e  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  t h e  Commonwealth b e i n g  s u b j e c t  t o  s92  w h i l e  
h a v i n g  an e x p r e s s  head  o f  power u n d e r  s 5 1 ( i )  t o  make laws w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  Barwick  s u g g e s t e d  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
be r e s o l v e d  by t r e a t i n g  s 5 1 ( i )  a s  o n l y  g i v i n g  t h e  Commonwealth 
power t o  f a c i l i t a t e  and p r o t e c t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  (1945)  71 CLR 
29, 3 3 -34 .  (Compare D u n c a n ' s  Case (1916)  22 CLR 556,  558 p e r  
B a r to n  J  and 618 p e r  I s a a c s  J . ) .  The Cour t  d i d  no t  have  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  w o r t h  of  t h a t  s u b m i s s i o n  as  i t  found  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  
of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  which was u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  be o f f e n s i v e  t o  
s 9 2 .  The g e n e r a l  t h r u s t  of  t h e  ju d g m e n ts  was ,  h o w e ve r ,  t o  
e m p h a s i se  t h e  w i d t h  of  t h e  power i n  s 5 1 ( i ) .  As C h ie f  J u s t i c e  
Barwick a c c e p t e d  t h a t  s 5 1 ( i )  i n c l u d e d  power t o  p r o h i b i t  o v e r s e a s  
t r a d e . M urphyores  I n c o r p o r a t e d  Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976)  136 
CLR 1, 5 c o n c u r r i n g  w i t h  S t e p h e n  J  who a f f i r m e d  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  
t h a t  power .  I d .  11.
2 [1955]  AC 241,  253.  Emphasi s  a d d e d .
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Barwick avoided having to justify the introduction of such
material by referring to it, not as evidence, but rather as providing
a convenient statement of his own understanding of s92. It is to be
hoped that their Lordships did not put too much reliance on this
"early" version of s92 to indicate what was subsumed by the words
"absolutely free". It was glorifying the context in which the phrase
appeared to describe it as "the draft convention". The phrase had in
fact been prepared by Parkes as one of a set of resolutions which he
proposed to move at the 1891 Convention. After an informal meeting
of Parkes, some Premiers and other interested parties, this draft was
abandoned.^- La Nauze argues persuasively that even in its original
form the reference to "all restrictions whatsoever" was a reference to
charges which were not definable as customs duties but had a similar
effect, and that the reference to "such regulations as may be
necessary for the conduct of business" was an attempt to allow charges
2for the execution of inspection laws. The Privy Council decided 
the case in Barwickfs favour without making any comment on Barwick’s 
proposal to confine regulation to such a narrow ambit.
Barwick took up the matter again on his appointment to the High 
Court. As Chief Justice in Harper v Victoria he put it thus:
"The basic nature of the permissible limitations on the trader’s 
activities so far as inter-State trade and commerce is concerned 
must be the mutual accommodation of the rights and actions of 
those engaged in that trade and commerce so that each is free in 
respect of such trade and commerce though none have licence."
1 JA La Nauze "Absolutely Free" in AE Martin (ed) Essays in 
Australian Federation, 57, 61-62.
2 Op cit 64-67.
3 (1966) 114 CLR 361, 375. Emphasis added.
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The idea reappeared in Samuels v Readers' Digest Associated Pty
Ltd
"It is the concept of freedom in a civilized society in contrast
with unbridled licence in a lawless state which itself involves
the necessity for laws of the land which accommodate one man's
activities to those of another so that each is free to trade
2within the society organized under and controlled by law.
in Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board
"The accommodation of the relationship of free men in trade and
„ 3commerce each to other in an ordered society ... ;
and in Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt
"[Section 92's] clear constitutional purpose is that that 
individual freedom to trade inter-State is itself paramount and 
not required to yield to some actual or supposed public interest 
by a law or executive action which is in its nature incompatible 
with that freedom".^
in Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board
"...the acceptable regulation' must be in the nature of an
accommodation of the rights of man and man in a society where
after the operation of the 'regulatory' law, each remains free in
the proper sense of that word, free in his trade, commerce or
„2intercourse
2 (1969) 120 CLR 1, 15. Emphasis added.
3 (1978) 140 CLR 120, 152. There are many similar statements on the 
same and succeeding page.
1 (1979) 27 ALR 182, 187.
2 (1980) 32 ALR 1, 8-9. Emphasis added.
376.
At this stage it is relevant to mention a distinction which 
Barwick CJ considered significant. In the Readers * Digest Case and 
again in NEDCO, his Honour emphasised the approach to the application 
of s92 should be to ask - to what is s92 giving freedom - rather than 
- from what is s92 guaranteeing freedom.'''
One can more readily see the point of this distinction in relation 
to the topic "direct/indirect". There the distinction tends to 
support Barwick’s proposition that as s92 is guaranteeing freedom to 
inter-State trade, the practical effect of any kind of law on inter- 
State trade is a relevant inquiry. Barwick CJ seemed to offer the 
distinction, however, as having relevance both to direct/indirect and 
to regulation/burden.
In reference to the latter topic the only point to the distinction 
can be that the issue regulation/burden can be decided according only 
to the effect of the law on inter-State trade and regardless of the 
effect of the law on other matters and regardless of the effect of 
inter-State trade on other matters. If that was the point of the 
comments of Barwick CJ then it can be dealt with as being subsumed by 
the larger proposition that it is the accommodation of the rights of 
inter-State traders inter se, and nothing else, which gives a law its 
character of acceptable regulation.
As I commented at the outset this proposition has a certain
logical force. If carried to its logical conclusion, however, the
3proposition would be totally unacceptable. If carried to its
1 (1969) 120 CLR 1, 15; (1974) 134 CLR 559, 580-581.
2 Direct/Indirect discussed Below pp422ff.
3 Unless offset by a theory of "direct" which limited s92’s reach. 
Cf Isaacs J in Exp Nelson [No 1] (1928) 42 CLR 209, 237-238.
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logical conclusion truck drivers would be entitled, while on an inter­
state journey, to run over pedestrians. The latter, not being engaged 
in inter-State trade have no interest which could make their 
protection by an interruption to the inter-State journey a mutual 
accommodation of the rights and actions of those engaged in inter­
state trade. Similarly inter-State traders would be entitled to sell 
goods likely to injure the health of local citizens not engaged in 
inter-State trade. Again the victims would not have an interest which 
would make their protection a mutual accommodation of the conflicting 
rights of inter-State traders.
Surely Barwick did not mean to allow such behaviour immunity from
government control? Yet the statements extracted above tend to that
unacceptable conclusion. Indeed, in his first submissions to the High
Court in BNC on the topic of curtailing the individual’s right to
trade inter-State Barwick did take an extreme position submitting that
s92 did not allow the prohibition of the passage of persons or goods
across State borders even if the persons or goods were in fact
carrying disease.^- On the other hand in his reply before the High
Court, Barwick acknowledged that unsafe ships might be excluded from
2inter-State navigation and that groups of individuals might be
excluded from inter-State trade on account of their status as, for
example, bankrupts, infants, or even perhaps aliens or on account of
3their membership of a professional group voluntarily entered. No 
rationale was offered for allowing these exclusions.
On other occasions Barwick spoke of regulation in terms of 
adjusting the rights of individuals to accommodate the rights of other 
individuals without expressly limiting the concept to the mutual
1 HCT, 18/2/48, 346-347.
2 HCT, 13/4/48, 2221.
3 HCT 13/4/48, 2225.
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accommodation of individuals engaged in inter-State trade.^  Even in 
Harper 's Case where Barwick CJ argued so strongly that s92 is only 
concerned with the rights of inter-State traders his Honour also 
cited with approval a discussion of the problem by Kitto J in Hughes & 
Vale (No 2). In the course of that discussion Kitto J talked of 
regulatory laws as being laws of "the kind by which an individual's 
latitude of conduct is circumscribed in the interests of fitting him 
into a neighbourhood - a society, membership of which entails, because 
of its nature, acts and forbearances on the part of each actor and by 
which room is allowed for the reasonable enjoyment by each other of
3his own position in the same society.
Barwick CJ acknowledged furthermore that guaranteeing 
wholesomeness in food stuffs,^ excluding diseased persons or 
goods,^ protecting all road users ("including pedestrians"), 
requiring honesty in commercial dealing,^ requiring tubs of 
margarine to be labelled as such^ and suppressing restrictive trade
1 BNC PCT 6/4/49, 4-5; Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 
85 CLR 488, 502; Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 
ALR 1, 8-9.
2 (1966) 114 CLR 361, 375. Above p374.
3 Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 2] (1955) 93 CLR 127, 
128. Barwick CJ may of course, have understood the reference by 
Kitto J to the "society" of which the individual trader is a 
member as being a reference to the "society" of inter-State 
traders.
4 NEDCO (1975) 134 CLR 559, 578-579. (See also the reservation of 
health and safety matters in Harper (1966) 115 CLR 361, 373.
5 Clark King v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120, 152; 
Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt (1979) 27 ALR 182, 
186; Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, 8.
6 Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, 9; Permewan 
Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt (1979) 27 ALR 182; Clark 
King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120,
152.
7 O'Sullivan v Miracle Foods (SA) Pty Ltd (1965) 115 CLR 177, 184.
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p r a c t i c e s ^  a r e  a l l  a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t o r y  g r o u n d s .  And y e t  i t  would 
be d i f f i c u l t  t o  e x p l a i n  a l l  t h e s e  m a t t e r s  i n  t e rm s  of  p r o t e c t i n g  
t r a d e r s ,  l e t  a l o n e  i n  t e r m s  of p r o t e c t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s .
How c ou ld  Barwick  CJ j u s t i f y  a l l o w i n g  t h e s e  laws t o  i n h i b i t  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e r s  m e r e ly  t o  p r o t e c t  p e r s o n s  no t  engaged  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e ?  As h i s  Honour h i m s e l f  a rg u e d  so f o r c e f u l l y  i f  s92  i s  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s  what  i s  t h e r e  i n  s92  i t s e l f  which  
a l l o w s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of i n d i v i d u a l s  who a r e  no t  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
t o  be t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t ?
I f  one r e a d s  a g a i n  t h e  e x t r a c t s  s e t  ou t  above where  Barwick  CJ i s
a r g u i n g  most  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  be c o n s i d e r e d  f rom t h e  p o i n t  of
view of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s ,  one w i l l  n o t e  t h e  a m b i g u i t y  of  t h e
2
s u r r o u n d i n g  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  f r e e d o m  bu t  no t  l i c e n c e ,  f reedom  i n  a 
s o c i e t y  unde r  l a w J f re e d o m  i n  an  o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  and f re e d o m  i n  
t h e  p r o p e r  s e n s e . ^  On t h e  f i r s t  r e a d i n g  of  t h e s e  p a s s a g e s  one i s  
l e f t  w i t h  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e s e  r e f e r e n c e s  c o r r e s p o n d e d  t o  t h e  
e x p r e s s i o n  " th e  m u tu a l  accommodat ion  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s " .  On 
r e a d i n g  t h o s e  p a s s a g e s ,  h ow e ve r ,  i n  l i g h t  of  t h e  knowledge  t h a t  
Barwick  CJ d i d  a l l o w  laws t o  o p e r a t e  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s  even  
th ough  t h e  laws were no t  p r o t e c t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s ,  t h e n  i t  seems 
t h a t  Barwick CJ a c c e p t e d  t h e r e  was a g e n e r a l  c a t e g o r y  of  laws 
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  p e r h a p s  o v e r l a p p i n g  b u t  no t  e x h a u s t e d  by 
" r e g u l a t i o n " ,  and t h a t  t h e s e  were i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  c o n c e p t  of f reedom
1 Samuels v Re a de rs  * D i g e s t  A s s o c i a t i o n  Pty  Ltd ( 1969) 120 CLR 1, 
19-20;  Mikasa  v F e s t i v a l  S t o r e s  (1972)  127 CLR 617;  C l a r k  King & 
Co Pty  Ltd v A u s t r a l i a n  Wheat Board ( 1978) 140 CLR 120, 152.
2 Cf Harper  v V i c t o r i a  (1966)  114 CLR 361,  375.
3 R e a d e r s 1 D i g e s t  Case ( 1969) 120 CLR 1, 15.
4 C l a r k  King Case (1978 )  140 CLR 120, 152; Permewan W righ t  (1979)
27 ALR 182, 187.
5 Uebergang v A u s t r a l i a n  Wheat Board (1980)  32 ALR 1, 9.
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in a civilized society and were compatible with s92.^ It is also
pertinent at this stage to note that statement extracted from Harpers
Case only says that the mutual accommodation of inter-State traders is
basic to the nature of permissible regulation. It does not say that
the mutual accommodation of inter-State traders exhausts the scope of
2permissible regulation.
Towards the end of his Chief Justiceship Barwick was part of a
3Court which was asked directly in Permewan Wright to accept that 
the only kind of permissible regulation is law to protect the trade of 
inter-State traders. This proposition was rejected by the Court.
Even though Barwick CJ dissented from the Court’s decision upholding 
the legislation, he did not accept the narrow theory of regulation
1 Compare these extracts from an address given by Barwick CJ to 
Queensland Branch of the AMA in 1970, published in its journal 
of November 1970 at 863 ff and entitled "Whither the Society?"
"We are mostly concerned, I think, with - and certainly we hear 
much about - the freedom of the individual - and rightly so ...
But it is personal freedom in a society of free men and women. It 
is freedom under and through law - the law of the society ... When 
I speak of the society, I do not refer to the abstraction which we 
call the State with a capital ’S ’. It is the community of 
individuals living together in a civilized fashion ... living 
involves a balance between the freedom of the individual and the 
proper claims of the society ... a balance which forms a large 
part of the content of civilization itself. (Id. 863) And later 
"[freedom of expression of opinions about public matters] is a 
freedom and not a licence. All our freedoms are freedoms under 
law. They derive both their sanction and their limitations from 
law. There is no freedom from law. To assert that there is a 
freedom from law is to assert privilege which ultimately may lead 
to tyranny of one form or another." (Id. 864) And later "For all 
these freedoms are mutual. The other fellow has his freedom. 
Freedom itself, as distinct from licence, involves the 
accommodation of one man’s conduct to that of another." (Id.
865)
2 Similarly the passage from Permewan Wright above makes the freedom 
to engage in inter-State trade the paramount, but not the only 
consideration.
3 (1979) 27 ALR 182.
381.
proposed. His Honour referred instead to the restraints inherent in 
the concept of freedom in a civilized society.^
It was no doubt quite sensible to conclude that s92 does allow 
laws basic to civilization. Barwick CJ never, however, attempted to 
offer any framework for identifying these laws. The laws allowable 
within this category were according to Barwick CJ laws "inherent" in 
the concept of freedom.
The fact, however, that Barwick CJ failed, indeed refused, to 
offer any guidance as to what would bring a law (other than a law to 
protect other inter-State traders) within the concept of regulation, 
enabled others to establish propositions in this regard which had, by 
the end of Barwick's Chief Justiceship dramatically destablized s92. 
These propositions had affected the outcome in some of the cases 
discussed in the next section. Before outlining those propositions 
and thus completing the discussion of the theory for distinguishing 
regulation from burden, I will demonstrate how Barwick CJ's notion 
of freedom was applied.
I • Distinguishing Regulation from Burden - The Practice
The undefined category of laws inherent in the concept of 
civilization was a significant qualification to Barwick CJ's emphasis 
on the rights of inter-State traders. That emphasis on the rights of 
inter-State traders was, however, a real emphasis borne out by 
Barwick CJ's decisions in the cases, as the ensuing discussion 
illustrates.
In the cases discussed in this section the outcome is often 
affected by the individual judges' approaches to direct/indirect as
1 Id. 186.
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w e l l  a s  t h e i r  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  b u r d e n / r e g u l a t i o n .  Th i s  s e c t i o n  i s  o n ly  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  t o p i c .  D i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  i s  d i s c u s s e d  
be low .
At an e a r l y  s t a g e  i n  h i s  C h ie f  J u s t i c e s h i p  Barwick  was i n v o l v e d  i n  
t h e  c a s e  of O’S u l l i v a n  v M i r a c l e  Foods (SA) P ty  L t d ^. The c a se  i s  
n o t a b l e  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Barwick  CJ h e l d  a r e s t r i c t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e r s  t o  be v a l i d  r e g u l a t i o n .  T h i s  c a s e  i n v o l v e d  Sou th  A u s t r a l i a n  
l e g i s l a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  s a l e  of  m a r g a r i n e  which  was c h a l l e n g e d  by 
a company b r i n g i n g  m a r g a r i n e  i n t o  t h e  S t a t e  f o r  s a l e .  One s e c t i o n  of 
t h e  Act r e q u i r e d  a l l  m a r g a r i n e  s o l d  t o  have t h e  word m a r g a r i n e  p r i n t e d  
i n  b l a c k  l e t t e r s  of  a c e r t a i n  d i m e n s i o n ,  on i t s  c o n t a i n e r .  Barwick  
CJ -5 j o i n e d  t h e  o t h e r  members of  t h e  c o u r t 1 234 56 i n  h o l d i n g  t h i s  
p r o v i s i o n  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  s 9 2 .  Barwick  CJ d i d  add t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n  
t h a t  an a t t e m p t  t o  r e q u i r e  l a b e l l i n g  of  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  p r o d u c t s  
migh t  no t  be a c c e p t a b l e . ^
The Court  d i v i d e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  o v e r  a n o t h e r  p r o v i s i o n  which 
p r o h i b i t e d  t h e  s a l e  o r  p o s s e s s i o n  f o r  s a l e  of  m a r g a r i n e  u n l e s s  i t  
c o n t a i n e d  0.1% a r r o w r o o t .  The p r e s e n c e  of  a r r o w r o o t  i n  a f o o d s t u f f  
can be d e t e c t e d  by a s im p l e  t e s t .  I n  d i s s e n t  Windeyer  J  would have  
a l l o w e d  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  t o  o p e r a t e  a s  v a l i d  r e g u l a t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  made 
t h e  p a s s i n g  o f f  of m a r g a r i n e  as  b u t t e r  more d i f f i c u l t . ^  The o t h e r  
d i s s e n t  t h a t  of  Menzies  J ,  was on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  His  Honour d i d  no t  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  law t o  be d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ' 7
1 Below p p 4 2 2 f f .
2 (1965)  115 CLR 177.
3 I d .  184.
4 I d . 191 p e r  T a y l o r  and Owen J J ,  194 p e r  Menzies  J  1968, p e r  
Windeyer  J .
5 I d .  184.
6 I d .  198.
7 I d .  195.
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Barwick  CJ i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  e m p h a s i s e d  h i s  t h e o r y  t h a t  t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  b a s e d  on p e o p l e  v e r s u s  g o v e rn m e n t .  On t h e  a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  i s  ba sed  on " t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  of  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  r i g h t s
of  p e o p l e  ea ch  t o  t h e  o t h e r " ,  t h e  mere c o n v e n ie n c e  of an o f f i c i a l  i n
t h e  d e t e c t i o n  of b r e a c h e s  of  an Act can  r a r e l y ,  i f  e v e r ,  be r e g a r d e d
a s  a p r o p e r  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  of  a r e g u l a t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  i n  r e f e r e n c e  t o
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e " . ' * '  The p o i n t  t h a t  Barwick  CJ seemed t o  o v e r l o o k
was t h a t  t h e  e a s e  of  t e s t i n g  was a m a t t e r  a f f e c t i n g  n o t  o n l y  t h e
c o n v e n ie n c e  of  o f f i c i a l s  bu t  a l s o  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of a b r e a c h  of an Act
2
( p r o t e c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s )  b e i n g  d e t e c t e d .
3
In  H arper  i n  1966 and a g a i n  i n  Permewan Wrigh t  C o n s o l i d a t e d  P ty  
Ltd v T r e w h i t t  i n  1979^ when t h e  Cour t  was a s k ed  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  
H a rpe r  t h e  s u s p e c t  V i c t o r i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  p r o h i b i t e d  t h e  s a l e  of  eggs 
u n l e s s  t h e y  had  f i r s t  been  s u b m i t t e d  t o  a government  b o a rd  f o r  
g r a d i n g ,  t e s t i n g  and m a r k i n g .  A f e e  was c h a rg e d  f o r  t h e  g r a d i n g .  
Barwick  CJ i n  d i s s e n t  on b o t h  o c c a s i o n s  would have  h e l d  t h a t  s 92  
p r e v e n t e d  t h e  law a p p l y i n g  t o  s a l e s  of  eggs b r o u g h t  i n t o  V i c t o r i a  f rom 
New South  W ale s .
In  Permewan W righ t  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  seems t o  have  been  c o n s i d e r e d  
as  h a v i n g  two a s p e c t s  r e l e v a n t  t o  i n d i c a t i n g  a r e g u l a t o r y  c h a r a c t e r  -  
"one a s p e c t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h a t  a r e a  of  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  
f i x i n g  and e n f o r c e m e n t  of  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  p e r i s h a b l e  f o o d s t u f f s ,  t h e  
o t h e r  t o  an e l e m e n t a r y  fo rm  of  consumer p r o t e c t i o n  and f a i r  d e a l i n g  
i n  t r a d e ,  r e q u i r i n g  f a i r  w e i g h t s  and m ea s u res  and a c c u r a t e  l a b e l l i n g
1 (1966)  115 CLR 179, 187.
2 The o t h e r  m a j o r i t y  j u d g e s ,  T a y l o r  and Owen J J  seemed t o  c o n s i d e r  
t h a t  t h e  g o a l  of  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  p a s s i n g  o f f  of m a r g a r i n e  as  
b u t t e r ,  d i d  n o t  j u s t i f y  t h e  l a w ' s  d r a s t i c  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e .  I d . 190.
3 (1966)  114 CLR 361.
4 (1979)  27 ALR 182.
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as to weights and quantitities^^ In Harper the question of public
health was reserved and it was only in the latter aspect, consumer
2protection, that the legislation was considered.
There was a bench of only five in Harper. Of the four majority
judges, only one, Menzies J rested his decision on regulation. His
Honour considered the provision to be prima facie valid because it
3related to standard fixing. In Permewan Wright there was a bench
of six. Murphy J upheld the law because it contained no offence to
his discriminatory fiscal impost theory of s92.^ The other three
majority judges, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ considered the law to be
acceptable regulation.^ Aickin J found the law offensive for
£reasons similar to those of Barwick CJ.
Barwick CJ did not deny that a requirement of sales according to 
prescribed grades might be an acceptable basis for restricting inter­
state trade.^ Nor did his Honour deny that a law might exclude
1 (1979) 27 ALR 182, 197 per Stephen J.
2 (-1966) 114 CLR 361 , 373.
3 Id. 378. McTiernan, Taylor and Owen JJ considered there was no 
direct effect. Id. 377, 377, 382 respectively. Below p449. In 
between the Harper and Permewan Wright decisions a bench of five 
which did not include Barwick CJ divided on the question of the 
validity of a New South Wales law which prohibited the sale of 
eggs that had been transported for more than three hundred miles 
until they had been tested and graded by a government board. 
Windeyer, Owen and Walsh JJ, with McTiernan and Menzies JJ 
dissenting upheld the law in its application to sales of eggs 
brought into New South Wales. Cantarella v Egg Marketing Board 
(NSW) 124 CLR 605.
4 (1979) 27 ALR 182, 208.
5 Id. 189-192, 192-202, 202-208 respectively. The judgment of Mason 
J was affected by his opposition to the individual liberty basis 
of s92 Below pp389ff.
6 Id. 208-228.
7 Harper v State of Victoria (1966) 113 CLR 361, 373.
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unwholesome eggs  from i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^  The o f f e n c e  of  t h i s
l e g i s l a t i o n  was ,  f o r  Barwick  CJ, c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  means chosen  f o r
p u r s u i n g  t h o s e  g o a l s .  The i n c o n v e n i e n c e  and e x p e n se  a f f o r d e d  t h e
t r a d e r  by h a v i n g  t o  subm i t  t h i s  p r o d u c e  t o  a government  b oa rd  f o r
g r a d i n g  was what  gave t h e  o f f e n c e .  The S t a t e  c o u ld  have p u n i s h e d
s a l e s  made i n  an o f f e n s i v e  way and l e f t  t h e  g r a d i n g  and t e s t i n g  t o  t h e
2
p r o d u c e r s  t h e m s e l v e s .
Barwick  CJ r e a s o n e d  t h a t  a law r e s t r i c t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  c o u ld  
n o t  be saved  j u s t  b e c a u s e  i t  was i n t e n d e d  t o  a c h i e v e  some w o r th y  
s o c i a l  g o a l .  His  Honour d i d  n o t  r e f e r  t o  t h e  1950*3 T r a n s p o r t  Cases  
bu t  he c o u ld  w e l l  have done so t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  
The n o t i o n  t h a t  a law would be redeemed m e r e ly  b e c a u s e  i t  was i n t e n d e d  
t o  a c h i e v e  some w o r th y  s o c i a l  g o a l  was c e n t r a l  t o  E v a t t  J ’s t h e o r y  of  
s 9 2  and t o  t h e  1930*5 T r a n s p o r t  C a s e s . ^  Both E v a t t  J*s  t h e o r y  and 
t h e  1 9 3 0 *s T r a n s p o r t  Cases  had c l e a r l y  been r e j e c t e d  by BNC and t h e  
1950*s T r a n s p o r t  C a s e s .
In  1969 Barwick  CJ was p a r t  of  a Court  which  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  Samuels  
v R e a de rs  * D i g e s t  A s s o c i a t i o n  P ty  L td^  a p r o v i s i o n  i n  a Sou th  
A u s t r a l i a n  A c t ,  t h e  T r a d i n g  Stamp A c t ,  p r o h i b i t i n g  t h e  i s s u e  or  
d e l i v e r y  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  s a l e  o r  a d v e r t i s i n g  of  any goods of  
any w r i t i n g  p r o m i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  p u r c h a s e r  w i l l  be e n t i t l e d  t o  any g i f t  
d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  p u r c h a s e  of  such g o o d s .  The R e a d e r s ’ D i g e s t  company 
was s a i d  t o  have  b r e a c h e d  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  by s e n d i n g  a l e t t e r  f rom  New 
So u th  Wales  t o  a p e r s o n  i n  Sou th  A u s t r a l i a  p r o m i s i n g  a f r e e  r e c o r d  t o  
t h a t  p e r s o n  i n  Sou th  A u s t r a l i a  i f  he  o r d e r e d  o t h e r  r e c o r d s  t o  be s e n t  
f rom  New Sou th  W a le s .
1 Permewan Wrigh t  (1979)  27 ALR 182, 187.
2 (1966)  114 CLR 361 ,  3 7 4 -375 ;  (1979)  27 ALR 182, 187.
3 Above p p 3 1 8 f f .
4 (1969)  120 CLR 1.
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Barwick  CJ was t h e  o n l y  member o f  t h e  Cour t  t o  h o ld  t h a t  s92
p r e v e n t e d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a p p l y i n g  t o  R e a d e r s ’ D i g e s t ' s  a c t i o n . ^
2
McTiernan  and T a y l o r  J J  a d o p t e d  t h e  l a n g u a g e  of  Latham CJ i n  t h e
3
Home B e n e f i t s  Case and r e l i e d  on t h e  supposed  d i s t i n c t i o n  between  
s t o p p i n g  t r a d e  and s t o p p i n g  a t r a d i n g  p r a c t i c e .  I t  was no t  c l e a r  
w h e th e r  t h i s  p o i n t  went  t o  " d i r e c t "  o r  " r e g u l a t i o n " .  The p o i n t  t a k e n  
by McTiernan  and T a y l o r  J J  was b r u s h e d  a s i d e  by Barwick CJ,  a s  i t  
d e s e r v e d  t o  be as  b e i n g  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g .  As Barwick  CJ p o i n t e d  o u t ,  
i t  i s  " q u i t e  b e s i d e  t h e  p o i n t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  t r a d e r  may make h i s  
o f f e r  s h o rn  of  t h e  i n d u c e m e n t .  That  i s  no t  t h e  o f f e r  he wants  t o  
make.  To p r e v e n t  h i s  making i t  a t  l e a s t  p r im a  f a c i e  i m p a i r s  h i s  
f r e e d o m  t o  t r a d e .
To s u p p o r t  h i s  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  was r e g u l a t i o n ,  Menzies  
r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  l o n g  h i s t o r y  of  " l e g i s l a t i v e  a n i m a d v e r s i o n  t o  t h i s  
k i n d  o f  p r a c t i c e " . ^  T h i s  h i s t o r y  d i d  n o t  i m p r e s s  Barwick  CJ who 
p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e s  t o  
c r e a t e  gaps i n  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r . ^ I f  a l l  S t a t e s  were t o  a d o p t  t h e  
same r e s t r i c t i v e  m ea s u res  t h a t  would mean o n ly  t h a t  more harm was 
b e i n g  done t o  n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  ^
In t h e  end a l t h o u g h  c o n v i n c i n g l y  d e b u n k in g  t h e  m a j o r i t y  j u d g m e n t s ,  
Barwick CJ d i d  no t  o f f e r  any p o s i t i v e  r e a s o n i n g  t o  s u p p o r t  h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  was n o t  a l l o w a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n .  Barwick  
CJ a l l o w e d  t h a t  t h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  of  f r a u d u l e n t  or  d e c e p t i v e  p r a c t i c e s
1 K i t t o  J  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  law was no t  o p e r a t i n g  d i r e c t l y  on 
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  I d . 31-32  Below p p 461 -462 .
2 I d .  23, 35.
3 Home B e n e f i t s  P ty  Ltd v C r a f t e r  (1939)  61 CLR 701,  711 -712 .
4 (1969)  120 CLR 1, 18.
5 I d .  40.
6 I d .  14-15 .
7 I d .  20.
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could be described as actually securing "freedom of trade and commerce 
as that freedom is understood in organized and civilized 
societies".^ Barwick CJ also acknowledged that it could well be 
compatible with s92 "in a society based on free competition in trade" 
to prevent monopolisation especially if acquired by disproportionate 
strength. Barwick CJ considered that the actions of Readers Digest 
were not analogous to either (relevant) category of allowable 
regulation.
In SOS Mowbray Pty Ltd v Mead the Court got another opportunity to
3consider s92 and margarine. Section 6 of the Tasmanian Dairy 
Product Act made it an offence to sell cooking margarine containing 
any prohibited colouring or flavouring substance. The prohibited 
substances were the substances giving margarine its appetising colour 
and palatable flavour.
Four out of the seven judges who sat decided that s92 did not 
prevent the Tasmanian provision from applying to the sales of 
margarine brought into Tasmania from New South Wales.^ Only two of 
the majority judges, McTiernan and Windeyer relied on a decision that 
the provision was regulatory.^
McTiernan J regarded the provision as acceptable regulation
1 Id. 19.
2 Id. 19 a view which Barwick CJ and the Court as a whole were to 
confirm in Mikasa v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617.
3 (1971) 124 CLR 529.
4 Of these four majority judges two, Menzies and Gibbs JJ considered 
that the law was not directly affecting inter-State trade. (1971) 
124 CLR 529, 557-558, 559-600 respectively.
5 Id. 555, 578 respectively, Windeyer J tended to assimilate the two 
questions of direct and regulation Id. 579.
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because it prevented margarine being mistaken for butter.^- Windeyer 
J accepted the provision on the wider basis that it prevented the 
adulteration of food. It was apparently immaterial to his Honour 
whether the adulteration was being forbidden to protect health, to
prevent passing off or indeed to protect (Tasmanian) dairy farmers3from the competition of (inter-State) producers of margarine.
The minority judges, Barwick CJ (with the concurrence of Owen J) 
and Walsh J, exposed the circularity of the point taken by Windeyer J. 
As the dissentients pointed out, margarine without the prohibited 
additives was not in a commercial sense, margarine anymore. Margarine 
had long been understood to be a substance with a butter-like colour 
and flavour.^ Barwick CJ and Walsh J considered that given the 
difference in character between yellow flavoursome margarine and the 
pale insipid tasteless substance which margarine was- without the 
additive, the Tasmanian provision was really an absolute prohibition 
on the sale of margarine. Such a drastic curtailment of trade could 
not be justified merely for the sake of preventing confusion of 
margarine with butter.^ Barwick CJ reinforced his conclusion on 
this matter by the quite valid point that margarine could not 
ordinarily be confused with butter as margarine is sold packaged and 
labelled.
The preceding discussion has illustrated that, operating within 
his individual liberty framework, Barwick CJ was willing to allow to 
inter-State traders a wide immunity from governmental control.
The discussion now turns to the challenge made to the assumption 
of individual liberty freedom and Barwick CJ's response thereto.
1 Id. 555.
2 Id. 578.
3 Id. 573-574.
4 Id. 542 per Barwick CJ, 595-596 per Walsh J.
5 Id. 542-543 per Barwick CJ, 596 per Walsh J.
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J. The 1970*3 attack on the individual right basis to s92
In the last years of Barwick's Chief Justiceship three judges 
challenged the individual right basis to s92. They were Mason, Jacobs 
and Murphy JJ.
Murphy J took the openly radical course of espousing and applying
the view that s92 is only concerned with discriminatory financial
imposts.^ There is a good case for this interpretation. It faced,
however, the significant problem that generations of precedent
2implicitly and at times expressly rejected it. To the extent that 
this interpretation determined (and continues to determine) the vote 
of Murphy J it was (and is) important. It has had, however, no 
discernible effect on other members of the Court.
Barwick CJ made some attempt to answer Murphy J's case on its 
merits. Such a theory would, according to Barwick CJ leave s92 
with very little function. Section 90 already prohibits the States 
from imposing customs duties. (This assumption about the function 
of s90 is rather dubious. What authority there is on the point would 
indicate that when s90 refers to customs duties it is referring solely 
to duties on importation from abroad.)^  For Barwick CJ it was 
impossible to believe that s92 was merely designed to prevent the 
Commonwealth imposing duties on movement from one State to another.
1 Buck v Bavone (1975) 135 CLR 110, 135; H C Sleigh Ltd v South 
Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475, 527.
2 McArthur's Case (1920) 128 CLR 530, 553-554 per Knox CJ, Isaacs 
and Starke JJ. In BNC the Privy Council said "Forty years of 
controversy upon these words [the words of s92] have left one 
thing at least clear. It is no longer arguable that freedom from 
Customs or other monetary charges alone is secured by the 
section." (1949) 79 CLR 497, 829.
3 Clark King (1978) 140 CLR 120, 151. KH Bailey had made the same 
point in "Interstate Free Trade. The Meaning of 'Absolutely 
Free'." (1933) 7 ALJ 103, 103-104.
4 Commonwealth and Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd v South Australia 
(1926) 38 CLR 408, 435, 438.
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The Commonwealth is already constrained by s51(ii) and s99 anyway.^-
Even if we accepted Barwick CJ’s proposition that State duties imposed
on the movement of goods from one State to another are caught by s90,
that would not necessarily reduce s92 to the scope ascribed to it by
Barwick CJ. Section 92 could be understood as intended to catch
discriminatory imposts disguised so as not to resemble conventional
customs duties. Even if one accepted the very narrow scope ascribed
to s92 by (Barwick's interpretation of) the Murphy proposal, that such
a narrow scope was intended, is only incredible if one knows or
assumes that s92 was intended to be a very important provision. If
one follows Barwick CJ's principle that the text is the test then
there is nothing on the face of s92 to indicate that it is any more
significant than any other section of the Constitution.If one looks
to the Convention Debates it soon appears that s92 was intended to be 
2important. Barwick CJ, however, while acknowledging that the 
reasons for the choice of particular language in parts of the 
Constitution might be relevant in case of ambiguity saw no need to go
3to such material as his Honour did not consider s92 ambiguous.
The attack by Mason J and Jacobs J on individual right was more 
complex and more successful than that presented by Murphy J. The case 
of Pilkington v Frank Hammond Pty Ltd was the first s92 decision for 
Mason and Jacobs as Justices of the High Court.^ Both took the 
opportunity to argue that s92 was concerned with some public 
principle. Admittedly individuals might obtain rights through s92. 
Those private rights were, however, merely incidental effects of the
1 Clark King (1978) 140 CLR 120, 151.
2 Appendix.
3 Uebergang (1980) 32 ALR 1, 18.
4 (1974) 131 CLR 124.
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public principle declared by the section and were not definitive of 
the principle itself.^"
If individual liberty was not the freedom declared by s92 then 
what was? What was the public principle declared by the section?
The proposition that private rights were merely incidental effects 
of a public principle echoes statements made in the American situation 
when the issue is the extent to which inter-State trade is freed from 
State action. In that context the "public principle" is that a free 
trade can be preserved from "particularistic or eccentric State 
policies" because of the national interest in trade being able to flow
freely subject only to uniform controls by the central authority.
2Was that the public principle their Honours had in mind?
In Pilkington itself Mason J seemed to accept that the meaning 
of "absolutely free" in s92 had been correctly discussed "in the 
decided cases". One would have thought that the "decided cases" 
had attributed to "absolutely free" the individual liberty theory 
which Mason J repudiated in his next breath. Jacobs J saw s92 as 
having the purpose and effect of creating "a common area of trade 
commerce and intercourse among the States of Australia"^ and of 
creating and preserving from fragmentation the economic and social
1 Id. 185-186 per Mason J, 199 per Jacobs J.
2 PE Nygh, "The Concept of Freedom in Interstate Trade" (1967) 5UQLJ 
317,333.
3 Id. 185-186.
4 Id. 198.
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e n t i t y . ^  Barwick  CJ would have  had no g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  
a c c e p t i n g  t h i s  vague  g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  s 9 2 Ts p u r p o s e .  In  t im e  
b o t h  Mason and J a c o b s  J J  were  d i r e c t l y  t o  i n v i t e  a c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h e  
a c c e p t e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  s92  and were t o  i n d i c a t e  sympathy  f o r  a 
t h e o r y  of an a n t i - p r o t e c t i o n  b a s i s  t o  s 9 2 .
Mason J  s a i d  i n  F ine m ore s  T r a n s p o r t  P ty  Ltd v New South  Wales
" I  have  a lw ays  d o u b t e d  w h e t h e r  s92  was i n t e n d e d  t o  do more t h a n
p r o t e c t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  f rom  b u r d e n s  of  a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  k in d  of
which N or th  E a s t e r n  D a i ry  Co Ltd v D a i ry  I n d u s t r y  A u t h o r i t y  o f
2 3NSW p r o v i d e s  a c o n v e n i e n t  exam p le .
A
In  h i s  ju dgmen t  i n  B a r t t e r ' s  Farms P ty  Ltd v Todd d e l i v e r e d  a 
few months a f t e r  F i n e m o r e , J a c o b s  J  s t a t e d  t h a t  he u n d e r s t o o d  s92  t o  
be p a r t  of  t h e  scheme t o  c r e a t e  a common m arke t  by i n t e r  a l i a , 
p r o h i b i t i n g  " a t t e m p t s  by one u n i t  of  a f e d e r a t i o n  by l e g i s l a t i v e  
p r o h i b i t i o n  t o  g i v e  i t s e l f  and i t s  r e s i d e n t s  economic  a d v a n t a g e s  o v e r
1 I d . 198-199 .  The l a n g u a g e  u s e d  by J a c o b s  J  i s  r e m a r k a b l y  s i m i l a r  
t o  t h a t  u s e d  by B e a s l e y  i n  t h e  c o n c l u d i n g  p a r a g r a p h  o f  h i s  a r t i c l e  
"The Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n :  S e c t i o n  92 -  I t s  H i s t o r y  i n  t h e  
F e d e r a l  C o n v e n t i o n s "  ( 1 9 4 8 -1 9 5 0 )  1 Annual  Law Review 97, 273,
433,  440 " . . .  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  an e x a m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  
Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i n  a l l  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  w i l l  r e v e a l  
ample e v i d e n c e  w i t h i n  t h e  f o u r  c o r n e r s  of  t h e  document i t s e l f  of  
t h e  t r u e  am bi t  o f ,  and t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon ,  t h e  t r a d e  and 
commerce power ,  t h a t  s e c t i o n  92,  r e a d  c o r r e c t l y  i n  i t s  c o n t e x t ,  
does  no more t h a n  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  c o n v e r s i o n  of  s i x  s e p a r a t e  
economic  u n i t s  i n t o  one and e n s u r e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  t h e r e i n  of  t h e  
c o n te m p o ra r y  c o n c e p t  o f  f r e e  t r a d e ; and t h a t  i t s  p r o h i b i t i o n  of  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  t h a t  c o n c e p t  e x t e n d s  s o l e l y  t o  such  m e a s u r e s ,  
f e d e r a l  o r  S t a t e ,  a s  would n e c e s s a r i l y  o r  d e l i b e r a t e l y  t h r e a t e n  
t h a t  economic  u n i t y  which  t h e  f o u n d e r s  o f  f e d e r a t i o n  i n  A u s t r a l i a  
had r e s o l v e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h . "  Emphasis  a d d e d .
2 
3
4
Below pp3 9 3 -3 9 5 .
(1978)  139 CLR 338, 352.  
(1978)  139 CLR 499, 523.
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other units of a federation . . .". Mason and Jacobs JJ never committed 
themselves to the proposition that s92 is to be taken as only giving 
freedom from discriminatory burden, that is, from protectionist 
action. By the time a Court of seven received, in Uebergang v 
Australian Wheat Board,^  an opportunity to review the basis of s92, 
Jacobs J had left the Court and Mason J contented himself with the 
development of "Plan B", the second level of his and Jacobs J ’s attack 
on the individual right framework.
In between the Pilkington decision in 1974 and the Finemore and 
Bartter's Farms decisions in 1978, Mason and Jacobs JJ developed their 
second level of attack. The propositions were first that the line 
between regulation and burden will vary according to the circumstances 
of the case and secondly that general public interest is relevant to 
s92. (This second vague proposition had grown out of their statements 
in PiIkington to the effect that s92 declared a public principle.)
The case in which these propositions were introduced was the NEDCO 
2Case. According to Mason J the concept of freedom guaranteed by 
s92 was not intended to be frozen and defined according to the 
doctrines of political economy prevailing in 1900. Rather the section 
should be understood as allowing the regulation of inter-State trade 
in the interests of the public. This would involve the operation of 
the section fluctuating and new categories of acceptable regulation 
appearing "as the community develops and as the need for new and
different modes of regulation of trade and commerce become 
. 3apparent . To support this approach to regulation Mason J
1 (1980) 32 ALR 1.
2 North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of New South 
Wales (1975) 134 CLR 559.
3 Id. 615.
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s e i z e d ^  on t h e  p r o v i s o  i n  BNC coming a f t e r  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s '
2
e ndo rse m en t  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t  t h e o r y .
The t e rm s  of  t h i s  i m p o r t a n t  p a s s a g e  a r e  now s e t  ou t  a g a i n .
"For  t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  do n o t  i n t e n d  t o  l a y  i t  down t h a t  i n  no
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  c o u ld  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of  c o m p e t i t i o n  so as  t o  c r e a t e  a
monopoly e i t h e r  i n  a S t a t e  or  Commonwealth agency  o r  i n  some o t h e r
body be j u s t i f i e d .  Eve ry  c a s e  must  be j u d g e d  on i t s  own f a c t s  and
i n  i t s  own s e t t i n g  o f  t im e  and c i r c u m s t a n c e ,  and i t  may be t h a t  i n
r e g a r d  t o  some econom ic  a c t i v i t i e s  and a t  some s t a g e  of  s o c i a l
deve lopm en t  i t  m igh t  be m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  p r o h i b i t i o n  w i t h  a v iew t o
S t a t e  monopoly was t h e  o n l y  p r a c t i c a l  and r e a s o n a b l e  manner  of
r e g u l a t i o n  and t h a t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e
t h u s  p r o h i b i t e d  and t h u s  m on o p o l i ze d  r em a in e d  a b s o l u t e l y  
3
f r e e . "
J a c o b s  J  a rg u e d  t o  t h e  same e f f e c t  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  m eaning  of  s92  
migh t  be c o n s t a n t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  t h e  s e c t i o n  would v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  f a c t s  s u r r o u n d i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  s u s p e c t  l a w s .  The i m p l i c a t i o n  was 
t h a t  p r e v i o u s  d e c i s i o n s  need se ldom  be o v e r r u l e d .  I n c o n v e n i e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  c o u ld  s im p l y  be c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e i r  f a c t s . ^
1 I d .  615.
2 Above p360.
3 [1950]  AC 235,  311;  (1949)  79 CLR 497,  640-641 .
4 (1975)  134 CLR 559, 621.  T h i s  i s  a t i m e - h o n o u r e d  d e v i c e  f o r  
j u d i c i a l  s a b o t e u r s .  Compare Dixon J  i n  G r a tw ic k  v Johnson  (1945)  
70 CLR 1, 19. " I n  q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  s92  of  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  I  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  h a s  become d e s i r a b l e  f o r  t h e  
Cour t  t o  a v o i d  as  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  of  g e n e r a l  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  and i n  e a ch  c a s e  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  m a t t e r ,  so f a r  a s  may 
b e ,  on t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  or  f e a t u r e s  which i t  p r e s e n t s . "
And t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  BNC commenting on James v The 
Commonwealth ' s  " f r e edom  as  a t  t h e  f r o n t i e r "  f o r m u l a .  "These 
words must  ( a s  must  e v e r y  word o f  e v e r y  j u d g m e n t )  be r e a d  secundum 
s u b j e c t a m  m a t e r i a m . "  [1950]  AC 235,  308;  (1949)  CLR 497,  637-638 .
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The State legislation involved in NEDCO involved a clear and 
unjustifiable discrimination against the products of another State and 
Mason J and Jacobs J joined in the majority decision that such an 
operation offended s92.^ The threat presented to the status quo by 
the comments of Mason J and Jacobs J was not therefore carried into 
action in NEDCO itself.
In 1978 the case of Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v The Australian Wheat 
2Board came before the Court. There were only five judges on the 
bench, Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ. In issue was 
co-ordinated Commonwealth State legislation prohibiting certain 
dealings with wheat and empowering the compulsory acquisition of 
nominated parcels of wheat. The ultimate purpose of the scheme was 
the stabilisation of wheat growers' incomes.
Barwick CJ and Stephen J in dissent would have held the 
legislation offended s92 in its application to inter-State trade in 
wheat. Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ upheld the legislation. Murphy J
3based his decision on his discriminatory imposts theory.
Mason and Jacobs JJ referred to the BNC exposition without 
committing themselves to an acknowledgement of its authority.^ They 
noted however, that that exposition included the proviso, emphasised 
by Mason J in NEDCO, which conceded that a prohibition with a view to 
State monopoly might in some circumstances be the "only practical and 
reasonable manner of regulation".^
1 Id. 607, 616 per Mason J, 632 per Jacobs J.
2 (1978) 140 CLR 120.
3 Id. 193-194. Above p389.
4 Id. 185.
5 (1949) 79 CLR 497, 641.
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Mason and Jacobs JJ considered that the circumstances were such as 
to justify the challenged legislation. Their Honours reviewed the 
history of the Australian wheat industry, the experience of widely 
fluctuating prices and in particular the 1930’s experience of a very 
low price for wheat with its consequent hardship for wheat producers. 
Against that background their Honours identified a need for stability 
in returns to wheat growers. Their Honours considered that the 
guarantee of a minimum return to farmers was basic to such stability. 
It further appeared to their Honours that the supplying of that fund 
from the returns on wheat sales in good years was also basic. The 
scheme to smooth out fluctuations by using the returns in good years 
to make up shortfalls in bad years could only work if all growers were 
required to submit to the scheme in good years as well as benefit from 
it in bad years. Thus their Honours concluded that the scheme was, in 
the terms of the BNC proviso, the only reasonable and practical manner 
of regulation of the wheat industry.^
The striking feature of the joint judgment of Mason and Jacobs JJ
was the complete absence of any direct reference to the nature of the
prima facie freedom which they found sufficiently rebutted by the
public interest in ordered marketing. It must be remembered that
Clark King was handed down just after Finemore and just before
Bartter’s Farms, the cases where their Honours stated their suspicion
that the decided cases had misconstrued s92 in extending its
freedom beyond freedom from protectionist action. In these cases,
their Honours also stated that they would follow the decided cases
2until a review of their basis was sought. Consistently with that
stance Mason and Jacobs JJ in Clark King, claimed to be applying the
BNC formula with its proviso, according to their understanding of
3what the Privy Council meant thereby (rather than applying their
1 (1978) 140 CLR 120, 188-193.
2 Finemore’s case (1978) 139 CLR 338,352 per Mason J, 35 per Jacobs
J.
3 Id. 185 - 186, 188.
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own understanding of s92). Still their Honours failed to give a 
positive statement of the freedom that they took the Privy Council to 
have found in s92. Did their conclusion of validity mean that the 
public interest was sufficient to offset even an individual liberty 
freedom? Or did it mean (bearing in mind their statements in 
Pilkington and NEDCO Above that they took the decided cases to have 
established a freedom derived from a great (but as yet undefined^ 
public principle of s92 with which this legislation was compatible?
The ambiguity could well have been deliberate.
Although Mason and Jacobs JJ claimed to be applying the BNC
formula according to its terms, the reality of their action was a
large shift in the operation of s92. The essence of the individual
liberty theory is the recognition of a privileged class, inter-State
trader, within society.^ The essence of the argument of Mason and
Jacobs JJ in Clark King was that fairness to growers generally
2required that inter-State traders not be privileged. Their Honours 
comment that this "Australia-wide wheat pooling scheme" involving 
coordinated Commonwealth State legislation was acceptable whereas a 
single State’s scheme involving the same prohibitions and acquisitions 
would be difficult to uphold, revealed a preoccupation with some 
approach to s92 other than individual liberty. As Barwick CJ had 
pointed out in Readers Digest^ once one accepted the individual 
liberty basis to s92 then the wider the adoption of an offensive 
provision the wider the breach of s92.^
1 Finemore ’s case (1978) 139 CLR 339, 340 per Barwick CJ.
2 Id. 193.
3 Id. 192.
4 (1969) 120 CLR 1, 20. Above p386.
5 Also Clark King (1978) 140 CLR 120, 158; Uebergang (1980) 32 ALR 
1, 17.
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No one had paid much attention to the BNC proviso until it was 
thus injected with life by Mason and Jacobs JJ.^ It seemed to be no 
more than a recognition by the Privy Council that it is difficult to 
devise a s92 formula which will meet all cases which may arise. 
Nevertheless, as Mason and Jacobs JJ pointed out, the terms of the BNC 
proviso recognize the relevance of the current "stage of social 
development" and recognize that such general considerations may 
justify the exclusion of individuals from inter-State trade even if 
the exclusion is to stop them competing with a government trading 
body.
(i) Barwick's defence of individual right.
After Mason and Jacobs JJ declared in Pilkington their willingness
to re-examine the basis of s92, Barwick CJ vigorously defended the
individual right theory in general and his own version of the
individual right theory in particular. He set out his defence in the
2cases of NEDCO in 1975 , Finemores Transport Pty Ltd v New South 
Wales^, and Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board^ in 
1978, Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt in 1979^ and 
in Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board in 1980 shortly before his 
retirement.^ (Barwick CJ sat on seven other s92 cases during this
1 R Anderson had noted the destabilising potential of the proviso in 
his note on BNC in (1950) 1 UQLJ 65, 67. An attempt to found a 
argument on the proviso had been rejected by the Privy Council in 
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 1] (1954) 93 CLR 1, 
34 on the basis that no facts had been proved to support such an 
argument.
2 (1975) 134 CLR 559.
3 (1978) 139 CLR 338.
4 (1978) 140 CLR 120.
5 (1979) 27 ALR 182.
6 (1980) 32 ALR 1.
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period where he found no occasion to review the basis for the 
section.)^
Many of the points in the defence of his individual liberty theory 
had been already made by him when developing his theory of regulation 
before the attack commenced, and before that, in his submissions in 
BNC and other cases as counsel.
On the question of whether s92 is concerned to create an 
individual right or some other kind of freedom Barwick CJ made these 
points.
The words of s92 make it plain that the intention is to create an 
individual right. First, because the section also protects 
intercourse and intercourse must mean exclusively intercourse by 
persons, individuals and corporations. This was a point taken by
the Privy Council in BNC echoing Barwick's submissions and receives
3comment above.
Secondly, because trade and commerce are both carried on by 
persons. Even though some activities engaged in by government 
executives or agencies closely resemble trading activities, such 
activities are not really trading activities.^ This proposition was 
inconsistent with authority and with Barwick’s own statements for the 
purposes of 51(xx) and is discussed below.^
1 Perre v Pollitt ( 1975) 135 CLR 139; Buck v Bavone ( 1976) 135 CLR 
110; HC Sleigh Pty Ltd v South Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475; 
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Lyd v Commonwealth
( 1977) 139 CLR 54; Bartter's Farms Pty Ltd v Todd ( 1978) 139 CLR 
495; Smith v Capewell (1979) 26 ALR 507; Boyd v Carah Coaches 
(1979) 27 ALR 161.
2 Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, 14.
3 Above p345-346, 356.
4 Clark King Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120, 
192; Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, 14.
5 Below pp414-419.
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Thirdly, if it matters, this large gap in the totality of 
legislative powers was deliberately created.'*'
As for the introduction by Mason and Jacobs JJ of the propositions
that the operation of s92 will vary with the circumstances of each
case - Barwick CJ agreed with that proposition, but drew the standard
2distinction between connotation and denotation. The connotation of
the words in the Constitution could not be changed by the High Court.
3They could only be changed by constitutional amendment under sl28.
The line between connotation and denotation is arbitrary. Barwick 
CJ’s point had some force on this occasion, however, as Mason J had 
come close to wandering from the orthodox jargon when he had said in 
NEDCO that the word ''free’' was not intended to be frozen to doctrines 
of political economy prevailing to 1900 but was intended to allow new 
needs to be taken into account.^
As for the introduction of the proposition that public interest 
can offset s92?s prima facie freedom - Barwick CJ steadfastly 
refused to acknowledge any indication of regulation other than the 
inherent meaning of freedom.^ Barwick CJ took the rebels to task 
for their vague talk about the public aspect of s92. Section 92 was a 
limitation on legislative power. To say that its principle could be 
offset by some public interest perceived by the legislators was to 
subject the legislative limitation to legislative power. That was to 
rewrite the Constitution.^ It was also inappropriate for a court of 
law to enter into inquiries about whether a law was good for the
1 Clark King (1978) 140, CLR 120, 153.
2 Above p92. Compare James v Commonwealth [1936] AC 578, 614; 
(1936) CLR 1, 43-44.
3 Uebergang's case (1980) 32 ALR 1, 17-18.
4 (1975) 134 CLR 559, 615 Above p393.
5 Above pp379-381.
6 Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, 16-17.
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community. "The decision whether or not a community or some part of it 
benefits from legislation involves social and political theory and 
must inevitably involve passage down a slippery path, better suited to 
the feet of legislators than to those of judges."'*'
To meet both the inference contained in Mason J’s discussion that 
his (Barwick CJ’s) interpretation of "free" was frozen to a 1900 
doctrine and to meet the attempt to bring in general public interest, 
Barwick CJ made this unequivocal declaration.
"Nothing I have ever written, nor, as far as I am aware, nothing 
that has been said in the decided cases, on the operation of s92 
has depended on any other consideration than the words of the 
Constitution itself."^
This was a new emphatic version of the familiar - the text is the
test. Its vehemence is undercut, when one reads back over Barwick
CJ's discussions of "free" and sees that Barwick CJ's conclusion about
what the test meant was reinforced by his Honour’s belief that his
3interpretation was good for the people of the federation.
1 Clark King (1978) 140 CLR 120, 153-154.
2 Uebergang’s case (1980) 32 ALR 1, 18-19. After his retirement 
Barwick J pursued a similar theme in his review, discussed above 
p3-4, of Professor LR Zines ’ The High Court and the Constitution.
3 The emphatic statement in the quoted passage is a little hard to 
reconcile with statements made by Barwick CJ in an address given 
at a luncheon on 6 April 1979 organized by the Australian National 
University Law Society. I attended that luncheon. According to 
my recollection confirmed by notes I made at the time, Barwick CJ 
said that the High Court was sensitive to the social implications 
of cases before it. His Honour referred to the then current 
controversy over road taxes and said that no court sensitive to 
the social implications of inserting costs in the form of taxes 
into the base of the cost structure would uphold the validity of 
such taxes. Discussed above p4.
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And what of  t h e  p r o v i s o  t o  t h e  BNC f o r m u la ?  In  1980 i n  Uebergang
v A u s t r a l i a n  Wheat Board'*' a wheat  grower  so u g h t  a r e - e x a m i n a t i o n  of 
2
C l a r k  K in g . While  t h e  c a s e  was s t i l l  a t  t h e  p l e a d i n g  s t a g e ,
Barwick  CJ s t a t e d  q u e s t i o n s  f o r  t h e  F u l l  C o u r t .  The f i r s t  and most 
i m p o r t a n t  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  was w h e t h e r  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  depended  on t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  any f a c t ,  and i f  s o ,  what  
was t h e  f a c t  t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d .
This  b r o u g h t  t h e  Cour t  up a g a i n s t  t h e  b a s i c  q u e s t i o n  of  t h e
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  BNC p r o v i s o .  A c c o r d in g  t o  Barwick  CJ t h e  BNC p r o v i s o
was i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  " c o r r e c t ” i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  t h e o r y  of 
3
s 9 2 .  I t s  i n c l u s i o n  by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  was a mere m a t t e r  of 
c a u t i o n .  The Cour t  s h o u l d  d e c l a r e  " o u t r i g h t  and u n e q u i v o c a l l y " ,  t h a t  
i t  c o u ld  n e v e r  a p p l y .  That  was t h e  " l o g i c  of t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n " .  I f  
h i s  b r e t h r e n  c o u ld  n o t  s e e  t h a t  t h e n  t h e y  s h o u ld  a t  l e a s t  r e c o g n i z e  
t h a t  t h e  p r o v i s o  c o u ld  o n l y  a p p l y  i n  e x t r e m e l y  r a r e  o c c a s i o n s .  The 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  Uebergang  were  no t  g r e a t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom  t h e
4
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s u r r o u n d i n g  o t h e r  c a s e s  d e c i d e d  b e f o r e  BNC. I t  was 
t h e r e f o r e ,  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  was a n y t h i n g  i n  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s u r r o u n d i n g  Uebergang which  would come w i t h i n  t h e  
e x t r e m e l y  r a r e  c a t e g o r y . ^  I n  any c a s e  t h e  p r o v i s o  would have  t o  be 
s t r i c t l y  com pl ied  w i t h  and a heavy  onus would l i e  on t h o s e  a f f i r m i n g  
i t s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y . ^
That  t h e n  was Barwick  C J ' s  c a s e .
1 (1980)  32 ALR 1.
2 (1978)  140 CLR 120.
3 I d .  10.
4 I d .  11.
5 I d .  11-12 .
6 I d .  12.
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(ii) The outcome of the 1970's attack - Uebergang’s Case
The case of Uebergang presented, in the manner described above, 
the opportunity for a bench of seven to re-examine the nature of s92Ts 
freedom.
Murphy J continued his discriminatory fiscal impost theory. The 
wheat marketing legislation was therefore valid and there was no 
possibility of any facts being proved which could change that result. 
His Honour did add, that his second preference was for the formulation 
of Stephen and Mason JJ.^
The joint judgment of Stephen and Mason JJ made no mention of the 
discrimination theory which Mason J had proposed in Finemore. The 
judgment did, however, represent a weakening of the individual liberty 
theory.
The mere fact that Stephen J joined in this judgment with Mason J, 
a clear opponent of the individual liberty theory, was itself 
significant. Stephen J had previously been a supporter of the 
individual right framework.
oIn NEDCO in 1975 he had concurred with the judgment of Barwick 
CJ which contained a discussion of the Chief Justice’s concept of
3regulation and freedom dominated by the rights of the individual.
In the Clark King case^ the dissent of Stephen J was vigorous in 
its disagreement with the conclusion reached by Mason and Jacobs JJ
1 Id. 28-32.
2 (1975) 134 CLR 559, 601.
3 (1975) 134 CLR 557, 581-582. Also Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival
Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617, 652-661.
4 (1978) 140 CLR 120, 162ff.
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t h a t  i t  was an a p p r o p r i a t e  c a se  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  BNC 
p r o v i s o .
The change  i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of  S t e p h e n  J  was f i r s t  a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e
c a s e  of Permewan W righ t  i n  1979.* The p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e ,  t h e
v a l i d i t y  of  egg g r a d i n g  and t e s t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  h a s  been  d i s c u s s e d  
2
a b o v e .  G ibbs ,  S t e p h e n  and Mason J J  (Barw ick  CJ and A i c k i n  J  
d i s s e n t i n g )  h e l d  t h e  law t o  be a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n .  (Murphy J  h e l d  
t h e  law t o  be v a l i d  b e c a u s e  i t  was no t  a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  f i s c a l  
i m p o s t . )  Gibbs J  d i d  n o t  s e e  any need t o  r e v i e w  t h e  b a s i c  i s s u e s .  
S t e p h e n  J ,  how ever ,  d i d  examine  t h e  b a s i c  i s s u e s  and t o o k  p o i n t s  which  
Mason J  had made i n  p r e v i o u s  c a s e s  and was making i n  Permewan i t s e l f .
In  r e j e c t i n g  a s u b m i s s i o n  ( b a s e d  on s t a t e m e n t s  f rom Barwick  CJ 
t h r o u g h  t h e  c a s e s )  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n  was t h e  m u tua l  
accommodat ion  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s ,  S t e p h e n  J  s t a t e d  h i s  b e l i e f s :
( a )  t h a t  g e n e r a l  community i n t e r e s t  c o u ld  j u s t i f y  r e s t r i c t i o n  of
3
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s ;
(b )  t h a t  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  was what  j u s t i f i e d  t h e  w e l l -  
a c c e p t e d  example  of  r e g u l a t o r y  laws p r o t e c t i n g  p u b l i c  
h e a l t h
( c )  t h a t  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of  r e g u l a t i o n  a r e  no t  c l o s e d . * ’
1 (1979)  27 ALR 182.
2 Above p p 3 8 3 f f .
3 I d .  198.
4 I d .  196-198 .
5 I d .  198
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Stephen J volunteered that although in Clark King he had applied 
the BNC proviso strictly according to its terms and required that the 
monopoly provisions be shown to be "the only practical and reasonable 
manner of regulation", his Honour would not always require such a 
strict compliance with a neat formula. His Honour now preferred to 
adopt a general test
"If a law which bears upon inter-State trade is nevertheless to be 
valid because regulatory the restrictions which it imposes must be 
no greater than are reasonably necessary in all the 
circumstances. ...Any attempt at greater elaboration of analysis 
than is afforded by the quite general standard of reasonableness 
in all the circumstances appears to me to be as unprofitable as it 
is unnecessary."^
Any possible ambiguity in Stephen J’s attitude to the BNC proviso
which might have been drawn from the context in Permewan was removed
by his position in Uebergang. In their joint judgment in Uebergang
Stephen and Mason JJ stated that the general test suggested by Stephen
J in Permewan Wright should be applied in all cases and that no
special rule should be developed for laws such as that in issue in
Uebergang involving prohibitions with a view to State Government 
omonopoly. In all cases the inquiry should be "whether or not the 
restrictions which the legislation imposes upon inter-State trade are 
no greater than are reasonably necessary in all the 
circumstances."^
Their Honours would not require strict compliance with the BNC 
proviso in cases of prohibition with a view to State monopoly. It was 
not appropriate to convert the proviso into a "conclusive 
formula".^
1 Id. 201.
2 (1980) 32 ALR 1, 25-28.
3 Id. 28.
4 Id. 27.
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Their Honours could not see any reason to require State monopoly which
was practical and reasonable regulation to be also the sole practical
and reasonable regulation.* The division of the Court in the Clark
King case, (with Stephen J and Mason J reaching opposite conclusions
as to whether or not that case was an appropriate one for the
application of the BNC proviso,) may well have been in mind, however,
in their joint judgment in Uebergang when Stephen and Mason JJ
commented that any prospect of certainty from applying the BNC proviso
2strictly would be illusory. The availability of alternative
feasible means of regulation need only concern the Court if raised by
3those attacking the legislation.
There is no doubt that the approach of Stephen and Mason JJ, by 
making the BNC proviso more readily available, made the prima facie 
freedom declared by s92 more vulnerable. As with the joint judgment of 
Mason and Jacobs JJ in Clark King,^  however, the joint judgment of 
Stephen and Mason JJ in Uebergang failed to give any positive 
statement of the underlying principle of s92 or of the nature of the 
freedom granted by s92.
Mason J cannot be said to have developed any coherent alternative 
to the individual liberty freedom before Uebergang. In Finemore in 
1978 Mason J had expressed sympathy for a discrimination test.“*
Before and after Finemore, however, Mason J identified features other 
than discrimination which would be likely to result in legislation 
being held invalid and held legislation invalid without connecting his 
decisions to a discrimination framework.
1 Id. 26.
2 Id. 27.
3 Id. 28.
4 Above pp395ff.
5 (1978) 139 CLR 338, 352.
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Mason J did provide some link for these propositions with a 
discrimination based theory where he said that Commonwealth controls 
of trade were more likely to be held to be regulatory because the 
Commonwealth was less likely to seek to prefer one State over 
another.^ His Honour did not say, however, that Commonwealth 
provisions would automatically be upheld.
All of this was coloured by Mason J ’s statement in Finemore to the
effect that although he suspected discrimination to be the true
indicator of invalidity, he would keep applying the decided cases
until an appropriate occasion for review arose. Did Mason J regard
prohibition and expropriation as being prima facie invalid because the
cases said so, or because, he understood s92 to say so? When the
opportunity to examine the basic freedom of s92 was presented in
Uebergang, Mason J made no attempt to declare for a discrimination
basis to s92.^ Indeed the test which he and Stephen J adopted,
expressly acknowledged that the adverse effect of a challenged law
upon traders was directly relevant to the question of whether it could
2be accepted as reasonable regulation.
The acknowledgement that adversity of effect upon traders can 
spell invalidity was quite compatible with an individual liberty 
freedom for s92. (It would have been surprising if Stephen J, whose 
earlier judgments had acknowledged that s92 is a declaration of a 
prima facie individual liberty, had subscribed to an incompatible 
formula without explaining that shift.) The discussion was, however, 
loose enough to be reconciled with other theories of s92 including, 
for example, a modified version of Evatt J’s fuzzy free trade theory
1 In Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt (1979) 27 ALR 
182, 206 Mason J suggested that Commonwealth regulations of trade 
might be upheld more readily than State controls because it was 
less likely that the Commonwealth would seek to prefer one State 
to another. This falls short of an unequivocal commitment to a 
discrimination only basis to s92. The individual liberty formula 
accepts that discrimination was one of the actions outlawed by 
s92. Clark King (1978) 140 CLR 120, 147 per Barwick CJ.
2 (1980) 32 ALR 1, 27.
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or a model parallel to America’s balancing of national and local 
interests.'*' Whatever the compatibility of the joint Stephen/Mason 
judgment in Uebergang with alternatives to a prima facie individual 
liberty, no alternative prima facie freedom was enunciated. The 
significance of the Stephen/Mason joint judgment in Uebergang lay in 
its assertion that public interest and administrative considerations 
could outweigh the adversity of a law’s effects on traders and in its 
loosening of the BNC proviso.
The other three judges in Uebergang, Gibbs, Aickin and Wilson JJ 
joined Barwick CJ to reaffirm unequivocally the authority of BNC and 
the individual liberty basis of s92. None of them would, however, 
join Barwick CJ’s proposal to declare that the BNC proviso could never 
apply. These judges did accept that the proviso would have to be 
strictly applied and could only apply in exceptional circumstances.
They considered that it was, therefore, open for the defenders of 
the wheat marketing legislation in issue to try to prove facts which 
would bring the legislation within the BNC proviso.^
1 Compare LR Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 116-122, 
126-130. (Written before the Uebergang decision was handed 
down.) See also DJ Rose, "Federal principles for the 
Interpretation of Section 92 of the Constitution" (1972) 46 ALJ 
371. Supporting the inference that Mason J was moving towards a 
federal theory of s92 were his statements in Clark King (1978) 140 
CLR 120, 192 (jointly with Jacobs J) and Permewan Wright (1979) 27 
ALR 182, 206 to the effect that prohibition or expropriation by 
the Commonwealth, or by joint Commonwealth/State action was easier 
to reconcile with s92 than was action by a single State, because 
the Commonwealth was less likely to seek to prefer one State to 
another. The American model is briefly outlined above pp312-313.
2 (1980) 32 ALR 1, 22 per Gibbs and Wilson JJ, 35-36 per Aickin J.
3 Id. 23-24 per Gibbs and Wilson JJ, 44 per Aickin J.
4 Id. 24-25 per Gibbs and Wilson JJ, 45 per Aickin J.
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On the issue of what considerations justify restrictions on
traders, Aickin J agreed with Barwick CJ that general public interest
was irrelevant'*' and adopted Barwick CJ’s theory of regulation in
2terms of the mutual accommodation of individuals. Gibbs and Wilson 
JJ, however agreed with Stephen and Mason JJ that general public 
interest could be taken into account and could outweigh the prima 
facie individual liberty.
K. The Kind of Freedom Guaranteed by s92 - Summary
This then was the state of the art when Barwick CJ left the Court 
in 1981. The BNC declaration to the effect that s92 erects a prima 
facie freedom for individuals to engage in inter-State trade, won by 
Barwick KC over thirty years before, was entrenched after its review 
in Uebergang by an unequivocal endorsement by Barwick CJ and three of 
his brethren with the only developed alternative theory, that of 
Murphy J, receiving no support. Mason J and Jacobs J had threatened 
to find an alternative freedom in s92 but Jacobs J had left the Court 
and Mason J had not defined any new principle.
The key to the entrenchment was, of course, the authority of 
BNC The BNC discussion, however, recognized the possibility of 
exception to its general principle and the Privy Council statement 
that its general principle was subject to exception was just as 
authoritative as its statement of general principle. Barwick CJ tried 
to keep the general principle while ignoring the exception but none of
1 Id. 44.
2 Id. 41.
3 Id. 21-23.
4 Although the discussion in BNC was in the nature of an advisory
opinion, the authority of the discussion can be found, if need be, 
in the adoption of that discussion by the Privy Council in its 
decision in Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 1]
(1954) 93 CLR 1.
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his brethren were willing to engage in a similar exercise in 
approbating and reprobating. Thus those intent on weakening the 
individual liberty theory of s92 successfully turned on Barwick CJ one 
of his own strengths -the authority of BNC.
Interacting with the issue of the status of the BNC proviso, was 
the question of what interests might justify a restriction of the 
liberty of individual inter-State traders. While acknowledging that 
there were a variety of restrictions which could be imposed without 
offence to s92, Barwick CJ refused to give any rationale beyond the 
inherent meaning of "free" to explain those restrictions which did 
not amount to an accommodation of inter-State traders inter se. In 
the absence of a rationale from Barwick CJ, other members of the Court 
endorsed an inquiry into general public interest. The difficulty for 
Barwick CJ was, of course, that a most attractive limitation - that 
which would preclude any inquiry into the general economic effects on 
others of the activities of inter-State traders - seemed to be 
precluded by the terms of the BNC proviso.
To say that the prima facie individual right created by s92 can be 
qualified because of general public need does not directly undermine 
the individual right basis to s92. A judge can accept that such a 
qualification is possible, but then find that on the facts before him 
the public interest is not sufficient to override the individual 
rights. The associated proposition introduced by the opponents of the 
individual liberty theory that each case depends on its own facts does 
not directly undermine the individual liberty theory either. That 
proposition could be used by those bent on downgrading the individual 
liberty theory to ignore earlier cases where similar laws have been 
held invalid. The proposition could equally be used, however, by 
supporters of the individual liberty theory to ignore earlier cases 
where similar laws have been held valid.
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The direct weakening of the individual liberty theory that the
proposition involves is, however, in the discouragement it provides to
individuals to go to Court to enforce their right. The prospect for
an individual trader of taking a State or the Commonwealth (or both)
to the High Court to resolve issues of fact involving inter alia,
general economic and social issues, would be, to say the least,
daunting - especially when, according to Stephen and Mason JJ, the
individual can only complain about the particular means chosen for
pursuing a worthwhile goal if he can suggest a feasible alternative
means.* Uebergang apparently found the exercise too costly and 
owithdrew.
Such issues were involved in BNC itself but were carried by large 
powerful corporations. Again this weakening of the individual 
liberty theory involves a turning on Barwick CJ on one of his own 
strengths. Barwick CJ used, and used successfully, the proposition 
that the compatibility of a law with s92 is not confined to an 
examination of the terms of a law but depends also on the surrounding 
facts. Barwick CJ used that proposition to extend the notion of 
"direct" (and thus the reach of s92) beyond that allowed it by Dixon 
CJ.^ The proposition was turned on Barwick CJ to enable an 
expansion in the categories of allowable regulation to take place 
without any need for a direct repudiation of the assumption of 
individual liberty.
1 Uebergang's case (1980) 32 ALR 1, 27-28.
2 The Financial Review of 20 May 1981 reported that Uebergang had 
withdrawn his action. In May 1982, however, Uebergang wrote to 
Commonwealth Parliamentarians asking them to support his 
application to the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department for 
financial assistance to continue the action.
3 This lends a new irony to the statement made by Barwick in 
argument in BNC (1948) 76 CLR 1 "when I speak of an individual’s 
freedom ... I mean the freedom of the banking corporation". HCT 
17/2/48, 325A; 76 CLR 1.
4 Below pp422ff.
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The discussion now turns to the other issues which determine the 
reach of s92 - what is inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse? - 
and - when will legislative or executive action be said to be 
affecting "trade, commerce and intercourse among the States"?
L. What is inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse? -
To a degree, but only to a degree, this question can be divided 
into separate issues - what is trade (commerce and intercourse) - when 
is trade inter-State? These are problems of definition. Logic cannot 
indicate the content of the definition. In the ensuing discussion I 
do not intend to review all these issues of definition. I merely 
propose to outline the main propositions established and issues which 
have arisen and to indicate Barwick's position in relation to those 
matters.
(i) What is trade?
An important general discussion on this problem is to be found in
the judgment of Dixon J in BNC.^  That discussion was adopted with
2approval by the Privy Council. Dixon J considered 'trade, commerce
and intercourse" to be dominated by a notion of "Transportation,
3traffic, movement, transfer, interchange, communication... . Dixon 
J could not reduce that six word composite notion to one word. The 
element common to the six is movement^ and that was the word to 
which Dixon J ’s discussion kept returning.
1 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 380-383.
2 [1950] AC 235, 303; (1949) 79 CLR 497, 632-633.
3 (1948) 76 CLR 1, 381.
4 Dixon J was concerned with the meaning of the word "trade" for 
the purposes of s92. Trade which did not involve movement could 
not often be inter-State.
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Both Barwick KC^ and Evatt A-G had accepted that movement is
2within the centre of the concept of trade. There was disagreement, 
however, on the question whether trade in s92 only refers to dealings 
with tangibles. Evatt A-G submitted that the section was so 
limited,^ Barwick KC that it was not.^ (In the Privy Council 
Evatt conceded that banking is trade and concentrated on his 
alternative submission that banking is not an inter-State activity.) 
The majority of the High Court and then the Privy Council agreed with 
Barwick KC that trade includes movement of intangibles. (Thus 
banking, which is the moving of money or credit is trade, and inter­
state transmission of credit is inter-State trade protected by 
s92.)1 2345
It is also clear that certain contracts can be within the concept 
of trade. Contracts for the sale of goods are the most frequently 
encountered examples. The difficulties that arise in this area are 
more to do with identifying contracts as being inter-State than with 
identifying them as trade.
These then are the two main kinds of trade relevant to s92 -
- movement (of the kinds referred to by Dixon J)
- contracts.
1 HCT 17/2/48, 287-322; 14/4/48, 2254-2272. Similarly PCT 28/4/49,
42-54.
2 HCT 12/3/48, 1391.
3 PCT 30/3/49, 9-11. HCT 12/3/48, 1364-1407; 16/3/48, 1512, 1518-
1522; 18/3/48-19/3/48, 1590-1652.
4 See earlier reference to Barwick’s submissions.
5 (1948) 283 per Rich and Williams JJ, 305-306 per Starke J, 383 per
Dixon J with Latham CJ (234) and McTiernan J (397) contra. The 
Privy Council adopted the discussion of Dixon J. [1959] AC 235, 
303; (1949) 79 CLR 497, 632-633.
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(ii) Does the word "trade" include non-commercial activities?
The question can be broken down into specific problems. Can a non­
profit making activity be trade? Can a non-revenue raising activity 
be trade? Can a government activity be trade?
In BNC Dixon J seemed to treat the three words "trade, commerce 
and intercourse" in s92 as being interchangeable synonyms which had 
been grouped together for emphasis revealing "an intention to include 
all forms and variety of inter-State transaction whether by way of
commercial dealing or of personal converse or passage".'*' Dixon J
considered indeed that the activities covered by the phrase "trade and 
commerce" in s51(i) were the same as those covered by the phrase 
"trade commerce and intercourse" in s92. On this approach movement 
is trade (or commerce or intercourse, which ever synonym one prefers) 
for the purposes of s92 (and for that matter for the purposes of
qs51(i)) even if the movement is not being carried on for reward.
In contrast with the approach of Dixon J, Barwick KC had argued
that financial reward is an essential part of the notion of trade.
"Of course, trade is not the passage of goods nor is the passage
of goods trade. Until you have got the exchange of goods for
money, until you have got some relationship between persons in
relation to goods and to money mostly, you have not got 
. 4trade .
1 Id. 383.
2 Id. 381.
3 Cf Airways Case (1946) 71 CLR 29, 82 where Dixon J had reserved 
the question whether inter-State transportation not for reward 
would be within s51(i).
4 HCT 14/4/48, 2254. Similarly PCT 27/4/49, 57; 28/4/49, 42-44.
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That a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  c o n c e p t  of  t r a d e  was r e l a t e d  t o  B a r w i c k ’s 
s u b m i s s i o n  i n  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h a t  even  i f  t h e  Cour t  c o n s i d e r e d  
b a n k in g  i t s e l f  n o t  t o  be t r a d e ,  i t  s h o u ld  b e a r  i n  mind t h e  u s e  made by 
t r a d e r s  of  b a n k in g  f a c i l i t i e s  and s h o u ld  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  of  s 9 2 ,  t a k e  
a c c o u n t  of  t h e  e f f e c t  on t h e  f r e e d o m  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s  of  
r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e i r  c h o i c e  of  b a n k in g  f a c i l i t i e s . ' * '  That  s u b m i s s i o n  
went  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  d i r e c t n e s s  and i s  d e a l t  w i t h  u n d e r  t h a t  
h e a d i n g . ^
An a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  r e v e n u e  r a i s i n g  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  of
t r a d e  seems t o  u n d e r l i e  an a rgum en t  u s e d  by Barwick  CJ i n  NEDCO.
There  Barwick  CJ was d e v e l o p i n g  h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  s a l e
3
a f t e r  i m p o r t  i s  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  To e m p h a s i ze  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  t h e  f i r s t  s a l e  a f t e r  im p o r t  and im p o r t  i t s e l f ,  
Barwick CJ s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p u r p o s e  of  s a l e  a f t e r  im p o r t  was what  gave 
t h e  im por t  i t s  c om m e rc ia l  c h a r a c t e r . ^  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t  can  o n l y  have 
any p o i n t  i f  Barwick  CJ was a s su m in g  t h a t  "commerce" means a c t i v i t i e s  
c a r r i e d  on f o r  r e w a r d .
In  argument  b e f o r e  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  Barwick  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  c o n c e p t  of  " i n t e r c o u r s e "  migh t  w e l l  o v e r l a p  t h e  c o n c e p t  
( t r e a t e d  a s  a c o m p o s i t e  a t  t h i s  s t a g e )  of  " t r a d e  and commerce",  i t  was 
a d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t .
"When one s p e a k s  of  f r e e d o m  of  i n t e r c o u r s e  one h a s  r e a l l y  t o  
p a r a p h r a s e  i t  a s  b e i n g  f r e e d o m  t o  move and comm unica te .  You can 
no t  a b s t r a c t  t h a t ; t h a t  means f o r  p e r s o n s  t o  move and t o  
c om m un ic a te " . ^
1 HCT 1 7 / 2 / 4 8 ,  332 -335 ;  1 4 / 4 / 4 8 ,  2252,  2285.
2 Below p p 4 2 3 -4 2 4 .
3 D i s c u s s e d  be low p451 .
4 (1975)  134 CLR 559, 579.
5 PCT 2 8 / 4 / 4 9 ,  26 -27 ;  79 CLR 497,  566.
416.
In Pilkington v Hammond'*' Barwick CJ expressly reserved the question 
of whether carriage other than carriage for reward could be trade and 
the question of what area the word intercourse might cover.
The issue whether movement other than movement for reward is trade
has not arisen for decision. Such an issue is not likely to arise in
the context of a s92 problem given the decision in the case of
Gratwick v Johnson, Barwick’s first s92 brief. There it was held that
even if the words trade and commerce do not include "non-commercial"
2movement, the word intercourse does.
As Chief Justice Barwick has held that an activity which in fact
makes a profit, even if it is only intended to earn enough money to
cover its costs, is a trading activity for the purposes of 
3s51(xx). In the course of holding the inter-State transportation 
activities of a non-profit making airline service to be within s51(i), 
Barwick CJ commented "In my opinion, neither the gaining of profit nor 
the intention or purpose to gain profit is an indispensable ingredient 
of a commercial operation".^
The exact relationship between the concept of "trading" in s51(xx) 
and "trade" in ss51(i) and 92 has not been discussed by the Court. In 
his leading judgment in Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd Barwick 
CJ seemed to assume that the word "trading" in s51(xx) had a meaning 
corresponding to the word "trade" in ss51(i) and 92. There Barwick CJ 
cited the BNC discussion of trade for the purposes of s51(xx).^
1 (1974) 131 CLR 124, 138.
2 (1945) 70 CLR 1.
3 St George CC Exp Trade Practices Commission (1974) 130 CLR 533, 
539.
4 R v Stanton Exp Associated Airlines Pty Ltd (1978) 141 CLR 281, 
288.
5 (1971) 124 CLR 468, 489.
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If the interconnection between these terms is to be assumed then 
some of the things Barwick CJ said in the context of s92 are in 
conflict with his decisions in the context of s51(xx).
To reveal their inconsistency one needs to start with the 1945
Airways Case. In that case Barwick KC argued that the notion of trade
was such that an activity by a government body could not be trade
within the meaning of the term in s51(i).^ This argument was
dismissed and the Court held s51(i) supported legislation setting up a
2government instrumentality to engage in inter-State trade.
Unchastened by the unequivocal rebuff that his submission received 
in the Airways Case, Barwick continued to reason from it both as 
Counsel and Chief Justice. The proposition that trade can only mean 
trade by individuals, that is, by non-government legal persons, seemed 
often to be the starting assumption in Barwick's argument that s92 
must be a guarantee of freedom to individuals qua individuals. Right 
at the end of his judicial career in the case of Uebergang v 
Australian Wheat Board, Barwick CJ developed the submission he had 
first put in the Airways Case.
"Commerce necessarily involves the participation of persons, again 
natural or corporate - not as a matter of economic policy or 
theory - but as a matter of language. Commercial activity is the 
antithesis of governmental or Executive activity.
Intergovernmental arrangements are not properly described as
1 (1945) 71 CLR 29, 34.
2 In BNC (1948) 76 CLR 1 Barwick KC pressed a parallel argument that 
the subject matter of banking in s51(xiii) only covers 
transactions between subject and subject and does not include 
transactions where a Government body takes the role of banker.
HCT 16/2/48, 214-249, 24/3/48, 1887 ff. Again the argument was 
rejected.
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commercial, however much they have commodities as their subject 
matter. In my opinion, the same may be said of the word ’trade', 
though we have become, perhaps increasingly, aware of Executive 
participation in activities which bear a close resemblance to the 
trading activities of persons. But, in my opinion, what the 
Executive or government agencies do in this respect ought not 
properly to be described as 'trading'. This, I think, is 
particularly true of the activities of an agency of the Executive 
which has a monopoly of acquisition and disposal of a commodity. 
Buy or sell governments and government agencies may, but their 
buying and selling is not truly a trading activity within the 
concept of trade, commerce and intercourse as found in s92.^
This passage completely ignored that aspect of the decision in the 
Airways Case which, despite the submissions of Barwick KC, held that 
an activity by a government instrumentality can be trade within the 
meaning of the term in s51(i).
The flat statement in Uebergang that for the purposes of s92, 
activity by a government agency can not be a trading activity (and the 
implications that that statement carries about Barwick CJ's attitude 
to the Airways decision), is to be contrasted with comments made by 
Barwick CJ in the Concrete Pipes Case and with his decision in the St 
George CC Case.
In the Concrete Pipes Case Barwick CJ said that corporations
formed under State or Commonwealth powers could be corporations of the
2 3kind described in s51(xx). In an apparent reference to the
1 (1980) 32 ALR 1, 14.
2 (1971) 124 CLR 468, 488. My thanks to G J Lindell for this point.
3 I say "apparent" as Barwick CJ cited Airways [No 2] (1945) 71 CLR 
115 which was not authority for his proposition. This was 
presumably an error.
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Airways decision^ Barwick CJ commented "Section 51(i) for instance
„2has been found a source of power to create a trading corporation. 
Barwick CJ held that a County Council, although a government agency, 
was a trading corporation within the meaning of s51(xx) of the
Constitution and that its character as a trading corporation was
3derived from its activity of buying and selling electricity.
Barwick*s definition of trade seemed to vary throughout these 
cases so as to serve his abhorrence of restrictive trade practices.
(iii) When is Movement Inter-State?
The movement from a point in one State to a point in another is 
not only inter-State at the point of the crossing of the border, but 
is also inter-State from its beginning in the one State to its end in 
the other.^ The difficulties arise in distinguishing mere 
preliminary steps from the start of the inter-State movement and in 
distinguishing the "concluding acts" of the inter-State movement from 
later dealings with goods that were once in inter-State movement.
(iv) When is a contract for the sale of goods inter-State?
Much of what was said by the Court in McArthur's Case has received 
criticism and modification in later judgments. So much, however, of 
the leading judgment as went to the issue of whether the contracts 
involved for the sale of goods were part of inter-State trade^ has
1 (1945) 72 CLR 29.
2 (1971) 124 CLR 468, 488.
3 (1974) 130 CLR 533, 543-544; See also his comments on the St 
George CC Case in Adamson's Case (1979) 143 CLR 190, 209.
4 McArthur's Case (1920) 28 CLR 530, 546 per Knox CJ, Isaacs and 
Starke JJ.
5 (1920) 28 CLR 530, 559-560.
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been regularly reaffirmed by subsequent High Courts.'*'
The principle established was that a contract for the sale of 
goods will be inter-State trade and will only be inter-State trade if 
it contains a term requiring inter-State delivery. If the contract 
does not contain a stipulation for inter-State delivery then it is not 
part of inter-State trade even if the parties to the contract are in
different States and even if the performance of the contract could be
2(or even was likely to be) by inter-State movement of goods.
In relation to the positive aspect of this principle - that a 
stipulation for inter-State delivery will suffice to fix a contract 
with the character of inter-State trade, Barwick KC/CJ offered the 
further proposition, that the presence in a contract of a term 
stipulating for inter-State delivery would suffice to give a contract 
the character of inter-State trade even if the party who had the right 
to require inter-State delivery was never likely to do so (as might be 
the case with hedging contracts). That proposition was never 
tested. Apart from the special category of the first sale of goods 
after they have been brought into one State from another,^ Barwick 
CJ seemed to accept the negative aspect of the McArthur principle that 
unless a contract for the sale of goods stipulates for inter-State 
delivery it will not be inter-State trade.^ It has been
1 Eg Wragg v New South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 53; HC Sleigh Ltd v 
South Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475.
2 The McArthur decision related to sale of unascertained goods by 
description. The Court has yet to consider how to characterise a 
contract for the sale of specific goods which are to be delivered 
to the purchaser in one State and which are in fact in another 
State at the time of contracting.
3 BNC HCT 14/4/48, 2261; 76 CLR’1, 144; PCT 28/4/49, 50; (1948) 76 
CLR 1; [1950] AC 235; (1949) 79 CLR 497; Clark King Case (1978) 
140 CLR 120, 139-140
4 Below pp445ff.
5 HC Sleigh Ltd v South Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475, 479-480.
421 .
s u g g e s t e d ,* how ever ,  t h a t  i n  d i c t a  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  Smith v
Capewell  Barwick  CJ ( w i t h  A i c k i n  J ' s  c o n c u r r e n c e )  was p r o p o s i n g
t h a t  i t  would s u f f i c e  i f  i n t e r - S t a t e  d e l i v e r y  was w i t h i n  t h e  "mutua l
c o n t e m p l a t i o n ” of  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  a c o n t r a c t  even  i f  t h e y  had  no
c o n t r a c t u a l  o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  d e l i v e r y .  I  acknowledge  t h a t
t h e  c r u c i a l  p a s s a g e  migh t  be so  c o n s t r u e d .  I ,  how ever ,  u n d e r s t a n d
Barwick  CJ t o  have  been  d i s c u s s i n g ,  a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  p o i n t ,  t h e  p rob lem
3
of  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  movement of  goods and t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h a t  
p ro b le m  of  a s s o c i a t e d  c o n t r a c t u a l  and o t h e r  a r r a n g e m e n t s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  p rob le m  of  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  c o n t r a c t s .
(v )  What e l s e  i s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ?
The c a s e  of  McArthur  p r o v i d e s  some of  t h e  more sw eep ing  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  of  t h e  n o t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
" ' T r a d e  and commerce’ b e tw een  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  -  we l e a v e  ou t  
f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  t h e  word " i n t e r c o u r s e "  -  has  n e v e r  been c o n f i n e d  
t o  t h e  mere a c t  of  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of  m e r c h a n d i s e  ove r  t h e  
f r o n t i e r .  That  t h e  words i n c l u d e  t h a t  a c t  i s ,  of  c o u r s e ,  a 
t r u i s m .  But t h a t  t h e y  go f a r  beyond i t  i s  a f a c t  q u i t e  a s  
u n d o u b t e d .  A l l  t h e  com m e rc ia l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  o f  which  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  i s  t h e  d i r e c t  and n e c e s s a r y  r e s u l t  fo rm  p a r t  of  
' t r a d e  and commerce’ . The m u tu a l  communings, t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  
v e r b a l  and by c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  t h e  b a r g a i n ,  t h e  t r a n s p o r t  and t h e  
d e l i v e r y  a r e  a l l ,  bu t  n o t  e x c l u s i v e l y ,  p a r t s  of  t h a t  c l a s s  of 
r e l a t i o n s  b e tw een  mankind which  t h e  w or ld  c a l l s  ' t r a d e  and 
commerce ' .
1 Z ine s  and L i n d e l l ,  Sawers  A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Cases  ( 4 t h  
e d )  240.
2 (1979)  142 CLR 509,  512 -513 .  There  were a l s o  some ambiguous 
a s p e c t s  t o  t h e  judgment  of  Gibbs J  who might  be r e a d  as  p r o p o s i n g  
a q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  McArthur  p r i n c i p l e .  Mason J  ( i d .  527) 
u n e q u i v o c a l l y  a f f i r m e d  t h e  McArthur  p r i n c i p l e .
3 The c a s e  of  Sm ith  v Capewel l  i s  d i s c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  be low pp435-436  
f o r  i t s  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  p rob le m  of  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  movement.
4 (1920)  28 CLR 530,  546-547 p e r  Knox CJ, I s a a c s  & S t a r k e  J J .
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And later
"But all the commercial dealings and all the accessory methods in 
fact adopted by Australians to initiate, continue and effectuate 
the movement of persons and things from State to State are also 
parts of the concept, because they are essential for accomplishing 
the acknowledged end."*
The discussion has proceeded about as far as it can outlining in 
the abstract the significant features of the definition of inter-State 
trade. That problem of definition is frequently inextricably 
entangled with the problems of distinguishing direct from indirect 
effects. The discussion will now turn to outlining the main issues 
under that heading. After that outline specific areas will be 
discussed to demonstrate the interaction of issues of definition with 
issues of direct/indirect.
M. Direct or Indirect - When is a law on inter-State trade?
Within Evatt J’s framework the question had been not whether a law 
was directly on inter-State trade, but whether it was directed at 
inter-State trade. This formula subsumed an inquiry into the 
substance of a law. That approach had for a period enjoyed the 
support of judges who disagreed with Evatt J’s starting assumption 
about the kind of freedom guaranteed by s92. In BNC the Privy 
Council declared that such an approach which seemed to import an 
inquiry into the purpose of a law was quite inappropriate. Their 
Lordships considered the issue to be whether a suspect law was 
directly on Inter-State trade.
1 Id. 549 per Knox CJ, Isaacs and Starke JJ.
2 Above p326.
3 Above p357.
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R e f e r e n c e  h a s  been  made t o  t h e  d i s s e n t i n g  judgment  of  Dixon J  i n  
G i l p i n ’s Case i n  1935 s e t t i n g  ou t  t h e  e l e m e n t s  of  h i s  H o n o u r ’s t h e o r y  
of  s 9 2 .*  A c c o r d in g  t o  Dixon J  a law c o u ld  o n l y  be s a i d  t o  be 
d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i f  i t  o p e r a t e d  on an a c t i v i t y  (which  was 
i n  f a c t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e )  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  i t s  i n t e r - S t a t e  c h a r a c t e r  
or  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  i t s  c h a r a c t e r  a s  t r a d e .
In  a rgum ent  i n  BNC Barwick  r e f e r r e d  t o  Dixon J ’s d i s c u s s i o n  i n
G i l p i n . Barwick  t h o u g h t  i t  c o u ld  be e x p l a i n e d  as  an a t t e m p t  t o  f i n d  a
f o rm u la  which  would r e p r e s e n t  t h e  d e c i d e d  c a s e s .  I t  was d e c i d e d
b e f o r e  James v .  The Commonwealth and gave s 92  an o p e r a t i o n  which  was
t o o  w i d e . Barwick  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  Dixon J  had abandoned  i t  and h e ,
Ba rw ic k ,  d i d  no t  s u p p o r t  i t .  Barwick  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  d i r e c t  meant
t h e  o p p o s i t e  of  r e m o t e / c o n s e q u e n t i a l  and i n v o l v e d  a q u e s t i o n  of  f a c t
and d e g r e e  and of  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  a law on an i n d i v i d u a l ’s
t r a d e .  Barwick  i l l u s t r a t e d  t h i s  p e r c e p t i o n  i n  BNC by d r a w in g  an
3
a n a l o g y  w i t h  t h e  p r o b le m  of  a s s e s s i n g  p r o x i m i t y  i n  damages .
On t h e  f a c t s  i n  BNC t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  t h e  Barwick  and Dixon 
c o n c e p t s  of  d i r e c t  would o n l y  have  been  i m p o r t a n t  i f  t h e  Cour t  had 
h e l d  b a n k in g  n o t  t o  be p a r t  of  t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  p r o t e c t e d  by s 9 2 .  
To c o v e r  t h a t  p o s s i b l e  C our t  p o s i t i o n ,  Barwick  had s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  s92 
was bought  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n  by t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  c l o s i n g  down banks  would 
have  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s  a s  u s e r s  of  p r i v a t e  b a n k in g  f a c i l i t i e s . ^  
As t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  High Cour t  m a j o r i t y  t h a t  b a n k in g  
was i t s e l f  t r a d e  t h e r e  was no need  t o  choose  be tw een  t h e  Dixon and 
Barwick  n o t i o n s  of  d i r e c t .
1 (1935)  52 CLR 189, 204-206 .  Above pp317 -318 .
2 BNC PCT 2 9 / 4 / 4 9 ,  26 -27 .
3 BNC HCT 1 7 / 2 / 4 8 ,  292,  1 8 / 2 / 4 8 ,  334-336 ;  PCT 5 / 4 / 4 9 ,  59 -60 ,
6 / 4 / 4 9 ,  51;  2 7 / 4 / 4 9 .  30 -3 1 ;  2 9 / 4 / 4 9 ,  5-6 a d o p t i n g  B a r to n  J  i n
Duncan v Queens land  (1916)  22 CLR 556,  593-598 .
4 BNC PCT 5 / 4 / 4 9 .  5 9 f f .
424 .
On b a l a n c e  t h e r e  was more i n  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  d i s c u s s i o n  t o
s u p p o r t  t h e  Barwick  t h e o r y  of  d i r e c t  t h a n  t h e r e  was t o  s u p p o r t  t h e
Dixon J  t h e o r y .  The P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  e c h o i n g  Barwick*s  s u b m i s s i o n ,
c o n t r a s t e d  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  w i t h  r em o te  or  m e r e ly  i n c i d e n t a l  e f f e c t s . ' * '
The P r i v y  C o u n c i l  r e g a r d e d  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t
2
as  b e i n g  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  r e g u l a t i o n  and b u rden
3
and seemed t o  r e g a r d  b o t h  as  " f a c t  and d e g r e e "  i s s u e s ,  " p o l i t i c a l  
s o c i a l  or  economic"  a s  much as  l e g a l  i n  t h e i r  s o l u t i o n . ^  T h e i r  
L o r d s h i p s  a l s o  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  " d i r e c t "  was no t  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  a h i g h  
d e g r e e  of d e f i n i t i o n . ^  These  s t a t e m e n t s  were no t  o n ly  s u p p o r t i v e  of  
Barwick*s  t h e o r y  of  d i r e c t  -  t h e y  were a g a i n s t  Dixon J * s .  There  was 
n e v e r t h l e s s  a crumb of  e n c o u ra g e m e n t  f o r  Dixon J  i n  one a s p e c t  of  t h e  
P r i v y  C o u n c i l  d i s c u s s i o n .  In  t h e  c o u r s e  of  r e j e c t i n g  E v a t t  *s 
i n v i t a t i o n  t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  o b j e c t  of  P a r l i a m e n t  t h e i r  L o r d s h ip * s  
a d o p te d  and a p p r o v e d ^  t h e  comments of  I s a a c s  J  i n  James v Cowan.  ^
I s a a c s  J  t h e r e  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  r e l e v a n t  " o b j e c t "  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  
i s  i t s  n e c e s s a r y  l e g a l  e f f e c t .  U l t e r i o r  economic  o r  s o c i a l  e f f e c t s  
were  no t  r e l e v a n t .  These comments made by I s a a c s  J  i n  1930 a r e  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  i n  h i s  judgm en t  i n  D unc a n ' s  Case i n  1916.  The
Q
d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  d i r e c t  m a n i f e s t e d  by B a r t o n  J  and I s a a c s  
a
J  i n  t h a t  c a s e  f o re s h a d o w e d  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  Barwick
1 [1950]  AC 235,  245,  309, 
641,  642.
312,  313;  (1949)  79 CLR 497,  637,  639,
2 I d .  309;  639.
3 I d .  312,  641.
4 I d .  310;  639.
5 I d .  313;  642.
6 I d .  307;  636 -637 .
7 (1930)  43 CLR 386, 409.
8 (1916)  22 CLR 556, 598. "The p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  i s t h e  t e s t " .
9 I d .  620-621 .
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( f o l l o w i n g  B a r to n  J )  and Dixon J  ( f o l l o w i n g  I s a a c s  J ) . ^
Whatever  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of  h i s  t h e o r y ,  Dixon J  t o o k  a d v a n t a g e  of  
t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  a f t e r  BNC t o  r e v i v e  h i s  G i l p i n  t h e o r y  of  d i r e c t  and 
managed t o  a t t r a c t  t o  i t  a good d e a l  of  s u p p o r t  f rom h i s  b r o t h e r  
j u d g e s .  Two of  t h e  c l e a r e s t  v i c t o r i e s  f o r  Dixon -  d i r e c t  were a l s o  
r e b u f f s  f o r  t h e  s u b m i s s i o n s  of  Barwick  QC.
2
In  Wragg v New Sou th  Wales  Barwick  QC a rg u e d  t h a t  a p r i c e ­
f i x i n g  law c o u ld  n o t  a p p l y  t o  t h e  f i r s t  s a l e  of  goods a f t e r  t h e i r  
im p o r t  i n t o  t h e  S t a t e  e i t h e r  b e c a u s e  such  a s a l e  was t o  be r e g a r d e d  as  
p a r t  o f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  o r ,  i f  t h e  f i r s t  s a l e  was h e l d  t o  be m e r e ly  
i n t r a - S t a t e  t r a d e ,  b e c a u s e  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  p r i c e  of  such  an i n t r a ­
s t a t e  s a l e  would d i r e c t l y  ( a l b e i t  p r a c t i c a l l y  and e c o n o m i c a l l y  and no t  
by any r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e - t e r m s  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n )  a f f e c t  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of  i m p o r t i n g  g o o d s .  The Cour t  h e l d  f i r s t  s a l e  a f t e r  
im p o r t  no t  t o  be p a r t  o f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  and h e l d  t h a t  t h e  economic  
e f f e c t s  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of  a law f i x i n g  i n t r a - S t a t e  p r i c e s  d i d  
n o t  g i v e  such  law t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of  law d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
3
I n  Granna11 v M a r r i c k v i l l e  M a r g a r i n e  P ty  Ltd Barwick  QC was 
b r i e f e d  by a m a r g a r i n e  p r o d u c e r  t o  c h a l l e n g e  a law p r o h i b i t i n g  such  
p r o d u c t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  w i she d  t o  p ro d u ce  m a r g a r i n e  f o r  e x p o r t  t o  
a n o t h e r  S t a t e .  Barwick  QC made no a t t e m p t  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  p r o d u c t i o n  
i s  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  Indee d  on t h i s  p o i n t  he seemed t o  
d e s e r t  h i s  l e a d e r  who had s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  an i n s e p a r a b l e  
p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^  Barwick  QC s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e
1 Above p321 .
2 (1953)  88 CLR 353,  372 -374 .
3 (1955)  93 CLR 55.
4 M acFar land  QC a t  60.
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practical effect on inter-State trade of prohibiting this production 
showed the prohibition of this production was directly on inter-State 
trade.* The Court held that production was itself not part of 
inter-State trade and that this law was not directly on inter-State 
trade. In a fairly direct reprimand to Barwick the joint judgment of 
Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ commented -
"Two tendencies have grown manifest of late. One is to press the
operation of s.92 beyond the subject matter of trade, commerce and
intercourse among the States so that it denies to the legislatures
of this country the power to impose any prohibition, restriction
or burden if its consequences could be seen in what was done or
not done in the course of inter-State commerce. The other is to
seek to extend the freedom which s.92 guarantees to trade,
commerce and intercourse among the States to antecedent or
subsequent transactions on the plea that they are incidental,
ancillary or conducive to inter-State transactions or necessarily
2consequential upon them."
Both tendencies were, according to their Honours, to be 
deprecated.
These and other judgments in the 1950's and early 1960's seemed to
3establish the Dixon theory of direct. The Dixon scheme was 
vulnerable at some points. First the Dixon theory had a proviso that 
even if not Dixon-direct a law which was a circuitous device might be 
brought down.^ This proviso implicitly recognised that the inquiry
1 Id. 68-69.
2 Id. 79.
3 Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v Victoria (1953) 87 CLR 1; R v
Anderson; Exp. Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177.
4 Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55, 78.
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under s92 could not and should not be blocked by cunning drafting.
The presence of this proviso detracted significantly from the
certainty which the Dixon theory of direct otherwise provided.^-
Secondly, judges who endorsed Dixon-direct, even Dixon himself, in
Grannall and Wragg and other cases were a little erratic in the
application of the theory. In Fish Board v Paradiso the Court held to
be directly on inter-State trade a provision operating on a sale after
2import and offered no convincing basis for distinguishing Wragg.
In Mansell v Beck Dixon CJ and others considered that a law 
prohibiting receipt of money was not directly on inter-State trade or 
intercourse in its application to the receipt of money for inter-State 
transmission even though their Honours accepted that the receipt was 
part of inter-State trade.
Despite these weaknesses in the Dixon theory, as late as 1967 in 
Freightlines & Construction Holding Limited v New South Wales the 
Privy Council took the acceptance of the Dixon notion of direct for 
granted.^ It is to be noted, however, that neither the Privy 
Council in Freightlines nor earlier Privy Councils in the Hughes and 
Vale decisions which had approved much of what Dixon had said about 
transport regulation, had ever chosen between Dixon J's narrow notion 
of direct and Barwick's practical effect approach. As has been noted 
the weight of the indications in BNC itself supported Barwick's 
approach.^ It was against this background that Barwick set out as 
Chief Justice to supplant "Dixon-direct" with "Barwick-direct."
1 DK Singh, "'Circuitous Means’ or 'Concealed Design' and Section 
92 of the Australian Constitution" (1962) 36 ALJ 95
2 (1956) 95 CLR 443.
3 (1956) 95 CLR 550, 563-568 per Dixon, CJ and Webb, J, 579-581 per 
Fullagar J. Contra 584-586 per Kitto J. Other members of the 
Court, McTiernan, Williams and Taylor JJ, upheld the law on other 
grounds.
4 [1968] AC 625,669.
5 Above p424.
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Barwick  CJ a c c e p t e d  t h a t  a law which  was d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  Dixon J ’s G i l p i n  t h e o r y  was t h e r e f o r e ,  d i r e c t l y  on 
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  of  t h e  BNC f o r m u l a .  Barwick CJ 
a rg u e d  t h a t  D i x o n - d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  d i d  n o t ,  how ever ,  e x h a u s t  t h e  
c a t e g o r y  of e f f e c t s  which  migh t  show a law t o  be d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e .  Barwick  CJ d i d  no t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  Dixon CJ had e v e r  
i n t e n d e d  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  t o  be e x h a u s t iv e . ' * '
Barwick CJ a rg u e d  f u r t h e r  t h a t  i t  would be i l l o g i c a l  t o  c o n f i n e  d i r e c t  
t o  D i x o n - d i r e c t .
As m en t io n e d  b e f o r e ,  i n e v i t a b l y  t h e  p ro b le m  of  d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  
becomes e n t a n g l e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o b le m  of  d e f i n i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  
Barwick  CJ i n t r o d u c e d  a non s e q u i t u r  u n d e r  c o v e r  of  t h a t  e n t a n g l e m e n t  
i n  t h e  R e a d e r s ' D i g e s t  c a s e .  Having  made t h e  u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e
2
s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t r a d e  and commerce i s  a b r o a d  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e p t  h i s  
Honour t h e n  u s e d  t h a t  s t a t e m e n t  a s  s u p p o r t  f o r  h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  o p e r a t i o n  of  a law i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  i t s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  as  
d i r e c t  or  i n d i r e c t .  The second  p r o p o s i t i o n  does no t  f o l l o w  f rom  t h e  
f i r s t .
Barwick  CJ had  some b e t t e r  a rg u m e n ts  f o r  h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  d i r e c t .  
The re  w e r e ,  of  c o u r s e ,  t h e  i n d i c a t i o n s  i n  BNC i t s e l f . ^  There  was 
a l s o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s92  i s  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e  of  f r e e d o m  and i s  
a g u a r a n t e e  of  f r e e d o m  t o  engage  i n  t r a d e  and commerce.  S u r e l y  t h e  
g u a r a n t e e  was n o t  c o n f i n e d  t o  a g u a r a n t e e  of  f r e e d o m  f rom  law s  i n  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  form? S u r e l y  t h e  economic  e f f e c t s  of  a law a r e  r e l e v a n t  
t o  t h e  f r e e dom  of  t h e  ( ec o n o m ic )  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t r a d e  and commerce?^
1 SOS Mowbray Pty Ltd v Mead (1971)  124 CLR 529,  549-550 ;  NEDCO 
(1975)  134 CLR 559, 587-588 .
2 (1969)  120 CLR 1, 15, 17.
3 I d .  17. S i m i l a r l y  i n  A s s o c i a t e d  S t e a m s h ip s  P ty  Ltd v W e s te rn  
A u s t r a l i a  (1969)  120 CLR 92, 102.
4 SOS Mowbray Pty  Ltd v Mead (1971)  124 CLR 529,  551; NEDCO 
(1975)  134 CLR 559, 584.
5 NEDCO (1975)  134 CLR 559, 589.
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These i d e a s  were  sound e nough .  They s t o o d ,  how ever ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  
Barwick  C J ’s a t t i t u d e  t o  economic  e f f e c t s  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s .  Under s92  
i t s e l f  unde r  t h e  t o p i c  of  r e g u l a t i o n ,  Barwick  CJ s e t  h i s  f a c e  a g a i n s t  
t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  economic  e f f e c t s  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s ’ a c t i v i t i e s  
on i n t r a - S t a t e  t r a d e r s  c o u ld  j u s t i f y  ( g i v e  v a l i d i t y  t o )  t h e  
r e s t r i c t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r s . ^  And y e t  h i s  Honour c o n s i d e r e d  
t h e  economic  e f f e c t  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of  a law d e a l i n g  w i t h  
s o m e t h in g  o t h e r  t h a n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  c o u ld  show t h e  i n v a l i d i t y  of  a 
l aw .
One s h o u ld  a l s o  c o n t r a s t  Barwick  C J ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o  economic  e f f e c t s
i n  t h e  i n c i d e n t a l  a r e a  of  t h e  Commonweal th’s power u n d e r  s51  ( i )  t o
make laws w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t r a d e  and commerce among t h e  S t a t e s .  There
2
Barwick  CJ r e s o l u t e l y  d e f e n d e d  t h e  d o c t r i n e  a u t h o r e d  by Dixon J / C J  
which  d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e  econom ic  e f f e c t s  of  i n t r a - S t a t e  t r a d e  on i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  c o u ld  j u s t i f y  Commonwealth c o n t r o l  of  i n t r a - S t a t e
-3
t r a d e .  Th is  d o c t r i n e  was s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  makes a d i v i s i o n  be tw een  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  ( i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  which  t h e  Commonwealth i s  g i v e n  l e g i s l a t i v e  power)  and i n t r a - S t a t e  
t r a d e  ( i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  which  t h e  Commonwealth i s  no t  g i v e n  any 
l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r . )  S i n c e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  made t h a t  d i v i s i o n ,  
so t h e  d o c t r i n e  c o n t i n u e s ,  t h e  Cour t  must  a t t e m p t  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t  and 
must  p r e v e n t  economic  e f f e c t s  b l u r r i n g  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  no m a t t e r  how 
i n t e r r e l a t e d  i n t e r - S t a t e  and i n t r a - S t a t e  t r a d e  may be i n  f a c t .
The Dixon Cour t  had  made a s i m i l a r  ( th o u g h  no t  e x a c t l y  p a r a l l e l )  
d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  Granna11 v M a r r i c k v i l l e  M a r g a r in e  P ty  Ltd ; D i x o n ’s 
Cour t  a c c u s e d  Barwick  QC of  t r y i n g  t o  i n t r o d u c e  i n t o  s 9 2 ' s  l i m i t a t i o n
1 Above p402.
2 Above p p l 3 6 - 1 4 5  A i r l i n e s  [No 2] Case (1965)  113 CLR 54,  7 7 - 7 9 ,  88;  
P o r t  Hedland Case (1976)  138 CLR 492,  499 a g r e e i n g  w i t h  S t e p h e n  J .  
508-511 .
3 R v B u r g e s s ;  e x p .  Henry (1936)  55 CLR 608,  671-672 ;  Wragg v New 
South  Wales (1953)  88 CLR 353,  385-386 .
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on legislative power, an "incidental area" of operation analogous to 
the area of power incidental to the grant of power under s51.^ If 
one treats s92 as a mere limitation on power then this criticism of 
Barwick's position seems to have some validity and Barwick's 
willingness to observe the constitutional distinction under s51 (i) 
makes his willingness to "blur the distinction" under s92 seem a 
little incongruous. Barwick CJ never bothered to reconcile his 
position on the two matters. If we recall, however, Barwick CJ’s 
point that s92 is a constitutional guarantee of freedom (as against 
Dixon CJ’s limitation on power) then it makes sense to look to 
economic and practical effects under s92. If anything it is Barwick 
CJ’s decision to exclude economic (though not other practical) effects 
under s51(i) which seems to lack logical support.
At first Barwick CJ found little support for his attack on Dixon 
CJ's definition of direct. The main upholder of the Dixonian faith 
was Sir Frank Kitto. When the make-up of the Court was changed by 
the departure from the Court of Kitto J and others around 1970, 
Barwick’s theory made some headway. By the end of his term as Chief 
Justice, Barwick CJ had gathered a good deal of support for his theory 
of direct. Indeed in the NEDCO case Barwick CJ’s theory of direct was 
expressly supported by three others - Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ - 
to give, with Barwick CJ’s own vote, an endorsement by a majority of 
the Court. The other two judges McTiernan and Gibbs JJ made no 
comment on the issue on this occasion.
1 (1955) 93 CLR 55, 71-72, 77-80 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb and 
Kitto JJ. jointly. It is to be noted that the constitutional 
division into inter- and intra-State trade did not in Dixon’s 
scheme of things have exactly correlative operations under s51(i) 
and s92. Under s51(i) economic effects are excluded but 
practical effects are not. Under s92 (subject to the proviso 
for "circuitous devices") all practical effects, including 
economic effects, are excluded.
2 (1975) 134 CLR 559, 581, 589 Barwick CJ set out his theory with 
Stephen J concurring id_ 602. Also 606, 622 to like effect per 
Mason and Jacobs JJ respectively. Menzies J had been involved 
in the case but died before judgments were delivered.
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I n d e e d ,  o f  t h e  J u s t i c e s  who made up t h e  Cour t  on t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  of  
Barwick  CJ t h e r e  was o n l y  o n e ,  Gibbs J  who had e v e r  e x p r e s s l y  d e c l a r e d  
f o r  D i x o n - d i r e c t  and a g a i n s t  B a r w i c k - d i r e c t .*
The d i s u s s i o n  w i l l  now t u r n  t o  some s p e c i f i c  s u b j e c t s  of  
l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  of  d e f i n i t i o n s  of  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  and t o  
d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  Barwick  CJ i n  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e .
I t  s h o u ld  be b o rn e  i n  mind t h a t  Barwick  C J ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  look  
t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s ,  a s  w e l l  as  t h e  t e r m s  of  r e f e r e n c e ,  of  a l aw ,  
p r e c l u d e s  t h e  p r e c i s e  d i v i s i o n  of  i s s u e s  which may o c c u r  w i t h  Dixon 
J / C J ' s  c o n c e p t  of  d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t . With Barwick  C J ’s t h e o r y  t h e r e  i s  
n o t  t h e  same n e c e s s i t y  t o  know t h e  e x a c t  b e g i n n i n g  and end of  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e .  With B a r w i c k ' s  t h e o r y  an  i n q u i r y  i n t o  how much a law 
a f f e c t s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  goes t o  b o t h  d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  and 
r e g u l a t i o n / b u r d e n .
( i ) Movement and C a r r i a g e
In  t h e  1 9 3 0 ' s  T r a n s p o r t  Cases  some j u d g e s  drew a d i s t i n c t i o n
be tw een  t h e  movement of  goods o r  p e r s o n s  i n t e r - S t a t e  and t h e  u se  of  a
v e h i c l e  t o  move goods o r  p e r s o n s  i n t e r - S t a t e .  The u s e  of  a v e h i c l e
f o r  such  c a r r i a g e  was c o n s i d e r e d  n o t  t o  be i t s e l f  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e
2t r a d e .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  was r e j e c t e d  by d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  Airways
3
and BNC d e c i s i o n s  and c o m p l e t e l y  d e p r i v e d  of  a u t h o r i t y  by t h e
1 A l th o u g h  s i l e n t  on t h e  i s s u e  i n  NEDCO, i n  an e a r l i e r  c a s e ,  Gibbs 
J  had a c c e p t e d  t h e  Dixon t h e o r y  as  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  and had 
e x p r e s s l y  r e j e c t e d  B a r w i c k ' s  t h e o r y .  SOS Mowbray v Mead (1971)  
124 CLR 529,  598 -604 .
2 (1945)  71 CLR 29.
3 (1948)  76 CLR (High C o u r t ) ;  [1950]  AC 235;  (1949)  79 CLR 497 
( P r i v y  C o u n c i l ) .
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d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  Hughes and Vale  c a s e s . * A f t e r  t h e s e  c a s e s  i t  
seemed t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t h e  c a r r i a g e  of  goods or  p e r s o n s  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  was i t s e l f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
Cases  i n v o l v i n g  laws d e a l i n g  w i t h  i n t e r - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e  have  
p r o v i d e d  g u i d a n c e  on t h e  g e n e r a l  p rob le m  of  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  r e g u l a t i o n
from b u r d e n  and on t h e  s p e c i f i c  p r o b le m  of  u s i n g  l i c e n c e s  t o  r e g u l a t e .
2
These c a s e s  have  been  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e .
Most of  t h e  o t h e r  c a s e s  i n v o l v i n g  laws d e a l i n g  w i t h  movement and 
c a r r i a g e  have  been  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  movement 
o r  c a r r i a g e  a s  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement or  c a r r i a g e .  Th i s  i s s u e  b r e a k s  
down i n t o  two q u e s t i o n s  -  w h e t h e r  a S t a t e  b o r d e r  h a s  been  o r  w i l l  be 
c r o s s e d  -  w h e t h e r  t h e  movement or  c a r r i a g e  i n v o l v e d  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h a t  b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g .
One migh t  have  e x p e c t e d  a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  be drawn be tw een  movement 
o r  c a r r i a g e  b e f o r e  any b o r d e r  h a s  been  c r o s s e d  and movement o r  
c a r r i a g e  a f t e r  a b o r d e r  h a s  been  c r o s s e d .  In  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e  one h a s  
t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f a c t  o f  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement o r  c a r r i a g e  h a v i n g  
o c c u r r e d .  When d e a l i n g  w i t h  movement or  c a r r i a g e  b e f o r e  any b o r d e r  
c r o s s i n g  t h e r e  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  p r o b le m  of  showing  t h a t  t h e  movement or  
c a r r i a g e  i n  i s s u e  was d e s t i n e d  t o  i n v o l v e  a b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g .  One 
migh t  e x p e c t  i t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  be e a s i e r  t o  show t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  
c h a r a c t e r  of  movement a f t e r  t h e  b o r d e r  h a s  been  c r o s s e d .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand a l l  movement and c a r r i a g e  t o w a rd s  t h e  b o r d e r  i s  e s s e n t i a l  
t o  t h e  c r o s s i n g  of  t h e  b o r d e r .  The b o r d e r  c a n n o t  be c r o s s e d  u n t i l  i t  
i s  r e a c h e d .  T h i s  m igh t  l e a d  one t o  e x p e c t  i t  t o  be e a s i e r  t o  show t h e  
i n t e r - S t a t e  c h a r a c t e r  of  movement or  c a r r i a g e  b e f o r e  t h e  b o r d e r  
c r o s s i n g .  No such  d i s t i n c t i o n s  have  been  made. The a s s u m p t i o n  seems 
t o  be t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of  movement or  c a r r i a g e  b e f o r e  t h e
1 Hughes & Vale P ty  Ltd v NSW [No 1] (1954)  93 CLR 1 ( P r i v y
C o u n c i l ) ;  Hughes & Vale Pty  Ltd v NSW [N o .2] (1 9 5 5 )9 3  CLR (High 
C o u r t ) .
2 Above p p 3 6 3 f f .
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b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g ,  i s  g o v e rn e d  by th e  same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a s  i s  th e  
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of movement or  c a r r i a g e  a f t e r  t h e  b o rd e r  c r o s s i n g .  
S i m i l a r l y  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  seems t o  be t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e th e r  
movement o r  c a r r i a g e  was d e s t i n e d  t o  i n v o lv e  a b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g ,  i s  
g o ve rned  by th e  same f a c t o r s  t h a t  d e te r m in e  t h e  s u f f i c i e n c y  of 
c o n n e c t io n  of movement o r  c a r r i a g e  w i th  a b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g .
( a ) Movement
There  have  n o t  been  many c a s e s  w here  t h e  s u s p e c t  law o p e r a t e d  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  movement. Only t h r e e  such  c a s e s  i n v o lv e d  B arw ick  as  
c o u n s e l .
One o f  t h e s e ,  G ra tw ic k  v Johnson  * was d e c id e d  b e f o r e  BNC. In
p o s t -BNC te rm s  t h e  i s s u e  was one o f  r e g u l a t i o n /  b u rd e n .  The c a se  i s
2
d i s c u s s e d  u n d e r  t h a t  t o p i c .  In  t h e  s e c o n d ,  C a r t e r  v P o ta to  
3
M a rk e t in g  Board B arw ick  KC p ro p o se d  a r a d i c a l  a p p ro a c h  t o  t h e  
d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  p ro b le m . The law  i n  q u e s t i o n  was a n c i l l a r y  t o  an 
a c q u i s i t i o n  scheme and B a r w ic k 's  s u b m i s s io n s ,  w hich  w ere  a f f e c t e d  by 
t h a t  f a c t  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  u n d e r  t h a t  t o p i c . ^
B arw ick  KC's t h i r d  and l a s t  c a s e  i n v o l v i n g  a law o p e r a t i n g  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  movement was Exp. B r a z e l l  G a r l i c k  and Coy.^  The 
movement in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  was movement b e f o r e  t h e  b o r d e r  had been  
c r o s s e d .  T h is  c a s e  t u r n e d  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of movement as 
i n t e r - S t a t e  movement.
1 (1945)  70 CLR 1.
2 Above p332 n o te  4.
3 (1951)  84 CLR 460.
4 Below p p 4 6 8 -4 7 0 .
5 (1951)  85 CLR 467.
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As C h ie f  J u s t i c e  Barwick  had o n l y  one c a s e  P e r r e  & P e r r e  v
P o l l i t t 1 23456 where  a s u s p e c t  law d e a l t  w i t h  movement.  There  were o t h e r
c a s e s ,  however ,  when Barwick  CJ c o n s i d e r e d  how t o  c h a r a c t e r i s e
movement of  g o o d s ,  a s  a p r e l i m i n a r y  t o  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  t h e  c a r r i a g e  of
2
t h e  goods moving .  Only one of  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  Holloway  v P i l k i n g t o n  
d e a l t  w i t h  c a r r i a g e  of  goods a f t e r  t h e  b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g .  In  t h e  c a s e  no 
one d o u b te d  t h a t  t h e  goods b e i n g  c a r r i e d  were on an i n t e r - S t a t e  
j o u r n e y . ^
The d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  t u r n  now t o  t h e  c a s e s  where B a rw ic k ,  as 
c o u n s e l  and j u d g e ,  gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of  
movement b e f o r e  t h e  b o r d e r  c r o s s i n g .  A l l  j u d g e s  seemed t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  
a j o u r n e y  w i t h i n  a S t a t e  c o u ld  be r e g a r d e d  as  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i f  i t  
were p a r t  of  a l a r g e r  j o u r n e y  f rom  a p o i n t  i n  one S t a t e  t o  a p o i n t  i n  
a n o t h e r .
In  P i l k i n g t o n  v F ra n k  Hammond P ty  Ltd two members of  t h e  C o u r t , 
McTiernan  and S t e p h e n  J J ,  t o o k  t h e  v iew t h a t  a s  t h e  t o t a l  j o u r n e y  i n  
t h a t  c a s e  was from one S t a t e  t o  an o v e r s e a s  d e s t i n a t i o n  v i a  a n o t h e r  
S t a t e  t h e  i n t r a - S t a t e  component was p a r t  of  an o v e r s e a s  j o u r n e y  and 
no t  p a r t  of  an  i n t e r - S t a t e  j o u r n e y . ^  Menzies  J  r e g a r d e d  t h e  j o u r n e y  
as  b e i n g  d i v i s i b l e  i n t o  t h r e e  j o u r n e y s  -  one i n t r a - S t a t e ,  one i n t e r ­
s t a t e  and one o v e r s e a s . ^Barwick  CJ,  G ib b s ,  Mason and J a c o b s  J J ^
1 (1976)  135 CLR 139.
2 (1972)  127 CLR 391.
3 The c o n t e n t i o u s  i s s u e  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  was t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  how 
t h a t  f a c t  a f f e c t e d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  c a r r i e r  c a r r y i n g  ou t  an 
i n t r a - S t a t e  s e c t i o n  of  t h e  o v e r a l l  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement .  That  
i s s u e  i s  d i s c u s s e d  u n d e r  t h e  h e a d i n g  c a r r i a g e  below pp441 -442 .
4 (1974)  131 CLR 124, 156-157 ,  181 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The c a s e  i s  f u l l y  
d i s c u s s e d  by M Coper ,  "The Impac t  of  S e c t i o n  92 of  t h e  
Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n  upon I n t r a s t a t e  Segments  of  I n t e r s t a t e  
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n "  (1974)  48 ALJ 563.
5 I d .  162.
6 I d .  152, 175-176 ,  196, 201 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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considered that the ultimate overseas destination did not deprive the 
intermediate journey from one State to another of its character as 
inter-State trade and did not prevent the intra-State journey being 
regarded as part of that inter-State journey. The intra-State journey 
might well be part of overseas trade. It was also, however, part of 
inter-State trade even if that inter-State trade were also part of 
overseas trade. The important consideration for these judges was that 
the journey, whatever its ultimate destination involved movement from 
one State to another. In concentrating on that fact their Honours’ 
approach seemed to be more in accord with the BNC discussion of inter­
state trade^ than did the approach of McTiernan, Menzies and Stephen 
JJ.
A more difficult question was how the inter-State destiny might be 
established.
Barwick CJ asserted that the inter-State destiny of goods can be 
drawn either from the presence of a contractual obligation to move 
goods inter-State (whether arising from the sale of specific goods or 
from the sale of unascertained goods followed by the appropriation of 
particular goods to the contract) or from the contemplation of the 
owner that the goods move *inter-State. Barwick CJ asserted further 
that although a past course of dealings would greatly assist in the 
ascertainment of the contemplation of the parties, if the
contemplation of the parties could be made out by other means, the
3absence of a past course of dealings would be irrelevant.
1 Above pp412-413.
2 Brambles Holdings Limited v Pilkington (1972) 126 CLR 524 an ex 
tempore joint judgment of Barwick CJ Menzies, Windeyer, Walsh and 
Gibbs JJ. Pilkington v Frank Hammond Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 124, 
137. Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 
CLR 140.
3 Exp. Brazell, Garlick & Coy. (1951) 85 CLR 467, 476-477; Deacon v 
Mitchell (1965) 112 CLR 353, 355-359; Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty 
Ltd v Pilkington (1968) 117 CLR 353, 359-364; Pilkington v Frank 
Hammond Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 124, 139, 143; Clark King Pty Ltd 
v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120, 140-143. Also Smith 
v Capewell (1979) 142 CLR 509, 512-513.
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These propositions seemed quite reasonable. Other judges had 
expressly acknowledged that the presence of a contractual obligation 
to move goods inter-State would demonstrate that the movement of those 
goods had an inter-State destiny.^-
When Chief Justice, Barwick claimed, in dicta in the case of Smith
? 3v Capewell, that Exp Brazell, Garlick & Coy (in which he had
appeared as counsel) was an example of a case where a transaction was 
part of inter-State trade because of the "mutual contemplation" of the 
parties to the transaction that goods would go inter-State even though 
there was, in the opinion of Barwick CJ looking back to the facts of 
the case, no contractual obligation to transport the goods inter­
state. In fact, four members of the Brazell Court had expressly held 
that there was a contractual obligation to transport the goods inter­
state“^ and the case could not be (and was not) claimed by Barwick CJ 
as clear authority for the sufficiency of "mutual contemplation" to 
establish inter-State character. Nevertheless Barwick CJ’s 
proposition has been accepted by some judges and not expressly
1 eg Exp. Brazell, Garlick & Coy (1951) 85 CLR 467, 479-480 per 
Dixon, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ; Deacon v Mitchell (1965) 
112 CLR 353, 361 per Taylor J.
2 (1979) 142 CLR 509, 513.
3 (1951) 85 CLR 467.
4 Id. 479-480 per Dixon, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ.
437.
rejected by any.^
Barwick CJ found himself in dissent in a series of cases, the 
Tasmanian Timber cases, involving characterisation of movement of 
goods, not because of any difference of opinion between Barwick CJ 
and other judges about how to determine the destiny of goods, but 
because of a difference of opinion on the issues -
(i) whether the goods being carried were the same goods as those 
that would eventually go inter-State;
(ii) whether, even if the goods being carried were destined 
to go inter-State, the carriage in issue was too 
remote from the eventual border crossing to be part
of that inter-State trade;
(iii) whether the likely practical effect, flowing from the 
restriction on carriage, on the possible inter-State 
movement of the goods was a direct effect.
1 That proposition did indeed receive express support in Exp 
Brazell, Garlick & Coy (1951) 85 CLR 467, 483, 486 per 
Williams J and Webb J respectively and in Deacon v Mitchell 
(1965) 112 CLR 353, 370 per WindeyerJ. Compare Wilcox Mofflin 
Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488, 820 where Dixon,
McTiernan & Fullagar JJ, seemed to be of the opinion that a 
mere intention on the part of the owner to put goods 
(currently not moving) into inter-State trade would not be 
enough to support a conclusion that the goods were inter-State 
trade. Their Honours would have at least required an objective 
manifestation of that intention. That requirement was probably 
affected by the fact that the person claiming to be an inter-State 
trader was trying to avoid having to comply with a State law. In 
the Clark King case (1978) 140 CLR 120, 142-143 Barwick CJ took an 
extreme position when he said in a situation where someone had 
made an offer to sell unascertained goods by description to an 
inter-State purchaser, and had in mind either particular goods, or 
a particular stock of goods from which to draw, to fill the 
contract should it be made, then those goods were all in inter­
state trade. Discussed further below pp472ff.
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Some of Barwick CJ’s brethren considered that the treatment that
the timber was to receive after the carriage in question, changed it
into a different commodity. Thus the timber being carried could not
be said to be on its way inter-State.^ Some of Barwick’s brethren
considered that, whether or not the timber which would eventually
leave the State was the same timber as the timber being carried, the
carriage was too remote from the inter-State trade to be itself part
2of the inter-State trade.
Barwick CJ acknowledged that interruptions to a journey could make 
the early movement of goods destined to go inter-State too remote from 
the inter-State movement to be itself part of that inter-State trade. 
Barwick CJ just did not consider that the interruptions involved in 
these cases - drying, dressing and standing in a timber yard for 
months - were enough to break the continuity of the inter-State 
movement. In the Clark King case Barwick CJ held that a "pause” of 
some months in the inter-State movement of wheat from the point of 
purchase in one State to the point of use by gristing in another State 
did not break the continuity of the inter-State trade, and that the 
wheat was still in inter-State trade whether stored in a silo in its 
State of origin or in a silo in the importing State.^ Barwick CJ’s 
conclusion in relation to this wheat is much more convincing than his 
conclusion in relation to the timber. The wheat was stored not to 
change its characteristics but because it was a seasonal crop which 
was only available at certain times.
1 Webb v Stagg (1965) 112 CLR 374, 377, 384 per Taylor J and 
Owen J respectively. Also, though not as unequivocally Deacon 
v Mitchell (1965) 112 CLR 366 per Menzies J Webb v Stagg 
(1965) 112 CLR 374, 380 per Menzies J and Tamar Timber Trading
Co Pty Ltd v Pilkington (1968) 117 CLR 353, 368 per Kitto J. This 
point is discussed below pp456-459.
2 Deacon v Mitchell (1965) 112 CLR 353, 361, 365 per Taylor J
and Menzies J respectively. Webb v Stagg (1965) 112 CLR 374, 380 
per Menzies J Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd v Pilkington (1968) 
117 CLR 353, 367-368 per Kitto J, 374 per Taylor J.
3 Deacon v Mitchell (1965) 112 CLR 353, 359; Webb v Stagg (1965)
112 CLR 374, 376.
4 (1978) 140 CLR 120, 140-141.
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In  t h e  Tamar Timber  c a s e ,  Barwick  CJ i n t r o d u c e d  an i n t e r e s t i n g  
d i s t i n c t i o n . ^  In  i s s u e  was t h e  c a r r i a g e  of  t i m b e r  by one company i n  
a group  of  compan ies  t o  t h e  p a r e n t  company ' s  t i m b e r  y a r d  w i t h i n  t h e  
S t a t e .  The e v i d e n c e  was t h a t  t h e  p a r e n t  company s e n t  i n t e r - S t a t e  99% 
of t i m b e r  b r o u g h t  t o  i t s  y a r d .
Barwick CJ was i n  t h e  u n c o m f o r t a b l e  p o s i t i o n  of  h a v i n g  a l r e a d y  
been  i n  t h e  m i n o r i t y  i n  two v e ry  s i m i l a r  c a s e s  where  t h e  m a j o r i t y  h e l d  
t h a t  t i m b e r  b e i n g  c a r r i e d  was n o t  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  In  an 
a p p a r e n t  a t t e m p t  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h o s e  c a s e s  Barwick  CJ s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
c a r r i a g e  i n  i s s u e  was e n t i t l e d  t o  p r o t e c t i o n  n o t  b e c a u s e  t h e  goods 
b e i n g  c a r r i e d  were on an i n t e r - S t a t e  j o u r n e y  bu t  b e c a u s e
" t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of  a m erc han t  i n  a commodity [ i s ]
b e i n g  h i n d e r e d  o r  b u rd en e d  by a p r o h i b i t i o n  upon t h e  t a k i n g
2
o f  a s t e p  i n  t h a t  t r a d e . "
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  Barwick  C J ’s p o i n t  ( i n  Tamar) was t h a t  
t h e  c a r r i a g e  was i t s e l f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  (even  th ough  no t  a s t a g e  i n  
i n t e r - S t a t e  movement)  o r  w h e t h e r  he c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  p r o h i b i t i n g  t h i s  
c a r r i a g e  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  As f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  Barwick CJ was d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  -  
t o  s a y  t h a t  an a c t i v i t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  does  n o t  
mean t h a t  i t  i s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  As f o r  t h e  p o s s i b l i t y  t h a t  h i s  
comment went  t o  " d i r e c t n e s s "  -  Barwick  CJ d i d  no t  i d e n t i f y  t h e  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  of  t h e  m erc h an t  which  was b e i n g  b u r d e n e d .  His  Honour 
a lm o s t  seemed t o  be s l i d i n g  i n t o  e q u a t i n g  t h e  b u s i n e s s  of an i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e r  w i t h  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  The two a r e  o b v i o u s l y  n o t  t h e  
same -  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  of  h i s  b u s i n e s s  an i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e r  may do many 
t h i n g s  which  a r e  n o t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  I f  Barwick  CJ were r e f e r r i n g  
t o  t h e  m erchan t  ’s t r a d e  i n  moving goods i n t e r - S t a t e  o r  i n  e n t e r i n g  
c o n t r a c t s  t o  move goods i n t e r - S t a t e ,  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  l o g i c  i n  B a r w i c k ' s
1 Tamar Timber  T r a d i n g  Co P ty  Ltd v P i l k i n g t o n  (1968)  117 CLR 353.
2 I d .  363.
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c o n c l u s i o n .  Or,  a t  l e a s t ,  t h e r e  i s  l o g i c  i n  Barwick C J V c o n c lu s io n  so 
l o n g  as  one a l s o  a c c e p t s  h i s  H o n o u r ' s  b a s i c  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  a 
p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  can  be a d i r e c t  e f f e c t .  To p r e v e n t  a s t e p  which  i s  
an e s s e n t i a l  p r e l i m i n a r y  t o  moving goods i n t e r - S t a t e ,  p r e v e n t s  t h e i r  
i n t e r - S t a t e  movement (which  i s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i n  i t s e l f )  and 
s t r o n g l y  d i s c o u r a g e s  t h e  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  of  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  
movement of  goods (which  i s  a l s o  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ) .
I f  t h i s  l i n e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  were i m p l i c i t  i n  Barwick  C J ’s s t a t e m e n t  
i n  Tamar Timber t h e n  t h e  c a s e  i s  n o t a b l e  f o r  b e i n g  t h e  o n l y  a r e a  o t h e r  
t h a n  f i r s t  s a l e  a f t e r  import'*'  where  Barwick  CJ a c t u a l l y  found  i n  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  a s u s p e c t  law an i n v a l i d i t y  which  c o u ld  n o t  be 
found  i n  t h e  l a w ' s  c r i t e r i a  o f  o p e r a t i o n .
( b )  C a r r i a g e
2
A l though  t h e  1 9 3 0 ' s  T r a n s p o r t  Cases  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  t h e  
i n t e r - S t a t e  movement of  goods ( p r o t e c t e d  by s 9 2 ) a n d  t h e  u se  of 
v e h i c l e s  t o  move goods i n t e r - S t a t e  (n o t  p r o t e c t e d  by s 9 2 )h a d  been  
e x p lo d e d  by t h e  Hughes & Vale d e c i s i o n s ,  a s i m i l a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  
c o n fu s e d  t h e  p r o b le m  of  a s s e s s i n g  law s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c a r r i a g e .
3
In  Hughes v Tasmania  i t  had been  h e l d  t h a t  a Tasmanian c a r r i e r  
who r e g u l a r l y  c a r r i e d  f r u i t  f rom  n o r t h e r n  Tasmanian  p o r t s  t o  Hobart  
f o r  c l i e n t s  who had i m p o r t e d  t h a t  f r u i t  f rom o t h e r  S t a t e s ,  was no t  
immune from a law r e q u i r i n g  c a r r i e r s  t o  o b t a i n  a p e r m i t  and pay a 
f e e .  The Cour t  d i d  n o t  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  goods were s t i l l  on t h e i r  
i n t e r - S t a t e  j o u r n e y ,  when t h e  c a r r i a g e  i n  i s s u e  t o o k  p l a c e .  The 
d e c i s i o n  was r e s t e d  on t h e  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  c a r r i e r ' s  a c t i v i t y  of
1 Below p p 4 4 5 f f .
2 Above p326 .
3 (1955)  93 CLR 113.
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i n t r a - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e  was no t  i t s e l f  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^  In  
some ways t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  seemed t o  be t h e  l o g i c a l  e x t e n s i o n  of  t h e  
p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  s92  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
and no t  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  f l o w  of  g o o d s .  That  i s ,  however ,  t o  t a k e  
t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n  g o i n g  t o  t h e  k i n d  of  f r e e d o m  g u a r a n t e e d  by s92  ou t  of 
c o n t e x t .
In  R u s s e l l  v W a l t e r s  on t h e  o t h e r  hand i t  was h e l d  t h a t  a m erchan t
who c a r r i e d  h i s  own f r u i t  on s i m i l a r  r o u t e s  was immune from t h e
2
c a r r i a g e  p e r m i t  r e q u i r e m e n t .  One would have  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  
c a r r i a g e  i n  Hughes was j u s t  a s  c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  a c t u a l  
movement of  goods i n t e r - S t a t e  a s  was t h e  c a r r i a g e  i n  R u s s e l l .
L a t e r  c a s e s ,  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  bu t  n o t  o v e r r u l i n g  Hughes v Tasmania 
a l l o w e d  c a r r i a g e  t o  come w i t h i n  s92  p r o t e c t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  two 
d i f f e r e n t  l i n e s  of  r e a s o n i n g .  F i r s t ,  i f  t h e  i n t r a - S t a t e  c a r r i e r  were 
p a r t y  t o  a c o n t r a c t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e  t h e n  h i s  i n t r a - S t a t e  
c a r r i a g e  was i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  and e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of  s92  
S e c o n d ly ,  a p a r t  f rom  any such  c o n t r a c t u a l  c o n n e c t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  
c a r r i e r ,  h i s  c a r r i a g e  c o u ld  be e n t i t l e d  t o  immunity  b e c a u s e  of t h e  
e f f e c t ,  of b u r d e n i n g  such  c a r r i a g e ,  on t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of t h e  
owner of  t h e  goods b e i n g  moved. I t  seemed t o  be i m p l i c i t  t h a t  a 
c a r r i e r  migh t  have  t o  b e a r  a b u r d e n  on h i s  c a r r i a g e ,  ( i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
of  an o v e r a l l  c o n t r a c t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e )  b e c a u s e  t h e  e f f e c t  on 
t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of  t h e  owner of  t h e  goods was no t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
c o n s t i t u t e  a d i r e c t  e f f e c t .
In  Holloway v P i l k i n g t o n ^ a Cour t  of  f i v e  i n c l u d i n g  Barwick  CJ 
gave a b r i e f  j o i n t  judgment  h o l d i n g  immune from a r e q u i r e m e n t  of  a 
p e r m i t ,  c a r r i a g e  of  im p o r t e d  goods f rom a p o r t  i n  Tasmania  t o  a
1 I d .  124.
2 (1957)  96 CLR 177.
3 Simms v West (1961 )  107 CLR 157; B e l l  Bros P ty  Ltd v Rathbone  
(1963)  109 CLR 225.
4 (1972)  127 CLR 391.
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destination within Tasmania. The case could have been rested on the 
ground, compatible with Hughes v Tasmania, that the carrier was agent 
of a carrier who was party to a contract to carry from Melbourne to 
the ultimate Tasmanian destination. Their Honours, however, indicated 
that they perceived some wider basis for decision by relying, inter 
alia, on Russell v Walters and by reserving the question of the 
correctness of Hughes v Tasmania.
The case of Pilkington v Frank Hammond Pty Ltd ^ involved the 
road carriage of frozen lamb from a depot in Tasmania to a port. The 
goods were on their way to Melbourne and thence to London. There were 
a number of companies involved in the operation. Barwick CJ was the 
only member of the Court, to find that the carrier whose road carriage 
was in issue was under a contractual obligation to transport the goods 
from the Tasmanian depot to Melbourne. The presence of such an 
obligation distinguished Hughes v Tasmania but as other members of the 
Court found no such obligation present Barwick CJ joined in the 
discussion of principle. Hughes v Tasmania, was finally declared by a 
majority including Barwick CJ to have been wrongly decided. Five 
judges, Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephens, Mason and Jacobs JJ decided that 
the carriage in issue in Pilkington was part of inter-State trade.^ 
Mason and Jacobs JJ preferred to go straight to the point that the 
carriage was a necessary part of the inter-State movement of the 
goods.^ Barwick CJ and Gibbs J spoke in the jargon of the cases, of 
the carriage being part of a larger transport operation which was 
inter-State trade. It seemed, however, that their Honours found the 
inter-State character of the larger transport operation in the fact
1 (1974) 131 CLR 124.
2 Id. 129, 132, 143.
3 Id. 151 per Barwick CJ,175 per Gibbs J, 179-180 per Stephen J,
193 per Mason J, 201 per Jacobs J. McTiernan J did not comment on 
Hughes v Tasmania. Menzies J seemed to accept the decision in 
Hughes v Tasmania. Id. 163-164.)
4 McTiernan and Menzies JJ dissenting.
5 Id. 186, 198-200 respectively.
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t h a t  t h e  goods b e i n g  c a r r i e d  were  moving i n t e r - S t a t e . ' * '  For  t h e s e
f o u r  j u d g e s ,  t h e  u l t i m a t e  o v e r s e a s  d e s t i n a t i o n  d i d  no t  d e p r i v e  t h e
c a r r i a g e  of  i t s  c h a r a c t e r  a s  i n t e r - s t a t e  t r a d e  which i t  d e r i v e d  f rom
2
t h e  S t a t e  t o  S t a t e  movement of  which i t  was a l s o  p a r t .
S t e p h en  J  who j o i n e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  t o  h o l d  t h e  c a r r i a g e  i n v o l v e d
immune from t h e  p e r m i t  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  d i d  so on a d i f f e r e n t  b a s i s .  His
Honour c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  o v e r s e a s  d e s t i n a t i o n  p r e v e n t e d  t h e
3
a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  l a r g e r  i n t e r - S t a t e  o p e r a t i o n  c o n c e p t .  I n  t h i s  
o p i n i o n  he  was j o i n e d  by t h e  d i s s e n t i e n t s  McTiernan  and Menzies  J J . ^  
S t e p h e n  J  c o n s i d e r e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  of t h e  
company which  was c o n t r a c t u a l l y  o b l i g e d  t o  a r r a n g e  t h e  t r a n s p o r t  of  
t h e  goods f rom  t h e  Tasmanian  d e p o t  t o  Melbourne  was b e i n g  d i r e c t l y  
a f f e c t e d  by t h e  r e s t r a i n t  on t h e  r o a d  c a r r i a g e  of  t h e  c a r r i e r  whose 
c a s e  was b e f o r e  t h e  C o u r t . ^
In  summary t h e n ,  d e s p i t e  a c e r t a i n  i n d i r e c t n e s s  of  l a n g u a g e ,  a f t e r  
t h i s  c a s e  i t  would seem t h a t  i n t r a - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e  which  i s  p a r t  of  t h e  
movement of  goods a c r o s s  S t a t e  b o r d e r s  i s  d i r e c t l y  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  of  s 9 2 . ^
1 I d .  137-143;  175-176 .
2 I d . 153-154 p e r  Barwick  CJ 177-178 p e r  Gibbs J ,  196-197 p e r  Mason 
J ,  200-201 p e r  J a c o b s  J .
3 I d .  180-181.
4 I d . 156-157 ,  166-167 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
5 I d .  181-184.
6 The p o s i t i o n  of  S t e p h e n  J  and even  t h e  d i s s e n t s  of  McTiernan  and 
M enzies  J J  would o n l y  q u a l i f y  t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  of  
a d d i n g  -  so l o n g  a s  t h e  movement of  t h e  goods s t a r t s  i n  one S t a t e  
and ends i n  a n o t h e r .  T h i s  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  would be of  r e l e v a n c e  t o  
movements which  c r o s s e d  S t a t e  b o r d e r s  ( so  a s  t o  come w i t h i n  t h e  
m a j o r i t y ’s n o t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e )  bu t  had t h e i r  commencement 
o r  t e r m i n a t i o n  o v e r s e a s  or  i n  a Commonwealth T e r r i t o r y .
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Whatever the merits of the distinction taken in Hughes v Tasmania 
between the carrier's activity of carrying goods (intra-State) and the 
goods' owner's activity of inter-State trade, and whatever the merits 
of the distinctions taken in later cases in trying to distinguish 
Hughes v Tasmania, the majority approach in Pilkington v Frank Hammond 
Pty Ltd has the attraction that it simplifies the task of assessing 
whether or not laws dealing with carriage are directly on inter-State 
trade and it does so by the quite reasonable approach of focusing 
attention on an activity within the centre of the concept of inter­
state trade, the inter-State movement of goods.
It only remains, under the heading of "carriage” to mention 
border-hopping - activities whereby goods are transported from point A 
in one State across the border with another State then back across 
the border to point B in the State in which the transport commenced.
Dixon's High Court had held that transportation activities between
two points in one State could not be brought within S92's protection
simply by the introduction into a journey of a detour across a State
border.'*' Barwick CJ (and his court) accepted the authority of the
2Dixon-Court's decision on that point.
In Jackson v Horne, however, Barwick CJ and the other four members 
of the Court involved in the case (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer 
JJ) took a technical approach to an arrangement whereby pursuant to 
a contract to deliver a bulldozer from Brisbane in Queensland to 
Aramac in Queensland a carrier employed an independent company to 
carry the bulldozer just across the border to a point in New South 
Wales whence the bulldozer was shifted to a different truck and 
carried by an employee of the carrier to Aramac in Queensland.
Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ were all agreed
1 Harris v Wagner (1959) 103 CLR 452, 458-459 per Dixon CJ, 466 per 
Füllager J.
2 Jackson v Horne (1965) 114 CLR 82, 89.
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t h a t  t h e  j o u r n e y  from t h e  p o i n t  i n  New S ou th  Wales t o  Aramac was 
p r o t e c t e d  by S92.  Barwick  CJ e x p r e s s l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  p r o t e c t i o n  
a p p l i e d  even  t h o u g h  t h e  s o l e  p u r p o s e  of  t r a n s p o r t i n g  t h e  b u l l d o z e r  
v i a  New Sou th  Wales was t o  a t t r a c t  s92.'*'
T h i s  a r r a n g e m e n t  was a p p a r e n t l y  t o  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f rom  t h e  c a se  
of  a s im p l e  a r t i f i c i a l  d e t o u r  a c r o s s  a b o r d e r ,  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  an i n d e p e n d e n t  s u b - c o n t r a c t o r  f o r  one l e g .  An 
anonymous c o n t r i b u t o r  ( B e n n e t t  QC?) t o  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Law J o u r n a l  
a s k e d  why i t  s h o u l d  be t h a t  t h e  Cour t  d e c l i n e d  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  of  t h e  
p l a c e  of  an i n t e r - S t a t e  l e g  of  a j o u r n e y  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  i n t r a - S t a t e  
j o u r n e y  i n  t h e  same way t h a t  i t  does  when d e a l i n g  w i t h  an i n t r a - S t a t e  
l e g  as  p a r t  of an o v e r a l l  i n t e r - S t a t e  j o u r n e y .  Why, a s k ed  Anon, 
s h o u ld  i t  be t h a t  t h e  p a r t  s h o u l d  t a k e  i t s  c h a r a c t e r  f rom t h e  whole 
i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e  b u t  n o t  i n  t h e  f o rm e r?
In  two o t h e r  c a s e s  d u r i n g  B a r w i c k ’s C h i e f - J u s t i c e s h i p , Barwick  and
t h e  o t h e r  members of  t h e  Cour t  e x c e p t ,  i n  e ach  c a s e ,  McTiernan  J ,  h e l d
t o  be p r o t e c t e d ,  c a r r i a g e  of  goods from a p o i n t  i n  one S t a t e  t o  a
p o i n t  i n  t h e  same S t a t e  v i a  a n o t h e r  S t a t e .  In  e a ch  c a s e  t h e r e  were
3
bona f i d e  c o m m erc ia l  r e a s o n s  f o r  c r o s s i n g  t h e  b o r d e r .  In  t h e  c a s e  
of  Boyd v Carah  Coaches a l l  members of  t h e  c o u r t  assumed t h a t  r u n n i n g  
t o u r s  a c r o s s  S t a t e  b o r d e r s  was p r o t e c t e d  by s92  e ven  t h o u g h  t h e  t o u r s  
were  round  t r i p s  t e r m i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  same S t a t e  a s  t h a t  i n  which  t h e y  
had commenced.^
( i i ) F i r s t  S a l e  A f t e r  Impor t
In  Wragg v New Sou th  Wales Barwick  QC had s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  
c o n t r a c t  f o r  t h e  s a l e  of  p o t a t o e s  i n  New Sou th  Wales  a f t e r  t h e i r
1 I d .  89.
2 " S e c t i o n  92 and t h e  C a r r i a g e  of  Goods: Did t h e  High Cour t  t a k e
a Wrong T u r n in g "  ( 1969) 43 ALJ 306.
3 R o a d a i r  P ty  Ltd v W i l l i a m s  (1968)  118 CLR 644;  Ward J  & J  P ty  Ltd 
v W i l l i a m s  (1969)  119 CLR 318.
4 (1979)  27 ALR 161.
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import from Tasmania was part of inter-State trade.^ It may have
2come as something of a surprise to Barwick to lose this point. He
O  /seemed to have support in the CORJ and Vacuum Oil4 decisions.
In both those cases the suspect law was limited in its operation to 
the first sale of commodities, petroleum products, within the 
State.^ In both cases the legislation was held to offend s92.
Barwick drew to the attention of the Court in Wragg^ statements
in the earlier cases to the effect that the sales after import in
7 8question were part of inter-State trade. Barwick also referred 
the Court to a statement from Dixon J in Vacuum Oil. There Dixon J 
said "The very essence of commerical intercourse between the States is
9importation or exportation from a State for purposes of sale." The 
Court in Wragg distinguished the COR and Vacuum Oil cases by pointing 
out that in those cases the legislation was limited in its operation 
to the first sale of goods within the State. As in the nature of 
things the first sale would be by a producer or by an importer, those
1 (1953) 88 CLR 353, 371, 373.
2 Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ agreed with 
the leading judgment of Taylor J. Webb J did not make a decision 
on this point.
3 Commonwealth Oil Refineries v South Australia (1926) 38 CLR 408.
4 Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Queensland (1934) 51 CLR 108.
5 In the COR case the law operated by reference to the first sale 
within the State whether made after entry of goods into the State 
or after production. (1926) 38 CLR 408. In Vacuum Oil the 
legislation was not expressed as directly but meant exactly the 
same thing. It operated by reference to all sales unless someone 
who had sold the goods before had been subject to the law (1934) 
51 CLR 108.
6 (1953) 88 CLR 353, 373.
7 COR (1926) 38 CLR 426, 427 per Isaacs J; Vacuum Oil (1934) 51 
CLR 108, 134 per Evatt J.
8 (1953) 88 CLR 353, 373-374.
(1934) 51 CLR 108, 128, Emphasis added.9
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c a s e s  c o u ld  be r e s t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  i m p o r t a t i o n  i s  p a r t  of  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e . * I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  t h e  magic  of t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .  
S u r e l y  any s a l e  w i l l ,  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h i n g s ,  be made e i t h e r  by an
i m p o r t e r  or  by a p r o d u c e r  or  someone who can t r a c e  h i s  p o s s e s i o n  back
2
t o  im por t  or  p r o d u c t i o n .
In  Granna11 v C Geo Kel leway  & Sons Pty Ltd t h e  Cour t  a p p l i e d  
Wragg, d e s p i t e  B a r w i c k ' s  s u b m i s s i o n s  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t o  h o l d  t h a t  
s a l e s  of  goods w i t h i n  a S t a t e  by an  a g e n t  f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  p r i n c i p a l s  
a f t e r  t h e  im p o r t  of  t h e  goods from a n o t h e r  S t a t e  was no t  p a r t  of
3
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
As C h ie f  J u s t i c e  Barwick  was t o  t a k e  up t h e  r e a l i t y  r e c o g n i s e d  i n  
Dixon J ' s  s t a t e m e n t  i n  Vacuum O i l  -  t h e  f i r s t  s a l e  a f t e r  i n t e r - S t a t e  
movement i s  c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
u s u a l l y  t h e  p r o s p e c t  of  t h a t  f i r s t  s a l e  which  p r o v i d e s  t h e  m o t iv e  t o  
move t h e  goods a c r o s s  t h e  b o r d e r .  By t h e  end of  h i s  C h ie f  J u s t i c e s h i p  
Barwick  was t o  s e e  t h i s  p o i n t  a c c e p t e d  by o t h e r  members of  t h e  Cour t  
and t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of  Wragg w h i t t l e d  away t o  n o t h i n g .
The t a s k  of  u n d e r m i n in g  Wragg was e a s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  by t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  Dixon Cour t  handed  down a d e c i s i o n  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  Wragg which  
was v e ry  h a r d  t o  r e c o n c i l e  w i t h  Wragg.  The c a s e  was F i s h  Board v
1 I d .  396-397 p e r  T a y l o r  J .
2 A law d e a l i n g  w i t h  s a l e  i s  a lw a ys  o p e r a t i n g  on goods which  were 
e i t h e r
( a )  p ro d u ce d  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e  or
(b )  b r o u g h t  i n t o  t h e  S t a t e
( i )  f rom  a b r o a d  or
( i i )  f rom  a n o t h e r  S t a t e
I t  was n e v e r  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  such  a g e n e r a l  law d e a l i n g  w i t h  s a l e  
i s  a lw ays  Dixon -  d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i n  a s p e c t  b ( i i )  of  
i t s  g e n e r a l  c r i t e r i o n  of  o p e r a t i o n .  Compare W e s te rn  A u s t r a l i a  v 
C h a m b e r l a in  I n d u s t r i e s  P ty  Ltd (1970)  121 CLR 1, 15-17 p e r  Barwick  
CJ.
3 (1954)  93 CLR 36, 51-52  p e r  j o i n t  judgment  of  Dixon CJ,  Webb, 
F u l l a g a r ,  K i t t o  and T a y l o r  J J .  On t h i s  o c c a s i o n  t h e  Court  d e c i d e d  
i n  f a v o u r  of  B a r w i c k ’s c l i e n t  on o t h e r  g r o u n d s .
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Paradiso.  ^ The law in question prohibited the sale of fish unless 
they had previously been sold in the government controlled fish 
market. The charge before the Court involved the sale outside the 
market of fish imported from another State. The law was held to 
offend s92 in its application to that sale of imported fish. The 
decisions in Wragg and Paradiso could be reconciled if one abandoned 
the Dixon Court notion of direct or if one accepted that the first 
sale after import could be, but was not always, part of inter-State 
trade or if one acknowledged that in essence the legislation was
limited to controlling the first sale within the State and that the
2case was therefore covered by COR and Vacuum Oil.
Barwick CJ was not in any mood for leaving Wragg even the 
authority of a "distinguished” decision. Through the cases of Harper 
v State of Victoria,^  0'Sullivan v Miracle Foods (SA) Pty Ltd,^
SOS Mowbray Pty Ltd v Mead,  ^NEDCO,^  Smith v Capewell  ^and 
Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt,  ^Barwick CJ 
continued to repeat the propositions that he had had rejected by the 
Court in Wragg. It is the prospect of sale after import that provides 
the incentive to import goods. This practical connection should lead 
to the conclusion that the first sale after import is part of inter­
state trade. If a first sale is so regarded then a law operating on 
first sale by reference to it being a sale is Dixon-direct (and
1 (1956) 95 CLR 443.
2 Various other "reconcilations" were suggested through the cases, 
(eg SOS Mowbray Pty Ltd v Mead (1971) 124 CLR 529, 566 per 
Menzies J, 578-579 per Windeyer J, 602-604 per Gibbs J.
3 (1966) 114 CLR 361, 372.
4 (1966) 115 CLR 177, 187.
5 (1971) 124 CLR 529, 543-544.
6 (1975) 134 CLR 559, 571.
7 (1979) 142 CLR 509, 514.
8 (1980) 27 ALR 182, 187, reaffirming his judgment in Harper.
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therefore also Barwick-direct). In the alternative, even if first 
sale is not regarded as being itself part of inter-State trade, the 
practical effect on inter-State trade (import of goods) of a law 
regulating first sale after import revealed that such a law was 
Barwick-(though not Dixon-) direct.
In Harper 's case, Barwick CJ’s first first sale case, his Honour
could gather no support for his attack on the decision and supporting
reasoning in Wragg. His was the sole dissent with the other four
judges, McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ willing to allow a
Victorian law prohibiting the sale of eggs until they had been graded
and stamped, to apply to the sale of eggs brought from New South
Wales. Even though the law seemed, with its one-off requirement
essentially focussing on first sales, to be similar to the law held
to be directly on inter-State trade in Paradiso, McTiernan, Taylor and
Owen JJ treated the case as covered by Wragg.^  Menzies J also
2relied on his opinion that the law was merely regulatory.
In the Miracle Foods case, Barwick CJ’s second first sale case, 
his Honour found himself in a three to two majority holding that a 
South Australian provision prohibiting the sale of margarine unless it 
contained arrowroot (a substance detectable by a simple test) could 
not apply to the first sale within the State of margarine brought from 
another State. One of the other majority judges was Taylor J who 
had given the leading judgment in Wragg. Now in Miracle Taylor J in 
his joint judgment with Owen J, found the law dealing with sale to be 
directly on import because of its practical effect of stopping 
import.^
1 (1966) 114 CLR 361, 377, 377-378 and 382 respectively.
2 Id. 378.
3 (1965) 115 CLR 177.
4 Id. 189-190. In dissent, Menzies J considered there was no 
direct effect on inter-State trade 195; Windeyer J considered 
the provision to be regulatory 198.
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SOS Mowbray Pty Ltd v Mead provides one of the best examples of 
the tradition amongst High Court judges of expressing independent 
individual viewpoints.^- The suspect Tasmanian law prohibited the 
sale of margarine containing certain prescribed substances which were 
in fact the substances that give margarine its colour and flavour. In 
issue was the application of that law to retail sale within Tasmania 
of margarine imported from another State. There were different ways in 
which the law could be held valid in that application. The following 
table charts the routes taken by the different judges to reach their 
conclusions.
Bar. McT. Mzies Wind. Owen Wish. Gibbs
was the law
acceptable No Yes
regulation
Yes No No
was this first
sale after import Yes No
inter-State trade
Yes Prob­
ably
No
is practical
effect relevant Yes No
to direct
Yes Yes Yes No
was the law
directly on inter- Yes No
State trade
Yes Yes No
was the law valid 
in its applic­
ation to the No Yes Yes
first sale in 
Tasmania?
Yes No No Yes
Thus Barwick CJ found that although he was in a majority on 
of the sub-issues, he was in the minority on the ultimate issue 
validity. (About the only possible route to validity which was
each
of
not
1 (1971) 124 CLR 529.
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us e d  was t h a t  wh ich  would have h e l d  t h i s  f i r s t  s a l e  no t  t o  be p a r t  of  
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ,  and w h ic h ,  w h i l e  a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  
can  be a d i r e c t  e f f e c t ,  would have  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  t h i s  p r a c t i c a l  
e f f e c t  was i n s u f f i c i e n t . )
In  NEDCO, t h e  d e c i s i o n  of  Barwick  CJ t h a t  a law o p e r a t i n g  on t h e
f i r s t  s a l e  of  goods a f t e r  im p o r t  was d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e
r e c e i v e d  t h e  s u p p o r t  of  G ibbs ,  S t e p h e n ,  Mason and J a c o b s  J J .  Barwick
1 2CJ gave h i s  u s u a l  r e a s o n s .  S t e p h e n  J  c o n c u r r e d .  Gibbs and 
J a c o b s  J J  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  Wragg and h e l d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s a l e s  
i n v o l v e d  i n  NEDCO were  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  even  i f  t h o s e  i n  
Wragg were n o t .  The s a l e s  i n  NEDCO were s a l e s  i n  New South  Wales of  
m i l k  p ro d u ce d  i n  V i c t o r i a  and b r o u g h t  a c r o s s  t h e  b o r d e r  by a V i c t o r i a n  
company.  The s a l e s  were e f f e c t e d  by t h e  company ' s  a g e n t s  s e l l i n g  door  
t o  doo r  and t h r o u g h  s u p e r m a r k e t  o u t l e t s .  Gibbs and J a c o b s  J J  d i d  no t  
t h i n k  t h a t  Wragg had  a n y t h i n g  t o  s a y  t o  such  s a l e s  where  t h e  vendor  
had such  a c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  S t a t e .  In  Wragg t h e  s a l e s  
seemed t o  have been  s im p l y  t h o s e  of  New South Wales p r o d u c e  m e r c h a n t s  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s e l l  i n  New South  Wales  p o t a t o e s  p u r c h a s e d  f rom
3
Tasm an ia .  Mason J  e x p r e s s l y  r e s e r v e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  w h e t h e r  f i r s t  
s a l e  i s  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ^  and r e s t e d  h i s  f i n d i n g  of 
d i r e c t n e s s  on t h e  p r a c t i c a l " e f f e c t  of  t h e  s u s p e c t  law i n  p u t t i n g  an 
end t o  t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement of  g o o d s . ^  In  t h i s  c a s e  Barwick  CJ 
a l s o  found h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  on t h e  u l t i m a t e  i s s u e  of  v a l i d i t y ,  
as  t h e  same j u d g e s  t h a t  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  law was d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e  a l s o  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  law was n o t  a c c e p t a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n . ^
1 (1975)  134 CLR 559,  571.
2 I d .  602.
3 I d . 600, 627-630  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
4 I d .  605.
5 I d .  606-607 .
6 Only McTiernan  J  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  law t o  be r e g u l a t o r y .  I d .  593. 
McTiernan J  d i d  no t  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  d i r e c t  p o i n t .
452.
Again in Permewan Wright (which involved a review of Harper^- 
Barwick CJ found that, by one or the other of the routes available, 
the majority of his brethren agreed with him that a law prohibiting 
the sale of eggs unless they had first been graded and stamped by a 
government authority was directly on inter-State trade in its
2application to the sale of eggs brought in from another State.
Despite the agreement at this level, Barwick CJ eventually found
himself in the minority with Aickin J because Gibbs, Stephen, Mason
and Murphy JJ found a law of this kind compatible with the kind of
3freedom they considered s92 to be guaranteeing.
(iii) Use after import
The question of whether the use made of a commodity in one State 
after its import from another State is or can be part of inter-State 
trade received some comment in Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian 
Wheat Board.^  The direct issue was whether a quantity of wheat was 
in inter-State trade when it was compulsorily acquired. The wheat had 
been purchased from growers in New South Wales by a Victorian miller. 
The wheat had been brought into Victoria and was being held in a store 
until needed at the mill, when it was acquired.
Mason and Jacobs JJ held that the transportation of the wheat 
inter-State had concluded, that the intended use of the wheat could 
not be regarded as part of inter-State trade and therefore that the 
wheat was not in inter-State trade.^ Strangely enough their Honours
1 Above p383.
2 (1979) 27 ALR 182, 193 per Stephen J, 203 per Mason J, 225
per Aickin J. Gibbs and Murphy JJ found no need to decide this 
question.
3 Above pp384-385.
4 (1978) 140 CLR 120.
The wheat of Victorian Oatgrowers Pool and Marketing Co. Limited 
Id. 182-183.
5 Id. 187.
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reinforced this conclusion with reference to the decision in Wragg's 
case, a case for which they had displayed no great enthusiasm in the 
NEDCO decision.^
Barwick CJ and Stephen J considered that this wheat was still in
2inter-State trade when acquired. Stephen J ’s decision was based 
on the idea that this wheat was in inter-State trade because the 
movement of the wheat from New South Wales to the destination in 
Victoria, the mill, was inter-State trade. The period of storage 
was necessitated by the fact that wheat is a seasonal crop and did not 
therefore, break the continuity of the inter-State trade.^ His 
Honour indicated that the case could well have been different if the 
wheat had already reached the mill when acquired.^ (The difference, 
one supposes, would be that the destination having been reached, the 
inter-State movement would be over.) Stephen J expressly reserved 
the questions of whether the gristing of wheat in the mill was itself 
inter-State trade and whether the business of the miller as a whole 
was inter-State trade.^
Barwick CJ did not rest his decision on the simple notion of 
movement from a point in one State to a destination in another. He 
spoke more generally of the miller’s business as being inter-State 
trade."1 234567 It was a mistake, according to Barwick CJ to try to 
separate the miller’s business "into two separate intra-State 
transactions, one of purchase and one of use, accidentally joined by
1 Above p451.
2 Id. 140, 165-166 respectively.
3 Id. 165
4 Id. 165-166.
5 Id. 166.
6 Id. 166
7 Id. 140-142. Compare the discussion in Tamar Timber Trading Co 
Pty Ltd v Pilkington (1968) 117 CLR Above pp439-440.
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i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  so as  t o  r e g a r d  t h a t  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  as  t h e  
o n l y  e l e m en t  of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  and commerce” .'*" Th i s  seems t o  
imply  t h a t  p u r c h a s e ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and u s e  were a l l  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e .  Barwick  CJ how ever ,  d i d  n o t  s ay  u n e q u i v o c a l l y  t h a t  t h e  
g r i s t i n g  would i t s e l f  be p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  His  Honour s a i d  
t h a t  t h e  f e e d  i n t o  which  g r a i n  i s  c o n v e r t e d  would n o t  be i n  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e ,  and t h a t  t h e  g r a i n  up t i l l  g r i s t i n g  was i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e  bu t  he d i d  n o t  d i r e c t l y  comment on t h e  g r i s t i n g  s t a g e  
i t s e l f .
( i v )  P r o d u c t i o n  f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e
R e f e r e n c e  has  a l r e a d y  been  made t o  Granna11 v M a r r i c k v i l l e  
3
M a rg a r in e  P ty  Ltd where  Barwick  QC was b r i e f e d  t o  c h a l l e n g e  a law 
p r o h i b i t i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  of  m a r g a r i n e .  B a r w i c k ’s c l i e n t  i n t e n d e d  t o  
s e l l  i t s  p r o d u c t  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  Barwick  QC was l e d  by 
M acF ar land  QC who s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  m a n u f a c t u r e  w i t h  an i n t e n t i o n  t o  send  
t h e  p r o d u c t  i n t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i s  p r o t e c t e d  by s92  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
i t s e l f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  o r  i s  i n s e p a r a b l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e . ^  Barwick QC g i v i n g  t h e  a d d r e s s  i n  r e p l y  abandoned  h i s  
l e a d e r ’s s u b m i s s i o n  on t h i s  p o i n t  and conceded  t h a t  m a n u f a c t u r e  
p r e c e d e s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^  In  i t s  judgment  t h e  Cour t  d e c l a r e d  
u n e q u i v o c a l l y  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  m a n u f a c t u r e  and p r o d u c t i o n  might  be 
e s s e n t i a l  t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  t h o s e  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  n o t  p a r t  of i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e . ^  The Cour t  a l s o  r e j e c t e d  B a r w i c k ’s p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t
1 I d .  141.
2 I d .  140.
3 (1955)  93 CLR 55 Above p p 4 2 5 -4 2 6 .
4 I d .  60.
5 I d .  69.
6 I d .  71 -72 p e r Dixon CJ M c T ie r n a n ,
p e r  F u l l a g a r  J .
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this particular law prohibiting manufacture was directly affecting 
inter-State trade.'*'
The Court in Grannall did not make it clear whether manufacture
and production are not to be regarded as inter-State trade because
they are not trade or because they are not inter-State or because they
2lack either character.
In a sequel to Grannall, Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd arranged
its business so that it received orders requiring it to appropriate
particular ingredients to an inter-State contract, process those
ingredients, which were to be the property of the inter-State
purchaser at all stages of production, and then deliver the finished
product across State borders. In this case of Beal v Marrickville 
3Margarine Pty Ltd the Court again held the activity was not 
inter-State trade but again did not specify to which half of the 
concept of inter-State trade to attribute this conclusion.
As Chief Justice Barwick stated that he understood the Grannall 
decision to be based, inter alia, on the "fundamental decision that 
manufacture is not itself trade or commerce within the meaning of s92 
of the Constitution." Barwick CJ stated that he agreed with that 
"fundamental decision".^
Although Barwick CJ accepted the fundamental decision that 
manufacture is not trade his Honour considered that the proposition 
was not relevant to any of the s92 cases which came before him. In
1 Above pp425-426.
2 The last alternative had been submitted by counsel defending the 
legislation. Id. 64-65.
3 (1965) 114 CLR 283. (McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen 
JJ, Barwick CJ did not sit.)
4 Damjanovic & Sons Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1967) 117 CLR 383, 
395. Similarly Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd v Pilkington 
(1968) 117 CLR 353, 362.
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f i v e  of  B a r w i c k ’s s92  c a s e s  o t h e r  j u d g e s  s i t t i n g  found  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  
was a p p l i c a b l e  and i n  t h r e e  of  t h e s e  c a s e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  of  o p i n i o n  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  Barwick  CJ b e i n g  i n  t h e  m i n o r i t y  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n .
In  t h e  c a s e  of  Tamar Timber  T r a d i n g  Co P ty  Ltd v P i l k i n g t o n  *
Barwick CJ o u t l i n e d  h i s  c o n c e p t  of  m a n u f a c t u r e .  The u l t i m a t e  i s s u e  i n
t h e  c a s e  was w h e t h e r  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t a n c e  of c a r r i a g e  of  t i m b e r
2
w i t h i n  Tasmania  was i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  The c a r r i a g e  was of  g r e e n  
t i m b e r  f rom a s a w m i l l  t o  a t i m b e r  y a r d .  The t i m b e r  would e v e n t u a l l y  
be s e n t  i n t e r - S t a t e  a f t e r  i t  had been  d r e s s e d  and d r i e d  a t  t h e  t i m b e r  
y a r d .  One of  t h e  a rg u m e n ts  a g a i n s t  t h e  c a r r i a g e  t o  t h e  y a r d  b e in g  
r e g a r d e d  as  p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  was t h a t  t h e  g r e e n  t i m b e r  
a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  y a r d  was a commodity d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h e  d r i e d  d r e s s e d  
t i m b e r  which e v e n t u a l l y  went i n t e r - S t a t e .  I f  t h e  d r y i n g  and d r e s s i n g  
were  r e g a r d e d  as  a c t i v i t i e s  p r o d u c i n g  a new commodity t o  go i n t o  
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ,  and w e r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a c t i v i t i e s  p r e c e d i n g  and no t  
p a r t  of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ,  t h e  a c t i v i t y  of  c a r r i a g e  of  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
i n p u t  ( g r e e n  t i m b e r )  was a f o r t i o r i  an a c t i v i t y  p r e c e d i n g  and n o t  p a r t  
of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
Very s i m i l a r  i s s u e s  had a r i s e n  b e f o r e  d u r i n g  B a r w i c k ’s C h ie f
J u s t i c e s h i p  i n  o t h e r  c a s e s  i n v o l v i n g  c a r r i a g e  of  t i m b e r  w i t h i n
Tasm an ia .  I n  Deacon v M i t c h e l l  t h e  i n t r a - S t a t e  c a r r i a g e  was of  t i m b e r
which  was o n l y  t o  be d r i e d  and packed  bu t  no t  o t h e r w i s e  a l t e r e d  b e f o r e
3
e v e n t u a l l y  g o i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e .  In  Webb v S t a g g  t h e  c a r r i a g e  was of 
t i m b e r  which  was t o  be d r i e d  and d r e s s e d  as  a r c h i t r a v e s  b e f o r e  
e v e n t u a l l y  g o i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e ^
In  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  a s  I n  Tamar T i m b e r , Barwick  CJ was i n  d i s s e n t  i n  
h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  c a r r i a g e  was p a r t  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  I t
1 (1968)  117 CLR 353.
2 Above p p 4 3 9 -4 4 0 .
3 (1965)  112 CLR 353.
4 (1965)  112 CLR 373.
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was no t  u n t i l  Tamar Timber t h a t  Barwick  CJ e x p l a i n e d  h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
of  m a n u f a c t u r e .
M a n u f a c t u r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Barwick  CJ i s  t h e  a s se m b ly  of components
t o  c r e a t e  a new and d i f f e r e n t  product . '* '  One can a g r e e  w i t h  Barwick
CJ t h a t  m a n u f a c t u r e  i n v o l v e s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of  new and d i f f e r e n t
p r o d u c t s .  There  i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  h o w e ve r ,  i n  a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  an a c t i v i t y
i s  o n l y  m a n u f a c t u r e  i f  i t  i n v o l v e s  t h e  a s se m b ly  of  com ponen t s .  Th is
r e q u i r e m e n t  would e x c l u d e  from t h e  c o n c e p t  of  " m a n u f a c t u r e "  a whole
r a n g e  of  a c t i v i t i e s  which  c r e a t e d  "new and d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t s " .  For
e x a m p le ,  p r o c e s s e s  of  s e p a r a t i o n  of  mixed goods o r  p r o c e s s e s  of h e a t
o r  c o l d  t r e a t m e n t  can  c r e a t e  new and d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t s .  S u r e l y  t h o s e
o
who c o n v e r t  g r a i n  t o  f l o u r  a r e  i n  a m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p r o c e s s ?  S u r e l y  
t h o s e  who o b t a i n  l i q u i d  oxygen f rom  a i r  a r e  engaged  i n  a m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
p r o c e s s ?  On Barwick  G J ’s d e f i n i t i o n  of  m a n u f a c t u r e  t h e y  a r e  n o t ,  as  
t h e y  do no t  a s s e m b le  c om pone n t s .  Barwick  CJ d i d  no t  e x p l a i n  why he 
i n t r o d u c e d  t h i s  e l e m e n t  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  " m a n u f a c t u r e " .  The OED 
does  n o t  s u g g e s t  any such  l i m i t a t i o n .  Nor does  t h e  c o n t e x t  
" m a n u f a c t u r e  p r e c e d e s  t r a d e " .
Barwick CJ d i d  n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e s t  h i s  d i s s e n t  i n  t h e s e  t h r e e  c a s e s  
on t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  t h e r e  was no a s se m b ly  of  c om ponen t s .  R a t h e r  h i s  
Honour t o o k  t h e  more b a s i c  p o i n t  t h a t  m a n u f a c t u r e  i n v o l v e s  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  of  new and d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t s .  For  Barwick  CJ g r e e n  t i m b e r  
s t r a i g h t  f rom t h e  s a w m i l l  was t h e  same commodity as  t i m b e r  d r i e d  f o r
1 (1968)  117 CLR 353,  362.
2 Homebush F l o u r  M i l l s  Case (1937)  57 CLR 390 above  p p 220 -221 .
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over a year, dressed and shaped as architraves.^
Barwick CJ considered that these dealings with timber were 
analogous to dealings in fruit and vegetables. Barwick CJ posed 
himself the questions - does the merchant who assembles green unpacked 
fruit in one State for sale as ripe packed fruit in another State 
carry on two separate trades - an intra-State trade in green unpacked 
fruit and an inter-State trade in ripe packed fruit? - does the 
merchant who sells apples inter-State carry on a separate trade when 
he brings apples to his depot to be cleaned of spray, sized, wrapped
and cased? - Barwick CJ answered, surely not. In this conclusion
2Barwick CJ was in conflict with Latham CJ who in Hartley v Walsh 
had said packing fruit is analogous to manufacture and is not trade.
In 1976 in Perre v Pollitt Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJqrejected Latham CJ’s approach and agreed with Barwick CJ that the 
packing of fruit destined for inter-State sale is part of, and not a 
mere antecedent of, inter-State trade.^
Accepting, as one can without difficulty, that packing does not 
change the character of fruit, one can not so readily accept that 
architraves are the same commodity as green timber. Barwick CJ
1 Deacon v Mitchell (1965) 112 CLR 353, 359 with the agreement of 
Windeyer J 367. Contra 366 per Menzies with Taylor and Owen JJ 
not commenting on this point but deciding the carriage was not 
part of inter-State trade on other grounds. 361-363, 372 
respectively. Webb v Stagg (1965) 112 CLR 374, 376 with the 
agreement of Windeyer J 384. Contra 378 per Taylor J and 384 
per Owen J. Query whether Menzies J 379-382 was also taking this 
point or merely relying on the idea that the intra-State movement 
of the timber was as a matter of fact and degree separated from 
its inter-State movement. Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd v 
Pilkington (1968) 117 CLR 353, 362. Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ 
treated the case as covered by Deacon v Mitchell 374, 380, 381 
respectively. Menzies J added a reference to Webb v Stagg.
Kitto J said simply that the carriage preceded inter-State trade 
366-367.
2 (1937) 57 CLR 372, 379.
3 (1975) 135 CLR 139, 145.
4 Id. 150, 152, 154, 157 respectively. Only Jacobs J (at 155) 
disagreed with this conclusion. Murphy J upheld the legislation 
by applying his discriminatory fiscal impost theory.
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argued that commercial reality rather than legal technicality should 
guide the application of s92. Surely the commercial reality is that 
architraves are different to green timber? (And, therefore, surely it 
follows that the change in character which takes place somewhere 
between the carriage of green timber in Tasmania and the arrival of 
architraves in Victoria makes it impossible to say that the green 
timber was on its way to Victoria).
In another pair of cases Barwick CJ was able to display his
unusual concept of "manufacture". These cases Damjanovic & Sons Pty
1 2 Limited v Commonwealth and Bartter's Enterprises v Todd required
a decision as to the character of keeping hens, the eggs from which
were sold inter-State trade. Most of the other members of the Court
in the cases considered that keeping hens was very similar to
production and therefore covered by the Grannall and Beal decision
3that manufacture precedes inter-State trade.
Barwick CJ said there was no analogy between keeping (egg- 
producing) hens and manufacture and could therefore not see that 
the decisions in Grannall and Beal had any relevance to the issues 
in Damjanovic^ and Bartter's Enterprises.^  This refusal by 
Barwick CJ to acknowledge the relevance to cases dealing with • 
ownership of productive livestock, of decisions about production, is 
quite unaccountable.
1. (1967) 117 CLR 383.
2. (1978) 139 CLR 495.
3 Damjanovic (1967) 117 CLR 383, 397, 400, 404 and 410 per Kitto, 
Taylor, Menzies and Windeyer JJ respectively, though in the case 
of Windeyer J it was only after His Honour had decried the 
tendency of some to replace the text of the Constitution with 
precedent Id. 407-408. Apart from Barwick CJ the only judges who 
did not apply Grannall and Beal were McTiernan J in Damjanovic 
who concurred with the Chief Justice (1967) 117 CLR 383, 397 and 
Murphy J in Bartter's Enterprises whose theory of s92 allowed him 
to decide without considering the matter.
4 (1967) 117 CLR 383, 395.
5 (1978) 139 CLR 499, 509.
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In Damjanovic Barwick CJ went to some trouble to cricicise the
tendency he perceived in others to make logical extensions from the
reasoning in decided cases to determine the outcome in cases with
different circumstances. "Always the Constitution remains the
text".'*’ (It is interesting to recall that a similar position was
taken by Dixon J when faced with precedent with which he was 
2dissatisfied.) Somewhat inconsistently, Barwick CJ then went on
to base his decision on an analogy he drew from the conclusion that an
expropriation of the hens involved would not offend s92 according to
his understanding of the accepted principles relating to 
3expropriation. Surely the only relevant way in which such 
principles could be "accepted" would be in the reasoning of earlier 
judgments? In Bartter's Enterprises v Todd, Barwick CJ's judgment 
seemed to demand a citation of Grannall and Beal. His Honour 
said:
"The supposed contract may amount to a promise by the vendor to 
keep the specified hens and harvest the eggs and thereafter to 
sell and deliver the eggs or egg products inter-State. But it is 
at least doubtful if there could be trade in eggs which do not 
exist. As commodities, the earliest time at which they could be 
the subject of sale would be the moment they were new laid. The 
antecedent obligation of the plaintiff to keep these hens and 
harvest the eggs would not itself, in my opinion, be an operation 
of inter-State trade and commerce."^
Barwick CJ treated Grannall and Beal as being based on exactly the 
same point. Why did he deny their relevance?
1 Id. 396
2 Gratwick v Johnson (1945) 70 CLR 18 above pp332-333.
3 (1967) 117 CLR 383, 397.
4 (1978) 139 CLR 495.
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In summary, the position of Barwick CJ on production was 
distinctive given his conclusions on the facts in the Tasmanian 
Timber cases and given the very narrow definition of manufacture he 
propounded(in the Tamar Timber case), but never tested. Apart from 
those qualifications Barwick CJ not only paid lip service to the 
authority of Granna11 and Beal as establishing the principle that laws 
dealing with production are outside the reach of s92 his Honour also, 
despite his claims of originality in Damjanovic and Bartters 
Enterprises, acted accordingly.
(v) Solicitation of business
In the case of Samuels v Readers' Digest Association Pty Ltd * 
Barwick CJ was part of a Court asked to consider a law which 
prohibited the issue or delivery in connexion with the sale or 
advertising of goods of any writing promising a gift dependent on 
purchase of the goods. Readers’ Digest had been charged with breaching 
the law by sending material from Sydney to Adelaide offering to make a 
contract to send goods from Sydney to Adelaide and promising a free 
record if such contract were made. Only Barwick CJ and Kitto J gave 
any thorough consideration to the question of whether the action of 
Readers’ Digest which attracted the law’s operation was inter-State 
trade.
Both Barwick CJ and Kitto J looked to the proposed contract for 
the sale of goods (which would come into existence if and when a 
recipient accepted Readers' Digest's proposal) and the inter-State 
movement of goods which would be involved in performance of such a 
contract. Neither doubted that a contract requiring inter-State 
delivery of goods and the actual movement of goods inter-State is part 
of inter-State trade. Kitto J considered, however, that Readers' 
Digest 's actions were not themselves part of that inter-State trade
1 (1969) 120 CLR 1.
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in goods but were rather merely preparatory and accessory to that 
proposed inter-State trade. ^
Barwick CJ referred to what he called a clear principle generally 
accepted and endorsed by the highest authority:
"that the trade and commerce of which freedom is predicated is to
be identified by applying a broad practical concept so as to
include at least all the 'mutual communings, the negotiations,
verbal and by correspondence’ and, as I would think, the
endeavours which lead up to a transaction of a commercial nature
which by its terms express or implied involves in its performance
of completion a movement of things tangible or intangible across 
oState lines".
No citation was given for the quote but it is taken from 
3McArthur's Case. Barwick CJ considered "offering and soliciting an 
offer" were relevant "mutual communings" and therefore part of inter­
state trade.^
Barwick CJ did not identify the "high authority" which endorsed 
this principle. Later in his judgment he went out of his way to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, Privy Council decisions which 
were, in the Chief Justice's opinion, authoritative^ and binding^ 
and, on the other hand, High Court decisions which were merely a 
helpful aid.'1 234567 The Privy Council can hardly be said to have
1 Id. 31-32.
2 Id. 15-16.
3 (1920) 28 CLR 530, 547.
4 (1969) 120 CLR 1, 18.
5 Id. 17.
6 Id. 18.
7 Id. 18.
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u n e q u i v o c a l l y  e n d o r s e d  M c A r t h u r ' s  Case on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p r i n c i p l e .  
The w i d t h  of  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  was a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  now e x p lo d e d  
p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  Commonwealth i s  no t  bound by s 9 2 . ^  D e s p i t e  t h e  
weak a lm o s t  c a r e l e s s  d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  which  Barwick  CJ s u p p o r t e d  h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  u n r e a s o n a b l e  a b o u t  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n .  I t  i s  
j u s t  a l i t t l e  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  Barwick  CJ t o o k  such  a l o n g  r o u t e .  Why 
d i d  h i s  Honour n o t  s im p l y  go t o  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of  Dixon J  i n  BNC which  
had been  ap p ro v e d  by t h e  " h i g h e s t  a u t h o r i t y " ,  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  and 
which  r e g a r d e d  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement,  and com m unica t ion  as  b e i n g
p
a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  s 9 2 ’s a m b i t?  S u r e l y  t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  d e l i v e r y  of
documents  c o u ld  be t r e a t e d  a s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  i n  i t s  own r i g h t
w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  t o  d e r i v e  i t s  s t a t u s  f rom i t s  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  any
p r o p o s e d  i n t e r - S t a t e  c o n t r a c t  o r  movement of  goods?  That  r o u t e  was 
3
u n d o u b t e d l y  open .  Barwick  CJ may, how ever ,  have  been  a n x io u s  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  w i d e r  p r i n c i p l e  which would g i v e  p r o t e c t i o n  t o  
s o l i c i t a t i o n s  t o  engage  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  which  were no t  t h e m s e l v e s  
made by i n t e r - S t a t e  i n t e r c o u r s e .
( v i ) Impor t  f rom  a b ro a d
I n  R v A n d e r s o n ;  exp I p e c - A i r  P ty  L td^  a Cour t  n o t  i n c l u d i n g  
Barwick  CJ u p h e ld  Commonwealth a c t i o n  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  i m p o r t  f rom 
a b ro a d  of  a i r c r a f t .  The Commonweal th 's  avowed p u r p o s e  was t o  p r e v e n t  
t h e  a i r c r a f t  b e i n g  u s e d  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  D e s p i t e  t h i s  p u r p o se  
t h e  Cour t  h e l d  t h e  im p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n  was n o t  d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e .  Barwick  CJ a p p ro v e d  t h e  I p e c  d e c i s i o n . ^
1 Above pp326 -330 .
2 Above pp4 1 2 -4 1 3 .
3 Cf McGraw-Hinds ( A u s t )  P ty  Ltd v Smith  (1978)  24 ALR 175, 191 p e r  
Mason J .
4 (1965)  113 CLR 179.
5 A n s e t t  T r a n s p o r t  I n d u s t r i e s  (1977)  139 CLR 54,  61. A i c k i n  J  a l s o  
app roved  Ip e c  a t  112-113.  Other  members of  t h e  Cour t  d i d  no t  have 
t o  e x p r e s s  a c o n c lu d e d  o p i n i o n  on I p e c .
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( v i i )  P o s s e s s i o n / O w n e r s h i p / A c q u i s i t i o n
Laws d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  or  ow n e r s h ip  of  goods and laws
p r o v i d i n g  f o r  t h e  c om pu lso ry  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  goods a r e  a f f e c t e d  by
s i m i l a r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Cases  on a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o v i d e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t
p a r t  of  t h e  ba c kg round  t o  BNC.^  The o r i g i n a l  p r o p o s i t i o n  d e r i v e d
2
f rom  t h e  1915 Wheat Case t h a t  a c q u i s i t i o n s  c o u ld  n e v e r  o f f e n d  s92
3
was r e j e c t e d  by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  d e c i s i o n s  James v Cowan and James 
v Commonwealth^ h o l d i n g  s 9 2  was o f f e n d e d  by t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n s  i n  
t h o s e  c a s e s .
I t  can r e a d i l y  be a c c e p t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  BNC n o t i o n  of  d i r e c t  and 
e ven  w i t h i n  t h e  Dixon n o t i o n  of  d i r e c t  t h a t  t h e  o w n e r s h ip  or  
p o s s e s s i o n  of  goods i s  i n s e p a r a b l e  f rom  t h e  c a r r y i n g  on of  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h o s e  g o o d s .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  can 
r e a d i l y  be a c c e p t e d  t h a t  any i n t e r f e r e n c e  ( w h e th e r  by d i r e c t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  by e x e c u t i v e  a c t i o n )  w i t h  t h e  o w n e r s h ip  of  p o s s e s s i o n  
o f  goods wh ich  a r e  i n  f a c t  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  an i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d i n g  
a c t i v i t y ,  would be d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^  As C h ie f  
J u s t i c e ,  Barwick  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of  " d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e "  would be a c c o r d e d  t o  a c q u i s i t i o n s  o p e r a t i n g  on goods 
i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ^  and no ju d g e  h a s  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  t h i s  
p r o p o s i t i o n .  In  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  i t  i s  
w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  a law o p e r a t i n g  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  o w n e r s h ip  of 
v e h i c l e s  i s ,  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  v e h i c l e s  u sed  s o l e l y  i n  i n t e r - S t a t e
1 Above p p 3 2 0 f f .
2 Commonwealth v New Sou th  Wales (1915)  20 CLR 54.
3 [1932]  AC 542;  1932 47 CLR 386.
4 [1936]  AC 518;  (1936)  55 CLR 1.
5 W ilcox  M o f f l i n  Ltd v New South  Wales (1952)  85 CLR 488,  519 p e r  
Dixon ,  M cT ie rnan ,  F u l l a g a r  J J .
6 Damjanovic  & Sons P ty  Ltd v Commonwealth (1967)  117 CLR 383,  397;  
Tamar Timber T r a d i n g  Co P ty  Ltd v P i l k i n g t o n  (1968)  117 CLR 353,  
364;  NEDCO (1975)  134 CLR 559,  580;  C l a r k  King P ty  Ltd v 
A u s t r a l i a n  Wheatboard  (1978)  140 CLR 120, 140, 143-144 ,  148-149.
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c a r r i a g e ,  D i x o n - d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e ^  and t h e r e f o r e ,  a_
2
f o r t i o r i , B a r w i c k - d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
The i s s u e  which  r e c e i v e d  some e x p l o r a t i o n  d u r i n g  B a r w i c k ' s  y e a r s  
and which  c a n n o t  y e t  be s a i d  t o  be r e s o l v e d  i s  w h e t h e r  an a c q u i s i t i o n  
can  be shown t o  be d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  by s o m e t h i n g ,  ( such
a s  p u r p o s e  o r  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t )  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r
3
goods a c q u i r e d  were i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .
J u s t  b e f o r e  BNC was a rg u e d  i n  t h e  High C o u r t ,  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  c a s e  
of  F i e l d  Peas M a r k e t i n g  Board ( T a s ) v C lements  & M a r s h a l l  P ty  Ltd was 
a r g u e d . ^  Barwick  KC r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  S t a t e  of South  A u s t r a l i a  
i n t e r v e n i n g  t o  a t t a c k  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  a rg u e d  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  be s e en  
a s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  o f f e n d  s 92  t h a t  an  a c q u i s i t i o n  i n  f a c t  r e s t r i c t e d  
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^  In  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  Barwick  KC s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  i f  
i t  were  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  a t t a c k e d  was 
d i r e c t e d  a t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  t h e n  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r  was s u f f i c i e n t l y  
r e v e a l e d  h e r e  by f a c t  t h a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  was of  a l l  of  t h e  commodity 
and was t h u s  n e c e s s a r i l y  d i r e c t e d  a t  so much of  t h e  commodity as  would 
o r d i n a r i l y  go i n t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  The s i t u a t i o n  was ,  i n  any c a s e ,  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  P e a nu t  Case and s h o u ld  a c c o r d i n g  t o
1 Hughes Vale  P ty  Ltd v New South Wales  [No 1] [1955]  SC 247; 
(1954)  93 CLR 1. A Dixon l e d  Cour t  a l s o  h e l d  t h a t  a law o p e r a t i n g  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  of  goods was d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  by t h e  i m p o r t e r  
of  goods t a k e n  f rom  one S t a t e  i n t o  a n o t h e r  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  t h e  
c o m p l e t i o n  of  t h e  i n t e r - S t a t e  movement of t h e  g o ods .  F e r g u s s o n  v 
S t e v e n s o n  (1951)  84 CLR 421.  See Mason J ’s comments on t h i s  c a s e  
i n  P i l k i n g t o n  v F r a n k  Hammond Pty  Ltd (1974)  131 CLR 124, 196.
2 P i l k i n g t o n  v F ra n k  Hammond P ty  Ltd (1974)  131 CLR 124.
3 T h i s  i s s u e  was f o r e s e e n  e a r l y  by G e o f f r e y  Sawer i n  h i s  commentary 
on t h e  High Cour t  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  Bank N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  Case 
b e f o r e  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  a p p e a l  (1948)  22 ALJ 213 ,2 1 5 .
4 BNC (1948)  76 CLR 1 was a r g u e d  i n  t h e  High Cour t  t h r o u g h  
F e b r u a r y ,  March and A p r i l  of  1948. F i e l d  Peas (1948)  76 CLR 414 
had been  a rg u e d  i n  Sep tember  and O c tobe r  1947.
5 Argument i s  no t  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  CLR. Th is  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  based  on 
t h e  r e p o r t  a t  [1948]  2 ALR 261, 268 f f .
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Barwick KC be treated as covered by the authority of the decision in 
that case.*
Only two members of the Court, Dixon J and Williams J, made 
comment on the appropriate manner for assessing acquisitions.
Williams J had granted an interlocutory injunction which was under 
appeal when Barwick KC put his submissions. Williams J, following 
the lead of Dixon J in the Peanut Case, considered that whether the 
test were directness of operation, purpose or subject matter, this 
acquisition of the entire crop of a commodity most of which was 
exported from the State, the acquisition being made for the admitted 
purpose of limiting inter-State sales, offended s92.
On the appeal from Williams J's grant of an interlocutory 
injunction, the Court heard the argument in the case, and then waited 
until the High Court had heard argument in BNC and delivered its 
judgments in BNC before delivering judgment in Field Peas. Dixon J 
found, however, that BNC gave him no guidance to the resolution of the 
Field Peas issue.^ Acquisition was a "special case" and this 
acquisition was of an entire crop. Even though the acquisition took 
place before particular goods were committed to inter-State trade,^
1 The Peanut Case (1933) 48 CLR 266 is discussed above p325.
2 The case had come before the Full Court in an unusual way. 
Originally an interlocutory injunction had been sought by the 
merchant attacking the legislation. Williams J had granted that 
interlocutory injunction ((1948) 76 CLR 401) and the State Board 
defending the legislation had then appealed against the grant of 
the injunction. In the result Williams J could not sit on the 
appeal and as it turned out the four Justices involved divided 
equally with Latham CJ and McTiernan J considering there was no 
offence to s92 and Starke and Dixon JJ considering there was. 
Rich J who had been involved was prevented by illness from 
participating in the conclusion of the case. Id. 417.
3 Id. 404, 407.
4 Id. 409.
5 Id. 420.
6 Id. 419, 423, 429.
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"That  S t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  of  t h i s  k i n d  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a commodity 
p r e d o m i n a n t l y  s o l d  as  an e x p o r t  f rom  a S t a t e  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l v e d  
an i n v a s i o n  of  t h e  f r e e d o m  which  s92  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p r e s e r v e s  i s  
a p r o p o s i t i o n  which  I  r e m a in  u n a b l e  t o  d o u b t . ” '*'
That  h i s  Honour was " u n a b l e  t o  d o u b t "  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  of  t h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n  i s  n o t  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n f o r m a t i v e  s t a t e m e n t .
I t  was n o t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  Dixon J  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h i s
p r o p o s i t i o n  depended  on t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  a c q u i s i t i o n  i n  such
2
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  of  p r e v e n t i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  b e i n g  commenced, or  
on t h e  p u r p o s e  of  such  a c q u i s i t i o n  b e i n g  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  volume of  
i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  o r  on t h e  p u r p o s e  of  such  a c q u i s i t i o n  b e i n g  t o  
p r e v e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  e n g a g i n g  i n  any t r a d e  ( i n c l u d i n g  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e )  i n  t h e  c om m odi ty .^  I t  must  be remembered t h a t  t h e  P r i v y  
C o u n c i l  j u d g m e n ts  i n  James v Cowan and James v The Commonwealth had 
y e t  t o  be r e - e x a m i n e d  and d i s c u s s e d  by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  BNC. I t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  h ow e ve r ,  t o  r e c o n c i l e  Dixon J ’s a t t i t u d e  h e r e  t o  an 
a c q u i s i t i o n  of  goods b e i n g  p r o d u c e d ,  w i t h  h i s  l a t e r  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  laws 
c o n t r o l l i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  were n o t  d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  b e c a u s e  
p r o d u c t i o n  p r e c e d e s  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e . ^
For  E v a t t  AG a r g u i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  BNC, t h e  
c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of  a c q u i s i t i o n s  w i t h  s92  t u r n e d  on one q u e s t i o n  o n l y  -  
t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n . So much i n d e e d ,  seemed t o  be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  James* C a s e s . Barwick  d i d  n o t  have  t o  e x p l a i n  how 
a c q u i s i t i o n s  would be d e a l t  w i t h  i n  h i s  f ram ew ork .
1 I d .  423.
2 I d .  424.
3 I b i d .
4 I b i d .
5 Above p 4 2 5 - 4 2 6 .
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In its discussion in BNC the Privy Council did not address itself 
specifically to the problem of acquisitions. Their Lordships did, 
however, comment that despite the possibility of "misinterpreting" 
what had been said by the Privy Council in the James’ Cases, and 
whatever might be the field of inquiry when examining executive 
actions the only "purpose" or "object" which was relevant when 
examining the "purpose" or "object" of an Act was purpose or object in 
the sense of "the necessary legal effect, not the ulterior effect 
economically or socially."'*'
2In the cases of Carter v Potato Marketing Board and Wilcox
3Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales, Barwick had the opportunity to give 
the High Court his thoughts on the problem. His most sweeping 
submission was to argue that an acquisition of any goods (except those 
irrevocably committed to intra-State trade) directly affected inter­
state trade because it deprived the owners of the option to commit the 
goods to inter-State trade.^
The Court could not accept that the mere existence of two facts - 
ownership of goods and the possibility to send those goods into inter­
state trade - was sufficient to indicate that an acquisition of those 
goods was directly on inter-State trade. Something more was 
required.^
1 [1950] AC 235, 307-308; (1949) 79 CLR 497, 636-637 approving Law
Officers Sir Roundell Palmer and Sir Robert Collier’s opinion 
cited by Isaacs J in James v Cowan (1930) 43 CLR 386, 409.
2 (1951) 84 CLR 460.
3 (1952) 85 CLR 488.
4 Carter v Potato Marketing Board (1951) 84 CLR 460, 464; Wilcox 
Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488, 493. Also 
Williams J's summary of Barwick’s submission at 529-531.
5 Carter *s case ( 1951) 84 CLR 464, 485-486 per Dixon, McTiernan, 
Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ; Wilcox Mofflin's case 
(1952) 85 CLR 488, 519 per Dixon, McTiernan, Fullagar JJ, 530-532 
per Williams J.
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In an alternative submission which looked to the nature of the 
acquiring law rather than to the circumstances of particular 
individuals whose goods were subject to the acquisition law, Barwick 
submitted that acquisitions made for the purposes of marketing schemes 
were directly on inter-State trade.^ One would have thought, 
legislative purpose more relevant to the burden/regulation issue than 
to the direct/indirect issue. The Court did not, however, reject 
Barwick’s submission.
Kitto J stated unequivocally, in agreement with Barwick that
purpose was the determinant of the direct or indirect issue for
2legislative acquisitions. Other members of the Court did not
3conclusively accept or reject Barwick's submission as they 
considered that whatever the relevance of legislative purpose, an 
acquisition law could not be held to be directly on inter-State trade 
in a particular application without some examination of the facts of 
the particular application and that on the facts of the cases in which 
the submission was put there was no direct application to inter-State 
trade.
In Carter 1s case the goods in issue had been sold in intra-State 
trade with an expectation of a re-sale in intra-State trade and with
1 Carter v Potato Marketing Board (1951) 84 CLR 460, 474. A similar 
submission put by Barwick in Grannall v Marrickville Margarine 
(1955) 93 CLR 55, 69 was the basis for an analogy and did not 
require or receive direct comment from the Court. Compare his 
submission in BNC (PCT 7/4/49, 51) to the effect that an 
acquisition of oats to feed the King’s horses would be acceptable 
while an acquisition of oats to sell would offend s92.
2 Wilcox Mofflin’s case (1952) 85 CLR 488, 539-540.
3 The joint judgment of Dixon, McTiernan, Fullagar JJ in Wilcox
Mofflin having just stated (in an apparent reference to the direct 
and indirect issue) the need to ascertain the bearing of a 
marketing plan upon inter-State transactions then set about 
discussing the James' cases in purpose terms. (1952) 85 CLR 488, 
516.
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no suggestion of any connection with inter-State trade.^ In Wilcox 
Mofflin the Court considered that a provision which exempted from 
acquisition any goods "the subject of trade, commerce or intercourse 
between States or required or intended by the owners of the hides for 
the purpose of trade commerce or intercourse between States" was 
sufficient to avoid conflict with s92. Some members of the Court 
indicated that this exception might go further than was required by 
s92 but none would commit themselves to an exhaustive statement of 
when an acquisition would be directly on inter-State trade.
Nevertheless those cases left well alive the possibility that even 
if particular goods are not actually committed to inter-State trade, 
their acquisition may be directly on inter-State trade, because of the 
strength of the possibility of them going into interstate trade.^ 
Indeed rather than just reserve the matter, Webb J stated that he 
considered s92 would necessarily catch acquisitions of the stock of 
traders who engaged in both inter and intra-State trade, and who would 
not know until they received orders how much or which part of their 
stock was required for inter-State trade.^ This approach clearly 
extended s92 to goods not committed to inter-State trade. To say that 
some acquisitions of goods not committed to inter-State trade can be 
held to be directly on inter-State trade is quite consistent with 
Barwick's theory of direct which looks to practical effect and treats
1 (1951) 84 CLR 460, 485 per Dixon, McTiernan, Williams, Webb, 
Fullagar and Kitto JJ.
2 (1952) 85 CLR 488, 518-520 per Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar 
JJ, 532 per Williams J, 537 per Webb J, 539-541 per Kitto J.
3 Id. 520 per Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ, 532 per 
Williams J.
4 Carter 's case ( 1951) 84 CLR 460, 485-486 per Dixon, McTiernan, 
Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto JJ. Wilcox Mofflin’s case (1952) 
85 CLR 488, 519-520 per Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ, 532 per 
Williams J.
5 Wilcox Mofflin's case (1952) 85 CLR 488, 537.
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the direct/remote issue as one of degree.'*' Kitto J also seemed to
give support to the relevance of practical effect in his judgment
which suggested that the test of validity could be whether an
2acquisition "would in practice diminish inter-State trade".
These then were the ways which had been suggested before Barwick 
CJ’s appointment that an acquisition could be directly on inter­
state trade.
First, when the goods acquired were committed to inter-State 
trade. This was uncontroversial.
Secondly, when the goods acquired were not committed to inter­
state trade but could have gone into inter-State trade.
Thirdly, in the case of an acquisition of all of a product, when 
the past course of dealings indicates that the product is 
predominantly exported from the State.
Fourthly, when the acquisition was made with the purpose of taking 
over trade (including inter-State trade) and a fortiori, when the 
acquisition was made with the purpose of discriminating against inter­
state trade. References to purpose are uncontroversial when referring 
to executive action, but are very controversial when used in relation 
to legislation.
1 It can also be brought within Dixon’s formula if classified as a 
circuitous device. This would seem necessarily to involve an 
inquiry into legislative purpose or practical consequence anyway 
and therefore rebutts Dixon’s claim to be engaged in a purely 
legalistic anaysis of the terms of operation of the law. LR Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution, pp 97-100.
2 Wilcox MoffTin’s case (1952) 85 CLR 488, 541.
472.
Barwick CJ found no occasion to comment on the third possibility. 
As already noted, Barwick CJ accepted the first situation as clearly 
being one where the acquisition was directly on inter-State trade.
The discussion in the preceding sections from "What is inter-State 
trade, commerce and intercourse" on, indicate how wide was the content 
that Barwick CJ gave to the concept "in inter-State trade". Perhaps, 
his Honour's comments in the Clark King case provide the most striking 
example of the wide content he was willing to give to the concept "in 
inter-State trade".*
There Barwick CJ set out a passage from the joint judgment of 
Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ in the Wilcox Mofflin case. In the 
course of explaining their conclusion that the acquisition legislation 
there in issue was compatible with s92, their Honours emphasised the 
width of the provision which exempted from acquisition goods in a wide 
range of situations. They considered that whether or not required by 
s92, the legislation even exempted from acquisition a stock of hides 
when the
"owner of [the] hides ... has made an offer, which is
outstanding and is as yet unaccepted, to sell hides by description
for delivery into another State if he contemplated the delivery of
the particular hides, or if he needed a portion of his stock of
2hides, to perform the contract should his offer be accepted."
Barwick CJ in commenting on this passage drew no distinction between 
the cases of the owner having particular goods in mind and the owner 
having a particular stock in mind from which to draw (but not 
exhaust). Barwick CJ stated that in such a case s92 would protect 
the goods. His Honour set out the wide statements from McArthur 's
1 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 
120, 142-143.
2 (1952) 85 CLR 488, 520.
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case which have been extracted above^ describing the concepts of
inter-State trade and said that those statements covered the 
2example.
An outstanding offer is, of course, a lot more than just a wish or 
a hope. It has the potential to become a binding contract. To say that 
the fact of an outstanding offer to sell goods by description to an 
inter-State offeree coupled with an intention in the seller to use 
particular goods, brings the situation within the concept of inter­
state trade takes the concept of inter-State trade a long way.
Ordinarily a good deal more is needed to appropriate goods to a
3contract than just the intention of the seller. To say that the 
fact of an outstanding offer to sell goods by description to an inter­
state offeree coupled with an intention to draw on (but not exhaust) a 
particular stock of goods is also a situation within the concept of 
inter-State trade is to take the concept of inter-State trade a good 
deal further.
It is difficult to reconcile Barwick CJ’s conclusion that such 
stock would be in inter-State trade with the High Court decision in 
Swift Australian Co Pty Ltd v Boyd Parkinson.^  In that case the 
issue was whether all the slaughtering of poultry carried on by a 
slaughterer whose poultry were sold both locally and overseas, could 
be said to be “slaughtering for export" within the meaning of 
Commonwealth regulations.
1 Above pp461-462.
2 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 
120, 143.
3 Sutton, The Law of Sale of Goods (2nd ed.) 216ff.
4 (1962) 108 CLR 189.
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To s e e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h a t  q u e s t i o n  we must
f i r s t  go back  t o  t h e  c a s e  of  O ' S u l l i v a n  v N oar lunga  Meat L i m i t e d  where
t h e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s  had been  h e l d  t o  be r e a s o n a b l y  i n c i d e n t a l  t o
s 5 1 ( i ) . ^  The j u d g m e n ts  e x p r e s s l y  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  were
l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  of  s l a u g h t e r  " f o r  e x p o r t "  and s t a t e d  t h a t  t h a t
f a c t  was r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  of  t h e  s u f f i c i e n c y  of  Commonwealth 
2
pow er .  The i s s u e  of  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n  S w i f t ,  t h e r e f o r e  gave i n d i r e c t  
g u i d a n c e  t o  t h e  sc ope  of  t h e  Commonwealth i n c i d e n t a l  power i n  t h i s  
a r e a .
The m a j o r i t y  i n  S w i f t  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  s l a u g h t e r i n g  i n  i s s u e  co u ld
3
n o t  a l l  be h e l d  t o  be " f o r  e x p o r t " .  Owen J  i n  d i s s e n t  c o n s i d e r e d  
t h a t  g i v e n  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h i s  b u s i n e s s  where  s t o c k  was h e l d  and goods 
were  o n l y  a p p r o p r i a t e d  t o  o v e r s e a s  o r  d o m e s t i c  d e s t i n a t i o n s  on r e c e i p t  
of  o r d e r s ,  a l l  t h e  s t o c k  was s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  same p o s s i b i l i t y  of  go in g  
o v e r s e a s  and t h e r e f o r e  a l l  s l a u g h t e r i n g  was f o r  e x p o r t . ^
Of t h e  m a j o r i t y  j u d g e s ,  K i t t o  J  t o o k  t h e  o p p o s i t e  e x t r e m e  t o  
Owen J .  For K i t t o  J  i t  seemed t h a t  no p a r t i c u l a r  a c t  of  s l a u g h t e r i n g  
c o u ld  be s a i d  t o  be s l a u g h t e r i n g  f o r  e x p o r t  w i t h i n  t h e  m eaning  of  t h e  
Commonwealth r e g u l a t i o n s .  R a t h e r ,  a l l  t h e  s l a u g h t e r i n g  was f o r  a poo l  
t o  s u p p l y  t h e  d o m e s t i c  o r  o v e r s e a s  m arke t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  what o r d e r s  
came i n .  " S l a u g h t e r i n g  f o r  e x p o r t "  m ea n t ,  f o r  K i t t o  J ,  " s l a u g h t e r i n g  
such  a s  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a p u r p o s e  of  e x p o r t a t i o n  o b j e c t i v e l y  
m a n i f e s t e d  as  a c t u a l l y  formed and e x i s t i n g , a l t h o u g h  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
u n a l t e r a b l e  and d i d  n o t  mean s l a u g h t e r i n g  " f o r  p o s s i b l e  e x p o r t " . ^
1 (1954)  92 CLR 565 p e r  Dixon CJ,  M cTie rnan ,  F u l l a g a r ,  K i t t o  J J ,  
Webb and T a y l o r  J J  e x p r e s s i n g  no o p i n i o n .
2 I d . 581 p e r  M cTie rnan  and 596-598  p e r  F u l l a g a r  J  who r e c e i v e d  t h e  
c o n c u r r e n c e  of  Dixon CJ and K i t t o  J .
3 (1962)  108 CLR 189. Dixon CJ,  M cTie rnan ,  K i t t o ,  T a y l o r ,  Menzies  
and Windeyer  J J .
4 I d . 286 Compare Webb J  i n  t h e  Wilcox  M o f f l i n  c a s e  (1952)  85 CLR 
488,  537 Above p470 .
5 I d .  208-209 .  Emphasis  a d d e d .
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If this kind of reasoning were applied to the hypothetical hide dealer 
considered by Barwick CJ in Clark King, then no particular hide in 
stock would be in inter-State trade until at least an intention had 
been formed to send that particular hide inter-State.
The other majority judges in Swift seemed to believe that the 
stock of birds and thus the acts of slaughtering which built up that 
stock, could be notionally divided with each bird having a 
predetermined destiny and with, therefore, some of the particular acts 
of slaughtering being slaughtering for export (within the Commonwealth 
legislation) and some being slaughtering other than for export (not 
within the Commonwealth legislation).*
This conclusion was, with respect, difficult to defend in logic 
and is therefore difficult to use as a basis for analogy for Barwick 
CJ’s hypothetical hide dealer. Nevertheless, I make this attempt.
If the stock of hides were notionally divided into hides for inter­
state trade and hides not for inter-State trade then how could it be 
said, as Barwick CJ seemed to say, that the whole stock was in inter­
state trade?
Admittedly the Noarlunga and Swift decisions were about the
incidental area of s51(i). The cases do nevertheless make Barwick
CJ's propositions about the meaning of inter-State trade, rather
difficult to accept. One would have thought that the hypothetical
hide dealer could have been more convincingly dealt with in terms of
the practical effect of the acquisition. Why did not Barwick CJ simply
say that the practical effect of acquisition in the hypothetical
case(s) would be direct and not merely remote? (Compare the second
possible route to declaring an effect direct and his sweeping
2submission in Carter 's case.)
1 Id. 198 per Dixon CJ, 202-203 per McTiernan J, 212-214 per Taylor 
J, 222 per Menzies J, 223-224 per Windeyer J.
2 Above p468.
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A f o r t n i g h t  a f t e r  t h e  C l a r k  King j u d g m e n ts  were d e l i v e r e d ,  t h e  
Cour t  handed down i t s  d e c i s i o n  i n  B a r t t e r s  Farms Pty  Ltd v Todd. ^
In  t h i s  c a s e  Barwick  CJ seemed t o  e x c l u d e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s  of  
a c q u i s i t i o n s  ( t h e  second  p o s s i b l e  r o u t e  s u p r a ) when he s a i d :
"To d e p r i v e  a p r o d u c e r  of  h i s  p r o d u c t  b e f o r e  i t  ha s  become p a r t  of  
i n t e r s t a t e  t r a d e  and commerce h a s  l o n g  been  h e l d ,  and i n  my 
o p i n i o n  c o r r e c t l y  h e l d ,  n o t  t o  be an i n f r i n g e m e n t  of  s 92  u n l e s s  
t h e  a c t  o f  d e p r i v a t i o n  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  h a v i n g  been  done t o  
p r e v e n t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  t h e  p r o d u c t  i n t o  i n t e r s t a t e  t r a d e  and 
commerce. "
A pa r t  f rom  p r o d u c t i o n  i n t e r f e r e n c e s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t h i n k  of  a 
s i t u a t i o n  o t h e r  t h a n  a c q u i s i t i o n  which  can have  such  a d r a m a t i c  e f f e c t  
on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  and n o t  be c l a s s i f i e d  Dixon -  d i r e c t .  Yet h e r e  
Barwick  CJ u n e q u i v o c a l l y  r u l e d  ou t  i n q u i r y  i n t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  
of  a c q u i s i t i o n .
N. D e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  -  t h e  D i r e c t / I n d i r e c t  I s s u e  
Summary
By t h e  end o f  B a r w i c k ' s  C h ie f  J u s t i c e s h i p ,  t h e  High Cour t  had come 
a ro u n d  t o  B a r w i c k ' s  p o s i t i o n  on d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t . P r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s  
c o u l d  be d i r e c t  e f f e c t s .  As a l w a y s ,  how ever ,  t h a t  i s s u e  i n t e r a c t e d  
w i t h  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  
any c a t e g o r y  of  l aw s  f o r  which  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  v a l i d i t y  depended  
c l e a r l y  on a c h o i c e  be tw een  D i x o n - d i r e c t  and B a r w i c k - d i r e c t . The 
d i s t i n c t i o n  was i m p o r t a n t  f o r  laws o p e r a t i n g  on f i r s t  s a l e s  a f t e r  
i m p o r t  bu t  even  t h e r e  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of  s92  t o  such  s a l e s  h a s  i n v o l v e d  
t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  Even f o r  
Ba rw ick  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i d e n t i f y  d e c i s i o n s  which were r e s t e d  s o l e l y  
on a w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  l o o k  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
of  a law o p e r a t i n g  on s o m e t h in g  which  was no t  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  Of 
c o u r s e ,  Barwick  CJ f r e q u e n t l y  a v o id e d  such  a d e c i s i o n  by p u s h i n g  ou t  
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  (Barw ick  C J ' s  e x c l u s i o n  of
1 (1978)  139 CLR 499.
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practical effects from acquisition inquiries was greatly offset by 
his notions of when goods were "in" inter-State trade.) And yet in 
the significant areas of controls on production and import from abroad 
(activities outside Barwick CJ’s definition of inter-State trade) 
Barwick CJ would not hold drastic practical effects on inter-State 
trade to be direct effects.
Why was it that Barwick CJ fought against Wragg so resolutely and 
accepted Grannall (and Ipec)? In the case of production and import 
prohibitions the practical effect on inter-State trade was greater 
than was the price control on the sale of goods after import in Wragg.
Prohibit production and there can be no inter-State trade in that 
commodity. Prohibit the import of planes from abroad and there can be 
no inter-State air transportation using those planes. Impose price 
control and there can still be inter-State trade - it just may happen 
that there is not as much economic incentive as there was previously 
to engage in inter-State trade.
Why was it that Barwick CJ made no attempt to bring production 
(and import) controls within the reach of s92. Was it that Barwick the 
freedom fighter, had to acknowledge the necessities of judicial office 
and bowed to the need for certainty in the law? This answer is 
difficult to accept given the frequency of Barwick CJ’s statements 
criticising those who looked to the case law on s92 rather than the 
text of the section itself.
If we were to treat s92 as being concerned only with outlawing 
inter-State protectionism then there might seem no offence in allowing 
a State to prohibit production for inter-State trade and thus injure 
its own producers. At one stage Barwick CJ had argued that s92 is in 
fact based on the purpose of ending the "barbarism of borderism". 
Barwick?s tolerance of production controls might be interpreted 
therefore as a recognition of the discrimination basis to s92. Such 
an interpretation is, however, difficult to sustain given that Barwick 
CJ went on to postulate and generally applied a concept of freedom 
much wider than a free-trade concept.
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No r a t i o n a l e  can  be found  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  f ramew ork  f o r  
d raw in g  t h e  l i n e  a t  p r o d u c t i o n  (and i m p o r t )  c o n t r o l s .  One might  s a y  
t h a t  a l i n e  h a s  t o  be drawn somewhere,  b u t  i f ,  a s  B a rw ick  CJ s a y s ,  i t s  
a l l  a q u e s t i o n  of  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  t h e  l a w ,  why draw t h a t  l i n e  
r i g i d l y ?
0 .  S e c t i o n  92 -  The o v e r v i e w  of  B a r w i c k fs b e h a v i o u r
As c o u n s e l , Barwick  won f rom t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  t h e  Bank 
N a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  Case t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  s 92  g u a r a n t e e s  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a s  i n d i v i d u a l s  a f r e e d o m  t o  t r a d e .  That  t h e  f r e e d o m  p o s t u l a t e d  by 
s 92  was f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  s e n s e  of  o r d e r e d  l i b e r t y ,  was an a s s u m p t i o n  
which  s t o o d  u n c h a l l e n g e d  u n t i l  t h e  mid 1 9 7 0 ' s .  In  1980 i n  Uebergang  
s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  f rom t h e  C o u r t ,  B a rw ic k  CJ and t h r e e  
of '  h i s  b r e t h r e n  r e a f f i r m e d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  b a s i s  t o  s92  w i t h  
o n l y  Murphy J  e x p r e s s l y  r e p u d i a t i n g  t h a t  b a s i s .  By t h e  t im e  of  
Uebe rgang t h e r e  were  s i g n s  t h a t  t h e  Cour t  was becoming  more w i l l i n g  
t o  f i n d  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s  t o  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
d i s p l a c e  t h e  p r im a  f a c i e  f r e e d o m  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  B a rw ic k  CJ was ,  
a s  he had been  t h r o u g h o u t  h i s  e n t i r e  C h i e f - J u s t i c e s h i p , r e m a r k a b l y  
u n w i l l i n g  t o  a l l o w  r e s t r a i n t s  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  The o n ly  two 
r e s t r a i n t s  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  which  he a c t u a l l y  h e l d  t o  be 
c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  s92  were (1 )  a r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  m a r g a r i n e  n o t  be s o l d  
u n l e s s  i t  were  l a b e l l e d  i n  a p r e s c r i b e d  manner  a s  m a r g a r i n e ,  and ( 2 )  a 
p r o h i b i t i o n  of  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s .
Th is  b r o a d  v iew of  t h e  k i n d  of  f r e e d o m  g u a r a n t e e d  by s 92  was 
p a r a l l e l e d  by Barwick  C J ’s a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e  and t o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of  government  a c t i o n  as  b e i n g  
d i r e c t l y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  Through t h o s e  i s s u e s  Ba rw ick  CJ 
a l l o w e d  some c h e c k s  t o  be p l a c e d  on s 9 2 .  C o n t r o l s  on p r o d u c t i o n  and 
c o n t r o l s  on im p o r t  f rom  a b ro a d  were  a c c e p t e d  by B a rw ic k  CJ as  b e i n g  
beyond t h e  r e a c h  of  s 9 2 .  The f a c t s ,  how ever ,  wh ich  a r e  c o n s p i c u o u s  
and e l o q u e n t  above a l l  o t h e r s  a r e  ( i )  t h a t  i n  t h e  l a r g e  sample  of  
c a s e s  d e p e n d in g  on s 92  d u r i n g  h i s  C h i e f - J u s t i c e s h i p  B arw ick  CJ h e l d  
s92  o p e r a t e d  t o  p r e v e n t  government  a c t i o n  v a l i d l y  a p p l y i n g  t o  t h e
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facts before the Court about five times as often as he held s92 did 
not apply while in the same sample of cases the majorities held s92 
to be inapplicable slightly more often than they held it to be 
applicable, and; (ii) that in no case did any member of the Court 
hold that s92 applied when Barwick CJ held that it did not.'*"
On his retirement from the Court, Sir John Latham said, "When I
2die, s92 will be found written on my heart." Sir John went on to
3propose something be done about s92 to make its meaning clearer. 
Barwick CJ never gave the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with s92. 
On the contrary in an extra-judicial statement Barwick CJ stated his 
belief in the unifying force of s92.^ If the anguish caused by s92 
to Sir John Latham was appropriately represented by saying that the 
terms of the section were written on his heart, then we might examine 
closely the knuckles of Sir Garfield Barwick to see whether the terms 
of s92 are tattooed thereon. Barwick used s92 like a blunt 
instrument.
1 Appendix.
2 (1952) 85 CLR ix.
3 Ibid.
4 (1969) 28 Public Administration 2,3.
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C o n c l u s i o n : An o v e r v i e w  of  Barwick  and t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n
Barwick and t h e  High Cour t
When Barwick  s t a r t e d  a p p e a r i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  High Cour t  i n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c a s e s ,  S i r  John Latham was t h e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e .  A l r e a d y ,  
however ,  t h e  C our t  was ,  i n  some s e n s e s ,  b e i n g  l e d  by S i r  Owen Dixon.  
Much of  D i x o n ' s  ju dgmen t  i n  t h e  Bank N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  Case was a pproved  
by t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l .  Dixon J  w r o t e  a main m a j o r i t y  judgment  i n  t h e  
Communist P a r t y  Case w i t h  Latham CJ i n  d i s s e n t .  Through t h e  1 9 5 0 ' s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  Dixon became C h ie f  J u s t i c e ,  j o i n t  unan imous or  s t r o n g  
m a j o r i t y  ju d g m e n ts  were f r e q u e n t .
I t  i s  n o t  w i t h i n  t h e  s c o p e  of  t h i s  t h e s i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  key 
t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s o l i d i t y  and l i k e m i n d e d n e s s  of t h e  Dixon Court. '*'  
Pe rhaps  t h a t  h o m o g e n e i ty  d e r i v e d  from some i n h e r e n t  q u a l i t y  i n  D i x o n ' s  
j u r i s p r u d e n c e .  P e r h a p s  i t  d e r i v e d  f rom  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  most of  t h e  
Dixon Court  p u i s n e  j u d g e s  were  s e l e c t e d  and a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  
government  of  R o b e r t  M e n z i e s ,  an  a r d e n t  a d m i r e r  of  Dixon .  Pe rhaps  
t h a t  h o m o g e n e i ty  was a p r o d u c t  of  t h e r e  b e i n g  a Commonwealth 
government  i n  o f f i c e ,  w h ich  was l e s s  a d v e n t u r o u s  i n  t e s t i n g  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a n  had  been  i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s .  ( I t  i s  n o t a b l e  i n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t  t h a t  when Barwick  as  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  l e d  t h e  Commonwealth 
i n t o  t e s t i n g  i t s  powers  u n d e r  s51 ( x x i ) ,  t h e  High Court  d i v i d e d  and 
C h ie f  J u s t i c e  Dixon t o o k  a r e l a t i v e l y  n a r r o w  view of  Commonwealth 
pow e r ) . ^
Wha tever  t h e  r e a s o n  o r  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  s o l i d i t y  of  D i x o n ' s  C o u r t .
t h a t  s o l i d i t y  meant  t h a t  D i x o n ' s  c l a i m  t h a t  High Cour t  j u d g e s  a p p l i e d
3
" s t r i c t  and c o m p l e t e  l e g a l i s m "  t o  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e
1 Cf C Howard, " S i r  Owen Dixon and t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n "  (1973)  9 
MULR 5.
2 M a r r i a g e  Act Case (1962 )  107 CLR 529.
3 On t h e  o c c a s i o n  of h i s  a p p o in t m e n t  as  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  (1952)  85 CLR 
x i  , x i  v .
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Constitution was quite credible. If nothing else, the divisions 
within the High Court during Barwick's Chief Justiceship make it all 
the more readily apparent that there is seldom any fixed objective 
meaning ascertainable by mechanical application of logic, when the 
issue is the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution. 
Undoubtedly by the reiteration of the maxim - The text is the test - 
Barwick CJ undercut whatever fixed objective meaning there was in 
precedent (so, for that matter, did the Engineers Case.) If anything, 
that there was division within the Court in the Barwick years was 
typical of the pattern of High Court behaviour through the history of 
the federation and it was the Dixon Court pattern of joint 
unanimous or strong majority judgments which was the aberration.
The shadow of Dixon fell long over Barwick’s Court. For the 
first half of Barwick's Chief Justiceship, there was continuity in 
the make-up of the Court. Justices McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, 
Windeyer and Owen who all sat with Chief Justice Barwick for 
substantial periods had also all been on Dixon's Court for some 
years.
The make-up of the Court changed in the 1970's. Suddenly Barwick 
CJ had a Court a generation younger than him. Of the judges appointed
in the 1970's, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs, Murphy, Aickin and
2Wilson JJ, only Gibbs J had been admitted to practice when Barwick
3had taken silk in 1941. Barwick had been the phenomenon of the bar 
in the 1950's when they were getting established. Some of them had 
appeared with him in the 1950's but, their main contact with him had 
been when they were putting submissions to his Court.
1 Consider for example the polarisation within the early Courts 
over the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and within the 
current Court over the scope of the external affairs power.
2 Gibbs was admitted in 1939 but served in the armed forces in the 
Second World War
3 Walsh J who was appointed in 1969 and died in 1973, had been 
admitted in 1934.
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It is difficult to find many constitutional issues where Barwick 
CJ’s thinking dominated or led the Court. On issues of 
intergovernmental immunity and in his interpretation and application 
of s92, Barwick CJ was, compared to his brethren, an extremist.
Barwick CJ was party to the establishment of the Fairfax and 
Murphyores principles of characterisation. Those cases represented, 
however, the vindication of the work of Sir Owen Dixon. Barwick CJ 
did not even write judgements of his own in Fairfax and Murphyores. He 
proceeded by adopting the fuller discussions of other members of the 
Court.
Perhaps the s90 receipts duty cases can be scored as Barwick 
victories. Even there, however, Barwick acknowledged that his 
judgment in the first receipts duty case had been prepared by Taylor J 
before that judge's death. Barwick also saw some of his views on s92 
issues prevail over those supported by members of the Dixon Court, but 
those victories were offset by the lack of support for Barwick's idea 
of "freedom" under s92.
The powerfully expressed views of Barwick CJ and (and Windeyer 
J) in Bonser v La Macchia, may as it were, have turned the tide of 
judicial opinion on the issue of the seaward limits of States (albeit 
by developing ideas put forward by D P O'Connell). Even though the 
potential of the corporations power was suggested by Sir John Latham, 
Barwick is entitled to the credit for the inflation of the power.
Apart from those areas the members of the "Barwick Court" were 
apparently uninfluenced by their Chief Justice.
Themes and Patterns in Barwick CJ's 
behaviour on constitutional issues
There are two related crude hypotheses which can be disposed 
of. First, Barwick CJ was affected by a desire to vindicate views,
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which he had put as counsel and seen rejected by the Court, because 
they were such views.^
Secondly, that Barwick CJ rejected things Dixonian because they 
were Dixonian.
As for the first hypothesis
Barwick as counsel had important losses in Lowenstein (separation 
of powers), the Communist Party Case (constitutionality), the State 
Banking Case and the Bank Nationalisation Case (on the issues of 
characterising a law as being with respect to a subject matter, though 
Barwick won the cases on other issues), the Second Uniform Tax Case 
(on Commonwealth power to use s96 to subordinate States), Wragg (on 
the application of s92 to first-sales after import), and Grannall (on 
the application of s92 to production controls).
The arguments which Barwick had put unsuccessfully in Lowenstein, 
were in their essence accepted in the Boilermakers Case. Barwick CJ 
indicated his dissatisfaction with the outcome in the Boilermakers 
Case and showed no enthusiasm for a subtle and technical doctrine of 
separation of powers such as that which his submissions in Lowenstein 
had proposed. They were, of course, Dixon’s arguments in Barwick’s 
mouth which were rebuffed by the majority in Lowenstein and were taken 
up in the Boilermakers Case and Barwick’s attitude to separation of 
powers might be seen as supporting the second hypothsis.
Barwick's unsuccessful submissions in the Communist Party Case 
to the effect that the Court should defer to the opinion of Parliament 
and the Executive on political matters were not echoed in the 
judgments of Barwick CJ. The contrary was rather the case. In 
Fairfax and Murphyores Barwick CJ accepted the principles which 
underlay the rejection of his submissions in the State Banking Case 
and the Bank Nationalisation Case about characterising laws as being
1 Compare D Marr, Barwick 131.
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with respect to subject matters of Commonwealth power. Barwick as 
Chief Justice did revive (and revive successfully) the arguments which 
had been rejected in Wragg but he did not challenge Grannall. There 
is, therefore, no pattern of Barwick using his position as Chief 
Justice to reverse losses as counsel.
Nor is there any pattern of Barwick CJ opposing the ideas of Sir 
Owen Dixon merely for the sake of opposition. Undoubtedly, Barwick 
CJTs maxim - the text is the test, was Barwick CJ's way of saying that 
he would not accept previous High Court judges’ expositions of 
constitutional provisions regardless of his own view of the 
provisions’ true meanings and there were some areas where Barwick CJ 
rejected positions taken by Sir Owen Dixon.
Barwick CJ did reject Dixon's scheme (and Rich J's and Starke 
J's schemes) for dealing with Commonwealth interference with States. 
And, as just noted, Barwick indicated his dissatisfaction with the 
decision based on Dixon's notion of the separation of powers doctrine, 
in the Boilermakers Case.
Barwick CJ also rejected Sir Owen Dixon's view in relation to 
whether the first-sale of goods after their import from another State 
was part of inter-State trade and Sir Owen Dixon's view of what were 
"direct*’ effects for the purposes of s92. Those two issues merged, 
however, and Barwick CJ did not push his view of "direct" effect out 
to bring any other activities under the protection of s92.
There is a substantial list of areas where Barwick and Dixon took 
similar approaches. Barwick and Dixon had a similar perception of 
the kind of freedom guaranteed by s92. Barwick supported Dixon's 
exclusion of economic effects from the incidental area of s51(i) and 
sought to carry that exclusion into sl22 issues. Barwick accepted, 
albeit with some reservation and some ambiguity, Dixon's general 
principles of characterisation. Barwick supported Dixon's proposition 
that there is inherent immunity from State interference for the 
Commonwealth.
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Barwick's performance on s90 had parallels with Dixon’s. Both 
went through a phase of seeking to give the section a wide operation 
and than retreated from that position. Although accepting the 
majority decision in Dennis Hotels upholding a time-lagged tax Barwick 
expressed preference for the reasoning of the minority amongst whom 
had been Dixon CJ. Barwick's conflict in this area was with Sir Frank 
Kitto rather than with Dixon.
There is no one-line formula to capture the essence of Barwick 
CJ’s behaviour on constitutional issues. It is possible, however, 
to disentangle some of the major constitutional tensions and conflicts 
from one another and to give an overview of Barwick CJ's attitude to 
these broad issues.
(i) Barwick CJ’s perception of the Federation as a federation
When ascertaining the limits of Commonwealth powers, Barwick CJ 
endorsed the Engineers Case explosion of the reserved powers doctrine 
and acted accordingly on s51(xx) and s51(xxix) issues but seemed to 
allow considerations of preserving certain areas exclusively for State 
control, to affect his attitude to s81, national implied power, 
s51(xxi) and the incidental aspect of S51(i). Barwick CJ's attitude 
of containing s51(i) stands in contrast with his proposition that s90 
recognizes a principle that the Commonwealth was to have powers of 
national economic management.
Although Barwick CJ pursued no consistent line when federal 
arguments were raised to determine limits on Commonwealth power, 
Barwick did have a consistent approach for problems of 
intergovernmental immunity and had another consistent approach for 
issues relating to Federal Parliament.
On issues of intergovernmental immunity Barwick CJ accorded to 
the Commonwealth a dominating position. The Commonwealth sphere did, 
and the State sphere did not, have immunity from the other sphere of
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government on account of its place in the federation and its status as 
a body politic. The Commonwealth’s position of strength in 
intergovernmental relations was complemented by Barwick CJ’s 
endorsement of Commonwealth use of s96 grants to subordinate State 
government action.
That behaviour, favouring national over State interests, is to 
be contrasted with Barwick CJ’s attitude to issues concerning Federal 
Parliament. There Barwick CJ took the view that the house of the 
nation, the House of Representatives, did not dominate Parliament and 
that the Senate had a structure and a status to enable it to protect 
State interests.
There is contrast between Barwick CJ’s attitude to the two topics 
- intergovernmental immunity and Parliament. That contrast does not 
necessarily indicate conflict. The composite perception may well have 
been that State interests are sufficiently represented in Federal 
Parliament and do not therefore require further protection through 
doctrines of intergovernmental immunity and that strong representation 
for State interests in Federal Parliament is one of the reasons why 
those acting under the authority of the Commonwealth and answerable to 
the Federal Parliament should have intergovernmental immunity.
Barwick did not, however, expressly relate these two different 
problems of balancing national and State interests in this way.
(ii) Barwick CJ’s perception of the relationship between the 
individual and government
Barwick showed no interest in the doctrine of separation of 
powers, a doctrine lauded by some as a protection of individual 
liberty. Barwick rejected arguments based on notions of democracy 
when considering voting rights. Although Barwick did not support the 
individual against government in those contexts he did support the 
individual trader on some issues.
Barwick CJ's attitude to s92 was redolent with a simplistic faith 
in the worth of trade by individuals. His decision holding Senator
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Webs te r  was n o t  d i s q u a l i f i e d  from s i t t i n g  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  by h i s  t r a d i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  was c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  w o r t h  of such  a c t i v i t y .  
Barwick  C J ’s e a r l y  e n t h u s i a s m  f o r  p u s h i n g  ou t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  s90  t o  
p r o t e c t  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  goods from S t a t e  t a x e s ,  was c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
Barwick C J ’s s u p p o r t  f o r  f r e e d o m  of  t r a d e r s  f rom government  c o n t r o l .  
The c o r r e l a t i v e  a t t i t u d e  -  a low r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  t r a d e  of  government  
s u p p o r t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  -  was a l s o  c l e a r  t h r o u g h  Barwick  C J ’s s92  c a s e s  
and was an a t t i t u d e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  Barwick  C J ’s d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  P o r t  
Hedland Case n a r r o w i n g  t h e  r a n g e  of  a c t i v i t i e s  which  t h e  Commonwealth 
a i r l i n e  c o u ld  u n d e r t a k e .
Barwick  CJ gave  v e r y  l i t t l e  w e i g h t  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  
i n d i v i d u a l s  o t h e r  t h a n  t r a d e r s  when s92  was i n  i s s u e .  Consumer 
p r o t e c t i o n  was n o t  f o r  Barwick  CJ a v e r y  c o m p e l l i n g  r e a s o n  t o  a l l o w  
Government  c o n t r o l  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e .  At l e a s t  Barwick  CJ would 
a l l o w  go v e rn m e n ts  t o  c o n t r o l  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s  b u t  t h a t  
cou ld  be a c c e p t e d  b e c a u s e  i t  p r o t e c t e d  t h e  f reedom  t o  t r a d e  of  o t h e r  
i n d i v i d u a l s .
I  have n o t  been  a b l e ,  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n f i n e s  of t h e  word l e n g t h  of  
t h i s  t h e s i s ,  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  l a r g e  c o l l e c t i o n  of  c a s e s ,  i n v o l v i n g  
Barwick CJ ,  r e l a t i n g  t o  s 5 1 ( x x x v )  of  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  My o b s e r v a t i o n  
t h e r e  has  b e e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  Barwick  CJ c o n s i s t e n t l y  h e l d  t o  be 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t h a t  which  u n i o n s  s o u g h t  t o  b r i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  
C o n c i l i a t i o n  and A r b i t r a t i o n  Commission and which  e m p lo y e rs  opposed ,  
and c o n s i s t e n t l y  h e l d  t o  be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t h a t  which e m p lo y e rs  s o u g h t  
t o  b r i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  Commiss ion,  or  wh ich  t h e  Commonwealth e n a c t e d ,  and 
which  u n i o n s  o p p o s e d .
Barwick  d i d  n o t  push  o u t  h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t r a d e r s  as  f a r  a s  he 
might  h a v e .  He h e l d  t o  be c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  s 90  a wide r a n g e  of  S t a t e  
t a x a t i o n  of  c o m m e rc i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  His d e c i s i o n  i n  Murphyores  
a l l o w i n g  t h e  Commonwealth t o  c o n t r o l  e x p o r t  f rom t h e  c o u n t r y  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  c a n n o t  s im p l y  be b r u s h e d  
a s i d e  as  b e i n g  a f f e c t e d  by h i s  i n v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i o n  
movement .^  He a c c e p t e d  t h a t  t h e  Commonwealth c o u ld  p r o h i b i t  e x p o r t
1 Barwick  was P r e s i d e n t  of  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s e r v a t i o n  F o u n d a t io n  
from 1965 t o  1970.
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by reference to any consideration. He also accepted that the 
Commonwealth could control imports so as to stop private traders going 
into competition with the air transport activities of the government 
airline and the private airline, which had shared out the market after 
Barwick’s victory as counsel in the Airways case.
It may ultimately turn out to be the case that Barwick’s success 
in establishing Commonwealth power under s51(xx) to control the 
trading activities of trading corporations will ultimately have 
greater importance for the capacity of the Commonwealth to regulate 
private persons than did any of his other positions on constitutional 
matters. Barwick put forward the proposition that s51(xx) allows the 
control of the trade of trading corporations - as a basis for 
supporting Commonwealth power to prevent restrictive trade practices 
by trading corporations. The power, however, could possibly be used 
to nationalise or at least rigorously control all intra-State 
activities of such corporations. That potential if realised in whole 
or in part would make increasingly incongruous the special laissez- 
faire freedom for inter-State traders which Barwick helped to maintain 
for so long.
(iii) Barwick CJ’s perception of the relationship 
of the High Court to government
Barwick CJ was consistent across a range of issues in his 
readiness to review the validity of government action.
On the question of compliance with s57 Barwick had no reluctance 
to examine and restrain proceedings within parliament. With s92, 
Barwick CJ saw no problem either in adopting an interpretation of the 
section’s guarantee which required the testing of government action 
against an impressionistic subjective criterion, or in applying the 
section to invalidate action supported by democratically elected 
governments, even when Commonwealth and State governments were co­
operating in the course of action and there was no offence to federal 
principles in the action.
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Barwick CJ’s high regard for the position of the High Court, of 
which he was Chief Justice, went beyond his attitude to the review of 
government action under challenge. In the nature of judicial review 
the High Court cannot initiate action. There were however, some 
issues which Barwick CJ would not allow to go past without becoming 
involved.
In a discussion which was not necessary to his decision in Bonser 
v La Macchia, Barwick went to some trouble to argue that the States 
territories end at low-water mark. In the Rocla Concrete Pipes Case 
Barwick who decided that the legislation before him was inseverably 
invalid, gave what was in effect an advisory opinion that the law 
would have been valid if it could have been limited in its operation 
to s51(xx) corporations. Barwick having been in the minority in the 
First Territories Representation Case invited States to re-open that 
issue.
Those cases of judicial initiative were bold enough. BarwickTs 
advice to the Governor-General, however, leaves them rather in the 
shade. True enough Barwick did not initiate that transaction. The 
Governor-General approached Barwick. Barwick's decision that he could 
and should advise, the fact that his advice went beyond questions of 
law into political matters of constitutional conventions, and the fact 
that Barwick's advice was so loosely almost casually argued indicate 
that Barwick CJ was operating on the assumption that the esteem 
associated with his office would of itself justify his action and 
provide authority for his opinions. Ironically his action rattled the 
very foundation of the authority of pronouncements of the Chief 
Justice of Australia, the principle of consitutionality, by causing 
some people, albeit a small minority, to ask why they should accept 
the opinions of the Chief Justice of Australia.
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It is generally accepted that Barwick never quite achieved the 
pre-eminence amongst constitutional law judges that he had had amongst 
constitutional law advocates. Perhaps the difference is that success 
as an advocate requires mastery of oral argument while success as a 
judge depends on mastery of written exposition. My impression after 
reading transcript of Barwick’s oral argument in the Bank 
Nationalisation Case and reports of his submissions in many other 
cases and after reading many of his judgments, is that what was a 
virtue in the barrister - the ability to simplify - was a shortcoming 
in the judge. The reasoning of Chief Justice Barwick was often 
shallow, little more than assertion. (Being Chief Justice of 
Australia can, of course, be rather demanding of one’s time)
Perhaps the difference is that success as an advocate requires 
sensitivity to the attitudes and values of the bench, while success 
as a judge (in a Court not subject to appeal) requires the individual 
to have, amongst other things, a coherent and complete philosophy of 
his own. It may be that the reason why Barwick may not be mentioned 
in the same breath as Dixon when great Australian constitutional 
judges are being discussed, is that Barwick’s faith in hard work and 
market forces was not by itself a broad enough framework with which to 
resolve the constitutional issues of Australia in the second half of 
the twentieth century.
APPENDICES
Appendix I
Sir Garfield Barwick's letter of advice to the 
Governor-General, Sir John Kerr
"Dear Sir John,
In response to Your Excellency's invitation I attended this day 
at Admiralty house. In our conversation I indicated that I considered 
myself, as Chief Justice of Australia, free, on Your Excellency's 
request, to offer you legal advice as to Your Excellency's 
constitutional rights and duties in relation to an existing situation 
which, of its nature, was unlikely to come before the Court. We both 
clearly understood that I was not in any way concerned with matters of 
a purely political kind, or with any political consequences of the 
advice I might give.
In response to Your Excellency's request for my legal advice as 
to whether a course on which you had determined was consistent with 
your constitutional authority and duty, I respectfully offer the 
following.
The Constitution of Australia is a Federal Constitution which 
embodies the principle of ministerial responsibility. The Parliament 
consists of two Houses, the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
each popularly elected, and each with the same legislative power, with 
the one exception that the Senate may not originate nor amend a money 
bill.
Two relevant constitutional consequences flow from this structure 
of the Parliament. First, the Senate has constitutional power to 
refuse to pass a money bill; it has power to refuse Supply to the 
Government of the day. Second, a Prime Minister who cannot ensure 
Supply to the Crown, including funds for carrying on the ordinary 
services of Government, must either advise a general election (of a 
kind which the constitutional situation may then allow) or resign.
If, being unable to secure Supply, he refuses to take either course,
Your Excellency has a consitutional authority to withdraw his commission 
as Prime Minister.
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There  i s  no a n a l o g y  i n  r e s p e c t  of  a Pr ime M i n i s t e r  ' s  d u t y  be tw een  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  
A u s t r a l i a  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  t h e  House of Commons, a 
p o p u l a r l y  e l e c t e d  body,  and t h e  House of  L o r d s ,  a n o n - e l e c t e d  body,  i n  
t h e  u n i t a r y  fo rm  of  government  f u n c t i o n i n g  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom. Under 
t h a t  s y s t e m ,  a Government  h a v i n g  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  of  t h e  House of Commons 
can s e c u r e  S u p p l y ,  d e s p i t e  a r e c a l c i t r a n t  House of  L o r d s .  But i t  i s  
o t h e r w i s e  u n d e r  our  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  A Government  h a v i n g  t h e  
c o n f i d e n c e  of  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  bu t  no t  t h a t  of  t h e  S e n a t e ,  
b o t h  e l e c t e d  h o u s e s ,  ca n n o t  s e c u r e  s u p p ly  t o  t h e  Crown.
But t h e r e  i s  an  a n a l o g y  be tw een  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of a Pr ime M i n i s t e r  
who has  l o s t  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  of  t h e  House of  Commons and a Pr ime 
M i n i s t e r  who does  n o t  have  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  of  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t ,  i . e .  of  
t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and t h e  S e n a t e .  The d u t y  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  t o  t h e  Crown i n  e a ch  c a s e  i s  t h e  
same:  i f  u n a b l e  t o  s e c u r e  S upp ly  t o  t h e  Crown, t o  r e s i g n  o r  t o  a d v i s e
an e l e c t i o n .
In  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t ,  c o n fo r m a b l y  t o  t h i s  a d v i c e ,  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  
c e a s e s  t o  r e t a i n  h i s  c o m m is s io n ,  Your E x c e l l e n c y ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t y  and d u t y  would  be t o  i n v i t e  t h e  Leader  of  t h e  O p p o s i t i o n ,  
i f  he can  u n d e r t a k e  t o  s e c u r e  S u p p l y ,  t o  fo rm  a c a r e t a k e r  Government  
( i . e .  one wh ich  makes no a p p o i n t m e n t s  or  i n i t i a t e s  any p o l i c i e s )  
p e n d in g  a g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  of  t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
or  of  b o t h  h o u s e s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t ,  as  t h a t  Government  may a d v i s e .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  my o p i n i o n  i s  t h a t ,  i f  Your E x c e l l e n c y  i s  s a t i s f i e d  
i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  P r e s e n t  Government  i s  u n a b l e  t o  
s e c u r e  S u p p l y ,  t h e  c o u r s e  upon which yo u r  E x c e l l e n c y  h a s  d e t e r m i n e d  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  yo u r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d u t y .
Yours r e s p e c t f u l l y ,  
( G a r f i e l d  B a r w ic k ) "
Appendix  I I
The M enzies  J  d i s t r a c t i o n  i n  t h e  R e c e i p t s  Tax Cases 1
Menzies  J  i n  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  m i n o r i t y  i n  W e s te rn  A u s t r a l i a  v 
Hammersley I r o n  P ty  Ltd [No 1] t o o k  a r a t h e r  n i c e  p o i n t .  Under 
s lO lA  when a s u p p l i e r  com p l ied  w i t h  t h e  law and made t h e  r e q u i r e d  
a c k n o w led g e m en t ,  he had t o  pay a t a x  q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
amount  of  t h e  acknow ledged  payment f o r  t h e  g o o d s .  I f  t h e  s u p p l i e r  
b r e a c h e d  t h e  l aw ,  h o w e ve r ,  t h e n  t h e r e  was no t a x  l i a b i l i t y .  He had 
com m it t ed  an o f f e n c e  and was s u b j e c t  t o  a f i n e .  As t h e r e  was no t a x  
l i a b i l i t y  u n l e s s  an acknowledgem ent  was a c t u a l l y  g i v e n ,  M enz ies  J  
c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  t h e  t a x  was on t h e  acknowledgement  of  paym en t ,  no t  on 
t h e  payment  i t s e l f .  (Menzies  J  d i d  n o t  say  t h a t  a t a x  on t h e  
p u r c h a s e  p r i c e  o f  goods would n o t  be an e x c i s e . )
T h i s  p o i n t  i s  a l t o g e t h e r  t o o  n i c e .  J u s t  abou t  any t a x  co u ld  be 
s a v e d  f rom  s 9 0  by b e i n g  c o u p le d  w i t h  an " o p t i o n "  f o r  t h e  t a x p a y e r  t o  
pay  a  f i n e  i n s t e a d .  The f i n e  h e r e  was a f l a t  f i n e  bu t  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  
s h o u l d  a p p l y  e q u a l l y  t o  a f i n e  which  was q u a n t i f i e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  amount of  payment r e c e i v e d .  A f i n e  i s  n o t  a t a x  no m a t t e r  how 
i t  i s  q u a n t i f i e d .
As e x p r e s s e d ,  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  of  Menzies  J  makes t h e  c a s e  lo o k  
s i m i l a r  t o  Dennis  H o t e l s  P ty  Ltd v V i c t o r i a ^. In  Dennis  H o t e l s  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  of  K i t t o ,  T a y l o r  and Menzies  J J  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  f e e  
f o r  a pe rm anen t  l i c e n c e  was n o t  an e x c i s e  d u t y  on t h e  p u r c h a s e  of  t h e  
goods by r e f e r e n c e  t o  wh ich  i t  was quan t i f i e d  had been  i n f l u e n c e d
1 D i s c u s s e d  p p 2 7 7 f f .
2 (1969)  120 CLR 42.
3 I d .  67.
4 (1961)  104 CLR 621 D i s c u s s e d  p p 2 4 5 f f .
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by the fact that there was no liability to pay any tax unless the 
licence was renewed. The tax was on renewal. It is quite a jump, 
however, from that proposition (which had only received the support 
of three judges in Dennis anyway) to the Hamersley [No 1] facts. In 
Dennis the State had not imposed any legal obligation on the taxpayer 
to do the act, renewal, which would attract the tax liability.
Menzies J considered the question in Western Australia v 
Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd to be "entirely different" to the 
question in Hamersley [No 1], "There the tax'*" was imposed upon the 
making of a document and, if there were no document, there was no 
tax." In Hamersley [No 1] Menzies J concentrated on what happened 
if the taxpayer breached slOlA and failed to make a receipt. The 
consequence was "Penalty: Twenty Dollars". That meant for Menzies J,
that there was no tax only a penalty if no receipt was made, that 
slOlA was taxing the making of receipts not the payment of money. In 
Chamberlain, if a taxpayer who had opted to make a monthly return 
under ss99A and 99B omitted to do so, the consequence was
"Penalty: Two hundred dollars and in addition to that penalty
the person is liable to pay double the amount of the duty that
would have been payable by him if he had complied ..." (s99C)
Menzies J commented
"Failure to submit statements exposes a taxpayer, who has so
3elected, to double duty as well as a penalty."
If the difference in the penalty provisions were the basis for 
the distinction that Menzies J saw between the two taxes, then the
1 Under slOlA.
2 (1970) 121 CLR 1, 24.
3 Id. 24.
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S t a t e s  c o u ld  e a s i l y  remove d o u b l e  t a x  p e n a l t y  p r o v i s i o n s .  There  m u s t ,  
h o w e ve r ,  be doub t  as  t o  w h e t h e r  Menzies  J  r e a l l y  d i d  r e s t  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  on t h a t  f i n e  p o i n t .
F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  " doub le  t a x "  as  a 
1 2" t a x " .  In  Re Dymond Dixon CJ,  F u l l a g a r ,  K i t t o ,  T a y l o r  and 
Windeyer  J J  had d e c i d e d  t h a t  a s i m i l a r  p r o v i s i o n  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  d o u b le  
t a x a t i o n  on b r e a c h  of  an Act was ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  l a b e l ,  n o t  a t a x  bu t  
r a t h e r  a p e n a l t y .  Those j u d g e s  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  i f  a p e c u n i a r y  
l i a b i l i t y  was imposed on t h e  o c c a s i o n  of  a b r e a c h  of an A c t ,  t h e n  t h e
3
e x a c t i o n  t o o k  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of  a p e n a l t y  r a t h e r  t h a n  a t a x .
(Menz ies  J  a l s o  s a t  i n  Re Dymond bu t  found he c o u ld  d e c i d e  t h e  ca se  
w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t  q u e s t i o n .  )
The second  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  r e c o n c i l i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n  of  Menzies  
J  i n  C h a m b e r l a in  w i t h  h i s  d e c i s i o n  i n  H am ers ley  [No 1] by r e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p e n a l t y  p r o v i s i o n s ,  i s  t h a t  h i s  Honour d i d  no t  
c o n f i n e  h i s  r e a s o n i n g  i n  H am ers ley  [No 1] t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  a t a x  
p a y a b le  on a m on th ly  s t a t e m e n t .
" I  do n o t  t h i n k  any d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t o  be drawn b e tw e en  d u t y  
imposed upon a p a r t i c u l a r  r e c e i p t  and d u t y  imposed  upon a 
s t a t e m e n t  of  r e c e i p t s  and p r o p o s e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  a d u t y ,  imposed i n t e r  a l i a  upon a r e c e i p t  g i v e n  
by a m a n u f a c t u r e r  f o r  so much of  t h e  p r i c e  of  goods m a n u f a c t u r e d  
i n  A u s t r a l i a  as  i s  f rom  t o  t im e  p a i d ,  i s  t o  t h a t  e x t e n t ,  a d u t y  
o f  e x c i s e .
1 I d .  24.
2 (1959)  101 CLR 11.
3 I d .  22 p e r  F u l l a g a r  J .
4 I d .  24.
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The provision which required the issuing of receipts for payments 
received within the State had a penalty provision which was 
indistinguishable from the penalty provision considered in Hamerslev 
[No 1] in that it was at a flat rate. There was no "double taxation" 
penalty.
What then is the key to the distinction perceived by Menzies J? 
His Honour contrasted the Hamersley [No 1] and Chamberlain situations 
thus
"There [Hamersley [No 1]] the tax was imposed upon the making 
of a document and, if there were no document, there was no tax. 
Here the tax falls upon the receipt of money and the giving of 
a receipt or returning a statement is but machinery for tax 
collection." ^
Is this to be taken as indicating that the distinction lay in the 
purpose of the provisions? If that is what Menzies J meant, it is 
a totally unconvincing basis for distinction. Menzies J described 
the receipt in Chamberlain as being merely "machinery for tax 
collection". Surely the receipt considered in Hamersley [No 1] was 
merely "machinery" to aid the "machinery for tax collection" 
considered in Chamberlain?
In short there- is no satisfactory explanation for the behaviour 
of Menzies J. The only recourse is to take these decisions into his
framework under the "non-principle" that it is all a question of the
2substance of the law with each case depending on its own facts.
Even on this view, Menzies J chose to emphasise facts, consisting of 
aspects of the legislation, which seemed to have little to do with the 
substance of the legislation.
1 Id. 24.
2 Above pp241-242.
Appendix  I I I
Did t h e  Moore v Commonwealth p o i n t  a bou t  
t h e  " p u r p o s e ” of  c o m pu lso ry  e x a c t i o n s  c o v e r  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  D i c k e n s o n ? ^
In  Moore v The Commonwealth i t  was a c c e p t e d  t h a t  i t  was i m p o r t a n t
when c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  a c om pu lso ry  e x a c t i o n  ( a s  b e i n g  or  n o t  b e i n g  a
t a x )  t o  s e e  how i t  had been  l a b e l l e d  by t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  T h i s  was
b e c a u s e  i t  was a c c e p t e d  t h a t  even  i f  one c om pulso ry  e x a c t i o n  co u ld
r e d u c e  a l i a b i l i t y  u n d e r  a s e p a r a t e  com pu lso ry  e x a c t i o n  b o t h  e x a c t i o n s
2
might  be h e l d  t o  be t a x e s .  Thus t h e  " p u r p o s e "  a rgument  t o  s u p p o r t  
v a l i d i t y  i n  D ickenson  would have  been  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i n d e r e d  by t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  d e s c r i b e d  payments  made p u r c h a s e s  as  " t a x " .
3
I n  Moore v The Commonwealth t h e  " p u r p o s e "  of  t h e  e x a c t i o n  was 
a s c e r t a i n e d  by e x a m in in g  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n v o l v e d  t o  s e e  what  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  d i r e c t e d  s h o u ld  ha ppe n  t o  t h e  money e x a c t e d .  The 
l e g i s l a t i o n  d i r e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  money be a p p l i e d  e i t h e r  t o  d i s c h a r g e  
f u t u r e  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  o r  t o  d i s c h a r g e  p r o v i s i o n a l  t a x  (which was ,  
d e s p i t e  i t s  name, n o t  t a x  bu t  payment i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  t a x  
l i a b i l i t y )  o r  i f  t h o s e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  d i d  n o t  e x h a u s t  t h e  money t o  
r e t u r n  i t  t o  t h e  t a x p a y e r .  In  D ic k e n s o n ^ n e i t h e r  t h e  Act no r  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n s  s a i d  e x p r e s s l y  t h a t  money p a id  a t  t h e  t im e  of  p u r c h a s e  was 
t o  be a p p l i e d  t o  d i s c h a r g e  l i a b i l i t y  t o  c onsum pt ion  t a x  when and i f  
a r i s i n g .  Tha t  seemed t o  b e ,  h o w e ve r ,  what  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  i m p l i e d l y  
i n t e n d e d .  The re  was no p r o v i s i o n  f o r  r e g u l a r  a s s e s s m e n t  of how much 
l i a b i l i t y  t o  pay  c o n s u m p t io n  t a x  t h e  t a x p a y e r  had i n  f a c t  i n c u r r e d .
1 D i s c u s s e d  p p 2 9 5 f f .
2 (1951)  82 CLR 547,  568-569  p e r  Dixon J ;  576 p e r  Webb J ;  577 p e r
F u l l a g a r  J ;  581-582  p e r  K i t t o  J .
3 (1951)  82 CLR 547.
4 (1974)  130 CLR 177.
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That should not, however, distinguish Moore v The Commonwealth as the 
tax liability "expected" to arise in that case depended on the 
enactment of the annual tax act. What may provide a basis for 
distinction is the comparison of the provisions relating to repayment 
should actual tax liability exceed the anticipatory payments. In 
Dickenson the relevant provision, s3(5) of the Act provided
Where the tax has been paid in respect of the consumption of any 
tobacco and, on application being made to him within three months 
of that tax being paid, the Commissioner is satisfied that that 
tobacco has not been, and will not be, consumed, he shall refund 
the amount of that tax to the person by whom it was paid or, if 
he has died, his legal personal representatives.
This provision seemed to contemplate the possibility of repayment 
only when the Commissioner was satisfied that the "tobacco has not 
been, and will not be, consumed...". If it were implied that the 
subsection meant that there could be repayment on the Commissioner's 
satisfaction that "the tobacco has not been, and will not be, 
consumed" by the person who made the anticipatory payment, then the 
case would seem to be covered by Moore v Commonwealth. Persons 
acquiring tobacco could pay an amount equal to the amount of their tax 
liability that would arise when and if they consumed the tobacco. 
Persons making such anticipatory payment could recover it or any part 
of it upon demonstrating that they had not and were not going to incur 
any consumption tax liability. On that construction payments received 
at the point of purchase were not "for" government purposes and were, 
therefore, not taxes. If they were not taxes they could not be 
excises.
The difficulty is that on its face, the subsection meant consumed 
by anybody. That is to say the purchaser who had made anticipatory 
payment would not be entitled to a refund even if he could show that 
the tobacco had been consumed by somebody else who had thus become 
subject to a liability to pay consumption tax. In such a situation
3 .
t h e  p e r s o n  who had  made t h e  a n t i c i p a t o r y  payment  would be p e r m a n e n t l y  
d e p r i v e d  of  h i s  money even  th o u g h  he d i d  no t  consume t h e  g o o d s .  I t  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e s c r i b e  a p e rm anen t  d e p r i v a t i o n  of  t h e  money i n  such  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  as  a t a x  on c o n s u m p t io n .  Whether  or  no t  such  a 
d e p r i v a t i o n  s h o u l d  be d e s c r i b e d  as  a t a x  on goods i s ,  how ever ,  a more 
d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n .
I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  r e g u l a t i o n  3 gave a g e n e r a l  
power t o  a p p o i n t  c o l l e c t o r s  t h e  power was s a i d  t o  be s u b j e c t  t o  t h e s e  
r e g u l a t i o n s .  R e g u l a t i o n  4 c o n t a i n e d  d e t a i l e d  p r o v i s i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  
t h e  making of  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i t h  t h e  o c c u p i e r s  of p r e m i s e s  where  a 
r e t a i l  t o b a c c o  b u s i n e s s  was c a r r i e d  on " f o r  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of  t h e  t a x  
p a y a b le  i n  r e s p e c t  of  t h e  con s u m p t io n  of  t o b a c c o  t h a t  i s  s o l d  on t h o s e  
p r e m i s e s  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h a t  b u s i n e s s  . . . " .  ( r e g  4 ( 1 ) ) .  Mason J  
i m p l i e d  from t h i s  t h a t  p e o p l e  c o u ld  o n l y  be made c o l l e c t o r s  i n  r e s p e c t  
of  p a r t i c u l a r  p r e m i s e s  and i n  r e s p e c t  of  cons u m p t io n  t a x  i n  r e s p e c t  
of  t o b a c c o  s o l d  from t h o s e  p r e m i s e s . *  I f  i t  i s  so i m p l i e d ,  i s  i t  
t o  be f u r t h e r  i m p l i e d  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  p e o p le  who c o u ld  make a n t i c i p a t o r y  
payments  t o  such  c o l l e c t o r s  were p e o p l e  p u r c h a s i n g  t o b a c c o  from t h e  
p r e m i s e s  f o r  wh ich  t h e  c o l l e c t o r  was r e s p o n s i b l e ?
I f  t h a t  s t r i n g  of  i m p l i c a t i o n s  were made t h e n  we would have  a 
law which  p r o v i d e d  ( a l b e i t ,  a t  some p o i n t s ,  i m p l i e d l y )  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  
a l l  p e o p le  who consumed t o b a c c o  s h o u ld  be l i a b l e  t o  pay t a x ,  a f u r t h e r  
e x a c t i o n  was t o  be made i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  P u r c h a s e r s  of  
t o b a c c o  c o u ld  make a payment  a t  t h e  t im e  of  p u r c h a s e  e q u a l  t o  t h e  
amount which  would  a r i s e  by way of  c onsum pt ion  t a x  when an  i f  t h e y  
consumed t h e  t o b a c c o .  P u r c h a s e r s  making such  payments  would be 
p e r m a n e n t l y  d e p r i v e d  o f  t h i s  money u n l e s s  t h e y  c o u ld  s a t i s f y  t h e  
Commiss ioner  t h a t  no p e r s o n  had or  would consume t h e  t o b a c c o .  That  i s  
t o  s ay  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  d e p r i v i n g  a dvance  p a y e r s  o p e r a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e s e  p e r s o n s  had p u r c h a s e d  t o b a c c o .  Even w i t h i n  t h e  
f o rm u la  o f  K i t t o  J  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of  
l i a b i l i t y  was no t  " p u r c h a s e " .
1 I d .  243.
Appendix IV
Voting behaviour in relation to taxes considered 
by the Court including Barwick CJ
Does s90 prevent the tax applying to the taxpayer? 
(Only cases on which Barwick sat are included.)
TAX BAR McT KIT TAY MZS WIND OWN WLSH GIB STE MAS JAC MUR AI WLSN MAJ M/D
1 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO M7/0
2 NO NO NO NO NO NO M5/0
3* YES NO NO NO YES YES YES M3/3
4 YES NO NO YES YES YES NO YES M4/3
5(a)N0 YES NO NO NO NO NO M5/1
(b )N0 NO NO NO NO NO NO M6/0
(c)YES YES NO NO NO YES NO M3/3
6 NO NO NO NO YES NO NO M5/1
7 YES NO YES YES NO NO YES M3/3
(i) (üi)
YES/ 4/ 2/ 0/ 0/ 1/ 2/ 2/ 0/ 0/ 1/ 2/ 1/ 0/ 3YES/
NO 5 4 4 2 5 2 2 1 5 4 3 1 2 6N0
(ii) (iv)
A/ 3/ 2/ 2/ 4/ 4/ 4/ 0/ 3/ 2/ 5/ 0/ 1/
D 3 2 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 M9/01
(i) The number of times the judge held that s90 prevented the tax 
applying to the taxpayer (Yes) against the number of times he 
held s90 did not prevent the Tax applying to the taxpayer (No).
(ii) The number of times the judge agreed with Barwick CJ's vote (A)/ 
disagreed (D).
(iii) Whether the majority held s90 applicable (Yes) or inapplicable 
(No).
(iv) Whether Barwick CJ was in majority (M) or dissent (D) and what 
the division of the Court was.
* In this case Taylor J heard argument but died before
judgment. Barwick CJ said that his judgment had been 
prepared by Taylor J as their joint judgment.
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Tax -  i n  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  o r d e r .
1 Andersons  P ty  Ltd v V i c t o r i a  (1964)  111 CLR 353.
Tax on consumer c r e d i t .
2 Clynes  Case (1966)  ALR 853.
Tax on l a n d .
3 W este rn  A u s t r a l i a  v Hamers ley  I r o n  Pty  Ltd [No 1] (1969)  120 CLR 
42.
Tax on payments  o u t s i d e  a S t a t e  f o r  goods s u p p l i e d  w i t h i n  t h e  
S t a t e .
4 W es te rn  A u s t r a l i a  v C h a m b e r l a in  I n d u s t r i e s  P ty  Ltd (1970)  121 CLR
1.
Tax on payment s  r e c e i v e d  w i t h i n  a S t a t e .
5 D i c k e n s o n ' s  Arcade  P ty  Ltd v Tasmania  ( 1974) 130 CLR 177.
( a )  T i m e - la g g e d  t a x  on r e t a i l e r s  of  t o b a c c o
(b )  F l a t  t a x  on r e t a i l e r s  of  t o b a c c o
( c )  Tax on c o n s u m p t io n  of  t o b a c c o
6 HC S l e i g h  P ty  Ltd v S ou th  A u s t r a l i a  (1977)  136 CLR 475.
T im e - la g g e d  t a x  on p e t r o l  s a l e s .
7 Logan Downs P ty  Ltd v Q ueens land  (1977)  137 CLR 59.
Tax on o w n e r s h ip  of  l i v e s t o c k .
In Harpe r  v V i c t o r i a  (1966)  114 CLR 361 M cTie rnan ,  T a y l o r ,  Menzies
and Owen J J  h e l d  l e g i s l a t i o n  d i d  no t  o f f e n d  s90  or  s 9 2 .  Barwick  CJ 
i n  d i s s e n t  h e l d  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  d i d  o f f e n d  s92  and d i d  no t  have  t o  
d e c i d e  t h e  s90  p o i n t .
Appendix V
The purpose of s92 - The Evidence of the Convention Debates
1 2Both Beasley, a lawyer, and La Nauze, an historian , have 
traced the drafting of s92. I do not propose to go again over their 
ground and review the amendments to the terms of s92 which were 
suggested at various stages - nor do I propose to detail as they have 
done the indications in the Convention Debates of the Founders' 
understanding of the provision.
It is sufficient for ray purposes to make the following points 
about what the debates reveal about s92. First, inter-State free trade 
was regarded as being basic to federation. The topic of inter-State 
free trade was introduced by Sir Henry Parkes at a very early stage of 
the 1890 Australasian Federation Conference in Melbourne.
The second of the four basic principles of federation moved by 
Parkes at the commencement of the 1891 National Australasian Convention 
in Sydney dealt with this topic in these terms
"That the trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, 
whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be 
absolutely free."^
1 FR Beasley, "The Commonwealth Constitution: Section 92 Its
History in the Federal Conventions" (1948-1950)1 Annual Law Review 
97, 273, 433.
2 JA La Nauze "'A Little Bit of Lawyers Languade' The History of 
Absolutely Free" 1890-1900 in A Martin (Ed) Essays in Australia 
Federation 1968.
3 Australasian Federation Conference, 1890 (hereinafter, Melbourne 
1890.
4 National Australasian Convention 1891 (hereinafter, Sydney 1891). 
The first principle was the continuity of the powers and 
territories of the existing colonies. The third principle was 
that power to impose customs duties be "exclusively lodged in the 
Federal Government and Parliament". The fourth principle was the 
entrusting to federal forces of the military and naval defence
of Australia.
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At the next meeting of colonial representatives in Adelaide in 
1897, proceedings again commenced with the endorsement of basic 
principles before the discussion of detail commenced. The principle of 
free trade, slightly altered, now appeared as the fifth principle.'*'
That the trade and intercourse between the Federated Colonies,
whether by land of sea, shall become and remain absolutely 
2free.
In the translation of the general principle to a specific 
provision, little change of form occurred. The first draft of the 
Constitution submitted to the 1891 Convention by the drafting Committee 
incorporated a specific provision (as cl 8 of Chapter IV) in these 
terms
So soon as the Parliament of the Commonwealth has imposed uniform 
duties of Customs, trade and intercourse throughout the 
Commonwealth, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean
3navigation, shall be absolutely free.
The Convention approved the clause with little discussion^.
Various minor changes took place in the form of this provision over 
the years before it appeared as s92. The suitability of the formula 
"absolutely free" was queried at some stages and some alternative 
formulae were proposed. None were accepted and no change took place at 
any stage in the key words "absolutely free". The apprehensions
1 There were now five instead of four principles as the 1891 first 
principle about State continuity had been divided into two 
principles, one about continuity of State territory, one about 
continuity of State power.
2 Australasian Federal Convention 1897 (First Session) (hereinafter, 
Adelaide 1897), 17. Also, 395.
3 Sydney 1891, 802.
4 Id. 802.
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that were expressed about the suitability of these words were that they 
were too wide. No change was made to allay these apprehensions. The 
amendments that were proposed were directed to limiting s92 expressly 
to the abolition of (various kinds of) fiscal imposts. Sharwood 
suggests that because nothing was done to allay the apprehensions 
expressed and because the attempted amendments were unsuccessful, it 
might be inferred that s92 was intended to have a very wide 
operation.*
It is apparent, however, when one reads the debates or follows 
their outline in Beasley and/or La Nauze that the majority had a 
similar perception of s92's function to that of the minority which 
sought to amend the provisions. The disagreement between the two 
groups lay in whether or not the provision was sufficiently clear as it 
stood. The failure of the founders to approve any of the proposals to 
replace "absolutely free" with a more specific phrase, seems to be 
attributable to the matters of timing of moving amendments, confusion 
of the general principle with side issues such a liquor control and 
railway rates, personality clashes and in the end the weariness of 
delegates and their impatience to get the job finished.
What then was the clear meaning of "absolutely free"? It
seems fairly clear that the Founders did not intend to incorporate the 
philosophy of laissez-faire as a constitutional principle governing 
inter-State trade. On my survey of the debates there are only two or 
three delegates who equated absolute freedom of inter-State trade with 
anything like laissez-faire freedom. All three were New South 
Welshmen.
1 RL Sharwood, "Section 92 in the Federal Conventions: A Fresh
Appraisal" (1958) 1 MULR 331.
4.
In 1891 while discussing Draft Clause 11 of Chapter IV (a 
provision similar to s99 of the final), Dibbs stated "The clear object 
of inter colonial free trade is to simplify trade in every possible 
shape ...”.*
Next came McMillan, sometime New South Wales Treasurer, who was a
2member of the Finance Committee in 1891 and its Chairman from 1897 
on. In brief statements and interjections he spoke of the freedom 
as being a freedom from the annoyance of government controls.^
The third was Reid. His comments were made in this context. At
Melbourne in 1898, Isaacs moved that the words "from taxation or
restriction" be added after the word "free".^ Reid amongst others
had opposed the amendment on the basis that it was unnecessary and
undesirable to clutter up this little bit of "laymen’s language"
(absolutely free) with legal technicalities when everyone knew it was a
guarantee of "freedom from government interference with equality of 
£intercourse." There was at this stage no hint of laissez-faire.
Isaacs' amendment was defeated. Isaacs indicated his 
disappointment and continued to argue the matter. He made the clear 
tactical error of trying to illustrate the dangers of the fomula by 
reference to the question of railway rates.^ This topic was only
1 Sydney 1891, 835.
2 La Nauze Op Cit 72-73.
3 La Nauze Op Cit 78-79.
4 Adelaide 1897, 877, 1148; Australasian Federal Convention (Second 
Session) 1897 (hereinafter Sydney 1897, 1021-1022.
5 Australasian Federal Convention (Third Session) 1898 (hereinafter 
Melbourne 1898) Volume II, 2365.
6 Melbourne 1898 Volume II, 2367. Emphasis added.
7 Melbourne 1898 Volume II, 2368ff.
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of  d i r e c t  c o n c e r n  t o  New South  Wales  and V i c t o r i a  i n  t h e i r  c o m p e t i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  t r a d e  of s o u t h e r n  p a r t s  of  New South  Wales which  were c l o s e r  
t o  Melbourne  t h a n  Sydney .  The t o p i c  had a l r e a d y  t a k e n  up a g r e a t  d e a l  
of  t im e  and t o  r e i n t r o d u c e  t h i s  p a r o c h i a l  i s s u e  a round  m id n i g h t  a t  t h e  
end of  a l o n g  day  was n o t  t h e  b e s t  way t o  move d e l e g a t e s  t o  r e - e x a m i n e  
t h i s  p r o v i s i o n .  I t  was a t  t h i s  s t a g e  t h a t  Reid made h i s  r e l e v a n t  
comment. He was a n s w e r i n g  I s a a c s '  p o i n t  t h a t  a s  s92  s t o o d  i t  might  
c a t c h  any a t t e m p t s  by V i c t o r i a  t o  l u r e  New South  Wales t r a d e  a c r o s s  
t h e  b o r d e r  by s e t t i n g  low r a i l w a y  r a t e s  f rom s o u t h e r n  New South  Wales 
t o  Melbourne  bu t  a l l o w  New South  Wales t o  d i s c o u r a g e  t r a d e  from l e a v i n g  
t h e  S t a t e  by s e t t i n g  low r a t e s  f rom  s o u t h e r n  New South  Wales t o  Sydney.  
Reid d e fe n d e d  t h e  r i g h t  of  a S t a t e  t o  p r o v i d e  cheap  even  f r e e  r a i l w a y  
t r a n s p o r t  t o  keep  t r a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e .
" I t  may be v e r y  h a r d  on you bu t  c e r t a i n l y  we canno t  c a l l  i t  
f o r e i g n  t o  t h e  s p i r i t  of  a c l a u s e  which  was d e s i g n e d  t o  make t r a d e  
and i n t e r c o u r s e  a s  e a s y  as  p o s s i b l e . When t h e  o r d i n a r y  r u l e s  of  
human c o m p e t i t i o n  a r e  b e i n g  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h ,  t h e y  c a n n o t  be 
i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  u n d e r  a c l a u s e  which i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  make them as  
f r e e  and a s  u n t r a m m e l l e d  as  p o s s i b l e . " ^
T h is  s t a t e m e n t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  s t a t e m e n t  anywhere  i n  t h e
Deba tes  t h a t  s92  was i n t e n d e d  t o  f r e e  t r a d e r s  f rom  government
r e s t r i c t i o n  p e r  s e . There  i s  no need  t o  a n a l y s e  t h i s  d i c t u m  from 
2
R e id .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t  i t  was an i s o l a t e d  s t a t e m e n t ,  a s  were t h e  
s t a t e m e n t s  of  Dibbs and M cM il lan .
1 Melbourne  1898 Volume I I , 2371.
2 In i t s  p u r e  fo rm  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  would no t  a l l o w  gove rnm en ts  t o  
s u b s i d i s e  p r i v a t e  t r a d e r s .  The p a s s a g e  i s  a l s o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
r e c o n c i l e  w i t h  R e i d ' s  own s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  s92  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
e q u a l i t y  of  t r a d e .
6.
There was undoubtedly support for the general tenets of laissez- 
faire amongst some of those present at the Convention. The clearest 
exmple is provided by an outburst of rhetoric by Parkes at the 1891 
Convention. Under consideration at the time was the Commonwealth’s 
taxation power. Parkes offered this comment to defuse opposition to 
federation on the grounds that it would mean double taxation.
Now, I am tempted, at the risk of possible being accused of 
performing an unnecessary task, to ask what really is government? 
Government, I apprehend, on any just, honest, not to say any
philosophical basis, is a contrivance which is found necessary
in a community of men to protect their rights, and property, and
their liberty, to enforce their laws, and to repress crime; and
whatever form this government assumes, the true principle is to 
call upon the people for whom this government is necessary, in 
the form of taxation, for just such sacrifices as may be necessary 
to support it. I am one of those who hold it to be a fundamental 
wrong to impose burdens upon a free people for any purpose 
whatever than the purpose of sustaining necessary institutions 
under a settled government; and in that case the taxes should be 
raised in the manner most consistent with liberty, the manner 
which will least interfere with the free activity of the citizens, 
and the manner which will be least oppressive as a pecuniary 
burden.^
Whether or not this recital of the libertarian’s creed was met with 
thunderous applause or embarrassed silence does not appear from the 
record of the debates. Parkes was in the habit of launching into 
grandiloquent generalities. Professor Geoffrey Sawer reports that in 
argument before the Privy Council, Barwick informed their Lordships
1 Sydney 1891, 315. Emphasis added.
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that Parkes had named his son Cobden.^ (Cobden was a prominent 
libertarian who had extended his hospitality to Parkes during Parkes’ 
lecture tour of Britain in 1860-1861).^ The mere fact that Parkes 
hoped the Commonwealth would be guided by libertarianism does not mean 
that the Convention as a whole or even Parkes himself intended the 
Constitution to incorporate such a nebulous doctrine as a permanent 
limitation on government action, and does not mean, in particular, that 
s92 was intended to incorporate such a doctrine.
Well then what exactly did the delegates have in mind when they 
agreed to absolute freedom of inter-State trade? The delegates often 
used the expression "free trade" when talking about bounties and 
railway rates. In those contexts it was used inter-changeably with 
"equality of trade" and seemed to mean that the position of traders in 
one State relative to traders in other States was to be free from 
artificial distortions of competitive relationships.
In the specific context of s92 the introduction of inter-State 
free trade and the abolition of border customs duties were frequently 
treated as being synonymous. La Nauze argues with force that the 
freeing of inter-State trade from fiscal imposts was all that some 
delegates, including Sir Samuel Griffith, intended by s92. La Nauze 
argues that in the usage of the times the phrase absolute freedom meant 
a freedom from all taxes on entry of goods into a State and was to be 
contrasted with a mere freedom from protectionist taxes which would 
allow States to tax the entry of goods for which there was no local 
competitor.
1 G Sawer, Cases on the Constitution of Australia (3rd ed) 272.
2 A Martin, Henry Parkes (Great Australians), 12.
3 Op Cit 76.
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There are, on the other hand, clear indications that some of the 
delegates considered that the formula "absolutely free" would catch 
non-fiscal restrictions on entry of goods into a State as well.
Beasley concludes after his review of the Conventions and compatibly 
with that review of the Conventions,
"that section 92, read correctly in its context, does no more than 
reinforce the conversion of six separate economic units into one 
and ensures the operation therein of the contemporary concept of 
free trade; and that its prohibition of interference with the 
concept extends solely to such measures, federal or State, as 
would necessarily or deliberately threaten that economic unit 
which the founders of federation in Australia had resolved to 
establish"*
Beasley does not limit s92 to fiscal imposts. Indeed the economic 
union of the nation would be fairly vulnerable if States could simply 
prohibit the producers of other States from competing with the local 
producers. My own impression is similar to that of Beasley’s. Section 
92 was not confined to fiscal imposts. Fiscal imposts on inter-State 
movement were the main mischief sought to be remedied by s92 but most 
delegates also clearly had in mind the abolition of artificial 
impediments to inter-State competition. This also explains the failure 
of the attemped amendments, none of which were appropriate to maintain 
such a principle.
1 Op Cit 440. Emphasis added.
Appendix VI
Barwick's record as counsel in s92 cases
From his first appearance in a case depending on the meaning of 
s92 in Gratwick v Johnson (1945) 70 CLR 1, until his last appearance 
in a s92 case in Pioneer Express Pty Ltd v South Australia (1958) 99 
CLR 227, Barwick was involved in fourteen such cases in the High Court. 
He went to the Privy Council for the appeals against two of these High 
Court decisions and in another case where he had not been involved 
before the High Court he appeared in the Privy Council appeal.
In every one of these cases Barwick supported the submission that 
s92 prevented the legislation validly operating. The argument 
prevailed in all of the appearances except for four in the High Court. 
The cases are listed below. That list shows that the High Court 
decided unanimously no less than ten times.
The only case where Barwick was associated with defending 
legislation subject to attack on the basis of s92 was the Communist 
Party Case in 1950 (1950) 83 CLR 1, where the Commonwealth legislation 
Barwick was defending was held invalid on grounds unrelated to s92. 
Apart from the Communist Party Case which did not turn on s92, the 
cases which involved Commonwealth legislation, were Gratwick, Airways 
and the Bank Nationalisation Case (Barwick’s first three s92 cases), 
the Privy Council appeal for the Bank Nationalisation Case and Wilcox 
Mofflin involving co-operative Commonwealth/State legislation.
Barwick’s successes were, in chronological order,
Gratwick v Johnson (1945) 70 CLR 1 where Barwick was with Maughan KC 
who presented the argument to the Court. 5/0 (the division of the 
Court). In all other cases in the list of successes, Barwick presented 
the argument to the Court.
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Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (The 
Airways Case) (1945) 72 CLR 29; 5/0.
Bank Nationalisation Case (High Court) (1948) 76 CLR 1; 4/2.
Field Peas Marketing Board (Tasmania) v Clements and Marshall Pty Ltd 
(1948) 76 CLR 414; The Court divided 2/2 with the result that the 
decision of Williams J which had been appealed from stood.
Bank Nationalisation Case (Privy Council) (1949) 79 CLR 497.
Cam & Sons Pty Ltd v Chief Secretary of New South Wales (1951) 84 CLR 
442; 5/1.
Queen v Wilkinson; Exp. Brazell, Garlick and Coy (1952) 85 CLR 467;
6/ 0.
Wilcox Mofflin Limited v State of New South Wales [No 1] (1952) 85 CLR 
488; 5/1 (in relation to a prohibition on the sale of unapproved 
skins).
Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [No 1] (1954) 93 CLR 
1; [1955] AC 241; Privy Council (Barwick not appearing in the High 
Court (1953) 87 CLR 40.)
Ant ill Ranger & Company Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Motor Transport 
(1955) 93 CLR 83; 7/0.
Commissioner for Motor Transport v Antill Ranger & Company Pty Ltd 
(1955) 94 CLR 177; [1956] AC 527 Privy Council.
Barton v Commissioner for Motor Transport (1957) 97 CLR 633; 4/2. 
Pioneer Express Pty Ltd v State of South Australia (1958) 99 CLR 227;
6/0.
3.
Barwick’s losses were, in chronological order,
Carter v The Potato Marketing Board (1951) 84 CLR 460; 6/0.
Wilcox Mofflin Limited v State of New South Wales (1952) 85 CLR 488;
4/2 (in relation to requirement that hides be submitted for appraisal 
and to compulsory acquisition of all hides other than those intended 
or required for inter-State trade).
Wragg v State of New South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 353; 7/0.
Grannall v C Geo Kelleway & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 36 where the 
argument was apparently presented by JK Manning QC. The s92 submission 
was rejected 5/0 but the Court held for Manning’s (and Barwick's) 
client on other grounds.
Appendix VII
Voting patterns on s92 issues in Barwick’s High Court
The table set out below shows the voting on decisions turning on 
s92, in cases on which Barwick sat. Barwick CJ held s92 to be 
applicable 25 times and inapplicable 5 times (a ratio fo 5 to 1). In 
the same sample, the Court as a whole (including Barwick CJ) held s92 
to be applicable 14 times and inapplicable 16 times (a ratio of 
approximately 1 to 1).
Barwick CJ and the majority
Barwick CJ was in the majority on 19 occasions and in dissent on 
11 occasions (a ratio of almost 2 to 1). Only 8 of the 30 decisions 
were unanimous. (Compare Appendix VI dealing with issues which Barwick 
argued as counsel before the High Court. Two thirds of those decisions 
were unanimous).
When the Barwick Court divided, Barwick was in the minority as 
often as he was in the majority (11 times each). On 7 of the occasions 
when Barwick CJ was in the majority in a divided court there was only 
one dissenter. McTiernan J was the sole dissenter 4 times and Murphy J 
thrice. On the other side<of the 11 occasions when Barwick CJ was in 
the minority he was the sole dissenter 4 "imes. These three were the 
only sole dissenters in the sample.
Barwick’s vote only determined the outcome twice. On issue 5(b) 
his vote was needed for a 3/2 majority. On issue 25 with the Court 
divided 3/3, his casting vote as Chief Justice determined the outcome. 
(It might also be said that his vote determined the outcome of issue 
19(a) where Barwick ws in a 4/2 majority. If he had voted with the 
dissenters to make a 3/3 split his vote would have determined the 
result.
These results indicate that Barwick CJ was not closely identified 
with the mood of the Court as a whole. A comparison of Barwick’s 
voting with the voting of individual judges makes the point clearer.
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Barwick and i n d i v i d u a l  j u d g e s
The p o i n t  h a s  a l r e a d y  been  made t h a t  Barwick  CJ, M cTie rnan  and 
Murphy J J  were t h e  s p e c i a l i s t  d i s s e n t e r s .  There  were 11 i s s u e s  on 
which  b o t h  Barwick  CJ and McTie rnan  J  were i n v o l v e d .  McTie rnan  J  h e l d  
s92  t o  be i n a p p l i c a b l e  i n  e v e r y  c a s e .  Barwick  CJ h e l d  s92  t o  be 
a p p l i c a b l e  f o r  9 of  t h o s e  i s s u e s .  There  was an i d e n t i c a l  p a t t e r n  f o r  
i s s u e s  on which  b o t h  Barwick  CJ and Murphy J  v o t e d .
McTie rnan  and Murphy J J  a r e  c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e s e  f i g u r e s  
as  e x t r e m e  i n  t h e i r  c o n s i s t e n t  p a t t e r n  of  v o t i n g  a g a i n s t  s 9 2 fs 
a p p l i c a t i o n .  Barwick  CJ was a t  t h e  o p p o s i t e  e x t r e m e .  Excep t  f o r  Walsh 
and A i c k i n  J J ,  e v e r y  o t h e r  j u d g e  i n  t h i s  sample v o t e d  f o r  s 9 2 ’s 
a p p l i c a t i o n  l e s s  f r e q u e n t l y  (on t h e  i s s u e s  on which b o t h  t h e y  and 
Barwick  CJ v o t e d )  t h a n  d i d  Barwick  CJ.  The two e x c e p t i o n s ,  Walsh and 
A i c k i n  J J ,  e a c h  a g r e e d  w i t h  Barwick  CJ on e a ch  i s s u e  on which t h e y  
v o te d  i n  t h e  s a m p l e .  There  was no o c c a s i o n  t h r o u g h  t h e  sample when 
any ju d g e  v o t e d  f o r  s 9 2 ' s  a p p l i c a t i o n  when Barwick  CJ d i d  n o t  a l s o .
Whose Cour t  was i t ?
T a y l o r  J  ( n e v e r  i n  d i s s e n t  i n  10 c a s e s )  and Menzies  J  (2 d i s s e n t s  
ou t  of  17 c a s e s )  do m in a te d  t h e  m a j o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of  
B a r w i c k ’s j u d i c i a l  c a r e e r .  T a y l o r  J  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  Barwick  CJ more 
o f t e n  t h a n  he a g r e e d  w i t h  him and M enz ies  J  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  Barwick CJ 
a lm o s t  a s  o f t e n  a s  he  a g r e e d  w i t h  him.
In  t h e  second  h a l f  of  B a r w i c k ' s  C h ie f  J u s t i c e s h i p  Gibbs J  ( n e v e r  
i n  d i s s e n t  f o r  f o r  14 i s s u e s )  and Mason J  (once  i n  d i s s e n t  i n  12 
d e c i s i o n s )  d om ina ted  t h e  m a j o r i t i e s .  The b a r e  a g r e e / d i s a g r e e  f i g u r e s  
t e n d  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  Barwick  was more i n  a g re e m e n t  w i t h  t h e s e  j u d g e s .  
Gibbs J  a g r e e d  w i t h  Barwick  f o u r  t i m e s  as  o f t e n  as  no t  and Mason J  
a g r e e d  more o f t e n  t h a n  d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  B a rw ick .  (The b a r e  f i g u r e s  do 
no t  r e v e a l  t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l  d i s a g r e e m e n t  be tw een  Barwick  CJ and Mason 
J  on t h e  k i n d  of  f r e e d o m  g u a r a n t e e d  by s 9 2 . )
3V o tin g  b e h a v io u r
V oting  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  -  Does s92  p r e v e n t  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  
a p p ly i n g  -  Yes o r  No? (Only c a s e s  on w hich  B arw ick  CJ s a t  a r e  i n c l u d e d . )
3 YES YES YES YES YES YES M5/0
4 YES NO NO NO NO NO D l /4
5a NO NO NO NO NO NO M5/0
b YES YES NO NO YES YES M3/2
6 YES NO NO NO NO NO D l /4
7 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO M6/0
8 YES NO YES YES YES YES M4/1
9 YES NO YES YES YES YES M4/1
C o n t in u e d
4Voting behaviour - cont M
ISS BAR McT KIT TAY MZS WIN OWN WSH GIB STE MAS JAC MUR AI WSN;'MAJ M/D 
NO*
10 YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES M6/1
11 YES NO NO NO NO NO Dl/4
12 YES NO NO NO NO YES NO D2/4
13 YES NO NO NO YES YES NO NO D3/4
14 YES YES YES YES YES YES M5/0
15 YES YES YES YES YES YES M5/0
16 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO M6/0
17 YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES M5/2
18 YES NO YES YES YES YES YES M5/1
19a YES YES YES YES NO NO YES M4/2
b YES YES YES YES YES NO YES M5/1
Continued
5V o tin g  b e h a v io u r  -  c o n t 'd
ISS
NO*
BAR McT KIT TAY MZS WIN OWN WSH GIB STE MAS JAC MUR AI WSN'MAJ M/D
I
20 YES NO NO NO NO NO NO D l/5
21 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO M6/0
22 YES YES YES YES NO YES YES M5/1
23a YES YES NO NO NO NO D 2/3
b YES YES NO NO NO NO D 2/3
24 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO M6/0
25 YES YES NO NO NO YES YES M3/3
26 YES NO NO NO NO YES NO D2/4
27 YES YES YES YES NO YES YES M5/1
( i ) ( i i i )
YES 25/ 
/NO 5
0 /
11
3/
4
2/
8
6 /
11
7 /
5
6 /
5
4 /
1
8/
6
8 /
6
6 /
6
4 /
6
0 /
11
4 /
1
0 /
0
14/YES 
1 6NO
( i i ) ( i v )
A/ 2/ 4 / 4 / 9 / 9 / 7 / 5 / 11/ 11/ 7 / 6 / 2/ 5 / 0 / 19M/
D 9 3 6 8 4 5 0 3 3 5 4 9 0 0 11D
6 .
( i )  The number of  t i m e s  t h e  j u d g e  h e l d  s 9 2  a p p l i c a b l e  ( Y e s ) ,  t o  t h e  
number of  t i m e s  he h e l d  s92  i n a p p l i c a b l e  (No).
( i i )  The number of  t i m e s  t h e  j u d g e  a g r e e d  w i t h  Barwick  CJ (A) t o  t h e  
number of  t i m e s  he d i s a g r e e d  (D) w i t h  B a rw ic k  CJ.
( i i i )  Whether  t h e  m a j o r i t y  h e l d  S92 a p p l i c a b l e  (Yes)  or  i n a p p l i c a b l e  
(No).
( i v )  Whether  Barwick  CJ was i n  m a j o r i t y  (M) or  d i s s e n t  (D) and what t h e  
d i v i s i o n  of  t h e  C our t  was .
* I s s u e  No
In  most  c a s e s  o n l y  one law i s  c h a l l e n g e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of  s 9 2 .
For  t h o s e  c a s e s  o n l y  a r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  c a s e  i s  g i v e n .  In  some c a s e s  
t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  one p r o v i s i o n  d e p e n d i n g  f o r  v a l i d i t y  on t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  s 9 2 .  For  such  c a s e s ,  a b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r o v i s i o n s  
i s  g i v e n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  c a s e  r e f e r e n c e ,  so a s  t o  be a b l e  t o  a t t r i b u t e  
t h e  v o t i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n s .
I s s u e  No.
1 Deacon v M i t c h e l l  ( 1965)  112 CLR 353.
2 Webb v S t a g g  (1965)  112 CLR 374.
3 J a c k s o n  v Horne (1965)  114 CLR 82.
4 Harpe r  v V i c t o r i a  (1966)  114 CLR 361.
5 O ' S u l l i v a n  v M i r a c l e  Foods (SA) P ty  Ltd (1966)  115 CLR 177
( a )  L a b e l l i n g  of  M a r g a r i n e  a s  M a r g a r i n e
(b )  P r o b i t i n g  s a l e  of  m a r g a r i n e  w i t h o u t  a r r o w r o o t .
6 Tamar Timber  T r a d i n g  Co P ty  Ltd v P i l k i n g t o n  (1968)  117 CLR 353.
7 Damjanovic  & Sons P ty  Ltd v Commonwealth (1968)  117 CLR 390.
8 A l l i e d  I n t e r s t a t e  (Q ld )  Pty  Ltd v B a rnes  (1968)  118 CLR 581.
9 R o a d a i r  P ty  Ltd v W i l l i a m s  (1968)  118 CLR 644.
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Issue No. Cont.
10 Ward (J & J) Pty Ltd v Williams (1969) 119 CLR 318.
11 Samuels v Readers Digest Association Pty Ltd (1969) 120 CLR 1.
12 Associated Steamships Pty Ltd v Western Australia (1969) 120 CLR 
92.
13 SOS (Mowbray) Pty Ltd v Mead (1971) 124 CLR 520.
14 Brambles Holdings Limited v Pilkington (1972) 126 CLR 524.
15 Holloway v Pilkington (1972) 127 CLR 391.
16 Mikasa (NSW) Pty Ltd v Festival Stores (1972) 127 CLR 617.
17 Pilkington v Frank Hammond Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 124.
18 Northeastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority (NSW)
(1975) 134 CLR 559.
19 Perre v Pollitt (1975) 135 CLR 139
(a) Packing fruit for sale
(b) Prohibition on taking delivery of fruit.
20 Buch v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110.
21 HC Sleigh Pty Ltd v South Australia (1977) 136 CLR 475.
22 Finemores Transport Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1978) 139 CLR 
338.
23 Clark King & Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978( 140 CLR
120.
(a) Compulsory acquisition
(b) Prohibition of sale.
24. Bartters Farms Pty Ltd v Todd (1978) 139 CLR 499.
Commonwealth legislation was under challenge with issues 7 and 
16 and co-operative Commonwealth and State action was under 
challenge with issues 23(a) and (b). All other issues concerned 
State laws.
There are three other s92 cases involving Barwick CJ which do not 
fit into this yes/no voting breakdown. In the case of Rogers v Jordan 
(1965) 112 CLR 580, Barwick CJ held regulations under challenge to be 
ultra vires then empowering Act and made no comment on the s92
challenge. Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ all held the 
regulations to be intra vires and compatible with s92.
8.
In Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 32 ALR 1, Barwick 
CJ was the only member of the Court in favour of holding legislation 
to be inconsistent with s92 at that stage of proceedings. Gibbs, 
Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ all considered that no conclusion 
of invalidity could be made until an opportunity to bring evidence had 
been given. Neither of these cases weakens the force of the comments 
made above on the trends in the general voting patterns. Indeed the 
Uebergang decision reinforces the description of Barwick CJ as an 
extremist.
In the third case, Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty 
Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, Barwick CJ and Aickin J held that 
there was no offence to s92 in the Commonwealth exercising statutory 
powers, controlling the import of goods from abroad, for the purpose of 
preventing inter-Btate trade using those goods (ld_: 61, 107 
respectively). The case did not, however, depend on s92. The issue 
was whether the Commonwealth had bound itself to exercise its statutory 
powers to control imports in that way. Barwick CJ and Aickin J 
considered that it had, but the majority, Gibbs, Mason and Murphy JJ 
held that it had not. Mason J suggested that any attempt to subject 
the Commonwealth to an obligation to exercise controls over imports 
from abroad so as to prevent inter-State trade could run into the 
"shoals" of s92 (Id: 70) This reluctance, on account of s92, on the 
part of Mason J to countenance the existence of the obligation which 
Barwick CJ and Aickin J (dissenting) found to exist and found to be 
compatible with s92 is the nearest that we can find of any of Barwick 
CJ’s brethren being willing to give s92 a wider operation than that 
which Barwick CJ supported.
(Murphy J commented that although on his view s92 would not be 
relevant, he was willing to make an implication into the Consitution 
of a freedom of movement which might be relevant to such exercises of 
Commonwealth power Id: 86-87.)
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